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Dedication 
Ms. Janet Hall, who passed away in late January 2009, was an early supporter and 
contributor to the REIL Network. Ms. Hall, a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer, 
Vice President at Westinghouse Corporation, and Counselor to the U.S. Trade 
Representative, spent much of her professional career immersed in the policy issues 
that influenced economic development strategies, energy use – both conventional 
and renewable, and international trade. As a Senior Policy Advisor to the 
International Bioenergy Initiative at the United Nations Foundation, Janet was a 
tireless advocate for bringing solutions to people with problems. Janet knew the 
power of contacts and engagement among a variety of people – in fact, she 
recognized that “network” was a verb long before the IT revolution – and that 
revolution only brought her in closer contact with people she knew who could share 
ideas, policy perspectives and best practices anywhere in the world. Engaging in the 
REIL Network was an early priority for her, and it has led to any number of formal 
and informal sessions that have produced new insights and highlighted best practices 
among a variety of players in this transformative international dialogue. All of us who 
knew her miss her wit, cogent insights, and guidance very much – and for that reason 
we are dedicating this volume to her memory. 
Melinda Kimble, United Nations Foundation 
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Preface 
Brad Gentry observed a few years ago that we by design do not attempt to fit our 
work to a pre­existing structure or paradigm but rather let the purpose and form 
“magically evolve as we do this dance of a network....” 
So far, we feel, the intention has worked and allowed for outcomes we could not 
have planned in advance. 
This year, therefore, we decided to have the volume reflect both the diversity of our 
eclectic band and its cohesion. This volume is meant as a forum for the ongoing 
expression of the individual thoughts of the members – but also hopes to be a 
reflection of the content of the group mind. 
To express the varying forms of output, we divided the book into 4 sections: 
1) essays and thought pieces by REIL; 2) analyses we requested of our own 
members; 3) analyses contracted by external organizations; and 4) pieces written by 
group members for other publications. All the opinions expressed herein reflect only 
those of the authors. Furthermore, REIL members belong to the group as individuals 
and not as representing any organization or entity. 
I am incredibly grateful for the members of the group, for the fact that we get to 
work together and for the work we do together. 
ºIt means a great deal to me to dedicate this volume to one of the first members of 
our group, Janet Hall. I met her in 2005 at a hearing of the International Trade 
Commission. We were instant colleagues and friends! To a lovely, kind, thoughtful 
woman, whom we all miss very much. Her energy and spirit will always be part of 
REIL and our work. 
Leslie 
Leslie Parker 
Director, REIL 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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Foreword 
Brad Gentry, Director, Yale Center for Business and the Environment 
James Cameron, Founder and Vice Chairman, Climate Change Capital 
Leslie Parker, Managing Director, REIL 
Martijn Wilder, Partner, Head of Global Climate 
Change and Environmental Markets Practice, Baker & McKenzie 
Rachel Maxwell, Deputy Director, REIL 
Richard Saines, Partner, Head of North American Practice, Global Climate 
Change and Environmental Markets Practice, Baker & McKenzi 
To the participants of REIL/REEEP/Yale Roundtables and to the Governing Board of 
REEEP and to REIL: 
This publication is a further compilation of much of the work REIL has done to date 
focusing on clean energy and climate change law, policy, and finance. REIL arose out 
of a “think piece” for the IEA Renewable Energy Working Party, in the run­up to the 
September 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development – at which Prime 
Minister Tony Blair launched REEEP. 
The past year, 2009, has seen a continued concerted focus on stimulus and private 
investment in clean energy despite the economic downturn. It saw further public 
finance and development of domestic laws to drive investment in renewable energy 
with many countries now endorsing industry development through government­
backed measures that include, among others, feed­in tariffs, government loans and 
grants and renewable energy targets. This past year ended on a somewhat muted note 
with the achievement of the Copenhagen Accord – a modest, albeit important step 
forward, which for the first time establishes specific targets for major developing and 
developed countries and a desired objective to limit global temperature rise to below 
2 degrees Celsius. Whether Copenhagen will ultimately be viewed as a watershed 
moment is yet to be determined. However it is clear that Copenhagen and its 
aftermath will impact the future strategies for growth of the global renewable energy 
markets. The success and failure of Copenhagen presents an important opportunity 
to the climate change and clean energy community, as it reflects on what remain and 
will be the best ways to catalyze the low carbon economy going forward – building 
on work being done on all levels – international, regional, national, subnational, and 
local. The challenges of achieving global consensus on this point highlight the 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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imperative to ensure that any policies that are adopted at any level of government 
align with and leverage off of economic realities. 2009 has reminded us that the long­
term, sustained financing toward scaled low­carbon solutions will be achieved only if 
it is underpinned by clear, long­term and economically robust policy systems. The 
policies and actions that make clean energy development the rational economic 
decision are going to be the ones that deliver the scale needed to solve the climate 
problem. 
This Yale publication and our Roundtables are outputs of REIL’s mission to both 
provide content for and to foster the dialogue between these various allies, to help 
stakeholders move from silos to systems in order to accelerate the international shift 
to clean energy. 
As we have said before, we are very grateful to have all of you as our partners in 
what has been a rewarding and fun endeavor to date. We look forward to continuing 
to work with you and thank you sincerely for both the keen insights and 
thoughtfulness that you have brought to the table! 
Sincerely, 
Leslie, Martjin, Rick, James, Brad, Rachel 
“The currents and eddies of right and wrong, I can’t navigate.
 
I’m no voyager. But in the thickets of the law, there I am a forester. . .
 
This country’s planted thick with laws . . . and if you cut them down,
 
d’you really think you could stand upright in the
 
winds that would blow then?”
 
— Thomas More on the importance of the 
rule of law in Robert Bolt’s play, A Man for All Seasons 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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Introduction
 
Mark Nicholls 
Editor, Environmental Finance 
How different things look in 2010 for renewable energy advocates. Last year, in the 
run­up to the Copenhagen climate talks, hopes were high that the world was 
approaching a tipping point. As momentum built ahead of the ‘make­or­break’ 
negotiations, many argued that progress towards an ambitious post­2012 
international climate change agreement would drive dramatic investment into 
renewable energy and other low­carbon technologies. 
Enough ink has been spilt about those two fractious – and profoundly 
disappointing – weeks for me not to need to rehearse the arguments here. Suffice to 
say, the conclusion of a legally binding global treaty to extend or replace the Kyoto 
Protocol looks as far off now as at the conclusion of the Copenhagen talks. 
Negotiators are already playing down expectations for the next set of negotiations, to 
take place in Cancún, Mexico, in December. 
And, in sharp contrast to the second half of 2009, climate change has slipped 
significantly down the global agenda. It is perhaps inevitable that the intense media 
interest ahead of Copenhagen could not be sustained, but the issue’s prominence has 
also suffered from the ‘Climategate’ controversy, where climate change sceptics have 
seized upon leaked emails to claim that climate change scientists have misled their 
peers and the public about the degree of global warming that can be observed. 
Furthermore, with the industrialised world struggling to emerge from the greatest 
economic convulsion since the Second World War, it is proving difficult to make the 
case for generous government support for low­carbon technologies. All this is 
conspiring to generate significant headwinds for those seeking to promote renewable 
energy around the globe. 
But while those in the climate change and clean energy communities may not be 
basking at the centre of the world’s attention this year, as last, the outlook for 
renewable energy and low­carbon development is not as grim as many suppose. 
For a start, as many commentators have noted, Copenhagen could have been 
judged a success before the first negotiator set foot in the city’s Bella Centre. The lead­
up to the talks generated unprecedented policy development, especially in the major 
fast­developing economies where, frankly, the battle against climate change will be 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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won or lost. China and India, especially, have introduced far­reaching climate change 
policies, with significant targets for increasing renewable energy penetration and 
improving energy efficiency. 
Second, commitments among most industrialised economies remain intact. While 
the EU did not feel able to move from a 20 percent greenhouse gas reduction target 
to a 30 percent target – as it had promised to do if other industrialised countries 
made similarly ambitious pledges – it has stuck to its stretching 2007 climate and 
energy package. There has been surprisingly little push­back at the policy level against 
the additional costs that are likely to be incurred by the EU’s 2020 renewable energy 
targets. 
Third, the more optimistic commentators are becoming more positive about the 
Copenhagen Accord. Many initially decried it as a toothless, voluntary agreement that 
fell outside the formal UN negotiating process. However, hopes are growing that it 
could prove a useful vehicle to break down the Kyoto barriers between industrialised 
signatories and the developing world. 
Moreover, many observers are coming to the conclusion that a comprehensive, 
top­down agreement along the lines of the Kyoto Protocol may prove to be 
impossible: the implications for energy use and economic development implied by a 
serious effort to control climate change may mean the stakes are simply too high for 
a UN process to handle. 
Nonetheless, and if you’ll pardon the pun, some of the heat has undoubtedly gone 
out of the climate change debate. In certain respects, that will make the job harder for 
some, in terms of garnering the attention of time­poor policy­makers, or the 
investment dollars of agnostic investors. 
In other respects, however, it’s business as usual. Investment will continue to flow 
– but at a lower and more considered velocity. Policy will continue to be made, and 
– and this is where the REIL network’s value is especially to be found – an enormous 
amount of the detail still needs to be elaborated. 
Despite the fads and fancies of the world’s media, the hysteria of the climate 
change sceptics, and today’s relative lack of lip­service from politicians, climate 
change is not going away as an issue, and renewable energy’s growing role in the 
world’s energy mix is assured. 
Indeed, the post­Copenhagen comedown has one clear outcome. The debate 
around the low­carbon economy has returned to being an argument much more 
about economics, rather than environmentalism and ethics. What will drive policy 
and investment over the next few years will be concerns over capturing the low­
carbon economy, rather than saving the world. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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Biosketches of Authors and Editors 
Lisa Alejandro is a Lead International Trade Analyst at the United States International 
Trade Commission. She analyzes trade in services, with particular emphasis on renew­
able energy and financial services. Ms. Alejandro orchestrated a report that examined 
U.S. and foreign markets for renewable energy services (USITC publication Renew­
able Energy Services: An Examination of U.S. and Foreign Markets), and is currently 
working on a study assessing the global competitiveness of U.S. solar and wind power 
service providers. She has written on several other environmental services topics 
(USITC publications Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Services: An 
Examination of U.S. and Foreign Markets; Remediation Services: An Examination of 
U.S. and Foreign Markets; and Air and Noise Pollution Abatement Services: An 
Examination of U.S. and Foreign Markets), as well as on banking and securities serv­
ices in numerous markets including China, Malaysia, Korea, India, Panama, Morocco. 
Ms. Alejandro holds a Bachelors degree in English and a Masters degree in 
International Trade from George Mason University. Prior to working for the U.S. 
International Trade Commission, she conducted trade development assistance in the 
Balkans as a consultant with Booz Allen & Hamilton. 
James Cameron is an Executive Director and Climate Change Capital’s (CCC) Vice 
Chairman. He is responsible for strategic and sector development and represents the 
firm at the highest levels of business and government. 
He is a pre­eminent expert in developing policy responses to climate change. Prior to 
CCC he was Counsel to Baker & McKenzie and was the founder and the head of their 
Climate Change Practice. He has spent much of his legal career working on climate 
change matters, including negotiating the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol as an adviser 
to the Alliance of Small Island States. He has held academic positions at Cambridge, 
London, Bruges and Sydney and is currently affiliated with the Yale Centre for 
Environmental Law and Policy. As a barrister he appeared in several of the leading 
cases in environmental law. 
Mr. Cameron is Chairman and a Trustee Member of the Carbon Disclosure Project, 
Chairman of China Dialogue, a Board Member of the Worldwatch Institute, a treas­
urer of REEEP, a member of Oxfam’s development board and a Senior Advisor to The 
Climate Group. He is a member of the board of GE Ecomagination, a member of the 
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Copenhagen Climate Council, a member of the development board of the Smith 
School and a member of the World Economic Forum’s Climate Council. 
Paul Curnow is one of the world’s leading legal experts on climate change, having 
specialised since 2000 in carbon, renewables, and environmental markets. He advises 
government, multilateral and private sector clients on domestic and international 
climate and renewable energy regulation and policy, cross­border project 
development and financing under the Kyoto Protocol and domestic and regional 
trading schemes, and structured carbon financing deals in OTC and exchange­traded 
markets. Between 2001 and 2004 he was an international climate change negotiator 
with the Australian Government (as part of the Australian Greenhouse Office). A 
partner with Baker & McKenzie since 2007, he is a Visiting Fellow in Environmental 
Markets at the University of New South Wales and Chair of the Australian Working 
Group, Carbon Markets & Investors Association (CMIA). 
Paul Curnow has a masters degree in Public Policy and Environmental Law from the 
Australian National University, where he also obtained his LLB and BA. He has 
published widely in climate change law including as co­editor of Implementing CDM 
Projects: A Guidebook to Host Country Legal Issues, and editor of the CDM and JI 
Rulebooks. 
Henry Derwent became the President and CEO of the International Emissions 
Trading Association (IETA) in February 2008. Previously, as international climate 
change Director for the UK Government, he oversaw the UK’s role in the 
international negotiations, in the G8 (especially as Prime Minister’s special 
representative during the UK G8 Presidency in 2005) and in other forums. He has 
been closely associated with the development of greenhouse gas trading in the UK 
and Europe from its earliest days. He previously had responsibilities for all aspects of 
climate change and sustainable energy in the UK as well as air quality and industrial 
pollution control. Before that, he was an international corporate finance executive at 
a major investment bank. 
Bradford Gentry is the Director of the Yale Center for Business and the Environment, 
as well as a Senior Lecturer and Research Scholar at the Yale School of Forestry & 
Environmental Studies. Trained as a biologist and a lawyer, his work focuses on 
strengthening the links between private investment and improved environmental 
performance. He is also an advisor to GE, Baker & McKenzie, Suez Environnement 
and the UN Climate Secretariat, as well as a member of Working Lands Investment 
Partners and Board Chair for the Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies. He received his 
B.A. from Swarthmore College (Phi Beta Kappa) in 1977 and his J.D. from Harvard 
Law School (Magna Cum Laude) in 1981. 
Colin High is the Chairman and co­founder of Resource Systems Group, Inc, an 
energy environment and transportation consulting firm based in White River 
Junction, Vermont. He is the leader of RSG’s climate and energy group and specializes 
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in lifecycle air emissions modeling in the electric power sector. He has worked on a 
wide range of projects in the environment and energy fields including renewable 
energy, energy efficiency, and carbon accounting. 
Dr. High holds a PhD in Geography and Earth Sciences from the University of Bristol 
in England and for many years taught environmental science at Dartmouth College, 
Columbia University and the University of Ibadan in Nigeria. He also helped develop 
environmental foreign study programs in Kenya and in Russia. 
Debra Jacobson is Co­Director of the Solar Institute at The George Washington 
University (GW), a Research Professor of Energy at GW, and a Professorial Lecturer 
in Energy Law at GW Law School. Since 2001, she also has served as the owner and 
principal of DJ Consulting LLC, a consulting firm specializing in energy and 
environmental issues. 
She has worked on issues involving energy and environmental law and policy for 
more than 30 years, including senior staff positions in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and the U.S. Department of Energy. She currently serves on the 
Strategy Committee for the Department of Energy’s Wind Powering America 
Program, as an Advisor to the Renewable Energy and International Law Project, and 
was a member of the founding Board of Directors of the Women’s Council on Energy 
and the Environment in Washington, D.C. She received her B.A. in Environmental 
Studies from the University of Rochester and her law degree from GW Law School. 
Sean P. Jamieson is an energy attorney with the law firm, Van Ness Feldman, P.C., 
where he primarily provides counsel to clients on matters relating to natural gas, 
electricity, transportation, and energy policy. He has previously worked in a legal 
capacity at Squire Sanders & Dempsey LLP, and as a law clerk to Commissioner Irving 
A. Williamson of the U.S. International Trade Commission. 
Prior to law school, he worked as a corporate governance management consultant at 
a Washington, DC­based consulting firm, in an advisory role for a national brand 
media campaign, and also as an intern at the United Nations headquarters in New 
York. He holds a bachelor’s degree from The George Washington University, where he 
was a presidential academic scholar. He received his juris doctor degree from Howard 
University School of Law and resides in Washington, DC. 
Richard L. Kauffman recently stepped down as the Chief Executive Officer of Good 
Energies, since 2007 having built it during that time into one of the largest investors 
in renewable energy. He led $750MM in equity investments in over 30 renewable 
energy technology companies and solar and wind project developments. He also 
served on the board of Q­Cells, one of the world’s largest producers of solar cells. 
He currently serves as Chairman of the Board of Levi Strauss and was previously a 
Partner of Goldman Sachs, where he was chairman of the Global Financing Group, a 
member of the firm’s Partnership Committee, Commitments Committee, and 
Investment Banking Division Operating Committee. Before joining Goldman Sachs, 
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he was vice chairman of Morgan Stanley’s Institutional Securities Business and co­
head of its Banking Department. 
He is a member of the board of The Brookings Institution, the Yale School of 
Management Board of Advisors, and Co­Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Yale 
Center for Business and the Environment. He is a member of the Council on Foreign 
Relations. 
Melinda Kimble is a senior vice president at the United Nations Foundation, and 
oversees their International Bioenergy Initiative. She joined the UN Foundation in 
May 2000 as Vice President for Programs and worked to develop Foundation 
partnership programs in the areas of Children’s Health; Energy & Climate Change; 
Biodiversity; Peace, Security, and Human Rights; and Women’s Health. Prior to the 
Foundation, Ms. Kimble served as a state department foreign service officer, attaining 
the rank of minister­counselor. She served in policy­level positions in the Bureau of 
Economic and Business Affairs, overseeing multilateral development issues and debt 
policy and in the Bureau of Oceans, International Environment and Scientific Affairs 
(OES), leading environmental negotiations. 
She has served or is serving on several key international boards and commissions, 
including the Board of International Science Organizations for the National Academy 
of Sciences, the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO and the Regional 
Environment Center for Central and Eastern Europe (REC). She also serves as an 
adjunct professor at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. She speaks French 
and Arabic and holds two master’s degrees: Economics (University of Denver) and 
MPA (Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government). 
Rachel Maxwell is the Deputy Director of REIL. She joined REIL in 2005. Rachel 
worked as the Vice President of Maxwell Statistics from 2000 to 2005 and as an 
Independent Education and Administration Consultant. She has worked on analysis 
projects for various organizations, from Microsoft and Xerox to the Early Learning 
Center of Snohomish, WA. Ms. Maxwell has extensive experience as an independent 
editor. She was co­editor of, From Debate to Design: Issues in Clean Energy and 
Climate Change Law and Policy A report on the work of the REIL Network 2007­
2008. She earned her bachelors degree from Bryn Mawr College and is currently 
working on an MBA in Sustainable Business at the Bainbridge Graduate Institute. 
Mark Nicholls is editor of Environmental Finance magazine, which covers the growing 
relevance of environmental and social issues to the financial community and its 
corporate clients. Launched in 1999, Environmental Finance specialises in coverage 
of emerging markets in environmental goods – such as greenhouse gas emissions 
allowances and renewable energy certificates. It also covers socially responsible 
investment, corporate social responsibility, renewables financing and weather 
derivatives. He is also editor of Carbon Finance, a specialist newsletter focusing on 
carbon trading, greenhouse gas emissions management, and the impact of climate 
policies on business and finance. 
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Over the last nine years, he has developed a particular specialty in business and policy 
responses to climate change, specifically in the emerging carbon markets created by, or 
linked to, the Kyoto Protocol. In 2000, he was named Socially Responsible Investment 
Journalist of the Year (trade press), in an award sponsored by Friends Provident. Prior 
to co­founding Environmental Finance, he was the Hong Kong­based Asia editor for 
Risk magazine, which is the leading financial derivatives and risk management 
publication. He has a degree in politics from Durham University and a master’s degree 
in European Politics and Policy from the London School of Economics. 
Robert Nordhaus is a member of the Washington, DC law firm of Van Ness Feldman, 
P.C., where he specializes in energy and environmental regulation. He also serves on 
the adjunct faculty of the George Washington University Law School. He originally 
joined Van Ness Feldman in 1981, after serving three years as the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission’s first General Counsel. He practiced with the firm until 
1993, when he was appointed General Counsel of the Department of Energy by 
President Clinton. He rejoined the firm in 1997. In 1977, prior to his service at FERC, 
he was a member of the Energy Policy and Planning Office in the Carter White 
House. In 1975 and 1976, he was counsel to the House Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce Committee, and from 1963 to 1974, he served in the House Legislative 
Counsel’s Office. He is a graduate of Stanford University and Yale Law School and a 
member of the New Mexico, District of Columbia and Supreme Court bars. 
Leslie Parker is the founder and managing director of REIL (Renewable Energy and 
International Law), an international policy and law network for clean energy, in 
association with the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, the Yale 
Center for Environmental Law and Policy, the Yale Center for Business and the 
Environment, and Baker & McKenzie’s Global Clean Energy and Climate Change 
Practice. REIL is a network of policy makers, business and finance, thought leaders, 
lawyers, and technical experts, addressing policy and law and technical issues arising in 
the mainstreaming of clean energy and the development of the clean energy market. 
REIL was founded in 2003 from a 2002 initiative of the International Energy Agency’s 
(IEA) Renewable Energy Unit where she interned. Prior to that she held various posts 
in New York City government, notably, as division director in the Finance office of the 
Department of Social Services where she was responsible for developing and 
enhancing City revenue and working with the Mayor’s Office on the agency’s 12 billion 
dollar budget, and as an Assistant Director of the budget at the Administration for 
Children’s Services where she oversaw 1.2 billion dollars of the NYC city budget. She 
has a Masters in Art History, and worked for 11 years at the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art, including seven in the Department of European Sculpture and Decorative arts. 
She attended Bryn Mawr College and New York University. 
Richard Saines heads the North American Climate Change and Environmental 
Markets Practice at Baker & McKenzie. He is widely published and globally 
recognized as a leading climate change lawyer, bringing over a decade of experience 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
           256   :            
on climate change law matters advising multinational companies, financial 
institutions, funds and project sponsors on carbon and environmental market 
transactions within the international, regional and voluntary markets. He also advises 
major global corporations on climate change policy, sustainable development and 
global corporate greenhouse gas compliance and management. He is recognized by 
Chambers USA and Chambers Global as a leading climate change lawyer. 
Paul Savage is the CEO of Nextek Power Systems, where he is the architect of the 
company’s IP, financial, and partnering strategy. He is also a Founding Governing 
Member of the Emerge Alliance Corporation, a current Member of the Clinton 
Global Initiative, and a member of the Board of Directors of Winrock International, 
a non­profit entity that seeks to advance and improve the lives of people around the 
world. His experience includes Bond Trading at CS First Boston and risk 
management at Lehman Brothers before joining the start­up operations of 
Caterpillar’s dealership in Vietnam filling 2 roles as the Director of Customer Finance 
and Marketing. He helped grow this green­field start­up to 87 employees, 5 offices and 
$22 million in sales in 2 years. He graduated from Haverford College with a 
Philosophy degree in 1983. 
Martijn Wilder is head of the Baker & McKenzie’s Global Environmental Markets 
(Climate Change) practice. He is regarded as a legal pioneer in the development of 
legal mechanisms and regulations underpinning the emergence of international 
carbon markets. He has been ranked as one of the leading climate change lawyers by 
Chambers Global and is listed among the best lawyers in his field by Best Lawyers 
Australia 2009. He founded serves as chair and/or board member of numerous 
climate change and emissions trading advisory groups and taskforces, including the 
International Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), the 
Carbon Trust (Australia) and the NSW Carbon Markets Taskforce. Martijn is also a 
Professor of Climate Change Law at the Australian National University. 
Mr. Wilder has advised governments and international agencies on the development 
and design of climate change and emissions trading laws, the building of market 
infrastructure and the procurement of carbon assets. He regularly works on 
international carbon transactions and has advised on a broad range of investments 
and fund raisings in, and the establishment of funds for the broader environmental 
markets areas. He continues to be a key adviser to governments and clients on post­
2012 carbon markets and funds and the development of polices and transactions in 
relation to reducing emission from deforestation and degradation (REDD++). He 
has honours degrees in both Economics and Law and a LLM (Master of Laws) from 
the University of Cambridge where he studied as a Commonwealth Trust Scholar. He 
has published widely in the climate change and international law area. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
13  
The Flight from the Rational:
Why Emissions Trading Fell from Grace
and Why It Needs to be Restored 
Henry Derwent, President and CEO
 
International Emissions Trading Association (IETA)
 
On 25 March 2010, the New York Times published an obituary of emissions trading. 
In a piece entitled “Cap and Trade Loses its Standing as Energy Policy of Choice,” 
John Broder set out how, in little over a year, the policy so firmly endorsed by the new 
President Obama was now “in wide disrepute,” and expected that any new legislation 
that crawled out of the Senate would be at best a pale shadow of the muscular 
economy­wide system that had been introduced with such fanfare into the House. 
A week earlier, it was the Economist pronouncing the last rites. In “Cap and Trade’s 
Last Hurrah – The Decline of a Once Widely Popular Idea,” their lead writer spoke of 
it as a 1990s idea, and said that market­based approaches were losing relevance. The 
Economist has also been tracking the difficulties with the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme (carefully named so as to not use the words cap or trade) in Australia as well 
as the tough politics surrounding the issue in the U.S. 
These news items may turn out to look premature if in fact a cap and trade bill 
does manage, despite the odds, to make its way onto the U.S. statute book, and if 
Kevin Rudd’s manipulation of broader Australian election issues clears the way for 
the Australian scheme to take effect. Nevertheless cap and trade as a policy has 
encountered furious and effective resistance not just in those two countries but also 
in Japan and Korea, where the final shape of government plans to introduce serious 
emissions trading systems remains very doubtful. The emissions trading scheme 
introduced in New Zealand has also been the subject of strong criticism and calls for 
its repeal or postponement. Only in Europe has the scheme, introduced with what 
looks with hindsight to have been remarkably little fuss, become a part of the policy 
landscape, even if arguments continue about the level of ambition of the next 
targeted emissions reduction total, about allocation methodology and about a variety 
of more technical issues. 
Why has this happened? Why is a policy widely regarded in the academic 
community as a success where it has been tried suddenly become so contentious? 
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Why has a policy originally intended to reduce costs to industry to a degree regarded 
as suspicious by environmentalists become so unacceptable to industry? Why has a 
market approach invented and proven in the U.S. for regional pollutants become so 
contentious there when it is applied to global ones? 
To answer these questions we need to go through the advantages claimed for 
emissions trading when it was in favour in the U.S. and introduced in the EU. We 
need to see whether there is real evidence that those advantages are illusory or what 
other elements of the case in favour have become politically unacceptable. 
There are perhaps eight reasons why trading seemed such an obviously tailor­
made solution for greenhouse emissions. 
1.	 Governments accepting the need for significant emissions reductions would 
be keen to find low­cost solutions to their obligations. The Kyoto mechanisms 
were constructed precisely in order to allow countries with targets to keep 
their costs down, within the negotiated supplementarity limits. 
2.	 IPCC and other cost data showed clearly that the cost of emissions 
reduction opportunities differed significantly across the globe; on the back 
of these figures, U.S., European and Australian economic models of global 
trading and the use by developed countries of project opportunities in 
lower­cost developing countries showed significant benefits from trading. 
3.	 There was no environmental reason to object to non­domestic locations for 
emissions reductions or to the principle of major polluters offsetting their 
pollution by equivalent amounts of traded or bought project­based 
emissions. It follows from the physical and chemical nature of CO2 and 
other greenhouse gases that it is the total level of emissions, not the location 
on the surface of the globe of the emission sources, that counts. Therefore 
GHGs, being also generally non­noxious around the source of their 
emission, are tailor­made for trading, more so than most other regional or 
local pollutants. 
4.	 Trading was almost universally acknowledged to be the most economically 
efficient means of imposing an emissions reduction target, on the grounds 
that the market will be much better at distributing the undoubted economic 
burden than regulators and the precise distribution (see the points above) 
was a matter of indifference from the perspective of the objective of the 
regulation. 
This is even more the case when there is a bewildering variety of different 
actions and investments possible that have the effect of reducing GHG 
emissions. The notion of a single marginal cost curve, however useful in 
terms of high­level explanation, gives a misleading impression of a priori 
knowledge available to regulators about the investments and sectors where 
action would be most economic at different stages of a national or global 
emissions reduction trajectory. 
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Many economists had earlier said that a tax is preferable to a price. The 
main reason was that the potential economic damage that could be done by 
fluctuating prices was seen as being greater than the benefit to the planet 
achieved by the earlier emissions reduction that could be achieved by 
accepting a fluctuating price. But as there was wider recognition that the 
damage caused by climate change was going to be greater and sooner than 
originally thought, the reason for preferring tax on economic grounds 
diminished. The political arguments against a tax and in favour of flexible 
regulation with an element of trading have, meantime, remained constant. 
5.	 A further reason for supporting trading, implicit in the economic 
advantages referred to in 4 above but worth drawing out on its own, stems 
from the recognition that companies all have their own abatement cost 
curves that can for historic or process reasons be very different from each 
other. Trading allows companies to come to their own “make or buy” 
decisions depending on their own existing capital stock, their own efficiency 
potential, their own cost of capital, and their own competitive and demand 
circumstances. 
Trading recognizes that there may be circumstances where it is economically 
rational for a company to continue to be a major emitter of greenhouse 
gases, and reduces that calculation to a price of carbon below which it makes 
sense to use the market to fulfill regulatory obligations, and above which it 
makes sense to spend money at home in order to keep the net cost of the 
regulatory obligations lowest, and perhaps produce emissions reductions 
that have a sale potential beyond the simple compliance with obligations. 
6.	 Again implicit in both 4 and 5, but worth drawing out because it is so often 
missed or misunderstood, is the temporal flexibility provided by trading. 
The timing of investments is a hugely important part of the investment 
decision, and stranded assets can radically affect companies’ overall 
profitability. It makes perfect sense for a company faced with an emissions 
reduction obligation that requires major capital investment to undertake 
that investment at the time that is economically optimal for the business, 
and use the markets in the meantime to deal with the regulator’s demands. 
Because of point 3 above, the earth’s atmosphere is none the wiser. 
7.	 A global regime needs global standards and global values, and both can 
usually only be achieved by global institutions. This applies as much to 
trading as to any other activity. Without trust in a common set of 
institutions and systems, willingness to trade diminishes and potentially 
expensive market failures prevent the capturing of the economic benefits. 
The UNFCCC system and the Kyoto mechanisms were founded on a 
common set of standards for measuring emissions and monitoring 
emissions reductions, and a common set of institutions – particularly the 
International Transaction Log and the CDM Executive Board – aimed at 
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setting standards for, and keeping the books on, international trading of 
emissions reductions and credits. 
While the day to day efficiency and throughput of the CDM system had 
been a source of complaint by much of the private sector from the very 
start, and the controversies of offsetting as a legitimate route for emissions 
reduction have never entirely gone away, the UN regime was broadly trusted 
by environmental, development and financial stakeholders alike, if only as a 
base on which to build. 
8.	 Finally, flexible trading schemes allow the emissions reductions to be 
captured even when they occur outside the boundaries of the trading 
scheme itself, by allowing the contribution of savings on a project basis. The 
calculation of the baseline from which the project savings are measured, and 
the distribution of the risk that the savings would have occurred anyway, are 
issues that have affected governments’ willingness to make use of supply­
only projects, though both issues are in fact also present in the establishment 
of targets and baselines at sectoral and national economy levels. 
There is also considerable political attraction in extending trading so as to 
make it potentially economically interesting for countries without 
(temporarily or otherwise) formal emissions reduction targets in a global 
scheme. That the economic incentive flows from private sector funds, rather 
than from aid­like funds contributed by developed country governments, 
was seen as another great advantage of global emissions trading. 
§ 
Every one of these reasons for making use of trading has in the past couple of years 
experienced considerable push­back from different groups of stakeholders, often with 
very different motives. It is instructive to consider in each case what the criticisms are, 
where they come from, and why they have grown so strong. 
1.	 Firstly, keeping the cost of emissions reductions low. The premise here, of 
course, is that is accepted that there should be emissions reductions at a 
level that raises the question of keeping the associated costs low at all. 
Unfortunately there is much less political support for this now than before. 
The economic recession increases the volume of the voices who say that the 
climate will just have to wait, and that in a time of economic difficulty the 
most important thing is to eliminate costs wherever possible. This links with 
the familiar, though previously not widely supported, argument that 
economic growth is good for the economy because in time it will lead to 
levels of prosperity such that people will be willing to trade off further 
conventional growth for public goods, including environmental benefits. 
The very companies who would stand to benefit from the introduction of 
the flexibilities of trading feel that they would do better from defending a 
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more forward position – that there should not be serious levels of imposed 
emissions reduction or regulation at all. It is logically inconsistent for them 
then to say much about trading such reductions. 
2.	 Secondly, the availability of lower cost opportunities abroad has been 
counterweighed by growing objections to the idea of doing anything abroad 
that could provide employment, when jobs at home are under pressure. The 
objectors using this argument tend to be those who have always been 
interested in protectionist approaches in times of economic recession – not 
companies but politicians responding to the political impact of recession, 
and organized labour. The degree to which the modern global economy, and 
supply chains used by almost everyone, depend on the use of global 
comparative advantage and global outsourcing, seems to have been 
forgotten. This is part of the anti­globalisation agenda. 
3.	 Third, the scientific reasons for indifference to the location of emissions 
reductions have not been assailed (though other scientific arguments have 
– see below). But the substitutability of emissions reductions abroad has 
come under attack on two fronts, from mainly environmental but also 
development­oriented NGOs and other stakeholders. There has been a 
growing suspicion of the bona fides of emissions reduction projects in 
countries perceived as untrustworthy, and this awakens sympathy from a 
public with an underlying tendency to believe in scams, fanned by a media 
which knows that scams have good news value. 
There has also been some re­emergence among environmental and 
development stakeholders of the argument that offsets or purchases from 
far away are like the purchase of indulgencies – that there is a moral 
obligation on polluting firms to stop polluting, rather than make 
calculations of the economic cost, to the companies concerned or even to 
society, of stopping polluting. This has some public and political traction on 
its own, but usually has to be joined with the suspicion of scams to be truly 
potent. 
4.	 The fourth area – the efficiency of trading – has perhaps seen the greatest 
reverses. This is deeper than the moral outrage over the behaviour of traders 
in other markets, particularly when those markets have failed spectacularly. 
This moral outrage is a deeply­rooted political response from a public 
which does not understand what has happened in those markets and is 
looking for someone to blame. That is naturally amplified by politicians 
who often have little better understanding of which particular aspects of the 
financial market turmoil are blameworthy and which are not, and which 
markets are susceptible to a repeat and which are not. 
But there are rather deeper failures of confidence in trading at work, leading 
to criticisms by politicians, companies and a variety of other stakeholders. 
A series of problems affecting the only example of a full emissions trading 
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system currently in operation, the EU emissions trading scheme, has been 
occurring for some time. Some of them, however, are not really problems 
that can fairly be described as intrinsic to cap and trade. Excess supply in the 
preliminary, experimental phase of the EUETS, leading to a price collapse, 
was caused by poor information, non­harmonised allocation method­
ologies and allocation generosity to some classes of companies subject to the 
EUETS, a short compliance period and the non­availability of banking into 
subsequent periods. Generous free allocations intended to ease in the 
economic changes implicit in the system led to windfall profits. Apparent 
excess supply in the second phase has been caused by the reduction in energy 
use and therefore of carbon emissions owing to the recession, though as a 
result of the availability of banking through to 2020 prices have stayed firm. 
Volatility of prices has been claimed, though the claim does not stand up 
when movements in carbon prices are compared with movements in other 
commodity prices over the same period. Poor security of account­holders’ 
details in unharmonised national details was exploited by fraudsters. Value 
Added Tax frauds have occurred as a result of different tax liability between 
the countries covered by the EUETS. A loophole in the EUETS registration 
regulations allowed some surrendered credits to be recycled, some legally, 
some fraudulently. 
These can be characterised as a bad run of luck for the EUETS or teething 
problems that do not detract from trading per se, but the impression of 
repeated problems has taken its toll of confidence in the scheme. 
Some rather more well­founded criticism has been directed at the low prices 
in the EUETS, clearly insufficient on their own to stimulate investment in 
low­carbon capital goods. Partly because of the low prices, carbon trading 
in the EUETS has appeared to be just a low­value add­on to prices of fossil 
fuels and electricity. A large proportion of trading has occurred in the power 
sector, with industrial companies unwilling to trade, apparently in defiance 
of economic logic. And there is not much policy coherence between the 
intended impact of the carbon price and the many EU regulatory and 
subsidy interventions designed to nudge companies into technologies and 
other investment decisions favoured by regulators and Governments. 
It can be countered that these are all the result of Governmental choices 
made within the framework of the EUETS that are again not the fault of the 
trading system. Furthermore assumptions about what companies should be 
doing to reduce carbon, in particular investing, are not consistent with the 
confidence in market decisions that is an essential part of a trading regime. 
Judged according to the principal objective of the EUETS, which is to 
achieve a given level of emissions reductions, the better view, as confirmed 
by recent full economic analysis of the performance of the scheme, is that 
the targets were unambitious but the EUETS has done what it was asked to 
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do. But again the number and variety of criticisms has left question marks 
over its overall performance, and the process of explanation has left the 
impression of needless complexity. 
Meanwhile the greater importance of a steady emissions reduction 
performance vis a vis a steady price has also been shaken by the recession, 
leading to the resurgence of arguments in favour of tax (which is even said to 
be less complex, though the features such as derogations and phasing leading 
to EUETS complexity are unlikely to be any less politically attractive if the 
imposition of a price is achieved by a tax rather than cap and trade system). 
5 and 6. The fifth and sixth advantages of trading, the flexibility for companies to 
choose whether and when to make or buy emissions reductions, have been 
criticized as part of the rather ill­founded objections to the EUETS record 
of achieving low­carbon investments. Here the criticism comes mainly from 
the environmental side, for whom the availability of alternative means of 
emissions reductions has allowed companies to get away without major new 
expenditure on an immediate fundamental change in investment policy. So 
the argument builds up that these flexibilities must be withdrawn, though it 
does not take much thought to see that the problem here, if there is one, is 
about the level of ambition of emissions reduction targets rather than the 
means available to companies to achieve them. 
7.	 Argument number seven concerns the reliability of the UNFCCC systems in 
providing the basis for a trusted global system of measurement and 
monitoring. The main focus of criticism here is the performance of the 
CDM, objected to by companies and environmental stakeholders alike, but 
for quite contradictory reasons. For many companies, the slow speed, 
opaque processes and poor management of the CDM Executive Board add 
transaction costs and detract from the promised availability of offsets as a 
source of flexibility and reduction in the overall cost of meeting targets. 
For those on the other side of the argument, the continued drip­feed of 
stories about questionable additionality of some projects or types of 
projects, and poor implementation of other safeguards built into the CDM 
process, suggest that far from speeding up and standardizing, the CDM 
needs to be run with ever tighter levels of scrutiny to ensure maximum 
environmental integrity, which is taken as being the most important 
criterion against which to judge the success of the system. 
8.	 Finally, the basis for allowing supply­only injections of offset projects has 
come under increased pressure from Government parties to the UNFCCC 
negotiations, on the grounds that the majority of the developing countries 
that have provided most of the CDM projects so far have now developed 
their economies to such an extent that they ought to take economy­wide or 
sectoral targets themselves rather than continuing to get the benefits that 
accrue to them under the current CDM system. This again is hardly the fault 
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of trading or the principle of offsetting, but rather of the lack of a durable 
and accepted methodology for categorizing countries between those taking 
caps and those only supplying offsets. But the controversy and 
dissatisfaction rub off on the whole international trading system. 
Acting as a background to all these criticisms is the increasing general public 
suspicion of the global emissions reduction enterprise which is engendered by 
increasing stories about holes in the science of climate change, doubt about the 
importance of human activities as a cause of climate change, and therefore decreasing 
confidence in the justification for expensive programmes and policies of which cap 
and trade systems form an important part. Some of this represents wishful thinking 
on the part of the general public about not needing to incur economic costs in a time 
of recession; but some companies and politicians have fed or amplified these 
thoughts by contributing material intended to reignite debates (loved by the media 
because of the attractions of reporting conflicting opinions) which many had 
thought were over for good. The generally heightened uncertainty about climate 
change is fertile soil for criticisms of all emissions reduction policies. 
§ 
The list of new and rejuvenated objections to the arguments in favour of cap and 
trade systems is a long one, and setting them out in full helps understanding of why 
the New York Times, the Economist and others have been tempted to conclude that 
the tide has turned and cap and trade is on the way out. 
But careful analysis of the arguments shows them to be incoherent, both in terms 
of the differing degrees of logic behind them and in terms of the different and often 
contradictory perspectives from which they come. Some of the objections are fair, or 
at least raise questions about the expectations of cap and trade systems and the 
importance of cost reduction against other objectives. Other objections come from 
perspectives generally regarded by economists as invalid, if seductive in times of 
hardship. Others arise from expectations that were never reasonable, at least given the 
choices so far made within the EUETS. Yet others are based on problems that have 
nothing to do with trading but which have occurred or are feared to be occurring 
around emissions trading schemes being designed or already in operation. 
But the issue that seems to lie deepest is that, in a recession, the public and 
politicians are less willing to accept the cost and disruption associated with carbon 
pricing. This is a legitimate political viewpoint, requiring the re­examination of the 
total costs of combating climate change vis a vis the benefits that society and the 
planet will get from success in doing so. It does not, however, affect the question of 
the superiority of cap and trade as a means of delivering whatever level of emissions 
reduction that society is happy with. Few of the arguments now being deployed raise 
real doubts about the justifications previously thought sufficient to settle that point. 
It is to be hoped that clear thinking about what is now being objected to will avoid 
the potential disaster of treating trading as a scapegoat and condemning future action 
on climate change to unnecessary additional costs. 
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Obstacles to Renewable Energy and
Energy Efficiency 
Richard L. Kauffman 
Former CEO, Good Energies 
In spite of a flood of articles about green energy and global warming, renewable 
energy accounts for only a tiny percentage of total power generated in the U.S. 
Together, wind and solar power contributed less than 3 percent of power produced 
last year. In fact, as a percentage of power produced, the U.S. produced less renewable 
power than it did in 1950. Surely, if the U.S. is to do its part to tackle climate change, 
create those much discussed “green” jobs, and to achieve energy independence, it 
must do more. 
So what are the obstacles? I suspect that they are not what most of us think. 
The problem isn’t technology. 
Some policy makers have advocated a “Manhattan­type” Project to solve our energy 
problem, meaning a government intensive R&D effort to come up with a silver bullet 
technology solution. After all, if renewable energy is more expensive than traditional 
sources, then surely we need more innovation to reduce costs. In fact, in spite of 
having been starved for years, the renewable energy innovation engine in the U.S. is 
working adequately. U.S. universities, National Labs, and corporations have 
substantial intellectual property in renewable energy and energy efifciency 
technology; in fact, many of the technologies now being deployed outside the U.S. 
were developed here. Many European countries have substantially more renewewable 
energy than the U.S., showing that renewables can make up a significant portion of 
power production by promoting technology available today. 
We’ve got the innovation deployment cart and horse backwards. 
By providing markets, the European renewable energy industry lowered costs by 
getting scale. We know from the PC industry where computer chips are ever cheaper 
and have greater performance that innovation follows commercialization, not the 
reverse. Moore’s Law is not an independent law of physics but rests on the role of 
markets; without a vibrant market into which to sell integrated circuits, the shape of 
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the performance curve would look very different. However, in renewable energy 
technology, we keep waiting for breakthrough technology that will achieve cost parity 
with conventional sources before deployment. Because most renewable energy 
technology is by definition capital intensive, much of cost reduction per unit 
produced stems from manufacturing scale advantages; these manufacturing scale 
advantages will rely more on extant manufacturing capabilities in other industries 
than on fundamental underlying renewable energy technology. A good example is the 
wind turbine where costs have declined dramatically; large market opportunities 
created by favorable European electricity rates encouraged established industrial 
players—in this case Siemens and General Electric—to enter the market with initially 
“good enough” technology, and through these firms’ manufacturing and engineering 
expertise, they were able to produce larger and larger windmills at lower costs per 
watt. In the U.S., we instead direct policy attention to innovation over deployment. 
Providing government funding to an early stage technology company makes a good 
photo op, but without large scale markets, the barriers to cost competiveness are 
nearly insurmountable since the manufacturer has to find a technology solution that 
is cost competive without manufacturing scale benefits. 
The energy problem isn’t production, it’s inefficiency. 
Americans use more than twice the energy per capita as Europeans. And the biggest 
source of energy use is in our buildings. Our built environment generates more than 
40 percent of greenhouse gases because our buildings use lots of electricity. Because 
electricity seems clean as it comes out of the socket, we don’t appreciate that most of 
our electricity comes from burning coal. More than 90 percent of energy is lost from 
its conversion to electricity, transmission, and inefficiency loss in the building before 
it is used for heating, cooling and lighting. If we want to solve our energy problems, 
we need to tackle energy efficiency in buildings. And we don’t need a Manhattan 
Project to get people to change lightbulbs or to get restaurants and shops to close 
their doors to the outside in the summer. We have national fire codes, but we don’t 
have national building standards for energy efficiency. India has an energy efficiency 
standard for buildings that exceeds ours. 
Markets aren’t working properly. 
Renewables are expensive relative to traditional forms of energy. But the playing field 
isn’t level. There isn’t yet a cost of carbon for fossil fuels. While a cap and trade bill 
will help, there are other areas where renewable energy is put at a competitive 
disadvantage. Traditional energy industries get much more substantial government 
support, in the form of $10 billion in annual tax incentives, or in the case of the 
nuclear industry, insurance. Solar appears “expensive”, yet its costs for 30 years are 
known, while the costs of providing peak power from conventional sources is high 
and future costs are unknown. Political support for renewables is uncertain. It is 
ironic that after nearly expiring in 2008, federal tax credits for renewables were added 
at the last minute to the TARP bill. Advocates of a cost of carbon treat it as a its own 
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silver bullet solution, but a cost of carbon is only one part of putting renewable 
energy and energy efficiency on a level market playing field. 
Utility regulation doesn’t encourage renewable energy adoption or efficiency. 
Although in a few states such as California regulators have provided economic 
incentives that permit utilities to get an equivalent economic return for investing in 
efficiency, in most states, the sad fact is that utiltities get paid more when consumers 
use more electricity. Utilites and regulators continue to favor centralized power 
plants, rather than distributed solutions such as solar and small scale wind. Even 
though we have observed an evolution towards distributed solutions in telephony and 
IT, we have resisted this transition in energy, In contrast to these other industries 
where incumbents saw potential opportuntiies and threats of new technology and 
therefore helped change the regulatory environment, most utilities are happy with the 
regulatory status quo. The “intermittancy problem’’—that the wind doesn’t blow all 
the time and the sun doesn’t shine at night—is belied by examples in Europe where 
wind and solar energy represent a much higher percentage of power production than 
in the U.S. American utilities prefer centralized production because it is easier to 
“store’ energy in unburnt coal sitting by the power plant. However, unfortunately the 
bias in favor of centralized production makes it much more difficult to implement 
efficiency solutions at the building level, which, by their nature, are local problems. 
Put differently, it may be that the best attribute of solar power is that policy and 
political infrastructure to support it—a regulatory regime and smart grid that 
permits time of use metering and net metering—are the very things that will enable 
efficiency; and it is effciency that is the problem we are trying to solve. 
We don’t have the infrastructure. 
The scale of infrastructure investment is enormous, and little will be done if there is 
inadequate government direction as to our energy future. Capturing carbon dioxide 
from burning of coal? It would require a pipeline system for handling CO2 greater 
than the current U.S. gas pipeline system. The Plains states could be the Saudi Arabia 
of wind. The problem is that the electric grid doesn’t go there. Solar power in the 
Southwest which can be transported to the Midwest and East? There’s no grid there 
either. Nor do we have a “smart grid” that would allow for more distributed power 
generation or time of use pricing that would provide incentives for consumers to shut 
off certain appliances at peak periods or to sell renewable power over the grid. The 
stimulus bill providing some funding for the grid, but it a tiny downpayment on the 
total cost. 
Getting debt to finance renewable energy projects is difficult. 
Many renewable energy projects are developed by smaller companies, not by big 
utilities. In the past, these projects were financed by banks. Because of the financial 
crisis, banks are not lending as much. These projects, however, will provide 20+ years 
of fixed returns that bonds investors might like. While the bond market has replaced 
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bank lending in mortgage and in long term corporate debt, the bond market has yet 
to replace bank lending for renewable energy projects. 
Put most simply, the obstacles to great adoption of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency in the U.S. relate mostly to improper market signals and to poor regulation. 
The bad news in this conclusion is that many of the classical problems in economics 
are represented: There are agency problems in the differences between building 
owners and tenants that lead to avoided investments in energy efficiency. Then, there 
are economic problems associated with regulation. Electric utilities are regulated 
entitities whose profits are determined by the amount of capital deployed; as a result, 
there is more profit to be gained by utilities from investment in generation assets than 
in efficiency. Economists also have to wrestle with the way consumers seem to act 
illogically in applying very high discount rates on investments that pay back later (in 
this way, investments in energy efficiency are like investments in disease prevention). 
And, of course, the issue of climate change raises the fundamental problem of 
externalities. The good news is that policies can be put in place to address these 
market failures, and, in so doing, can quickly unleash human and financial capital. 
Finally, a key part of the solution is to get consensus on the problem we are trying 
to solve. Reading a list of proposed policy solutions makes one wonder whether we 
are trying to solve a production problem or an efficiency problem, an innovation 
problem, a cost problem, a transportation problem, a fuels problem or an electrical 
problem. That the degree of global policy intervention during the recent financial 
crisis occured at such magntiude and at such speed without ideological debate 
suggests that policymakers, academics and the private sector generally had common 
understanding of the problem they were trying to address; it is not likely that this 
shared view of the world would have existed even a few decades ago and is no doubt 
a result of years of debate, common study, and policy trial and error. We need to 
recognize that in the area of overcoming the barriers to renewable energy and energy 
efficiency adoption, this global community of shared views has not yet coalesced. We 
can take heart from the financial crisis that it is possible to develop such common 
purpose, but must also recognize that we do not have decades to do so. 
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The Road from Copenhagen: Next
Steps in Climate and Energy Policy 
This paper synthesizes discussions held by REIL in the lead­up to the UNFCCC Climate 
Negotiations at Copenhagen in December 2009, and discussions post­Copenhagen that 
have sought to make sense of the outputs of the UNFCCC process. REIL is a group of 
individuals from diverse backgrounds including finance and investment, technology, 
regulation, policy and research, who share a common interest in issues relating to climate 
change and in particular the deployment and financing of low carbon technology. In 
their discussions on various topics the group has sought to address the key issues at stake 
in the global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This account attempts to capture 
those issues, analyze to what degree the Copenhagen negotiations mark progress, and set 
out what steps need to be taken, both within and outside the UNFCCC, in 2010 and 
beyond. Written by James Davey, Martin Devine, and Leslie Parker, April 2010.* 
§ 
context: negotiations within the united nations framework
convention on climate change (unfccc) 
The emerging shape of a global climate deal and the need to go beyond Kyoto 
The Bali Action Plan, agreed at the end of 2007, launched two strands of negotiation 
under the UNFCCC. One (the ad hoc Working Group on the Kyoto Protocol, or 
AWG­KP) considers the future of the Kyoto Protocol and, critically, targets for 
developed countries. The other, the ad hoc Working Group on Long­term 
Cooperative Action (AWG­LCA) considers what wider measures are necessary to 
facilitate implementation of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
including emission reductions across all countries (developed and developing). 
The rationale behind launching the LCA discussions from a developed country 
point of view was that the Kyoto protocol does not provide the emissions reductions 
necessary to address climate change as it contains targets for only a limited set of 
countries, which account for less than 40% of the global emissions. Action will be 
required by all countries, or at least all the major economies, which include India, 
China, Brazil and South Africa, to tackle climate change. Developed countries believe 
that what is needed therefore is a new framework to incentivise action in developing 
countries through targets and enhanced support on finance and technology from 
*The views and opinions 
expressed in this paper are the 
synthesis of a diverse group 
discussion conducted in a 
range of fora and do not nec­
essarily reflect the views of the 
authors, REIL, its members and 
contributors or any govern­
ment or organization. See 
addendum at the end of the 
article for a list of some of 
those who were part of this 
conversation over the past 
year. 
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1 The EU would define ‘ambi­
tious’ in line with the science, 
which suggests Annex I would 
collectively have to reduce 
their emissions by the upper 
end of the range of 25% ­ 40% 
below 1990 levels by 2020 in 
order to have a reasonable 
chance to meet the 2 degree 
objective. 
developed countries as well as fair and equitable commitments among developed 
countries themselves. However, many developing countries would argue that such a 
framework already exists, namely the Convention, and that it is full implementation of 
the Convention (with the implication that it is the developed, rather than developing, 
countries that are not implementing their obligations) that is required, rather than 
the negotiation of a new agreement. 
This situation is further complicated by the fact that the U.S. has not ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol, nor is it ever likely to do so. This puts the remaining developed 
countries in a difficult position. They do not want to be seen to ‘kill’ the Kyoto 
Protocol, but they need the U.S. to enter into an ‘equivalent’ legal instrument, to 
ensure that the U.S. delivers a quantified emissions reduction target internationally, 
and by extension, participates in a global carbon market. 
From a European viewpoint, a satisfactory outcome would lead to all developed 
countries (i.e. those currently listed in Annex I of the Convention) taking an economy 
wide ambitious1 mitigation commitment, together with some form of legally binding 
actions from major developing countries, with all commitments (whether economy­
wide caps, or mitigation actions) open to international scrutiny and verification. 
Whether this means a continuation of the KP or not is an issue of secondary 
importance to the EU. What is critical is that the aquis of the KP (including economy 
wide targets, a 1990 base year, inventories & registries, and the carbon market) are 
maintained. 
The U.S. viewpoint is less focused on the KP (since it is not a party to it) or 
numbers, but is concerned about legal form. It has stated it will not be bound by any 
legal instrument unless China is also bound by the same instrument. The nature of 
commitments is up for discussion (e.g. U.S. could take an emissions cap, China could 
commit to ‘actions’) but the legal nature (i.e. bindingness) must be equivalent for all 
parties. 
The Japanese viewpoint is close to that of the U.S. even though it is formally a 
Party to the Kyoto Protocol. Although Japan is not interested in “destroying” the 
Protocol which bears the name of its ancient city, it has made its position clear; that 
Japan would not accept any new legally binding instruments without the active, fair 
and equitable participation from all major economies, particularly the U.S. and 
China. While respecting the spirit and achievements made under the Kyoto 
framework, Japan supports a single legal instrument incorporating all relevant 
elements of the Kyoto Protocol where the US, EU countries, and all other major 
economies take commitments based on their capabilities. 
Developing countries, in general, see no need for a new legal framework. Their 
view is that the U.S. should ratify Kyoto and be bound by it, and that developing 
countries should be supported to take mitigation and adaptation actions supported 
by the provision of finance and technology. 
Throughout 2008 and 2009 the AWG­LCA considered a large number of 
suggestions and contributions for the text that might form the basis for negotiation 
at Copenhagen. Fears rose during 2009 that Copenhagen would not lead to a full legal 
agreement. Too much was left to do. Whilst there is some convergence among Parties 
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on adaptation and technology, the key issues of mitigation and finance were not 
progressed as they should have been. Immediately before Copenhagen, therefore, the 
key question was whether countries would put enough on the table in terms of 
commitments to reduce emissions, and the provision of finance, in order to reach a 
critical mass that would allow a strong initial political agreement, followed soon after 
by a more detailed discussion of numbers and legal text in 2010. We shall consider 
later whether this outcome was achieved. 
Slow progress – the need for collective action, hampered by the desire to see
someone else move first 
Progress towards an agreed solution under the UNFCCC in 2009 was slower than 
many would have liked. Developing countries wanted to see strong early signals (i.e. 
emission reduction and finance commitments) on the part of developed countries 
before committing to any actions for themselves; whilst some developed countries, 
such as the U.S. and Japan, were looking for clear prospects of action being taken in 
the developing world before adopting targets at home stringent enough to have a 
significant impact on climate change. Historically, many developed country 
politicians have shied away from anything other than grand long term targets, which 
could only be judged many years into the future – avoiding the need to take difficult 
action in the short term, but also failing to convince others that action is necessary. 
Much of 2009 seemed to be wasted in circular arguments. However, through 2009 
commitments began to emerge, such as the UK Prime Minister’s call for climate finance 
flows to developing countries of $100 billion per annum to be generated by 2020, the 
Japanese Prime Minister’s pledge for reducing Japan’s emissions by 25% by 20202 and 
the EU’s offer to move to a 30% reduction by 20202 if others ‘do their fair share’. 
§ 
reil analysis: challenges, barriers, and a possible way forward 
Agreeing on public finance – concerns over governance, transparency, timing and
origin 
Historically there has been a split between developed countries and the G77 group.3 
The G77 want to see predictable and credible funds for technology, mitigation and 
adaptation, all under direct control of the UNFCCC, whilst many developed 
countries want to see a range of vehicles, many of which would not be under the 
UNFCCC. The centralized technology fund in the G77 model might cover research 
and development, deployment support and IPR acquisition, but some, recognising 
that public finances are unlikely to ever be able to cover all of the costs of the 
transition to a low carbon world, question if such a model can effectively engage the 
private sector at the scale necessary. The EU counter offer is of a model that contains 
some public finance, but also a large component of private finance, driven, by 
mitigation targets, through the carbon market as a means of engaging with the 
2 Compared to 1990 levels. 
3 The G77 is the negotiating 
group that represents the 
majority of developing coun­
tries. Membership, initially 77, 
now stands at 130. 
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private sector. Also on the table is the approach taken by the U.S. and others of 
focussing on a myriad of specific actions and initiatives on the ground. Whilst the 
EU’s offer seems the clearest path to unlocking finance and distributing it in an 
efficient way, a lack of clarity (particularly on scale, sources of finance, and 
governance) suggests that the EU and its allies need to do more to sell the benefits of 
their approach if it is to succeed. 
Most of the technology discussions focus on finance, and developing and 
deploying new technology will be expensive, so finding a solution to this difference 
in views is critical. A ‘good deal’ on technology can only be effective if it is 
complimented by an effective deal on finance. In addition, national action plans are 
likely to need support to get off the ground, but a critical part of ensuring that plans 
are forthcoming and ambitious is having the support in place to provide capacity 
building and technical assistance. 
The 2009 Major Economies Forum leader’s statement suggested a multiplicity of 
financing sources, suggesting some broadening of the G77 position. It is clear that 
donors want all their financing activities to count, even if they are outside a central 
UNFCCC fund. In the same way that we can think of emissions reductions being 
comprised of wedges of different measures, financial support might also be seen as 
being made up of different forms and modes of contribution. 
There likely needs to be a blend of finance instruments that reflects the various 
different needs. National mitigation strategies for developing countries will likely be 
grant funded; indeed this can be seen as a political requirement for reaching a deal. 
Such a capacity fund could be small (hundreds of millions), on a GEF type model 
using implementing agencies such as the UNDP under a holistic UNFCCC 
programme. Unfortunately this needed to begin 5 years ago, for countries to have 
developed plans, identified barriers to technology transfer and deployment and 
worked out how to address them all, to be ready for 2013 when the money could start 
to flow – in that light, 2013 is very close. To compound this problem, developed 
country governments’ finances are suffering the effects of the global slump, so it will 
be harder than usual to find money in 2010 to get the capacity building fund going. 
But UNEP’s blueprint for a capacity building fund suggests a requirement of around 
only $300m per year. Such a capacity building fund is not so large as to be 
unobtainable and so could be the first element of a deal, placed on the table by 
developed countries. 
Such an offer would undoubtedly be a good step forward as it’s needed to build the 
capacity to allow countries to develop their plans; but it needs to start in 2010 so that 
developing countries are able to begin to use larger scale finance in 2013. If 
contributions are reliant on proceeds from emissions trading that won’t begin until 
2013 then progress will be hampered. 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) funding is another potential source for 
the capacity building fund, but there are political concerns for the G77, due to 
previous commitments and pledges remaining unfulfilled which makes talk of the 
ODA in UNFCCC difficult, and ODA itself remains bound by OECD governance. 
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The role of public finance – what is the best way to use it to develop private
markets? 
Companies seek investment opportunities, primarily at the project level. In order to 
influence the investments that companies make, the equation needs to be rebalanced 
in favour of low carbon technology. Sometimes these are issues that negotiators don’t 
think about as they are not running businesses or raising finance. 
Questions the private sector are asking when making decisions on renewable 
technology include: is there a long term market for the power (hence the popularity 
of renewables quotas and feed in schemes) and is the return enough to pay back in 
the terms of the finance, i.e. what are you going to be paid and for how long? Is the 
customer credit worthy? The last question is always important, but often a critical 
barrier in the developing world. 
Technology transfer can only work if there is demand in the target markets and a 
lack of appropriate policy frameworks to drive demand is a key barrier to technology 
transfer. It is therefore difficult to separate discussions on mitigation from 
discussions on technology transfer. If countries are serious about being on the 
receiving end of technology transfer, they need to ensure that they have the right 
policy environment; which means not just transparency and rule of law, but also the 
types of policies that clearly favour low carbon technologies. This is a key element of 
the EU’s position in the negotiations and it drives their wish to see countries develop 
national strategies for low carbon tech. But developed countries need to do this too 
and as yet their potential for renewable energy deployment and energy efficiency is 
far from realised. 
Developing countries need to own their national policies. They can’t just come to 
UNFCCC and be told what to go home and do to build markets for low carbon 
technology. There has to be a process of discovery and learning: making a national 
climate strategy, looking at the cost effectiveness of the measures, prioritising and 
refining. But this can be accelerated through co­operation and experience sharing, 
especially between regional groups of countries, as occurred successfully under the 
Montreal Protocol and there are good examples emerging, such as the Asia Pacific 
Partnership’s compendium of State and Local Best Practices on Energy Efficiency and 
Renewable Energy, which seeks to define and share subnational best practices of Asia 
Pacific Partnership members. 
Increasingly the discussions under the UNFCCC are looking at novel approaches 
to developing low carbon technologies. In part this is driven by the U.S. and others’ 
desire to throw technology related actions into the mix of commitments under 
discussion, but has the potential to help achieve the necessary acceleration of 
deployment and the development of technologies that will benefit new markets in 
developing and developed countries. The standard model whereby a nation develops 
a technology for use in its home markets, which might after some years begin to 
spread globally, will not provide the rapid deployment needed. In addition to the 
more conventional bi and multi­lateral agreements on R&D, there is increasing 
interest in developing hubs or centres of excellence for technology development. 
These may be regionally based or centre on a particular technology or sector. 
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Experience in the private sector has shown that it is important that such hubs relate 
directly to markets, suggesting that a technological focus may work well and could 
result in the investment opportunities that would be needed to see newly developed 
technologies to fruition. 
However technology development is not a silver bullet, in that there is no single 
technology that will allow U.S. to avoid dangerous climate change, nor does the 
existence of a range of clean technologies mean they will be deployed. As expressed 
by one member, “We’ve got the innovation deployment cart and horse backwards. By 
providing markets, the European renewable energy industry lowered costs by getting 
scale. We know from the PC industry, where computer chips are ever cheaper and 
have greater performance, that innovation follows commercialization, not the reverse. 
Moore’s Law is not an independent law of physics but rests on the role of markets; 
without a vibrant market into which to sell integrated circuits, the shape of the 
performance curve would look very different, however, in renewable energy 
technology, we keep waiting for breakthrough technology that will achieve cost parity 
with conventional sources before deployment. Because most renewable energy 
technology is by definition capital intensive, much of cost reduction per unit 
produced stems from manufacturing scale advantages; these manufacturing scale 
advantages will rely more on extant manufacturing capabilities in other industries 
than on fundamental underlying renewable energy technology.” 
When we consider development and adaptation too, it’s important to remember 
that finance only looks at the bottom line. Positive external benefits (clean air, clean 
water, flood protection) are not part of the revenue stream for power, so get ignored 
because the market is not designed to capture them. There needs to be a clear value 
placed on these wider environmental values, then the finance community may take 
an interest. (Doubtless, this is much further in the future than a value for carbon.) 
Negotiators need to recognise that investors are not philanthropists (generally 
speaking) and that the solution is for governments to shape the market in a way that 
facilitates investment in sustainable activities. 
Recognising the scale of the challenge posed by climate change is also critical in 
moving markets on the right long term path. The shift required to keep emissions 
down at a level unlikely to push climate change beyond 2°C is seismic and long term, 
and because of the nature of energy use requires not just technological change, but 
systemic change in behaviour across society. In developing private markets and 
encouraging investment, it will be necessary to ensure that short terms targets for the 
next decade place technology investment on a pathway to long term deep emissions 
cuts. Whilst much needs to be done to meet 2020 targets, the decades after 2020 are 
when we need to see very significant decarbonisation of infrastructure to meet long 
term targets of 80% reduction, especially given the inevitability of continuing 
emissions from sectors such as agriculture and aviation. The period from 2010 to 2020 
will be important therefore, not just to achieve reductions, but set the stage for the 
further reductions that need to follow. 
Renewable energy technology is a long term asset, but in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis banks are slow to lend to renewable energy projects. Investors have 
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seen a tightening of terms which does not favour the long return period of renewable 
energy investments and credit for investments in developing countries is particularly 
affected (financing terms across the world have shortened with the impact of the 
global finance crisis and the consequent reduced risk tolerance on the part of banks, 
from 10­12 years to 5­7 years; terms in the developing world are even more 
challenging). Governments could play a role here by guaranteeing finance over longer 
periods and providing reliable subsidies to ensure ongoing revenue. In part this could 
be done through the carbon market, but that still leaves a gap which feed in tariffs or 
renewables quotas can fill. In other areas such as long term corporate debt and the 
mortgage market, bonds have begun to replace bank lending as a source of finance. 
This has not yet happened for renewables, but with the long term returns of 
renewable energy projects, often over 20 years or more, this could prove an interesting 
area for bond markets which are well suited to blending public and private finance 
over long timescales. 
Carbon finance – a driver for change, but in what form will it exist in the future? 
The contribution of the carbon market is limited at present by uncertainty over the 
value of carbon beyond 2012. Everyone expects there to be a value beyond 2012, but 
lack certainty as to what it will be. 
There is no clear agreement on CDM at present. India and China see it as vital, but 
it’s unpopular in the U.S. and there are other approaches, such as sectoral and 
regional schemes that are also currently being explored. It is likely that there will be 
some sort of project based mechanism, but it might look different to the current 
CDM and sit within a suite of other measures. 
The EU has provisions in its Emissions Trading Scheme for CDM to carry on post­
2012 and envisages a single carbon market architecture, whilst in the US, where is 
seen as intrusive, the prospects for agreement on joining a fully fledged international 
market are unclear. It’s possible that we may see a number of different schemes 
emerging / evolving that could gradually coalesce into a network of linked schemes. 
But given the scale of reductions needed and the as yet inadequate numbers put 
forward by some key developed countries, it would seem that the CDM is the only 
viable way for such countries to acquire the sorts of volumes necessary to meet the 
targets being contemplated. At the same time, McKinsey’s report said that two thirds 
of the reductions that could be achieved for less than $60 per tonne were to be found 
in developing countries, so there is a clear economic rationale for trade in carbon to 
make emissions reductions in the cheapest way. Despite the many arguments put 
forward against carbon markets, there has been no real alternative put forward that 
embodies the same degree of choice and flexibility or that does not move down the 
path of autocratically setting limits on emissions. It could be said that the carbon 
market is akin to democracy: the worst idea, except for all the other ones. 
To add a further dimension of complexity and uncertainty to the carbon market 
picture, forestry is now also being thrown into the mix with as a source of credits. 
One possible future for the CDM is to move more towards a programmatic 
approach based on national policies and programmes. But private investors invest in 
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companies, products, services and projects – they do not invest in programs or 
sectors. If the effort to scale­up the response to climate change results in only national 
or sectoral plans, then the only private investment that will follow will be the service 
of lending money to governments. Only by translating those national or sectoral 
plans into incentives for a huge array of individual, investable opportunities – at the 
company, product/service and project level – will the amount of private capital 
joining the response to climate change continue to increase. Only by using market 
rules such as a price on or rights to carbon, to create a space within which private 
investors will experiment, succeed and certainly sometimes fail, will we spark the 
innovation and creativity needed to address climate change in a rapid and cost­
effective manner. 
Institutional and market barriers are still waiting to be addressed with much of the
existing low carbon technology not deployed as widely as it could be – why? 
The price of carbon and other externalities is not yet properly factored into the price 
of fossil fuels, and support, in the form of tax incentives and, in the case of nuclear, 
insurance subsidies, unbalance the playing field for renewables. 
But possibly the greatest single problem for low carbon investments is uncertainty. 
Uncertainty over the return on investments, stemming from transient and 
fragmented support schemes, portfolio standards and feed in tariffs, means that 
whilst costs are relatively easy to predict, revenues can be less certain. On the global 
scale, the lack of clarity over commitments beyond 2012 means that carbon revenues 
are hard to rely on. On a national and state level the different timeframes, qualifying 
criteria and returns for the various schemes reduce the ability to assess investments 
and make it less easy to invest. Where schemes provide an uncertain revenue flow, it 
is hard to factor them into an investment package, meaning that the incentive they 
attempt to offer is greatly reduced in value, and often, especially in light of the credit 
crunch, investors are willing to trade some degree of return for greater certainty. 
Integration of the various schemes and, most importantly, clear guarantees that such 
incentives are here to stay, can unlock much of the investment that is willing, but 
unable, to flow into low carbon technology. 
In providing energy for development, especially in countries and rural areas where 
energy can be very expensive, there is ample technology to provide low carbon 
solutions; the issue is that price signals and regulations do not provide proper 
incentives. But it is also important that the basic underlying investment environment 
is robust enough to attract business. If the private sector wouldn’t make a 
conventional investment in a country, why would they consider any investment? 
Centralized generation infrastructure, that favours neither renewable nor energy 
efficiency, is often still encouraged by energy regulators, and although states like 
California and countries like the UK have begun to incentivise investment in energy 
efficiency measures by energy companies, most still make more money by selling 
more kWh. In some markets the price of power is artificially low, making it even 
harder to make renewables cost competitive. 
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As noted by one REIL contributor: “The infrastructure required to shift to clean 
energy on a large scale is enormous and not yet in place – from the pipeline network 
that could allow transportation and storage of carbon from CCS plants to the 
distribution grids that could take power from renewable sources such as solar in 
North Africa or the south­west U.S. to centres of population such as Europe or the 
mid­west cities, whilst accommodating distributed generation and sophisticated time 
of use pricing – there is a huge gap in what is needed to achieve a low carbon energy 
system and the current levels of investment or policy support. If countries had an 
appropriate price for carbon, time of use pricing for electricity, building and 
appliance efficiency standards and incentives for utilities to invest in efficiency, we 
would see very substantial capital flows. 
Energy efficiency is critically important. The energy problem isn’t production, it’s 
inefficiency. The U.S. uses more than twice the energy per capita as Europeans and 
the biggest source of that energy use is in buildings. The built environment generates 
more than 40 percent of greenhouse gases because our buildings use lots of 
electricity. Because electricity seems clean as it comes out of the socket, we don’t 
appreciate that most of our electricity comes from burning coal. More than 90 
percent of energy is lost from its conversion to electricity, transmission and 
inefficiency loss in the building before it is used for heating, cooling and lighting. If 
we want to solve our energy problems, we need to tackle energy efficiency in 
buildings. And we don’t need a Manhattan Project to get people to change light 
bulbs or to turn down the air conditioning. 
Policy makers understand many of these issues, but in the past have often avoided 
making hard choices. It’s a lot easier (and cheaper) to fund more R&D on energy 
scattered around the country than take on the more prosaic, tougher and more 
expensive problems of figuring out how to build transmission lines across state lines 
and to tackle electric utility regulatory reform. The current “let the market decide” 
approach won’t work because market signals are wrong, vested interests are strong, 
and the scope of the problem requires clearer direction.” 
Trade and politics – barrier or opportunity? 
There are wider issues around barriers to trade in low carbon technology than the 
price of carbon and feed in tariffs. Tariff barriers such as the U.S. import duty on 
ethanol, designed to protect the domestic industry, can hamper the development of 
markets for low carbon tech elsewhere. This is an issue that the UNFCCC cannot 
address alone and it needs to be raised in the WTO and other economic fora. 
Some in the U.S. are seeking an international element to cap and trade legislation 
which is being developed, but there is resistance to this. Progressive elements were 
very keen to see a bill on the table in time for Copenhagen but this was not achieved. 
Fears in the U.S. remain that it will be hard to ‘give money to China’ in the current 
economic climate and in awareness of a misconception in America that all of China 
is as developed as a visit to the Olympics or Shanghai might suggest. But 
strengthening the market for U.S. exports of low carbon tech is a strong counter 
argument, if it can be deployed. 
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Much of this is an issue of perception. China sees pledges to reduce emissions 
substantially by 2050, but little short term action, which makes the pledges seem 
implausible and invites a cynical interpretation that western governments are using 
climate as a tool to limit the growth of China. For the US, the move of manufacturing 
to China is a concern, but all countries are keen to build their capacity in new 
technologies – from America, to Europe, to Asia. 
Addressing these wider issues of trade politics is vital. We want to see a global shift 
to low carbon, innovations in technology and a development of the capacity to 
manufacture that technology. This brings with it politically charged questions of job 
loss and creation which can dominate political thinking and raise the spectre of 
protectionism. If a transition to low carbon can be achieved consistently in a balanced 
way then the emergence of winners and losers will be minimized. But whilst countries 
may fear becoming losers, the possibility of becoming a winner may be an incentive 
to move towards low carbon; indeed many nations sell the low carbon agenda on the 
basis that it provides an opportunity to develop a new advantage in technology and 
manufacturing. Any international framework needs to help balance these tensions if 
it is to succeed. Politicians in any country, no matter how rich, can’t sell a job loss 
argument to their electorates. 
Unlocking inertia – the role of MEF and other fora? 
To unlock the inertia currently dogging the negotiations there needs to be a 
demonstration of effort by all major economies. Forums such as the Major 
Economies Forum (MEF) need to do more than simply produce reports and analyses 
or G8 style reaffirmations of what has already been said, they need to develop flagship 
initiatives involving collective action that can demonstrate commitment on all sides. 
In these discussions China is not a recipient, but an equal partner. Such flagship 
initiatives need to have a significant impact, so might cover things such as: CCS 
deployment – in both developed and developing countries; deploying 10Gw of 
advanced solar in less developed countries in the next 5 years; supporting the 
development of low carbon cities; or, deploying X thousand electric cars. Whatever 
their precise nature, these would need to provide clear benefits to both sides, beyond 
carbon reduction, e.g. China and India could both become major manufactures and 
consumers of low carbon vehicles. Given the need for technology investment to shift 
onto a long term low carbon pathway, of the kind identified in the IEA’s Blue 
Roadmap, this kind of intervention from the MEF and others could prove a tool to 
drive future commitments beyond the next decade, and in the absence of a deal in 
Copenhagen, the role of smaller groupings such as the MEF could be a last chance for 
securing action. However at this point in time, key countries, such as China, India, 
and Brazil do not seem attracted to the idea of making the MEF or G8 these decision 
making entities. 
Developing and deploying new technologies 
Meeting the challenge of reducing emissions will require a massive deployment of low 
carbon technologies across every sector. The metaphor of the Apollo project is often 
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used to indicate the scale of the task, but low carbon technology may require a 
different approach. The technologies that emit carbon now are embedded across 
every part of daily life, and the change needed is not only one of new technology, but 
also of new behaviours. While the end goal can be readily predicted now, in terms of 
the total amount of carbon tolerable in the atmosphere, the technologies that will be 
in place to achieve this decades in the future are less certain. To enable the 
development of technologies there needs to be quick learning – adopting new 
technologies, learning from failures and problems, and changing plans when they are 
proved to be wrong. 
In looking at the type of technological change needed, the existing infrastructure 
for distributing energy and providing basic services presents both a major challenge 
and an opportunity. Buildings are slow to be replaced and much of the existing stock 
contains technology that dates back to the start of the 20th Century. Innovative work 
on intelligent grids that manage power in a much smarter way, scalable local DC 
grids, and technologies such as LED lighting and energy efficient building design, 
which offer major savings over their predecessors, are beginning to become main 
stream, but face major barriers to achieving full market penetration. In addition to 
the new technologies there will be a need for new skills and business models (e.g. 
builders, electricians, energy service companies) to equip and service and 
infrastructure that could operate very differently to today’s. 
Such a transformation of our energy systems seems daunting, but there are clear 
signs that it is beginning to occur. The rate of change in investment in low carbon 
technology is accelerating already, albeit not yet as quickly as the models of growth 
and emissions would suggested is needed. 
Intellectual Property – an issue of perception or a real barrier? 
A key concern for many private sector organisations observing the climate 
negotiations is Intellectual Property (IP). In the negotiations themselves IP is a 
sticking point, as some view it as an integral part of a deal, whilst others see IP as 
wholly separate and not something that the UNFCCC should tackle. Some question 
whether it is an issue UNFCCC is even equipped to tackle, but there is a strong 
argument that a UNFCCC IP fund, developing new technology, is necessary for 
political reasons, even if it is unlikely to result in significant new innovations. 
A pragmatic approach seems plausible; tackling IP on a project by project basis, 
with prior agreement on the part of the parties involved to share, or otherwise 
allocate, any IP resulting. This sort of activity might happen outside of the UNFCCC, 
but could be seen and counted as part of a wider effort. And it is important to 
recognise that IP in itself is only part of the equation – the knowledge and know­how 
to manufacture complex technological products may in many cases be a bigger 
barrier than IP itself. 
Efforts to centrally develop new IP might be more appropriate where there is little 
commercial market, e.g. technologies for least developed countries and for adaptation 
technology where there is currently little or no market demand that can drive 
technological development, often because the people who need the technology are 
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too poor to pay for it. Equally, the current IP process can be slow and act as a 
disincentive for quick dissemination of technology – being able in some way to 
overcome the slow pace of IP, for climate technologies at least, would be extremely 
valuable. Demonstrating action in this area is particularly important to address the 
concerns of developing countries in the negotiations, especially those whose views 
may often be overshadowed by the main voices in the G77. 
But ultimately it is clear that private companies prefer licensing and protection of 
IP to having to hand it over as part of a deal – but it does not matter if the licensing 
is financed with public money by bodies such as the World Bank, so long as its paid 
for and protected. 
How to best engage with the private sector? 
Much is made of engaging with the private sector, and it is clearly a vital part of 
implementing emission reduction, but it’s important to look at the motivation of 
whoever from the private sector you are considering. Elements of the private sector, 
seeking to preserve the status quo, have in the past done much to hamper progress 
and prevent any deal being struck, but increasingly a significant part of the private 
sector sees potential change as opportunity rather than threat and can engage in a 
constructive way. A key message that comes across consistently from those looking to 
invest in low carbon technology is that whilst the detail of any policy that aims to 
engage the private sector to facilitate a transition to low carbon is important, the 
stability and longevity of that policy is even more so. The greater the risk, the greater 
the return that is required in order for business to be able to make the investment. 
Stable policy reduces risk and opens the door to being able to finance projects with 
lower returns over longer periods of time. This allows the required step change from 
speculative short term investment to scaled long term investment that builds the 
markets. 
Ultimately the investment decisions that will determine future emissions will be 
made on much the same basis as any other investment decisions, and this means that 
terms of the deal for low carbon technology needs to be on par with the alternatives. 
The carbon market is the most convincing mechanism around to translate the 
undesirability of those alternatives into the language of investment decision making. 
Unfortunately there is no effective carbon market without a framework of multiple 
national legislation, whether or not in pursuit of internationally binding targets, 
incentivising companies on whom a new regulatory imposition is placed to look 
across the world to source their carbon reductions. Despite the efforts of economists 
and enthusiasts in the private and public sectors, in most countries there is profound 
resistance from much of the industry whose emissions must be limited, either to the 
level of regulatory emissions constraint consistent with meeting global targets, or to 
any new regulatory constraint at all. 
From the perspective of protecting shareholder value, and safeguarding 
competitiveness, market share and jobs, the instinctive reaction from these industries 
is easy to understand. On the whole climate change still affects future public goods, 
which are the concerns of Governments, far more than today’s share prices, which 
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remain primary motivating factors for businesses. And in addition, Governments 
seem susceptible to secondary objections to carbon trading, such as objections to 
foreign sourcing or sourcing from particular processes, that most gave up long ago in 
other fields as business and industry became globalised. 
Faced with these objections, it seems at present to many dispassionate business 
observers that Governments are crumbling: they do not see enough political 
advantage to action, in terms of rewards from their voters who seem increasingly 
uncertain whether the climate problem exists or is important to overcome the natural 
resistance from their industry. And the lack of support for trading schemes, and the 
political squabbling over design features, suggests that carbon pricing, whatever its 
advantages in terms of efficiency, is no more secure against political changes of mind 
or tack than any other Government scheme intended to skew investment away from 
normal economic choices, such as support schemes, regulation or tax treatment. 
At the same time, however, many businesses are putting much effort into 
renewable and other energy technologies that have no economic justification until 
carbon is priced or substantial new regulation and support is assured. This may seem 
inconsistent; but for some industries the downside of being left back down the track 
if Governments somewhere in the world really do create major markets for low­
carbon investment is too great to ignore. However, transforming that mindset into a 
willingness among a rather different grouping of industries, to voluntarily accept 
substantial and costly emissions reduction obligations is a task that at global level 
largely remains to be done. Until all the industries and businesses involved genuinely 
believe that Governments collectively are serious, and will not be diverted by lobbying 
or the prospect of some economic dislocation, progress will be very hard. 
Engaging with the private sector has to be seen in this light: it is not sufficient to 
talk about collaboration on research and technology transfer, since there has to be 
communication, based on evidence, of worldwide Governmental commitment to 
early and significant regulatory action, whether that action takes the form of a price 
and a market, or something else. 
Achieving a global climate deal 
Bringing the above analysis together, we arrive at some interesting conclusions. 
Ultimately, at the most basic level, there are two parts to a global climate deal. 
First there is the political deal needed to deliver an international agreement – to 
bring both the G77 and the developed countries to the table with mutually (and 
hopefully environmentally) acceptable commitments and contributions. For many 
this is, on the one hand, about clear support and political recognition of developed 
countries’ responsibility manifested in the transfer of resources under whatever 
governance structure can be agreed upon and, on the other hand, clear commitments 
by all countries to make significant efforts to reduce or limit the growth of emissions. 
Secondly, there is a more complex and organic deal, with the private sector. But the 
private sector is not a single actor. It is the result of the actions of a myriad of 
individuals, companies and corporations, each looking for their own opportunity to 
invest and put their business models into action. The private sector is responsive to 
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ideas that directly influence the environment for investment – feed in tariffs, loan 
guarantees, carbon pricing and other things pertinent to specific transactions – so for 
this element of the deal to work, the international framework needs to promote the 
sorts of policies and measures that really alter the decision making of the private sector. 
The technology needs assessments and national action plans are, in theory, where 
this all comes together – funded and facilitated by the international framework, but 
developed by nations for themselves, the success of these will be measured by the 
extent to which they facilitate private sector investment. Private sector involvement in 
their development could help to ensure they are successful. 
High level negotiations such as Copenhagen are unlikely to be the forum where 
such specifics are decided – but getting the right deal on public finance (i.e. the 
transfer of resources from developed to developing countries) will allow deals on 
commitments which in turn translate into policy frameworks which will engage the 
private sector and affect investment. So although the public finance component of the 
overall picture is small, it can be seen as critical in unlocking a deal. 
Some key elements that could be incorporated in a global climate deal 
Economy­wide emissions caps for developed countries 
Building on those targets established at Kyoto, developed countries should take the 
lead in delivering global emissions reductions. The Fourth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC suggest that collectively developed countries need to reduce their emissions by 
25% to 40% (measured against a 1990 baseline) by 2020 in order maximize the 
chances of global mean temperatures not rising by more than two degrees. 
Country­led plans of action 
Developing countries (especially the large emerging economies such as China, India, 
South Africa and Brazil) need to put forward their own self­designed and country led 
plans of action, including the implementation of clear policy frameworks to build 
markets for clean technology. With these in place, finance support can then flow in. 
However, the effectiveness of this approach depends to some extent on what 
commitments developed countries are willing to make on the provision of finance. 
The better the deal on support, the higher the level of ambition in the national plans 
is likely to be. The recent growth, fourfold globally during 2004­8, of investment in 
renewable energy, driven by those countries that have strong policy frameworks for 
renewables shows how vital and effective such frameworks are. 
Technology road maps 
Technology roadmaps that highlight what needs to be done in terms of research, 
development and deployment, are required in order to push forward the top 
technologies (maybe 20 or 30 technologies) to be commercially competitive. A lot of 
this work already exists (e.g. under the International Energy Agency), but needs to be 
recognised internationally under the UNFCCC. This raises an important point; that 
the majority of things that are happening, or will happen on the ground in the sphere 
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of technology, will be outside of the UNFCCC. There needs then to be a mechanism 
to identify such initiatives and account for them in the UNFCCC discussions – or to 
put it another way, to glue UN ‘blue berets’ on to those initiatives that already 
represent part of the solution. This would then facilitate action to address the 
identified development & deployment needs and barriers – a point widely accepted 
by negotiators. 
A research and development fund 
The development of technology roadmaps would highlight technologies whose 
development is lagging behind others. A relatively small (possibly around $0.5­2bn 
p/a) R&D fund under the UNFCCC, which could take the form of a prize fund, a 
challenge fund, or just straight out R&D grants, could address the laggards identified 
in the roadmap, plugging the gaps in private sector and national government funding. 
Models such as the CGIAR programme for agricultural research (which facilitates 
collaboration on agricultural technology to develop local solutions) could provide a 
template for spurring R&D to develop locally appropriate applications for new and 
existing technologies. 
A demonstration and deployment fund 
A larger pot of money is needed to finance demonstration and deployment of 
technologies that are not commercialised, or not present in a particular market. 
Figures of $5bn a year have been discussed, but it is acknowledged that such a fund 
might start smaller and take time to work up to that level. Such a fund needs to avoid 
supporting things that already happen in the market but at the same time needs to be 
demand­led. This could be seen as an upgrading of the existing Clean Technology 
Fund, but it would likely be a wider range of financial tools than simply grants and/or 
loans. The World Bank would seem the logical home for this, but that will require 
working through political issues of trust around the World Bank and there is a clear 
desire for whatever mechanism emerges to be transparent and open in its governance. 
Key to the concept of a deployment fund is that the money should be used not simply 
to support the project but to incentivise the private sector to invest. Incentives might 
include project insurance, forward purchase commitments or other instruments – 
but a critical and unanswered question is ‘what is the most effective way to use public 
money to incentivise private sector investment?’ Due to its limited supply, public 
money needs to be spent on significant change, not just incremental improvements 
and needs to leverage private finance. Some existing initiatives such as the Private 
Finance Advisory Network (PFAN) may provide good models here that could be 
repeated and scaled up. 
The acceleration of deployment, along with research and development is critical. 
In other technology fields, such as the micro­processor, innovation has been driven 
by increasing market share and economies of scale, not the other way around. But 
some technologies, in particular carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), are seen as 
both too important and too far from commercialisation to be left without assistance 
to support demonstration and deployment. While the contentious nature of CCS 
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*Although its compatibility 
with some of the existing 
aspects of the Kyoto protocol 
such as the CDM would need 
to be addressed. In addition, 
achieving sectoral trading for 
one or two global industries at 
the expense of an economy 
wide cap and trade system is 
not necessarily the optimum 
outcome. 
means a big global deal on CSS is unlikely, it could be well suited to government 
support on a deal by deal basis for demonstration plants. 
Carbon markets 
Ultimately, a global carbon market would be a way to achieve global emissions 
reduction in a way that reduces overall costs (though it is not the only global 
approach to pricing carbon – Switzerland, for example, have proposed a global 
carbon tax, revenues raised by which could be recycled to support mitigation and 
adaptation).* 
One way in which a deal could be seen to have made progress on carbon markets 
is for it to stimulate (through domestic legislation) the establishment of cap and trade 
schemes in the US, Japan and other economies that could trade with the EU scheme 
and buy in credits from the CDM. The role of the UNFCCC in this system would be 
to set the rules regarding the credits to be traded, ensuring so far as is possible the 
equivalence of emissions reductions (so­called ‘environmental integrity’) in different 
schemes. 
For an ambitious deal (i.e. one that is compatible with the EU 2 degree target) the 
volumes of carbon finance flows become very large (several tens of billions of dollars 
per annum by 2020). It is difficult to see how project­by­project generation of credits 
through the CDM, as it currently exists, could deal with this volume of trading. 
Furthermore, the U.S. and EU would want to see the production of many 
internationally traded commodities (most obviously steel and other metals) treated 
in a way that did not disadvantage their industry. This suggests ‘sectoral trading’ 
where, for example, the steel sector in India, China, Brazil etc. entered into a cap and 
trade scheme compatible with international trading. The advantage, from a 
developing country perspective, of such an approach is that (in theory) new plant in 
emerging economies is very efficient, and net positive carbon market flows into these 
markets could be expected. However, developing countries are understandably 
suspicious of this – since it involves taking on legally binding emissions caps, even if 
only on part of their economies. And the promise of ‘finance flows’ looks a rather 
empty one while the U.S. and Japan have not yet established cap and trade schemes. 
Nonetheless establishing the principle of ‘sectoral trading’ would be a major 
achievement in a global deal. 
Negotiating the deal – UNFCCC versus delivery elsewhere 
Other than the country led action plans, the possible elements of the deal set out 
above are focused on technologies and policies, rather than countries. But, is a forum 
of 194 countries the best place to try and drive forward R&D? Might it be more 
effective to leave countries and groups of countries to come together around specific 
needs? And politically it is not clear that all countries would be willing to put money 
under a UNFCCC banner, meaning activity will occur outside of the direct influence 
of UNFCCC, but how can this be reconciled against the need for global action under 
UNFCCC? 
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These questions highlight the need for a mechanism to account for wider efforts 
that are going on now, and in the future, outside of the auspices of the UNFCCC. Any 
UNFCCC fund envisaged would become a coalition of the willing additional to these 
efforts, to plug the gaps that exist and not duplicate existing work. 
Whilst considering the prospects for a UNFCCC deal it is important to remember 
that many of the things considered below can be done with or without a deal and on 
their own merit. In addition to helping meet carbon reduction targets, renewables 
and energy efficiency provide energy security benefits, cost savings, air quality and 
other environmental co­benefits and can channel expenditure on energy away from 
foreign towards domestic enterprises. 
§ 
beyond copenhagen 
December 21, 2009 – The day after 
The analysis presented so far largely summarizes thinking within REIL in the lead up 
to the climate negotiations at Copenhagen. It is clear that, in the light of what actually 
happened in the negotiations at Copenhagen, it is necessary to reassess this analysis, 
and consider what future steps can be taken to address climate change – unless of 
course we come to the conclusion that Copenhagen was such a success that further 
action is no longer necessary. 
There are as many assessments of what occurred at Copenhagen as there are 
viewpoints on the issue of climate change generally. 
From the perspective of an environmental NGO (or Small Island Developing 
State) Copenhagen was an unmitigated disaster. The EU failed to commit to a KP 
second commitment period or move from its unilateral offer to reduce emissions by 
20% on 1990 levels, a U.S. offer amounting to only a 4% reduction on 1990 levels, no 
REDD mechanism was agreed, there was no agreement on long­term finance and, 
above all, a series of national offers were made but no legally binding commitments 
signed up to. 
From the U.S. negotiators perspective Copenhagen can be considered a reasonable 
success. The Accord, which was their preferred conclusion to Copenhagen, was 
agreed, China agreed to some form of monitoring, reporting and verification of their 
emissions and emissions reductions actions, and, critically, the U.S. negotiation team 
did not find themselves ahead of the Senate (unlike at Kyoto). 
Like the U.S., China got what it wanted (principally not being bound by any 
commitments) but seemed genuinely surprised at the flak it took in the media in the 
immediate aftermath. It is factually correct to say that China blocked some key 
elements of a potential deal, including references to global emissions peaking by 2020 
and a 50% global emissions reduction by 2050. However, one should also consider 
what China was getting from any deal on offer at Copenhagen. In terms of concrete 
offers on finance to assist China, or concrete offers on technology collaboration, the 
answer is “very little”, which may explain the position they took in negotiations. 
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4 The EU, collectively, will meet 
its Kyoto target. However, it is 
clear that some countries in 
the EU will not be able to 
meet, in terms of their nation­
al emissions reductions, the 
targets they set themselves at 
Kyoto. 
If the U.S. and China got key elements of what they wanted, EU did not. While 
some of the EU’s ideas are reflected in The Accord, the Accord does not reflect EU 
aspirations for Copenhagen. The EU does not see strong action from the U.S. or 
China, which makes it very difficult for ambitious voices to push for the EU to move 
to a 30% emissions reduction, and the failure to agree anything on sectoral trading 
does not help the carbon market. Worst of all, where the U.S. was seen to speak with 
one strong voice, and with China effectively dominating the negotiations, the EU was 
perceived as ineffective and became associated by some with the role of the Danes, 
who presided as Chair of the negotiations and became a focus for criticism. 
From a business perspective, the outcome of Copenhagen is worrying for those 
with investments in carbon trading. There was no commitment to a second 
commitment period of the KP (the first will end on 31 Dec 2012), no move to sectoral 
trading (which may never yet had any real supporters other than the EU anyway), and 
no sign as to when (or indeed whether) Japan and the U.S. would move to 
international trading. 
At any rate, what mechanisms are used is secondary to the overall demand in the 
market, which will be quite small given the woefully inadequate level of existing 
Annex I pledges. 
Environmentally, it is clear that Copenhagen does not go far enough, and in that 
we are all ‘losers’. It is clear that all major emitters, developed and developing, will 
either have to significantly increase their mitigation ambitions for 2020 beyond their 
Copenhagen Accord commitments or take very strong mitigation commitments after 
2020 in order to achieve the 2 degree C objective. Therefore, those parties or groups 
that might consider they ‘won’ at Copenhagen may need to re­evaluate this ‘victory’ 
on the basis of the long­term damage climate change will do to the global economy 
and the heightened cost of deferring action to the future, as identified by Lord 
Nicholas Stern and others. 
Can we achieve climate stabilization or is the world doomed? 
The value of The Copenhagen Accord, as an agreement that drives emissions 
reductions, depends largely on one’s faith in voluntary ‘pledges’. On the one hand, 
some very significant offers (including those of Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico and 
South Africa) have been tabled. However, one only has to look at the performance of 
Canada and a number of EU countries since Kyoto4, to see that ‘pledges’ are not 
always met. It would be unfair to say that any of these countries did not take actions 
to reduce their emissions. But they have found that reducing their emissions is very 
much more difficult than they had hoped. 
Therefore, the Copenhagen Accord is significant, in that it contains pledges from 
all major emitters to constrain emissions, and signals future ambitious commitments, 
particularly on finance, and on 2 degrees, that will need further commitments to be 
delivered. However, the Accord is limited, because it is not clear how these further 
commitments will be delivered, and it does not set out a timetable for agreeing them. 
One thing is clear. A pathway to 2020 and then to 2050 that would see temperature 
rise stabilized at ‘safe’ levels is needed, and this has not yet been agreed. 
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Lessons for future negotiations 
From the somewhat surreal perspective of someone who was at Copenhagen (people 
who, by definition, have spent far too much time locked in windowless rooms with 
nothing but piles of negotiation text to look at), Copenhagen is a contradiction. A 
process that ended with recriminations around whether the Accord document 
represented an accepted outcome because it was negotiated by a non­representative 
group but which, at the end of the day, was largely dominated by the relationship 
between only two nations, with all others (even India, and certainly the EU) playing 
a lesser role in determining the eventual outcome. It is not, therefore clear, that a push 
towards more ‘open and transparent’ negotiations solves anything. 
●	 The ‘consensus’ approach may prove to be broken, because there will always 
be a small group of nations willing to block process on any issue. 
● An inclusive process does not change the nature of the US/China dynamic. 
It doesn’t matter if one country, or 100 countries, disagree. If China and the 
U.S. cannot agree, there will be no deal. However, Copenhagen also shows 
that agreement between China and the U.S. may be a necessary condition, 
but it is clearly not a sufficient one. From a scientific perspective, the 
mitigation offers China and the U.S. tabled at Copenhagen are not 
sufficiently ambitious in terms of the 2 degree objective. 
In short, the challenge that could not be resolved in 1997, when the U.S. Senate 
rejected Kyoto, remains unresolved in 2009. The US, the world’s largest economy, is 
not party to a legally binding emissions reductions commitment. And the emergence 
of China as a world superpower makes the issue more, and not less, difficult to 
resolve. 
At some stage, China and the U.S. will have to make a deal. Both will have to sign 
up to commitments that they can accept, trusting that the other will make good on 
its offer. This did not happen at Copenhagen. Rather, China and the U.S. committed, 
unilaterally, to actions they were already resolved to do for domestic reasons (and in 
fact, as was true at Kyoto, any U.S. commitment is meaningless until and unless 
passed by Congress). Neither pledge is, of itself, compatible with stabilization of 
emissions at ‘safe’ levels, but it should be noted that the U.S. aspiration to reduce 
emissions by 42 per cent by 2030, and 83 per cent by 2050, would be consistent, 
broadly, with a 2 degree outcome. It is hard to see a future U.S. administrations 
delivering this aspiration, however, if Chinese emissions continue to rise post­2020. 
Prospects for 2010 
Can a deal, that proved so elusive at Copenhagen, be achieved at the UNFCCC 
negotiations in Cancun in December? Probably not – though it’s not out of the 
question. Economic recovery may make governments more ambitious, but the 
recovery remains fragile, especially in the developed world. U.S. legislation would 
certainly change the negotiations, but it is questionable as to whether legislation will 
pass this year, and cap and trade may not be included in legislation in the short­term.5 
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5 As one policymaker noted, 
though, lawmaking is like 
financial day trading, follow­
ing it minute to minute can 
make one insane: A tempes­
tuous process does not negate 
the possibility of effective leg­
islation at the end of the day. 
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A U.S. bill without cap and trade, even if it contained fairly ambitious domestic 
efficiency and renewables obligations, might well weaken the ambitions of others, and 
would certainly not help the carbon market. And, of course, none of this changes the 
position of China. They were unwilling in Copenhagen to commit to anything that 
might imply long­term emission reductions in China. The leadership in China is 
naturally cautious. A radical change of philosophy as regards climate seems therefore 
unlikely to occur in a year. However, at the same time, China is increasingly aware of 
the need to reduce emissions given the impact climate change will have on China. It 
remains a challenging balancing act. 
Copenhagen established a High­Level Advisory Group on climate financing, to be 
co­chaired by UK Prime Minister Brown and President Meles of Ethiopia this year. 
This group is to consider a range of approaches to securing $100 billion finance flows 
for climate change per annum by 2020. It is difficult to imagine, given the history of 
finance discussions within the UNFCCC to date, that this group will be able to come 
up with a mechanism that will please both the developed, and developing, countries. 
Possible options to generate public finance to pay for adaptation, technology and 
REDD include the auctioning of emissions permits to raise revenues, a banking 
transaction tax, or a levy on airfares. The difficulties of agreeing any of these are 
marked. Private finance flows could be considerable, given a fully functioning carbon 
market, and ambitious emissions caps, but as already discussed, the prospects of 
achieving this in 2010 are remote, and G77 countries which have been averse to the 
whole concept of emissions trading would have to agree to reconsider this position. 
What does all this mean for the UNFCCC process, and the EU, which has staked so 
much on it? The nightmare scenario is that 2010 sees the disintegration of the 
Copenhagen Accord, as negotiations are dominated not by issues of substance, but 
rather by disagreements about the legal status of the Accord. If such ‘process’ debates 
dominate proceedings, there is a danger that the UNFCCC could fail as an 
organization in 2010, thus possibly damaging the nascent carbon market. The EU, in 
particular, needs to find a narrative which, in the absence of a binding deal that 
includes China and the US, prevents such a collapse and maintains the relevance of the 
UNFCCC process, and moves discussions forward. Two challenges present themselves: 
●	 The immediate challenge is to rescue the Kyoto Protocol, the concept of a 
global carbon market and, by extension, private investment in emissions 
trading. Carbon markets could be significantly assisted by the introduction 
of cap and trade legislation in Japan and demand for emissions reductions 
credits in the US, via trading schemes like RGGI. 
● The second challenge is to deliver actions that address climate change. 
Financing of REDD activities is needed to halt the rate of deforestation, 
therefore minimizing global GHG emissions. Adaptation actions need to be 
supported, to demonstrate to developing countries that the developed world 
is serious about dealing with their climate problems (and not just 
demanding that they reduce their emissions). And the EU needs to drive a 
step­change in the way clean technology is developed and deployed, 
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internally through meeting its own targets (such as the target of achieving 
20% of primary energy production from renewable resources by 2020), 
externally through stimulating international cooperation and ‘technology 
transfer’. In short, the EU needs to put its money where its mouth is, through 
demonstrating what each member state will commit on fast­start, and 
beyond, and convince others to do likewise. Demonstration of real action is 
far more likely to change the minds of leaders than any amount of pious 
lecturing and economic ‘models’ highlighting the benefits of trading schemes 
for all. 
Two possible routes to a global deal 
Two very different possible narratives emerge from Copenhagen, both of which result 
(eventually) in a global climate deal. These two routes should therefore not be seen as 
mutually exclusive, since in reality there will be some “cross­talk” between them, and 
each can strengthen the other. What can be achieved through bottom­up processes 
can and should reinforce a more ambitious UNFCCC deal; at the same time a 
UNFCCC deal is necessary to galvanise the bottom­up activities and ensure that they 
do not dissipate over time. 
The narrative where the world fails to take actions to reduce emissions, and 
emissions grow on a ‘business­as­usual’ path is not reflected, though it has clearly 
been considered, and found wanting in many ways. 
The UNFCCC deal 
The political climate changes in such a way that China and India are willing to enter 
into some form of legally binding commitment, and the developed world, led by the 
US, commits to ambitious, legally binding, economy­wide emissions caps that 
stimulate real action at domestic level. Major developing countries sign up to sectoral 
trading, which links their heavy industries to cap and trade schemes in developed 
countries, resulting in significant investment in clean technologies, globally, thus 
driving ‘technology transfer’. The global carbon market is overseen by the UNFCCC 
which ensures environmental integrity and the equivalence of traded units. The 
developed world agrees to a funding mechanism that can cover the costs of REDD 
activities, and pay for adaptation for the most vulnerable. The prospect of global de­
carbonization drives significant investment in innovation which results in the 
development and global spread of new low­carbon technologies. 
The bottom­up deal 
Progress in the UNFCCC is stalled following the Copenhagen meeting. Domestic 
efforts in the EU, U.S. and other major economies (both developed, and developing) 
drive emissions reductions (or at least retard emissions growth). A REDD mechanism 
is agreed, on the basis that all countries recognize deforestation is a threat, and there 
is political will on all sides to commit public finance to address it. Adaptation is not 
dealt with through the UNFCCC, but rather is mainstreamed into the conventional 
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official development assistance (ODA) process. Investment in renewables 
significantly increases, driven by domestic concerns around security of fossil fuel 
supply, long­term sustainability, economic growth and air quality. CCS is 
demonstrated in the EU and the US. Japan and Australia (although the latter looks 
increasingly unwilling and it would appear this may be out of the cards till at least 
2013.) pass cap and trade legislation, which, together with EU demand for CDM 
credits, allows the carbon market to survive (if not thrive). These schemes link, 
since it is economically sensible to do so, and some form of arbitrage system ensues. 
Eventually, the US, having driven emissions down through efficiency and stimulus 
measures is able to pass cap and trade legislation (or, alternatively, regional schemes 
gain critical mass) and links to the other schemes. A global carbon market therefore 
begins to emerge, at a pace determined both by the political process (i.e. how long 
it takes to get the schemes in place) and the degree of ambition (i.e. how deep the 
cuts are). Technology competition gives way to technology cooperation as the 
impacts of climate change become more apparent, and more severe. This eventually 
allows all major economies to return to the UNFCCC and commit to a binding 
deal, which is largely simply a way of putting their domestic efforts into an 
internationally recognized form. The UNFCCC maintains countries GHG inven­
tories, and thus is able to take an overview of what global emissions are, but 
otherwise its roles have largely been replaced by domestic, and bilateral, decision 
making processes. 
summary 
Much thinking was done on how to address climate change, particularly around how 
to reduce global GHG emissions in a practical, and politically acceptable, way. The 
issues that were considered in the lead­up to Copenhagen have not all been resolved, 
as can be evidenced by the lack of legislation in the US, the lack of a binding deal at 
Copenhagen, the low carbon price and, most critically, the continued growth of 
global emissions. However, Copenhagen at the very least, marked the moment when 
all major world leaders engaged on the issue of climate change. There are many 
challenges to be faced over the next decade and this analysis suggests that some of the 
important ones are 
● National policy frameworks will have critical importance in driving 
emissions reductions – how can these be developed in the most effective 
way? How can we share best practices and lessons learnt? How can 
governments use private sector expertise to implement these? 
● A step change in investment in clean technologies in developed countries is 
needed, to bring about changes in infrastructure and drive emissions 
reductions. How can this be achieved? 
● How do we address the systemic barriers to investment in least developed 
countries? 
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●	 How can we scale up investment in emerging technologies, such as solar and 
CCS, in order to ensure these technologies become commercially 
competitive in the near future? 
●	 Perhaps most critically, what steps are needed to change the political 
dynamics, particularly in the U.S. and China, that could lead to these two 
superpowers committing to ambitious mitigation actions, and cooperating 
on clean technology development and deployment? 
Negotiators had hoped that Copenhagen might mark the end of a process to 
address many of these problems, but like Berlin, Kyoto and Bali before it, the process 
continues, with no end in sight. It is clear that many of these issues will not be resolved 
through the UNFCCC process, but rather within domestic processes and bilateral 
agreements. The exact role of the UNFCCC is unclear. 
All of this is daunting. But the international community will continue to work on 
a variety of fronts and in various multilateral and bilateral fora. Forging ahead is 
critical. As will be good will and generosity of spirit – neither of which has been 
absent from the process to date, even if they have been obscured by media reporting 
and the demands of the negotiations. 
Finally, if we could make one plea on the future of climate discussions, it would be 
for a far more intelligent, two­way conversation between decision­makers in 
government, and (from a climate perspective) the decision­makers who really matter, 
the ones who build the coal­fired power stations, and air­conditioning units, and cars, 
and also the wind­turbines, solar panels, insulation, and design the products of 
tomorrow, in short, the decision­makers in business and finance. A low­carbon future 
is possible, but only if we invest in it, globally. 
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DC Microgrids: Benefits and Barriers 
Paul Savage, Robert R. Nordhaus, and Sean P. Jamieson1 
i. overview 
Our electric power system was designed to move central station alternating current 
(AC) power, via high­voltage transmission lines and lower voltage distribution lines, 
to households and businesses that used the power in incandescent lights, AC motors, 
and other AC equipment. Today’s consumer equipment and tomorrow’s distributed 
renewable generation requires us to rethink this model. Electronic devices (such as 
computers, florescent lights, variable speed drives, and many other household and 
business appliances and equipment) need direct current (DC) input. However, all of 
these DC devices require conversion of the building’s AC power into DC for use, and 
that conversion typically uses inefficient rectifiers. Moreover, distributed renewable 
generation (such as rooftop solar) produces DC power but must be converted to AC 
to tie into the building’s electric system, only later to be re­converted to DC for many 
end uses. These AC­DC conversions (or DC­AC­DC in the case of rooftop solar) 
result in substantial energy losses. 
One possible solution is a DC microgrid, which is a DC grid within a building (or 
serving several buildings) that minimizes or eliminates entirely these conversion 
losses. In the DC microgrid system, AC power converts to DC when entering the DC 
grid using a high­efficiency rectifier, which then distributes the power directly to DC 
equipment served by the DC grid. On average, this system reduces AC to DC 
conversion losses from an average loss of about 32% down to 10%.2 In addition, roof 
top photovoltaic (PV) and other distributed DC generation can be fed directly to DC 
equipment, via the DC microgrid, without the double conversion loss (DC to AC to 
DC), which would be required if the DC generation output was fed into an AC 
system. 
This paper describes the operation of DC microgrids, potential national benefits, 
barriers to deployment, and policy measures that could accelerate this deployment. 
ii. dc microgrid technology 
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Title XIII, identifies the elements 
that characterize the “Smart Grid” policy goals. In summary, these are3: 
1 Paul Savage is CEO of Nextek 
Power Systems, Inc., Detroit, 
Michigan, and a Founder of 
the EMerge Alliance. Robert R. 
Nordhaus is a Member of, and 
Sean P. Jamieson is an 
Associate in the Washington, 
DC law firm of Van Ness 
Feldman, P.C.; views expressed 
in this paper are personal, not 
necessarily those of the law 
firm or its clients. The authors 
wish to thank Leslie Parker for 
her counsel on this paper. 
2 See Section III below for 
discussion of 68% average 
efficiency (32% loss) of the 
current AC to DC conversion. 
3 Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007 § 1301 et 
seq., 42 U.S.C. § 17381 et seq. 
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4 There followed seven “Points 
of Varying Agreement”, and a 
survey of who was doing 
what with microgrids at that 
time; survey available at 
http://www.electricdistribu­
tion.ctc.com/pdfs/Microgrid 
_Vision_ Workshop_ 
Presentation.pdf (last visited 
March 15, 2010). 
5 MISSING 
6 While for simplicity’s sake, we 
refer in the paper to DC 
microgrids, these systems can 
be further defined as follows: 
Nanogrids – defined as an 
electrical power system as 
described in the two universal 
points of agreement that 
serves a defined space in 
onebuilding; Microgrid – 
defined as an electrical power 
system as described in the 
two universal points of 
agreement that serves one 
building; and Minigrid – 
defined as an electrical power 
system as described in the 
two universal points of 
agreement that serves more 
than one building. 
● reliability; security; storage; distributed generation 
● energy efficiency; sustainability; renewable inputs 
● IT/communications leverage/full cyber­security 
● load awareness; demand side management; plug­in vehicles 
● lowering unnecessary barriers to achieving the above 
Each of these goals can be advanced through the use of DC microgrids, and often 
at lower cost with greater effectiveness than measures applied to the greater AC grid. 
The national power grid system in the U.S. and around the world was not designed 
to handle the energy demands of the modern economy. To meet the contemporary 
needs of the grid’s customers today, we should consider the tools available through 
DC microgrids, which can optimize the use of electronic devices, electrical storage, 
and distributed generation. 
The national Smart Grid discussion should thus focus on ensuring that the grid 
optimally balances what we refer to as the “Power Equation” (power generated, less 
line and conversion losses, equals power used). The interest in DC microgrids over 
the past 10 years has been growing. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the 
California Energy Commission (CEC), the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 
several utilities and many entrepreneurs and investors have sought through Smart 
Grid initiatives to upgrade the interface between the utility grid. The vast majority of 
these efforts have been designed to operate in the AC currency of the national grid. 
The present discussion focuses on DC microgrids as a way to improve the efficiency, 
reliability and security of the implementation of the Smart Grid 
A. What is a DC microgrid? 
Defining “microgrid” is important for our discussion, but not necessarily simple. The 
DOE and the CEC jointly commissioned a report from Navigant Consulting in 2005 
that wrestled with this very definition. The final report identified two “Points of 
Universal Agreement” of what constitutes a microgrid, which remain valid today: 
A microgrid consists of interconnected distributed energy resources capable 
of providing sufficient and continuous energy to a significant portion of 
internal load demand. 
A microgrid possesses independent controls, and intentional islanding takes 
place with minimal service interruption (seamless transition from grid­par­
allel to islanded operation).4 
These two definitions work easily in both the AC and DC domain, so we will 
borrow them both.5 
DC microgrids can be deployed in a portion of a building, building­wide or 
covering several buildings. We will refer to these systems (whatever their scale) as “DC 
microgrids” in the balance of this paper.6 
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This defined physical area that the DC microgrid serves is an important element 
when considering the deployment– more so than power level – because an 
important design consideration of DC networks at these voltages has to do with scale. 
DC power is highly susceptible to impedance (or resistance) losses, which are those 
imposed by the transmission medium itself, usually wire. The nature of DC is such 
that resistance can quickly sap power, but the efficiencies of DC systems—as we shall 
7 See, e.g., Report of Interna­
tional Energy Agency at (per see—are dramatic and must be considered in deciding the scale of a DC system. 
capital consumption and ener­
All of these grids have the common need to adopt standards to guarantee gy use by appliance), available 
interoperability. These standards are essential to the efficient development of the grid at 
http://www.iea.org/papers/and the successful achievement of the key goals of the Smart Grid at a lower cost than 
2005/AIXGapplianceenergyeff 
possible in the AC domain, as discussed above. _TG.pdf (last visited April 15, 
2010); 2007 Energy 
B. What can DC microgrids do?	 Information Administration 
Estimate, available at 
How would the grid look if its architecture optimized solar PV inputs, and http://www.eia.doe. 
maximized the efficiency of all of our electronic devices? What benefits would be	 gov/emeu/rec/contents.html 
(last visited April 15, 2010). gained by further accelerating these two fast growing elements of the Power 
Equation?7 Let us start with DC­powered electronic devices—which represent 50% of 
the electric load in many buildings today. In the 50 years following the advent of semi­ 8 Nippon Telephone & 
Telegraph (NTT) of Japan con­conductors in consumer products, electronic devices have become ubiquitous. 
ducted a great deal of 
Computing and Internet connectivity is showing up in many appliances, incandescent research in the 1990s about 
lights are giving way to electronic ones (either fluorescent or LED) and portable how to support the large 
electronic devices continue to proliferate. Another element of the growing DC load is	 amounts of new data running 
over its networks. NTT discov­the Variable Speed Drives (VFD) for electric motors. ered that when it comes to 
These electronic devices have been deployed in the millions to improve the reliability, AC does not come 
efficiency of the nearly ubiquitous AC induction motor. By installing VFDs in front close to the reliability realized 
in DC power systems. Over of their AC motors, building owners and operators are able to control the speed of the 
nine years later, with more 
motor, which delivers an outsized benefit: for every one­eighth the motor slows in than two times the DC sys­
speed, one­third of the energy is saved. Therefore, when a pump, fan or blower motor tems observed versus the AC 
systems, the DC systems can opportunistically be throttled back, a great deal of electricity is saved for the 
delivered better uptimes by 
customer. The grid benefits too, by not suffering the demand spikes that are caused an 8:1 ratio. Given the trend of 
when regular AC motors are turned off and on because they cannot modulate their increasing data (which, thanks 
speed. to Voice Over Internet 
Protocol, VOIP, most phone A VFD is not just an AC device that has AC going into it from the grid, and AC calls are digital rather than 
leaving it to the motor; instead the electricity must pass through a DC state, meaning analog) NTT has deployed 
that the AC motor connected to a VFD can become a DC consuming device, just like hundreds of new DC systems 
to support their data centers. your cell phone, laptop, LCD or plasma TV and overhead lights. 
A group convened by the U.S. 
Let us imagine these loads distributed throughout a building as they are now and utilities trade organization, 
imagine how we should power them, again borrowing the Smart Grid’s guiding Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI), has imple­principles for our better­optimized Power Equation. Because we are looking for 
mented such a demonstration 
reliability and redundancy, we will want to create a DC environment to deliver power in California and is working 
to these loads as the telecommunications has done historically in switching stations, with interested parties to do 
and more recently to support servers in data center applications.8 more. 
But better redundancy is only the beginning benefit a DC network brings because 
a DC Network does not need the ubiquitous AC to DC converting power supply (like 
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9 Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory (LBNL) estimates 
that the average loss in the 
installed base of internal and 
external power supplies 
(2008) is 32%. 
10 This assumes a 5% inverter 
loss, 9% transmission and 
distribution loss (DOE range 
is 7 to11%) and a rectifier loss 
at the device on an average 
of 32%, resulting in an overall 
loss of 41%. Note that with 
more efficient rectifiers sup­
plying the electronic device, 
this loss can be reduced. 
the brick that plugs into your laptop) for every electronic device. Assumed to be a 
necessity, power supplies currently on the market impose losses on the power going 
to the device, typically 15% to 40%.9 This range of losses in a DC microgrid can be 
readily lowered to 10% to 15% by using a higher efficiency conversion for multiple 
loads. This topology will persistently win out due to the superior economics of bulk 
conversion versus converter at every point­of­use. 
Another benefit of the decision to incorporate DC microgrids is the superior 
compatability of the DC power with electricity storage. During every major grid 
blackout (or brown­out, as periods of insufficient power production are called) 
experts note that further development of grid­scale power storage would vastly 
improve the stability of the grid. This concept, while technically possible, appears 
implausible because it evokes an image of some giant C­Cell Battery in the desert that 
would sustain the grid in case of emergency. This would simply be too expensive to 
make much sense. On the other hand, using distributed batteries connected to a DC 
network maximizes the battery’s power by avoiding the conversion of its output, but 
also equals the sum of its parts precisely, such that 1000 small battery banks each 
having 10 hours of capacity to run a laptop needing 100 watts equals 1 megawatt hour 
just as if it came from a giant battery owned by the utility. But this analogy is too 
generous to the latter: power from the distant battery would suffer other losses the 
local battery would not. These include inversion losses (going from the DC in the 
battery to the AC of the grid), transmission and distribution losses (estimated to be 7 
to 11% by the U.S. Department of Energy) and finally rectification losses when it gets 
to your electronic load. Collectively, these losses could add up to as much as 41% of 
the energy ultimately delivered to a DC device.10 
These conversion losses and line losses can largely be avoided by use of distributed 
batteries in a DC microgrid. Thus, although the DC network improves the economics 
of batteries (which are themselves DC devices) by marrying them closely to the DC 
devices they back­up in a highly distributed fashion, storage can be added to our 
developing DC microgrid in preference to large centralized battery storage schemes. 
Fortunately, adding DC storage to a DC microgrid is a comparatively simple piece 
of engineering compared to the complications of integrating DC storage in the AC 
domain where additional hardware is required. The oldest continuously operating 
electrical systems in the world, stretching back to the origins of Bell Telephone, use 
DC storage. Those early exchanges formed the model of reliability, if not universal 
connectivity — it took over 30 years to resolve barriers between exchanges so that 
callers could reach customers of other exchanges. 
Moreover, we have in this set of DC building loads the opportunity to integrate – 
at higher efficiency – other renewable energy generators that are intrinsically DC 
sources such as solar PV, small wind turbines, or fuel cells. Unlike an AC system, these 
various DC elements can work in concert without regard to matching phases. In a DC 
system, only the voltage needs to be considered, whereas AC systems require each 
element to have identical wave shapes—or be synchronized—to operate. This 
coordination is achieved through a complex device called an inverter, which provides 
the perennial weak link in distributed generation systems. 
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The DC microgrid thus can accommodate DC inputs because they enjoy a 
common currency. Therefore, given a suitably robust generator and ample storage, we 
now have quite an efficient local grid network that uses solar PV and integrates 
electrical storage at higher efficiencies than are possible in a conventional AC system. 
Existing plug­in devices pose a transitional challenge for DC microgrids because until 
these products are replaced by ones using a standard voltage, not all can be plugged 
in without a DC to DC converter. 
The DC microgrid can also simplify and raise the efficiency of how plug­in hybrid 
electric vehicles (PHEV) and electric vehicles (EV) connect to the grid. Rather than 
automatically requiring the grid to negotiate opportunistic givers or takers of electric 
power, which could have large adverse impacts on the grid’s stability, a DC microgrid 
can act like a high­efficiency buffer, optimizing generation and storage and increasing 
grid reliability. Moreover, because DC power has no phase to match, the connection 
to the vehicle is simplified, providing a more efficient path to its DC battery. As a 
system, the DC microgrid also creates more possibilities for the vehicle’s stored or 
generated power by enabling either high efficiency on site use, or the more marginal 
economics of sending the power to the grid. This option is valuable and will help 
create more efficient markets for all DG connected in this manner throughout the 
system. 
By locally managing sources and loads, a DC microgrid can optimize its net 
surplus of power (output to the grid) or deficit (input from the grid). This greater 
local management of both supply and demand creates a buffer to the grid and relieves 
some of its burden. Conventional means of Demand Side Management (DSM) do 
not accomplish these ends as efficiently. This becomes possible because of better 
exploitation of DC’s natural characteristics, which remains the lifeblood of all 
electronic devices and the de facto fuel of the digital economy. 
C. Perspective on the AC vs. DC battle 
Looking back a century at the struggle for dominance in the business of electricity, a 
great battle was fought over which paradigm would hold sway, AC or DC. A great deal 
of business history was written about these a\ttacks and counter­attacks, as well as a 
few torrid battlefield accounts, which all boil down to, for our purposes, four 
important points: (1)wholesale power production in large plants was cheaper than 
many distributed small ones; (2) AC could travel long distances with low losses, 
unlike DC; (3) incandescent lamps were the majority of the load and they operated 
on AC or DC; and (4) semi­conductors had not yet been invented. 
These facts led to Westinghouse’s triumph over Edison in many ways; however, 
they are also the reason why we need to resurrect some of Edison’s arguments to 
better serve the load today. As the Smart Grid guiding principles remind us, our 
Power Equation has to protect the environment more, and has a growing need for 
Distributed Generating DC inputs like solar PV and DC Storage. Meanwhile, 
electronic devices are the fastest growing segment of the load, showing decades of 
momentum. 
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11 See (public) Executive 
Summary of 1.0 version the 
standard, available at 
http://www.emergealliance.o 
rg (last visited March 22, 
2010). 
12 This assumes 600 million 
square feet of ceilings 
installed providing 1 watt per 
square foot of power, equal­
ing 600 MW of solar PV. 
13 See, e.g., Commercial, 
Industrial and Manufacturing 
Ventilation savings in the fol­
lowing tables. 
14 Power electronics in this 
sense refer to systems that 
use semiconductor compo­
nents usually found mounted 
on printed circuit boards. 
These ubiquitous devices con­
trol electrons through tran­
sistors, resistors, capacitors, 
diodes and the like to ampli­
fy, convert or otherwise 
transform the power input to 
them. 
Examples of the convergence of the DC microgrids and the Smart Grid include the 
work of over 50 companies that have come together in a non­profit organization 
called the EMerge Alliance to promote low­voltage DC power standards for device 
manufacturers and systems integrators. This group expects the momentum of LEDs 
as a light source for common lighting applications to continue and eventually 
dominate the lighting market. LEDs typically plug into a 110­volt or 208­volt AC 
power supply that converts that power to 24­volt DC which is what the light source 
consumes to make visible light. Not coincidently, 24­volt DC is the first DC power 
standard promulgated by the EMerge Alliance.11 
The companies that participate in the EMerge Alliance have developed products 
compatible with this DC power standard that enable a new kind of suspended ceiling 
that distributes low­voltage 24­volt DC power through the metal grid support 
structure in which ceiling tiles sit. This innovation in DC power distribution through 
the ceiling provides a new highly efficient channel for DC power generators to serve 
DC loads like electronically ballasted or LED lighting. If all of the new ceilings that 
are installed in the U.S. every year were specified to distribute DC in this new way, 
with solar inputs, these systems would accommodate over a Gigawatt of solar PV in 
the first two years.12 Similarly, roof­top solar could be incorporated in its native DC 
form at 99% efficiency to a portion of offset air handling loads, potentially providing 
over 50 TWh of annual avoided peak load in the U.S. per annum.13 This is power that, 
as in the lighting example, brings both the user and the grid consumer base benefits 
which the AC paradigm does not, avoiding transmission and distribution losses as 
well as conversion losses at the building site. 
iii. analysis of potential national benefits from widespread dc
microgrid deployment 
Identifying efficiency benefits that will come from widespread DC microgrid 
deployment involves gross estimates of the nation’s highly diverse load set. On the 
aggressive end, we note the estimate from Virginia Polytechnic Institute’s Center for 
Power Electronic Systems (CPES) which estimates that 80% of all electricity used in 
2010 will pass through power electronic systems.14 Because this estimate relies on a 
measure of the status quo which is mainly AC, we can confidently assume that these 
conventional systems could all be improved in terms of efficiency by instituting 
higher­efficiency conversions of AC to DC networks, instead of converting the AC 
power at each point­of­use. More conservatively, however, we can identify specific 
benefits DC microgrids can bring to loads like lighting and adjustable speed drives for 
induction motors, and multiply that number by the best estimates of the total load 
used for those segments. The latter underestimates the full efficiency benefits of DC 
microgrids in action; the former suggests efficiency savings that, by using DC 
microgrids, they would approach over time. 
What are our expectations for this new paradigm? Instead of the vertical, top­
down, hierarchically driven grid we have today, we are presenting a horizontal, highly 
distributed architecture that is open to innovation. We should expect similar pay­offs 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
s;v;ge, nordh;us, ;nd j;mieson 57 
to the users of the system to resemble those achieved by information seekers via the 
Internet. 
A. Energy savings (MWH) 
The Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) has estimated that the total 
amount of energy flowing into external power supplies for electronic devices in the 
U.S. is about 290 TWh/year.15 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 15 Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory Symposium, What the DOE’s Energy Star program estimates that one­third to one­half of the power sent 
the Real World Tells Us About 
to these devices is lost as heat. This ultimately means that around 100­150 TWh/year Saving Energy In Electronics, 
are currently being lost in these conversions.16 available at http://eetd.lbl. 
Most of the comprehensive national electric power data available is about the gov/ea/nordman/docs/e3s_ 
nordman.pdf (last visited output from the grid, not how that power is used. Borrowing largely from the U.S. March 22, 2010). 
Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) categories and data, we can begin to 
build a ground­up, load­by­load assessment of the energy savings possible through 
16 U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, Information About the use of DC microgrids. Where savings are derived from improved power supply 
External Power Supplies, 
efficiency only, 70% or 75% efficiency is used as an average range for AC power available at http://www. 
supplies, which is generous given the LBNL estimates,17 and 90% is used for the bulk	 energystar.gov/index.cfm? 
c=archives.power_supplies high­efficiency rectifier that would be used in a DC microgrid. These rectifiers are 
(last visited March 22, 2010). 
currently available in the market. The table below shows these sectors, the relevant 
loads, and the potential savings: 17 Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory (LBNL) estimated 
18 average efficiency of 68%. Residential power consumption by addressable load, 2006
Device MWh used 
Potential DC 
microgrid savings MWh saved 
Refrigerators 160,158,600 40%19 64,063,440 
Indoor/Outdoor Lighting 103,113,000 15% 15,466,950 
Furnace Fan 39,193,200 25% 9,798,300 
Microwave 19,801,800 15% 2,970,270 
Color TV 33,960,600 15% 5,094,090 
VCR / DVD 11,593,800 15% 1,739,070 
Cable Boxes 2,975,400 15% 446,310 
Satellite Dish 1,846,800 15% 277,020 
Desktops 17,647,200 15% 2,647,080 
Laptops 1,333,800 15% 200,070 
Printers 4,617,000 15% 692,550 
Pool Filter Pump 10,054,800 25% 2,513,700 
Ceiling Fan 9,849,600 30% 2,954,880 
Water Pump 5,643,000 25% 1,410,750 
Stereo Systems 5,130,000 15% 769,500 
Evaporative Cooling 3,283,200 25% 820,800 
Portable Stereos 718,200 15% 107,730 
Cordless telephones/answer 4,514,400 15% 677,160 
Rechargeable tools 
Residual20 
2,154,600 
82,285,200 
15% 
10% 
323,190 
8,228,520 
Total 519,874,200	 121,201,380 
18 This 2001 data has interpolat­
ed for 2006 using the growth 
of households from U.S. 
Census data as proxy. 
19 While 40% appears to be a 
large number, only US­manu­
factured DC refrigerators 
were discovered to actually 
deliver an 80% improvement, 
but not without some com­
promises such as more insu­
lation leading to smaller 
cubic storage, necessary peri­
odic defrosting, etc. This effi­
ciency benefit discount is 
meant to accommodate 
these variations in the serv­
iceability between AC and DC 
refrigerators. 
20 This residual load is uncate­
gorized, but significant; 
therefore, this modest expec­
tation of efficiency improve­
ment of 10% should be de 
minimus. 
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Potential percentage savings for the residential sector’s addressable load: 25.32%; 
corresponding reduction in the total U.S. load: 2.98%. Addressable load refers to load 
that can be connected to a DC microgrid. 
21 Energy Information 
Administration, Office of 
Commercial building power consumption by load 2006
21 
Energy Markets and End Use, 
Form EIA­871A, C, and E of the 
2003 Commercial Buildings 
Energy Consumption Survey. 
22 Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, 
Data Center Electricity Bills 
Double, INFORMATIONWEEK, 
Feb. 19, 2007, available at 
http://www.information­
week.com/news/infrastruc­
ture/management/showArtic 
le.jhtml?artic leID= 
197006830 (last visited 
March 22, 2010). 
23 DC Power for Improved Data 
Center Efficiency Report, 
Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory (Mar. 2008), avail­
able at http://hightech.lbl. 
gov/documents/DATA_ 
CENTERS/DCDemoFinalRepor 
t.pdf (last visited April 15, 
2010). 
Device MWh used 
Potential DC 
microgrid savings MWh saved 
Ventilation 128,000,000 33% 42,240,000 
Lighting 393,000,000 15% 58,950,000 
Office Equipment 20,000,000 15% 3,000,000 
Computers 46,000,000 15% 6,900,000 
Residual 61,000,000 20% 12,200,000 
Total 648,000,000 123,290,000 
Potential percentage savings for the commercial building sector’s addressable load: 
19.03%; corresponding reduction in the total U.S. load: 3.03%. 
Manufacturing sector power consumption by addressable load 2006 
Device MWh used 
Potential DC 
microgrid savings MWh saved 
Ventilation 64,274,133 20% 12,854,827 
Lighting 64,274,133 20% 12,854,827 
Office Equipment 64,274,133 20% 12,854,827 
Computers 64,274,133 20% 12,854,827 
Robotics 64,274,133 20% 12,854,827 
Residual 64,274,133 20% 12,854,827 
Total 385,644,800 77,128,960 
Potential percentage savings for the manufacturing sector’s addressable load: 
20.00%; corresponding reduction in the total U.S. load: 1.09%. 
22 
Data center power consumption 2005
Device MWh used 
Potential DC 
microgrid savings MWh saved 
Total Load 53,654,594 28%23 15,023,286 
15,023,286 Total 53,654,594 
Potential percentage savings for the data center sector’s addressable load is 28.00%, 
which corresponds to the reduction in the total U.S. load of 0.37%. 
Two dimensions of this large potential savings number are notable: first, that data 
center power consumption doubled from 2000 to 2005 and is expected to double 
again by 2010, which highlights the urgency of achieving efficiency gains in this 
sector; and second, one­half of data center building­wide efficiency gain is due to the 
avoided cooling load from fewer watts escaping as heat inside the building envelope. 
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This avoided cooling is easily measured in the extremely high­density power 
environment of a data center, but is nevertheless present in all DC microgrid 
installations at a smaller scale. This is mentioned in the “Additional Benefits” Section 
3, following. 
24 24 Summary table in terawatts Id.; please note that columns 
do not add up due to round­
ing; also, the summary table 
is the sum of the table 
results preceding it. 
Potential Potential efficiency Potential reduction 
Sector TWh saved gain in sector(s) in U.S. national load 
Residential 121 25.32% 2.98% 
Commercial 123 19.03% 3.03% 
Manufacturing 77 20% 1.90% 
Data Centers 15 28% 0.37% 
Total 337 21.50% 8.28% 
1. Generation capacity savings (MW)25 
These large potential benefits from efficiency would have an immediate positive 
impact on capacity, and capacity planning benefitting all grid stakeholders. Using 
contemporaneous data from 2006 for our load analysis, we can see how a lower load 
would deliver large benefits. The avoided 337 TWh of power generation, for example, 
could have allowed grid operators to shut down or avoid construction of about 75 
GWof generating capacity.26 
2. Transmission and distribution 
The key strength of the AC is its un­matched efficiency as an inexpensive long­haul 
operator. Lowering end­use loads and facilitated on­site generation reduces loads on 
the transmission and distribution systems. We should therefore use the AC currency 
of the grid to the maximum benefit, as we have done with DC. Because DC 
microgrids reduce end­use loads and facilitate on­site generations, they can 
significantly reduce loads on the transmission and distribution system. 
Other high­voltage DC transmission schemes are outside the scope of this analysis. 
It is interesting to note, however, that short high­voltage DC power lines do regularly 
operate between large service territories of the grid so that these large synchronized 
pools of AC power can stay connected to each other without the burden of precisely 
matching the phase of their neighbor. This buffer is important when a large section 
of the grid is brought down for any reason. With DC connections to its neighboring 
grid territories, coming back on­line is easier when the reviving generator does not 
have to synchronize with a connected systems’ precise phase. 
3. Additional benefits for on­site power generation from DC Sources (e.g. solar PV,
small wind turbines, fuel cells and variable DC generators) 
Because DC microgrids are more efficient, they produce less heat inside the building 
envelope. As we saw in the data center application, this electrical efficiency benefit can 
double due to the avoided cooling load. This benefit is present in all DC microgrids, 
but has not been modeled outside the data center application in this analysis. 
25 http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_ 
sum.html 
26 This calculation assumes 
peak load decreases in the 
same percentage as total 
load. Thus 8.28% X (2008 U.S. 
noncoincident peak load + 
15% reserve margin) = 75.2 
MW. See, e.g., http://www. 
eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/ 
epa/epa_sum.html (last visit­
ed Apr. 14, 2010). 
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It should also be noted that multiple DC power inputs to the microgrid can be 
more simply integrated. No phase matching is required as in AC systems, and the 
efficiency observed extends to batteries, small wind turbines, fuel cells and variable 
speed DC generators. The latter has great potential in that they could respond in near 
real time to increased load demand, providing more battery­like surge capacity. 
Combining multiple inputs raises the likelihood that several different fuels could 
be used at the building site, which increases the intrinsic security of the system. 
iv. barriers to dc microgrid deployment and recommended public
policy initiatives 
Current federal environmental law and utility regulatory practices in many states do 
not recognize the full societal value of energy efficiency and renewable energy 
investments in general, or of DC microgrids in particular. The systemic flaws in our 
current regulatory framework are well­recognized; they include the failure of the 
current regulatory framework to internalize the social costs of greenhouse gas 
emissions. A price on carbon and other GHGs will increase the cost of fossil fuel 
generation and thus make both energy efficiency and zero­carbon renewable 
generation more cost­effective. 
Further, many state utility commissions have not decoupled utility profits from 
volume of sales, leaving in place substantial disincentives for utilities to promote 
energy efficiency and distributed generation if they decrease utility demand. These 
issues are familiar ones and ones that we discuss only in summary fashion in this 
paper. Instead this paper focuses on the specific issues related to DC microgrid 
deployment. These specific issues include (1) information and education programs 
for construction industry and building code officials; (2) codes and standards; (3) 
federal tax law; (4) federal financial assistance programs; (5) utility rate design and 
regulation; and (6) renewable electricity standards. 
A. Information and education program for construction industry and code officials 
We recognize the importance of good communications about the benefits of DC 
microgrids. Historically, consumers have not appreciated their electrical service in its 
complexity, but that is changing rapidly with increasingly higher energy prices and 
innovations in time­of­use (TOU) pricing. Likewise, the awareness of environmental 
issues, such as carbon emissions and global warming, have piqued the interest of 
power industry professionals and prompted legislation to address these issues. 
Collectively, these forces have created an atmosphere of uncertainty around the future 
of our electrical system. 
These facts highlight the need for an organized effort to disseminate information 
about the benefits DC microgrids offer. Some of this work has already begun by the 
EMerge Alliance through outreach to utilities, universities, the electrical trades and 
other interested parties. A “road­show” may be necessary to reach authorities having 
jurisdiction (AHJs), so that federal, state and local government can play an important 
role in supporting this effort. State and local governments, as primary regulators for 
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buildings, will find that conversion to a DC microgrid system provides a cost­effective 
method to further energy efficiency goals. Because local building inspectors have the 
responsibility to interpret the National Electric Code, advocates of DC microgrids 
should conduct informative presentations to the trade organizations and conferences 
that cater to these inspectors. 
B. Codes and standards 
The National Electric Code® (NEC)27 is a living body of work that grows every few 
years through the efforts of thousands of electrical and electronics engineers and 
administrators. Fortunately, most of the work of putting together a DC microgrid 
falls under the existing code. Occasionally, however, the NEC remains silent on DC 
power installations below 600­volts DC, so that DC power is accommodated under 
rules that govern either AC or DC power systems of the same voltage. This is true, for 
example, for the insulation and shielding requirements for wires carrying electricity 
under 600 volts. 
While often not prohibited, a lack of references to DC can give both electricians 
and AHJs reason for concern; therefore, newly articulated descriptions of DC systems 
should be considered, even when no new rules are established in their narrative. Well­
established sections of the code in place for decades have defined the 48­volt DC 
domain that was once ubiquitous as the voltage in plain old telephone service 
(POTS). Twenty­four volt DC has had no such history, but systems operating below 
30­volts DC, which strictly limit current to under 100 volts­amps are designated 
“Class 2,” denoting them as intrinsically safe from shock or fire hazard, which is an 
obvious advantage. The 24­volt DC standard promoted by the EMerge Alliance is in 
this category. That effort, coordinated with NEC committees’ input and guidance, 
will spread the word, but a timely roll­out would benefit greatly from some 
coordinated efforts from interested areas of the government and standards bodies 
such as National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI), the National Electrical Manufacturers Association 
(NEMA), the U.S. Department of Energy, and its system of National Laboratories and 
Technical Centers. 
C. Federal tax law 
Federal tax law provides a range of tax credits and other tax incentives for energy 
efficiency, renewable energy and other low­ or zero­carbon technologies.28 However, 
these tax incentives do not provide any significant financial benefit for DC microgrid 
technology even though, as we note above, these microgrids can provide extensive 
savings in energy use and result in significant reductions in GHG emissions. Two 
specific changes in Federal tax law could help close this gap: a “negawatt credit” for 
DC microgrid systems, and a clarification of the production tax credit. 
1. DC microgrid negawatt credit 
Under this proposal, the owner of a DC microgrid would be allowed the equivalent 
of a production tax credit (currently about 2¢ per kWh) for each kWh of avoided 
27 NFPA 70, National Electric 
Code (2008)® is a United 
States standard for safe 
installation of electrical 
wiring and equipment, and 
part of the National Fire 
Codes series published by the 
National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA). 
28 26 U.S.C. §§ 45, 48(a)­(c) 
(2009). 
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29 “Self­generation” means 
renewable generation that is 
consumed by the owner of 
the facility (or an affiliate of 
the owner). 
conversion losses attributable to the operation of a DC microgrid. These avoided 
losses would encompass (1) savings from a centralized AC­to­DC conversion at the 
point where AC grid power enters the DC microgrid, and (2) avoidance of AC to DC 
to AC conversion for on­site renewable generation. 
2. Production tax credit 
Section 45 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 provides for a production tax credit 
of electricity produced by renewable generation facilities. The credit currently is set 
at 2¢ per kWh, and is adjusted for inflation. Tax credit qualification remains subject 
to numerous technical limitations, including a requirement in section 45(a)(2)(D) 
that requires that the output of the facility be sold to an unrelated person. This 
limitation disqualifies self­generation; that is, renewable generation that is consumed 
by the owner of the facility (or an affiliate of the owner).29 One of the attractions of 
DC microgrids is their ability to use the DC output of on­site renewable generation 
without the double conversion loss (from DC output to AC to DC for equipment use) 
that occurs when on­site renewables must be integrated into an AC grid. We would 
recommend that section 45(a)(2)(D) be amended to make the sale­to­unrelated­
party requirement inapplicable to on­site renewable output delivered into a DC 
microgrid and consumed on­site. 
D. Federal financial assistance programs 
DOE administers a series of federal financial assistance programs for advanced 
energy technologies. These include basic research and development under the ARPA­
E program, various programs administered by DOE’s National Laboratories, cost­
sharing grants administered by DOE’s program offices (in particular, the Office of 
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy and the Office of Fossil energy), and a 
massive loan guarantee program under title XVII of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
DC microgrid projects are eligible for assistance under most of these programs. 
However, because of the projects’ low visibility and the fact that they cut across 
jurisdiction of various DOE program offices, they have never been a major funding 
priority. The following changes in DOE’s financial assistance programs would 
advance the DC microgrid technology. 
1. Designate responsible DOE program office 
As noted above, responsibility for DOE’s DC microgrid programs, to the extent they 
exist, are scattered among a number of program offices, with none responsible for 
coordinating DOE’s support for the development and deployment of these systems. 
Designating a single program office (such as EERE) as responsible for coordinating 
DOE’s efforts in this area could significantly advance the pace and effectiveness of 
DOE’s efforts in this realm. 
2. Strengthen DOE funding for demonstration projects 
While commercial deployment of DC microgrid systems is proceeding in individual 
buildings, demonstrating multi­building and community­scale systems could benefit 
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from more effective DOE financial support, in the form of cost­share demonstration 
grants. DOE has ample authority under its organic RD&D statutes;30 however, an 30 See Federal Nonnuclear 
Energy Research and appropriation specifically for this purpose (but not for any specific project or 
Development Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
projects) would significantly advance demonstration of the technology	 and 5919 (2008); Energy 
economics of these larger scale projects.	 Reorganization Act §§ 101­107, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 5811­5817 (2008). 
E. Utility rate design and regulation	 31 See, e.g., U.S. Energy 
1. Ratemaking issues	 Information Administration, 
“Status of Electricity 
(a) DC Microgrids Under Conventional Utility Regulation Restructuring By State” (Jan. 
The traditional electric utility regulatory model is cost­of­service regulation	 2010), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cnea of a vertically integrated power supplier who has a local retail monopoly. 
f/electricity/page/ restructur­
This model is still the norm in about half of the U.S.31 A DC microgrid ing/ restructure_elect.html 
system that (i) is end­user­owned, (ii) is behind­the­meter, and (iii) (last visited Mar. 8, 2010). 
supplies no output back to the grid does not prevent regulatory issues under 32 El Paso Elec. Co., 114 FERC ¶ this model. The DC microgrid is simply another means of the customer’s 61,175 (2006) (FERC has no 
internal distribution of power purchased from the utility supplier. However, jurisdiction over a customer 
if any of the three conditions are not met, then, absent regulatory that traditionally purchased 
its power under a state­regu­accommodation to this new technology, regulatory barriers (which 
lated retail tariff, and has pro­
incumbent utilities may exploit) can retard deployment of these systems. vided primarily a submeter­
These potential barriers include: ing function, because the 
customer is not reselling that 
Third­party systems—One attractive model for large­scale DC microgrids is power and thus no sale for 
a system which is owned by a third party (rather than the end­user), and resale exists); see also 
Alabama Power Co., 95 FERC which purchases AC power from the utility, converts it to DC, and resells ¶ 61,002 (2001) (disclaiming 
it to individual users. This configuration raises two important questions jurisdiction); Cf. City of 
under conventional utility regulation. First, is the utility sale to the system Oakland, 31 FERC ¶ 61,139 
(1985), rev’d on appeal, operator a wholesale sale regulated by FERC under the Federal Power Act, 
Oakland Bd. Of Port Comm’rs 
rather than a retail sale regulated by a state utility commission under state v. FERC, 754 F.2d 1378 (185). 
law? Second, is the sale to the end­user a retail sale that contravenes the 
33 See, e.g., state law retail utility’s retail monopoly? No clear answer exists to either question because 
restructuring programs for 
the answer relies on inconsistent FERC precedent relating to utilities in Florida, California, 
“submetering,”32 and vagaries of state law on exclusive retail service areas.33 and Massachusetts. 
Because answering these questions on a case­by­case basis expends both 
time and money, a federal statutory solution would be the most efficient 
resolution. One approach would be to exempt utility sales to third­party DC 
microgrid systems from wholesale regulation under the Federal Power Act, 
conditioned on the state’s regulating the utility sale to the third­party 
microgrid operator, permitting the operator to resell to end­users, and 
ensuring that the utility’s rates to the microgrid are not unduly 
discriminatory. 
Sales back to grid.—Another key benefit of a DC microgrid is the ability to
 
collect distributed renewable generations (or other on­site DC generation),
 
to efficiently convert it to AC and to sell it back to the grid. The sale to the
 
grid is a wholesale sale and ordinarily falls subject to wholesale rate
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34 PURPA § 210(e); 16 U.S.C. § 
824a­3(e)(1) (2009) (requiring 
the FERC to “prescribe rules 
under which geothermal 
small power production facil­
ities of not more than 80 
megawatts capacity, qualify­
ing cogeneration facilities, 
and qualifying small power 
production facilities are 
exempted in whole or part 
from the Federal Power Act, 
the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act, and state laws 
and regulations” with respect 
to rates or financial or organ­
ization regulation of electric 
utilities if the Commission 
determines that such an 
exemption would be neces­
sary to encourage cogenera­
tion and small power produc­
tion); see also Sun Edison LLC, 
129 FERC ¶ 61,146 at P. 20 
(2009) (finding that because 
the end­use customer makes 
no net sale to the local load­
serving utility within which it 
has a net metering agree­
ment, the sale of electric 
energy to the end­use cus­
tomer in such circumstances 
does not constitute a sale for 
resale and thus not subject 
to FERC’s jurisdiction). 
35 18 CFR § 292.601(c) (2009). 
36 16 U.S.C. § 824a­3(e)(2) (2009) 
(establishing that no qualify­
ing small power production 
facility exceeding 30 
megawatts may be exempt­
ed under the rules prescribed 
pursuant to PURPA § 210(e)(1), 
unless that facility produces 
electric energy solely by the 
use of biomass as a primary 
energy source). 
37 FERC Order No. 688 (Oct. 
2006), 18 C.F.R. § 292.309(a) 
(2009) (implementing PURPA 
§ 210(m), 16 U.S.C. §824a­3(m) 
(2009)). 
regulation under the Federal Power Act (FPA), unless exempt under the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).34 PURPA generally exempts 
small renewable power generation and certain cogeneration (“qualifying 
facilities”) from regulation under the FPA. However, large renewable 
systems (above 20 MW)35 and other on­site generation, (such as fuel cells 
and micro­turbines) are not exempt and sales of their output to the grid 
likely fall subject to FPA regulation.36 
PURPA also requires utilities to purchase the output of qualifying facilities. 
However, significant limitations exist both on the utility’s federal law 
obligation to purchase from these facilities and on a state’s ability to require 
purchase at rates above avoided cost. In major competitive wholesale 
markets (such as PJM, NY ISO, ISO New England), FERC rules have relieved 
utilities of their purchase obligations.37 In addition, the federal purchase 
obligation, where it exists, is limited to “avoided cost”38 – which is the cost 
the utility would have incurred if it had generated the power itself or 
purchased it elsewhere, as determined by the state utility regulatory 
commission. In most states, avoided cost is well below retail rates and may be 
insufficient to support many types of renewable generation. 
Another issue relates to a state’s authority to require utilities to pay higher­
than­ avoided­cost rates. FERC precedent from 1995 purports to preempt 
certain state rules requiring utilities to pay qualifying facilities rates in excess 
of avoided cost.39 To the extent these rules raise a problem for DC microgrids, 
they can be dealt with, at least in part, by changes in federal law that (1) 
permit these systems to sell output at avoided cost rates without regard to 
size, and (2) give states clear authority to require above avoided­cost rates. 
(b) DC Microgrids in Restructured Electric Power Markets 
In much of the U.S., electric power regulation has been restructured to allow 
retail competitions. DC microgrids face fewer issues in the markets than in 
cost­of­service areas. While their sale of AC power by a utility or other seller 
may be subject to FERC regulation, the resale of DC power to end­users will 
not raise questions under exclusive services area laws (which no longer 
apply). However, sales back to the grid in restructured markets raise similar 
issues to those discussed in retail cost­of­service markets. 
2. Feed­in tariffs 
A feed­in tariff is a standing offer by a utility to purchase the output of a renewable 
generator at a fixed or formula rate. A feed­in tariff applicable to DC microgrid 
renewable generation sold into the grid could significantly improve the economics of 
these systems. 
PURPA’s avoided cost purchase obligation, discussed above, represents one form of 
a feed­in tariff—albeit a complicated one because in many circumstances it requires 
a case­by­case determination of the utility’s avoided cost. A more useful feed­in tariff 
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arrangement would entail a standardized rate set on the basis of the incentive 
necessary to deploy the resource rather than on the basis of the purchasing utility’s 38 16 U.S.C. § 824a­3(b) (2009) 
(explaining that no rule pre­avoided cost. However, this type of tariff is not permissible under federal law if it sets 
scribed in PURPA Section a rate above avoided cost, and a significant question has been raised as to whether it 210(a) shall provide for a rate 
is permissible under state law, as we note in the discussion above.40 Clarifying that which exceeds the “incre­
PURPA does not preempt higher than “avoided cost” feed­in tariffs should provide mental cost” to the electric 
utility of alternative electric grounds for states to move forward with innovative feed­in tariff proposals, which energy). In the context of 
could benefit DC microgrids and other renewable systems. electric energy purchased 
In addition, feed­in tariffs should be designed to permit DC microgrid renewable from a qualifying cogenera­
tor or qualifying small power generation to receive feed­in tariff credit for its entire renewable output, whether or 
producer, PURPA § 210(d) 
not consumed within the DC microgrid. In return, the DC microgrid would pay the defines incremental cost as 
utility’s retail rate for its entire internal load. This type of arrangement allows the DC	 the “cost to the electric utili­
ty of the electric energy microgrid to take advantage of the feed­in tariff for its full renewable output without 
which, but for the purchase incurring conversion losses that would be necessary if it physically delivered its full from such cogenerator or 
output to the grid and physically supplied its full internal load from the grid.	 small power producer, such 
utility would generate or pur­
chase from another source.” 3. Utility ownership of DC microgrids 16 U.S.C. § 824a­3(d). 
An alternative to third­party ownership of large scale DC microgrids is utility 39 Cf. Conn. Light & Power, 70 ownership of the microgrid. This model could be an effective means of deploying 
FERC ¶ 61,012 (1995) finding 
systems that sell DC power from a multi­building network to multiple end­users, that the Federal Power Act 
particularly in states that have exclusive retail service territory laws. If the incumbent	 preempted the Connecticut 
Department of Public utility is the retail seller, then no retail service exclusivity issue arises; however, the DC 
Utility’s ability to order a util­microgrid service must still be authorized either under the general terms of the state’s ity to enter into a contract at 
utility laws or by action of the state regulator. A more important issue is whether the a state­set price because oth­
utility will provide a useful and cost­effective DC microgrid service to end­users and erwise it would be impossi­
ble for the utility to simulta­whether the public is better served by having competitive offerings from a number of neously comply with the 
prospective microgrid operators. state mandate and the FERC 
mandate); Midwest Power 
Systems, 78 FERC ¶ 61,097 F. Renewable Electricity Standard 
(1997) (finding that the 
Current proposals for a Renewable Electricity Standard (RES) require retail electric	 Federal Power Act did not 
preempt a state law requir­utilities to generate or purchase a minimum percentage of renewable energy resources 
ing utilities to purchase from each year. Generators of clean renewable energy resources are issued tradable state­designated facilities, 
renewable energy credits (RECs). Utilities may purchase RECs for use for compliance but the FPA did preempt any 
purposes, or they may produce renewable energy from their own facilities. Electricity order by the Iowa Utilities 
Board which set rates for savings from energy efficiency may also be used for compliance purposes. wholesale transactions); see 
The RES as currently formulated would provide full credit for renewables delivered also Scott Hempling et al., 
into a DC microgrid system; however, the treatment of the efficiency gains from these “Renewable Energy Prices in 
State­Level Feed­In Tariffs,” systems is unclear. An RES provision specifically tailored to DC microgrids that 
National Renewable Energy 
provides explicit credit for efficiency gains (from lower conversion losses) for DC Laboratory (Jan. 2010), avail­
microgrids would resolve any confusion related to the applicability of the general	 able at http://www.nrel.gov/ 
docs/ fy10osti/47408.pdf (last provisions for computing electricity savings. Such a provision would direct DOE to 
visited Mar. 9, 2010). determine electricity savings by rule, based on the difference between conversion 
losses for the average AC system minus demonstrated lower conversion losses for the 40 See discussion, supra at note 
DC microgrid. 38. 
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v. conclusion 
The DC microgrid concept represents a decentralization of the idea of the grid, and 
one that advances the goals of the current Smart Grid overhaul. The DC microgrid 
begins to change the paradigm from a centralized generation and distribution system 
of power delivery to a system that is more flexible and more accommodating of the 
load that has come to be: one that is more electronic, more ubiquitous, and more 
essential to our economy and our culture. 
DC microgrids can create power systems that are more efficient and more 
compatible with the fastest growing segment of the load today: electronic devices. In 
turn, by catering to the needs of digital devices, we naturally expand the networks in 
which they operate (both power and control) to benefit from – or indeed require – 
redundant operation that is primarily available today through the other ubiquitous 
DC device, the battery. 
But widespread deployment of DC microgrids will not happen automatically – the 
impediments to deployment identified above need to be dealt with. Our 
recommendations can be a first step in doing that. 
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Renewable Energy Services in the GATS 
Lisa Alejandro1 
United States International Trade Commission 
what are renewable energy services? 
Much attention is paid to trade in renewable energy goods, such as wind turbines, 
solar PV cells, or dual­use goods such as inverters. Services essential to the 
development and operation of renewable energy projects, however, tend to receive 
less attention, due in part to uncertainty about what constitutes such a service. 
Certain services are widely identified as renewable energy related activities. In the 
wind sector, for example, project development, financing, construction, engineering, 
transportation, and operation and maintenance are generally considered to be 
fundamental services in the lifecycle of a project. A company trying to provide any of 
these services in a foreign market may face barriers to entry which could ultimately 
raise project costs, delay implementation, or derail a project altogether. As such, it is 
important for services providers to be able to clearly understand existing 
commitments or barriers in a particular country, and for WTO members to expand 
commitments across the energy services spectrum. 
In the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), services are divided into general categories and then broken out in greater 
detail according to the Services Sectoral Classification List (W/120). In most 
instances, categories are defined according to the Provisional Central Product 
Classification (CPC). There is no single category for energy services, renewable or 
otherwise. Most of the services involved in the provision of renewable energy are 
found in various categories throughout the W/120. In the context of the Doha 
Development Agenda, the United States offered to liberalize commitments across a 
selection of services identified in a “checklist” of energy­related services (Table 1). 
This checklist has been adopted by several countries and is the most comprehensive 
approach toward liberalization of the energy services sector to date. Because energy 
negotiations in the WTO are source neutral – that is, the method of generation (e.g., 
coal, wind, biomass, etc.) is irrelevant – any commitments made to services in the 
checklist automatically apply to renewable energy unless specifically exempted. 
1 The work in this paper does 
not represent the views of the 
United States International 
Trade Commission or any of its 
individual Commissioners. This 
paper is the work of the 
author only, and not an official 
Commission document. 
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Table 1 Checklist of energy­related services included in the U.S. GATS offer, 2003 
CPC code Description 
5115, 883 Services incidental to mining 
8675 Certain related scientific and technical consulting
services 
887 
861, 862, 863, 8672, 8673, 9312, 
93191, 932 
Services incidental to energy distribution 
Certain professional services, including 
engineering and integrated engineering services 
6111, 6113, 6121, 621, 622, 631, 632 Distribution services, including commission
agents, wholesale trade, and retail trade services
that apply to fuels, related products, and
brokerage of electricity 
633, 8861­8866 Maintenance and repair of equipment, except
transport­related equipment 
865 Management consulting and related services 
511­518 Construction and related engineering services 
7131 Pipeline transportation of fuels 
7422 Storage and warehouse services, particularly
bulk storage services of liquids and gases 
8676 Technical testing and analysis services 
Source: WTO, “Council for Trade in Services – Special Session – Communication from the United States – 
Initial Offer,” TN/S/O/USA, September 4, 2003; and United States International Trade Commission, Renewable 
Energy Services: An Examination of U.S. and Foreign Markets, Publication 3805, October 2005, 1­4. 
how are renewable energy services traded? 
Most services, including renewable energy services, are traded either across borders or 
through affiliate transactions. Cross­border transactions occur when money or 
information is sent from a supplier in one country to a consumer in another (mode 
1), a foreign consumer enters the country of a supplier to consume the service (mode 
2), or a foreign national enters another country to provide the service (mode 4). 
Affiliate transactions (mode 3) are conducted when a firm sells its services in a foreign 
market through an affiliated firm that it has established or acquired a presence in that 
market. When making commitments in the GATS, countries may choose to fully 
liberalize market access and/or national treatment across all four modes, partially 
liberalize by committing to select modes, or make no commitments at all. 
how free is trade in renewable energy services? 
Commitments on renewable energy services are not easily identified or quantified, 
and as such it is difficult to assess how liberal or restrictive a particular market may 
be. Further, factors such as policy environment, energy demand, and electricity prices 
are likely to be more influential in determining whether multinational companies 
enter a particular market regardless of existing barriers to trade. For that reason, 
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foreign presence in a certain market is not a good gauge of that market’s openness. 
However, it may be useful to examine the commitments that leading countries have 
made in a number of energy services sectors to get a sense of the general level of 
liberalization. For illustrative purposes, Table 2 catalogues existing commitments in 
the checklist categories most relevant to the provision of wind energy services by the 
25 leading wind energy markets as measured by installed capacity (EU members are 
grouped together). 
Table 2 Snapshot of GATS commitments in services related to wind energy 
Description Un
ite
d S
ta
te
s
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
Un
ion
Ch
ina
Ind
ia
Ca
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da
Ja
pa
n
Au
str
ali
a
Tu
rk
ey
Br
az
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Eg
yp
t 
Certain related scientific and 
technical consulting services 
� 
� � � � � � ● � � �
Services incidental to energy
distribution 
� 
● � � � � � ● � � �
Certain professional services,
including engineering and 
integrated engineering services 
● � � � � ● ● ● � �
Distribution services, including
commission agents, wholesale
trade, and retail trade services 
that apply to fuels, related
products, and brokerage of
electricity 
� � � � � ● � � � �
Maintenance and repair of
equipment, except transport­
related equipment 
● ● � � ● � � � � �
Management consulting and
related services 
� 
● ● � � � ● ● ● � �
Construction and related 
engineering services 
� 
� � � � � � � � � �
Technical testing and analysis
services 
� 
� � � � ● � � � � �
● = full commitments 
�= partial commitments
�= no commitments 
Most measures regarding the supply of services through the presence of natural persons (mode 4) are addressed 
in a member country’s horizontal commitments. For the purposes of this table, a full commitment is any 
commitment that grants full market access or national treatment to foreign individuals or firms that provide 
renewable energy services through cross­border supply (mode 1), consumption abroad (mode 2), and commercial 
presence (mode 3). 
Note: This table is intended as a snapshot of commitments in the listed categories and is in no way a 
comprehensive assessment of GATS commitments. In many cases, commitments apply to only part of the sector 
and specific limitations may be in place. For full details regarding commitments, see the GATS schedules of 
individual countries. 
Source: Compiled by the U.S. International Trade Commission from individual countries’ GATS Schedules of 
Specific Commitments 
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Services commitments vary widely in these countries, with developed countries 
generally offering a greater degree of liberalization. However, renewable energy firms 
are pursuing opportunities in all of these markets presumably because the conditions 
are favorable and the benefits to market participation outweigh perceived risks. GATS 
commitments may hold greater weight in countries where renewable energy is in its 
nascent stages. It is important to note that many of the commitments outlined in 
Table 2 were made as early as 1994, and in some cases current practices are more 
liberal than what is reflected in the GATS schedules. Such conditions make it even 
more pressing that countries update their commitments, signaling to services 
providers that the operating environment will not change unexpectedly. 
why is free trade in services important? 
With increasing global demand for both energy and greenhouse gas­reducing 
technologies, it is important that renewable goods and services be made readily 
accessible to customers that want them. Because cost remains one of the most 
prohibitive factors to large­scale adoption of renewable energy technologies, any 
measures that reduce costs should be implemented. By making full commitments to 
trade in energy services, nations ensure that consumers in their markets have access 
to a greater selection of services at competitive prices, which in turn encourages more 
widespread adoption of renewable energy technologies. That may lead to further 
economic benefits such as the growth of domestic renewable energy goods and 
services firms that may eventually export to the world market. 
what is the future for trade liberalization in renewable energy
services? 
The Doha Round has been underway since 2001, but has yet to reach a satisfying 
conclusion. Despite the current impasse, efforts to move forward on the liberalization 
of trade barriers affecting climate­friendly goods and services are underway. 
Paragraph 31(iii) of the Doha Declaration specifically calls for reduction of tariff and 
non­tariff barriers to environmental goods and services, and it was under that mantle 
that the United States and the European Union drafted the Environmental Goods and 
Services Agreement (EGSA). The EGSA proposes a two­tiered approach to 
liberalizing those sectors that meet environmental policy goals, with particular 
emphasis on objectives laid out in the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. The EGSA proposal specifically calls for members to commit to 
existing levels of market access and national treatment and undertake new 
liberalization to remove market access barriers on a broad set of environmental and 
climate­related services, including energy, construction, architectural, engineering 
and integrated engineering services. Negotiations are still in progress and it is unclear 
what this particular effort will yield. Further complicating matters, because the 
services instrumental to the provision of renewable energy are so deeply enmeshed in 
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the general energy services negotiations, it is unclear whether such services can be 
separated out for extraordinary treatment. At the WTO ministerial meeting in 
December 2009, trade ministers discussed efforts to fast track negotiations on 
climate­related goods and services, but no agreement has been made as yet. Some 
industry groups advocate the pursuit of environmental goods and services 
liberalization independent of the Doha negotiations, but at this point no plans exist 
to pursue multilateral liberalization outside of the WTO. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
State renewable energy portfolio standards ("RPS") are creatures of state law, created by 
state legislatures to reflect the policies and priorities of that state. One result of this state-
by-state approach is that RPS policies have limited commonality across states. In 
particular, the most typical differences include: (i) inconsistent definitions of eligible 
renewable energy resources; (ii) varying definitions of what constitutes a renewable 
energy credit ("REC"); and (iii) geographic restrictions on the trading of RECs 
themselves.1 These differences either unintentionally or explicitly limit the trading of 
RECs across state boundaries. Often REC trading is further restricted by the requirements 
of the regional attribute tracking system governing the RECs. This state-based approach 
to renewable energy development creates a fragmented, local market for RECs and is 
thought to inhibit investment in renewable energy projects. However, achieving 
consistency among state RPS policies is not a simple task, as it requires changes to the 
statutes and regulations of the various states, and modifications to regional attribute 
tracking systems, or the adoption of a federal RPS.2 
Much research and thought has been put into the differences among RPS and REC 
policies and the impediments to harmonizing such policies across states. The underlying 
assumption is that harmonization of state RPS policies will attract new investors and 
increase investment in renewable energy. Theoretically, increased REC liquidity should 
increase the flow of funds to renewable energy generation due to greater transparency in 
pricing and the additional cash flow associated with REC sales. 
However, it is not clear that the price transparency and REC liquidity brought by RPS 
harmonization would alone be sufficient to significantly increase renewable energy 
investment in a particular state beyond existing investment levels. While the ability to 
freely trade RECs should create a more efficient market, it may be that other factors drive 
renewable energy investment with RECs playing a smaller role. Alternatively, renewable 
energy investment in the various states may be already maximized with investors are 
capitalizing on the current market fragmentation. 
As the final deliverable for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on behalf of the 
Connecticut Energy Office, the Massachusetts Energy Office, and the Vermont Energy 
Office, Baker & McKenzie interviewed individuals with experience in REC markets and 
renewable energy investment. The purpose of these interviews was to gain understanding 
as to the extent to which the current fragmentation in the REC market and variations in 
RPS policies influences renewable energy investment decisions and whether 
harmonization would change those decisions. This paper discusses the opinions 
 
1 The differences between state RPS programs are discussed more fully in Enhancing Markets for 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Credits: Interim REC Market Status Report attached as 
Appendix A.
2 Further discussion of the options available for harmonizing state RPS policies can be found in 
Legal Options for the Harmonization of State Renewable Credit Policies attached here as 
Appendix B. 
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expressed by these interviewees and draws certain conclusions as a result of such 
interviews. 
II.	 PROCESS 
Baker & McKenzie interviewed individuals with extensive experience as buyers and/or 
sellers of RECs or as investors in and developers of renewable energy projects across the 
U.S. These individuals were selected not only for their experience but also for their 
knowledge about state RPS policies and how these policies impact REC markets and 
investments in renewable energy.3 
Baker & McKenzie conducted an interview with each individual, focusing on the factors 
critical to their decision to invest in renewable energy projects and what role RECs and 
state RPS policies played in the decision-making process. The interviews did not focus 
exclusively on investments that are required by state RPS, in other words utility company 
investments required to comply with the RPS or renewable projects developed in 
cooperation with a utility to satisfy such requirements. The interviewees also discussed 
the implications of a more liquid REC market on energy projects that sell into the "spot 
market.� In particular, each interviewee was asked the following three questions: 
•	 Do investors look to a state's RPS and REC policies when determining 
where to develop (or invest in) renewable energy? Why or why not? What 
are the most important factors in making those investment decisions? 
•	 Does the lack of REC liquidity across states negatively (or positively) 
impact investment in renewables? If the impact is negative, what changes 
would increase investment? 
•	 Other than changing state RPS legislation, are there other options for 
harmonizing state REC policies or for creating a more fluid REC market? 
Throughout each interview, the interviewees raised issues that they felt were important to 
a discussion of RPS policies and REC liquidity. These thoughts and comments are 
incorporated into the discussion below. 
For purposes of this paper, the comments and opinions of the interviewees have been 
summarized and combined so that no one comment may be attributed to any one 
individual. In addition, the conclusions drawn from these interviews are those of the 
authors and not necessarily the interviewees. While this is by no means a broad survey of 
the various opinions regarding REC markets, RPS policies, and the intersection with 
renewable energy development, it is a representative sample that can help inform state 
policy makers.
 
3 For purposes of this report, all interviewees requested to remain anonymous. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
78    :        
III. DISCUSSION 
The rationale underlying efforts to harmonize state RPS policies is that consistent 
treatment of RECs and the ability to easily buy and sell RECs across state lines will 
increase investment in renewable energy. There are reasons to believe that a national or 
even regional REC market could drive-up such investment. First, a liquid REC market 
should appeal to investors attracted by the ability to easily commoditize their investments 
and capitalize on the REC market. At least one interviewee expressed the view that 
decreased fragmentation in the REC markets would not necessarily increase mainstream 
investment in renewables, but would attract a broader range of investors. Entities such as 
hedge funds and other market intermediaries would be attracted to renewable energy 
projects that such investors might not have otherwise considered. Marginal projects in 
particular would benefit from the new financial resources. Currently, financial investors 
target a limited number of projects in a select few states that have robust renewable 
energy markets. While RECs provide a mechanism for commoditizing a renewable 
energy investment, RPS policies severely restrict the liquidity and sale of such RECs. 
The current limitation on REC sales makes them a less attractive investment vehicle for 
these types of investors and eliminates a potential source of financing for renewable 
projects. 
Second, a broader, more robust, and liquid REC market should provide greater price 
stability. Renewable energy projects are capital intensive and developers need a known 
(or at least predictable) revenue stream to allow them to finance and operate their 
development. While this difficulty is mitigated under power purchase agreements with 
utilities seeking to meet RPS requirements, developers of merchant facilities do not have 
the funding stability of a power purchase agreement and a robust, liquid REC market that 
allows for price discovery may be more critical for such developers. A stable REC price 
and broader market should encourage independent development of projects. 
However, it is not the presence of a larger pool of investors, price stability, or even the 
liquidity of RECs in and of themselves that would increase renewable energy investment. 
Instead, ability of RECs to influence renewable development is linked to their role as a 
mechanism for financing projects and not just a marker for the transfer of environmental 
attributes. There are a number of reasons why harmonization may not improve 
investment in renewable energy, including the impact of liquidity on REC prices, the role 
of RECs as a marker of regulatory compliance, and the existence of other factors that 
may be more important to the development of renewable energy. These factors are 
discussed further below. 
Pricing 
The impact of harmonization on REC monetary values is a significant factor in whether 
harmonization will lead to additional renewable energy investment. Both the absolute 
value of a project's REC and the value of those RECs to the cost of the project are 
important. 
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With respect to the value of RECs, a liquid REC market does not guarantee that REC 
prices will increase and in fact, the current market restrictions may be inflating REC 
prices overall or at least within certain submarkets. Because most RPS impose 
geographic limitations on the local REC market, REC buyers cannot reach outside of 
those boundaries, limiting the supply of available RECs. Markets with restricted supply 
typically experience higher prices depending on the local demand. Thus, opening the 
market may actually depress REC prices overall. If the local REC markets have varying 
prices, not all markets will benefit from harmonization. A true market, even just regional, 
will likely drive REC prices toward a mean price. Thus, submarkets with higher REC 
prices will find their REC price decrease. If RECs help subsidize renewable projects in 
those submarkets, then development may be negatively impacted. 
This price decrease is likely to have the most financial impact on high cost renewables 
that may be more reliant on the cash generated by REC sales to help offset the cost of 
producing energy from that resource. RPS set asides for such technologies help address 
this difficulty for compliance RECs, but do little for any additional merchant 
development. Lower REC price might make financing harder especially if the resource 
relies on the sale of RECs as part of its cash flow. 
On the other hand, submarkets with REC prices that start out below the mean will benefit 
by a move to the higher mean price. Further, a regional REC market would allow utilities 
to buy resource specific RECs from generators that can efficiently produce certain types 
of renewable energy either due to the ready availability of the resource in a particular 
geographic area or due to technological advantage. This could drive funding toward 
renewable development in those areas or toward specific technology. While there would 
be little or no immediate benefit to the development of all types of renewable in each 
state, it could lead to more overall renewable energy development in the U.S. 
Even if REC prices do increase as the result of RPS harmonization, the increase may not 
be sufficient to allow RECs to play a substantial role in financing renewable development 
so as to actually increase such development. While RECs currently provide some level of 
financial support for certain renewable projects, they likely do not provide enough cash 
flow alone to be critical to any one project's success. Other sources of financing such as 
grants and tax credits are typically as, if not more, important. 
Developers must still sell the energy from their projects and unless that energy can be 
sold at a competitive price, there may be few takers. Of course, the incremental value of 
the RECs may help finance projects for which tax credits and other financing 
mechanisms are not sufficient to make the energy price competitive. Certainly, RECs 
along with tax credits and grants can provide the financing necessary to make renewable 
energy cost competitive. However, the key issue is whether the relative value of RECs 
matter to a development and whether a liquid REC market increases the value of RECs 
sufficiently for them to drive additional investment. 
A notable outcome of the interviews was the common opinion that while eliminating 
REC market fragmentation and the inconsistency among state RPS policies would lead to 
some increase in renewable energy investment, differing RPS policies and illiquid RECs 
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are not the primary barrier to increasing investment. Instead, the financial fundamentals 
of a renewable energy project are more important to investment decisions and RECs do 
not substantially impact these fundamentals. The individuals interviewed agreed that 
harmonizing state RPS and REC policies could increase investment in renewable energy 
generation, although none believed that harmonization alone without broader policy 
reform would result in a substantial increase in such investment. 
Resource Availability 
Another factor impacting renewable energy investment, and one raised by all of the 
interviewees, is the availability of renewable resources. The ready availability of cost-
effective renewable resources available within a state or region is critical to the 
development of renewable resources. Resource availability is unaffected by RPS 
harmonization. Investors will target states with readily available renewable resources that 
can cost-effectively produce energy regardless of that state's REC policies. Although 
states with limited resources should have higher REC prices, these prices need to be high 
enough to offset the additional cost associated with the energy source. The geographic 
limitations contained in many RPS are a direct response by state legislators to the concern 
that the ability to buy RECs from other states would decrease renewable investment in 
their states. The interviewees understood the concern for states with limited renewable 
energy resources or resources that are expensive to develop. However, they felt that most 
renewable investment is, and will continue to be, directed toward states with readily 
available renewable resources. States with limited renewable resources are not likely to 
attract investment beyond the minimum required under their RPS even with a liquid REC 
market. 
Price Caps 
A truly liquid REC market will require changes to state RPS beyond just harmonizing the 
definition of a REC and an eligible renewable energy resources or removing the 
geographic restrictions. Development of market pricing for RECs is further complicated 
by the presence of price caps or emergency price relief provisions. Price caps, which exist 
in many RPS, commonly provide that if the price of RECs exceeds a pre-established 
amount the utility may pay a fixed dollar amount to the state in lieu of purchasing the 
required RECs. These price caps are intended to protect local utilities from high REC 
prices, which would result if insufficient renewable energy sources were developed to 
meet RPS requirements. However, these relief mechanisms have the unintended 
consequence of depressing investment in renewable energy resources. 
Renewable energy projects, like conventional energy projects, are capital intensive and 
require a longer-term financial commitment for the purchase of energy and RECs. Buyers 
have no incentive to hedge against cost increases in RECs by locking into long term 
contracts because RPS price caps provide a guaranteed maximum price. Further, these 
price caps set the upper limit on REC prices. Additionally, these price caps negatively 
impact the development of a secondary REC market in which investors that purchase 
RECs speculate on rising prices. All of the individuals interviewed mentioned prices caps 
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as a deterrent to a stable, liquid REC market and stated that the removal of price caps 
would have a greater impact on investment decisions than increased REC fungibility. 
Regulatory Stability 
One additional factor that could deter renewable investment even in a liquid REC market 
is the frequency of the modifications to RPS policies and regulations by both state 
legislators and administrative agencies. Regulatory stability was felt by the interviewees 
to be a particular deterrent to long-term stable REC markets and thus to investment in 
renewable resources. As a result of these changes, investors had little confidence that the 
regulatory scheme underlying their investment will not change in the short-term, making 
them reluctant to make substantial long-term investments. Even if the current policies are 
not ideal, it may be better for a state to resist changing them. Further, the current state-
based approach for renewable investment was thought to be unsustainable over the long 
term and modifications inevitable. 
Power Market 
A final factor that may limit renewable energy investment even in a liquid REC market is 
the role that the current structure of the power market plays in limiting investment in 
renewable energy. For some of the interviewees, this was the key deterrent to investment 
and, unless addressed, investment would continue to lag. Issues such as wheeling charges 
and the short length of power purchase agreements were key concerns. These issues can 
be addressed without harmonizing state RPS policies and could have a bigger impact in 
renewable investment. 
FEDERAL RPS 
Ultimately, the underlying difficulty with transforming RECs into a financing tool that 
helps stimulates renewable development is that RECs have no value outside of their role 
as a marker of compliance with RPS standards for utilities. RECs are creatures of 
regulatory compliance and without the RPS compliance requirements, there would be no 
market for RECs. Thus, a liquid REC market will only drive renewable development to 
the point at which RPS compliance is achieved. 
The adoption of a federal RPS may be the best mechanism for increasing the 
development of renewable resources. A nationwide renewable portfolio standard sets a 
floor for renewable development and requires additional renewable energy development 
to the extent that state-specific RPS have a renewable percentage lower than the federal 
RPS. However, depending on its structure, a federal RPS may or may not lead to 
harmonization of the REC markets. A federal RPS may interact with the existing state 
RPS in several ways including: pre-empting the state program, remaining silent, or 
recognizing the state RPS. Under the pre-emption approach, since the state RPS would 
cease to exist a fully harmonized REC market would exist. 
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To the extent that a federal RPS recognizes the state level RPS programs or permits states 
to maintain parallel programs, the REC market will remain fragmented at the state level. 
In fact, a federal RPS may create a more complex two-tiered system with RECs for 
federal RPS compliance trading on a national market and RECs for state RPS compliance 
trading only within the parameters defined by that RPS. 
Several pieces of legislation have been introduced by Congress over the past several 
years seeking to create a federal RPS.4 The American Clean Energy Leadership Act 
recently approved by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee is an example 
of the Congressional efforts to move forward a Federal RPS. The House Energy and 
Commerce Committee has passed its own version of a federal RPS in the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act. 
Regardless of the approach used under a federal RPS, a clear integration or pre-emption 
of the state RPS will be critical to maintaining the REC market. Additional discussion of 
the potential structures and the issues associated with a federal RPS are contained in our 
earlier report Legal Options for the Harmonization of State Renewable Credit Policies 
attached as Appendix B. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The general consensus among the individuals interviewed was that the most gains in 
renewable development could be made by addressing the issues discussed above and 
creating some degree of interoperability between state RPS policies; interoperability in 
which RPS do not work against each other but were not identical. 
Further, the harmonization does not need to be nationwide. Instead, the interviewees felt 
the development of regional renewable energy and REC markets have the greatest 
potential for increasing renewable energy investment and bringing additional investment. 
Regional liquidity is most likely to bring economic development and renewable energy 
development to a region as a whole, and to those states that do not have sufficient 
renewable resources to develop robust renewable markets of their own. 
Liquidity in any market, including the REC market, is valuable, as liquidity should 
provide greater transparency in pricing and attract additional investment in renewable 
energy development. However, harmonization of the various state RPS may not have the 
intended, or hoped for, consequences. As discussed in this report there are a variety of 
policy, regulatory, and market forces that otherwise hinder the creation of an efficient 
market for RECs. Further, these forces may not be addressed by creating identical or even 
compatible RPS policies across states. Harmonization of state RPS would require 
reconciling inconsistent definitions of eligible renewable energy resources and the 
varying definitions of what constitutes a REC as well as eliminating geographic 
restrictions. Thus harmonization may be a difficult goal to achieve, absent federal action, 
as it requires that all states in a region act in concert. Nonetheless there are steps, other 
 
4 Such as the Bingaman Amendment to the 2007 Energy Act H.R. 6 (2007). 
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than attempting to create a liquid REC market, that individual states can take such as 
addressing price caps, regulatory stability, and the dynamics of the local power market 
that could be as, or more, critical to advancing renewable energy development within 
their borders. 
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APPENDIX A 
Enhancing Markets for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 

Credits:  Interim REC Market Status Report.
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Enhancing Markets for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Credits:  Interim 
REC Market Status Report 
Introduction 
State created Renewable Portfolio Standards ("RPS") and the establishment of 
Renewable Energy Credits ("RECs") that may be traded in markets as a mechanism to 
comply with RPS targets has attracted private investment in renewable energy systems 
and technologies. A similar, but less well established system for Energy Efficiency 
Credits is beginning to emerge.  The degree to which the REC markets (and nascent 
Energy Efficiency Markets) can catalyze significant additional private investment in 
renewable energy and energy efficiency technology remains to be seen and will depend 
largely on whether current barriers to liquidity in the REC markets can be overcome and 
the degree to which the energy efficiency policies avoid placing similar institutional 
barriers to market liquidity. 
As part of the project proposal "Enhancing Markets for Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency Credits" (the "Project") submitted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on 
behalf of the Connecticut Energy Office, the Massachusetts Energy Office, the Vermont 
Energy Office, the Alliance to Save Energy and the Renewable Energy and International 
Law Network, Baker & McKenzie has prepared the following summary report on the 
status of REC markets and RPS. The Project seeks to analyze market barriers to RECs 
and Energy Efficiency Credits in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Vermont 
(the "Partner States") and develop strategies and legal options for overcoming these 
barriers. 
This report is the first in a series of deliverables addressing the status and harmonization 
of REC markets. It is intended to serve as a concise overview of RPS and REC activities 
occurring in the four Partner States. As there has been substantial work done in the area 
of REC markets and RPS programs5, this report does not replicate that work but instead 
provides a summary of the status of the Partner State programs, identifies barriers that 
limit the fungibility of RECs and the harmonization of the REC markets across the four 
Partner States, and serves as a foundation for the next phase of the Project which will 
focus on potential legal solutions to those barriers. 
RPS and REC Markets Overview 
As of the end of 2007, 25 states and Washington, D.C. had adopted a mandatory RPS. 
Four additional states have voluntary renewable energy goals. Generally these programs 
establish renewable energy purchase obligations for electricity generators, distributors 
and suppliers within the state. Almost all RPS allow generators, distributors, and 
suppliers to achieve compliance with their renewable energy obligations through the 
 
5 A resource list including some of the recent papers discussing REC markets and RPS programs 
is attached to this report. 
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purchase of RECs. Allowing the use of RECs to achieve compliance with the RPS has 
resulted in compliance-based REC markets throughout the United States.6 
Three of the four Partner States - Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts - have 
mandatory renewable energy programs while Vermont has adopted a voluntary program.7 
Although the specifics differ, the three mandatory programs require covered entities to 
achieve a specified level of renewable energy within their portfolios by set dates.8 The 
percentage of renewable energy required by each state escalates over time. 
Vermont has established a voluntary renewable portfolio goal under which retail energy 
suppliers are encouraged to meet the growth in energy demand with renewable energy 
resources. If the public utility board finds that the programs goals are not achieved by 
2012, the voluntary goal converts into a mandatory RPS. 
A chart summarizing the key aspects of the Partner States renewable energy programs is 
attached. 
Key Barriers 
A review of the Partner State's renewable and alternative energy portfolio requirements 
and prior research into the RPS programs identify several programmatic and structural 
barriers to liquid REC markets. In particular: 
Generation Mix and Renewable Attributes: In each of the four Partner States (that define 
RECs) a REC is defined to represent a unit of renewable energy. However, a REC can 
represent both a unit of renewable energy and also the environmental attributes associated 
with that unit. In practice, the environmental attributes will vary depending on the mix of 
energy sources replaced by the renewable energy (e.g., a MWh of displaced coal 
generation has a different environmental attribute than a MWh of displaced hydro 
generation). As the Partner States sit within different regional energy markets, the 
generation mix and thus the environmental attributes of the RECs vary to some degree. 
The PJM generation mix is largely reliant on coal as compared to ISO-NE which relies 
more heavily on natural gas. The differing generation mixes creates different 
environmental attributes for RECs on a per MWh basis and thus is a practical limitation 
on the fungibility of the RECs between PJM and ISO-NE.
 
6 While RPS compliance is the underlying driver for the compliance-based REC market, a 
voluntary REC market also exists. However, unlike the compliance-based market which is driven 
by the desire to provide renewable energy (along with the various environmental and energy 
supply benefits derived therefrom), the voluntary REC market is primarily a surrogate for carbon 
reductions. There have been efforts in Congress to adopt a federal RPS which would impact 
voluntary as well as compliance-based REC markets. While this issue is beyond the scope of this 
status report, a discussion on the impacts of a federal RPS on voluntary markets is attached. 
7 The Connecticut and Massachusetts renewable portfolio requirements are referred to as RPS 
while Pennsylvania uses the term "Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard."
8 As shown in the attached table Connecticut's statute covers electric suppliers and distribution 
companies, Massachusetts' RPS applies to retail electricity suppliers selling electricity to end-use 
customers, Pennsylvania's AEPS applies to electric distribution companies and electric 
generation suppliers, and Vermont's program covers electric suppliers. 
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Renewable Energy Resource Definitions: RECs typically represent a MWh or generation 
from a renewable energy resource.  The definition of what constitutes a renewable energy 
resource varies among the Partner States, as it does among most states. Two of the 
Partner States - Connecticut and Pennsylvania - have classes or tiers of renewable 
energy resources that are eligible under their programs. Massachusetts and Vermont have 
one class of renewable energy resource. While Connecticut and Pennsylvania's 
categories of "first tier" renewables are largely similar to the Massachusetts' and 
Vermont's renewable energy categories, the precise definitions of the categories can 
vary.9 More difficult are the "second tier" renewables, which may include energy sources 
that are not considered renewable in other state programs such as the waste coal included 
in Pennsylvania's Tier II category. These varying definitions make translating all RECs 
from one state to another difficult. Synchronized definitions, limitations on trading only 
RECs from similarly defined renewable energy resources, or an adjustment factor would 
be necessary to enable an interstate REC market. 
Geographic Restrictions: Another key barrier to REC fungibility is the fact that many 
states place restrictions on the geographic location of the renewable energy generation. 
Because most states seek to encourage generation of renewable energy within their own 
borders for a variety of economic and environmental reasons, RPS programs typically 
place boundaries on the source of the renewable energy and any RECs used for 
compliance with the RPS. Connecticut, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania are not 
exceptions to this trend, placing some restrictions on the source of RECs for their 
programs.10 
REC Tracking Systems: Even if states do not impose geographic restrictions in their RPS 
programs, the REC attribute tracking systems (NEPOOL-GIS and PJM-GATS in this 
 
9 For example Pennsylvania defines biomass energy as: 
"(i) organic material from a plant that is grown for the purpose of being used to produce 
electricity or is protected by the Federal Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and provided 
further that crop production on CRP lands does not prevent achievement of the water quality 
protection, soil erosion prevention or wildlife enhancement purposes for which the land was 
primarily set aside; or 
(ii) any solid nonhazardous, cellulosic waste material that is segregated from other waste 
materials, such as waste pallets, crates, and landscape right-of-way tree trimmings or agricultural 
sources, including orchard tree crops, vineyards, grain, legumes, sugar and other crop by-products 
or residues." 
In comparison Massachusetts's definition is as follows: 
"Fuel sources including brush, stumps, lumber ends and trimmings, wood pallets, bark, 
wood chips, shavings, slash and other clean wood that are not mixed with other solid wastes; 
agricultural waste, food material and vegetative material as those terms are defined, . by the 
Department of Environmental Protection at 310 CMR 16.02; energy crops, biogas, organic 
refuse-derived fuel that is collected and managed separately from municipal solid waste; or neat 
biodiesel and other neat liquid fuels that are derived from such fuels sources.
10 Connecticut's RPS statute permits RECs: 
1. issued by NEPOOL GIS f the RECs are for: 
a. energy produced by a unit generating Class I or II energy in ISO-NE 
b. energy imported into control area of ISO-NE; and 
2. under contract to serve end-use customers in the state on or before October 1, 2006. 
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case) often have their own rules that may limit the source of the RECs. For example, the 
REC tracking system itself may limit the locations of generators for which it will issue 
RECs. The NEPOOL-GIS requires that the energy associated with certificates issued 
under the NEPOOL-GIS be delivered into ISO-NE and that the energy be generated in a 
control area adjacent to ISO-NE. Thus even if a state RPS statutorily allows non-state 
generated RECs to be traded within the state's REC market and be used for RPS 
compliance, the attribute tracking system may not permit it. 
The above barriers are both legislative and regulatory in nature at the state and regional 
transmission organization levels.  In the next phase, the Project will develop approaches 
for addressing these barriers specifically looking toward legal options that states may use 
to address these barriers. These legal options will be accompanied by a briefing paper on 
the financial community's perspective on REC market design and the current limits on 
fungibility. 
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Clean Energy States Alliance, New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, Office of Clean Energy & 
the Center for Energy, Economic and Environmental Policy, Northeast RPS Compliance 
Markets: An Examination of Opportunities to Advance REC Trading (2005). 
Ryan Wiser and Galen Barbose, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Renewable Portfolio 
Standards in the United States; S status Report with Data Through 2007 (April 2008). 
K.S. Cory, National Renewable Energy Laboratory & B.G. Swezey, Applied Materials, 
Renewable Portfolio Standards in the States: Balancing Goals and Implementation Strategies 
(2007). 
Cliff Chen, Ryan Wiser & Mark Bolinger, Weighing the Costs and Benefits of State Renewables 
Portfolio Standards: A Comparative Analysis of State-Level Policy Impact Projections (2007). 
Edward A. Holt, Ed Holt and Associates, Inc., & Ryan H. Wiser, Environmental Energy 
Technologies Division, The Treatment of Renewable Energy Certificates, Emissions Allowances, 
and Green Power Programs in State Renewables Portfolio Standards (2007). 
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V. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
State renewable energy portfolio standards ("RPS") have a significant impact on the renewable 
energy credit ("REC") market and the subsequent investment in renewable energy resources. 
Since RPS are creatures of state law, the RPS have been created to reflect the policies of the 
various states. This fact has resulted in a fragmented market for RECs. 
The fragmentation is largely caused by (i) inconsistent definitions of eligible renewable energy 
resources; (ii) varying definitions of what constitutes a REC; and (iii) geographic restrictions on 
the trading of RECs themselves. There are several options for achieving harmonization among 
the state RPS and increasing REC market liquidity. These options include changes to the statutes 
and regulations of the various states, modifications to the regional attribute tracking systems, and 
the adoption of a federal RPS. While no one option provides a complete and simple resolution, 
this paper explores the benefits and potential negatives of these options. 
VI. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is the second in a series of deliverables on the harmonization of state-based REC 
policies for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on behalf of the Connecticut Energy Office, the 
Massachusetts Energy Office, and the Vermont Energy Office (the "Partner States"). RPS 
programs and RECs are a strong force behind renewable energy development in the U.S. and the 
Partner States are seeking to advance both their RPS and development of renewable resources.11 
The Partner States requested that the Alliance to Save Energy, the Renewable Energy and 
International Law Network, and Baker & McKenzie analyze market barriers to RECs and energy 
efficiency credits in the Partner States. 
To date there has been much thoughtful work on the differences between the various state RPS 
programs and how the state program variations present barriers to the fungibility of RECs. This 
paper builds on that work by analyzing the legal options for harmonizing state RPS as a means to 
reduce fragmentation in the REC market. Increasing REC fungibility and market liquidity is 
viewed by many as an important factor in catalyzing greater investment in renewable energy 
technologies. This paper identifies several options as possible approaches to expanding the REC 
market,12 including: creating identical state RPS programs; harmonizing state RPS programs, 
including addressing the requirements of the regional attribute tracking systems; creating a 
weighted REC scheme; and implementing a federal RPS. 
 
11 Ryan Wiser and Galen Barbose, Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States, A Status Report 
with Data Through 2007, April 2008, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, P. 12.  The data do not 
determine whether the renewable energy was developed because of a state's RPS and do not take into 
account that some states allow for out-of-state generation to count toward the RPS. 
12 Since the barriers to REC market liquidity are generally consistent across states, we focus our 
discussion on the Partner States. 
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VII. The Status of State RPS and REC Markets 
Over twenty-five states have a RPS in place with over half of these implemented since 2004. 
Most existing RPS allow regulated entities to use RECs for compliance purposes. While the 
general principle of a RPS-to require retail electricity suppliers to obtain a particular level of 
renewable energy per year-is consistent across the states, the details of the RPS among the 
states vary greatly. State programs differ in the type of eligible renewable projects, the ability to 
use RECs outside of the state's power pool, and even the definition of what qualifies as a REC. 
RPS programs in the Partner States are no exception, each taking a different approach. Of the 
four Partner States, three - Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts - have a mandatory 
RPS while Vermont has adopted a voluntary program. The details of the three mandatory 
programs differ but all three require covered entities to include specified, increasing levels of 
renewable energy within their portfolios by set dates. Vermont established a voluntary renewable 
portfolio goal which encourages retail energy suppliers to meet the growth in the state's energy 
demand using renewable energy resources. If the programs goals are not achieved by 2012, the 
voluntary goal converts into a mandatory RPS.  The details of the Partner States' RPS are 
outlined in Appendix A. 
While most states use the term RPS in reference to their portfolio standards, Pennsylvania refers 
to its portfolio standard as an Alternative Energy Portfolio Standard ("AEPS") and uses the term 
Alternative Energy Credit ("AEC") in place of REC. The AEPS seeks to increase the use of 
alternative forms of energy including renewable resources, reflecting the fact that Pennsylvania's 
program includes energy sources that are not renewable.13 
States have various economic, environmental, and policy reasons motivating the design of their 
RPS. For instance, some states may restrict the ability to buy RECs in order to create incentives 
for the development of local renewable energy sources. Connecticut and Pennsylvania have 
established preferences for certain types of renewable energy sources by creating different "tiers" 
of renewable energy resource types and setting targets specific to such tiers. A tiered system 
functions to encourage higher-cost renewable energy sources that may not otherwise be 
competitive. A tiered system also allows a state to favor resources that provide particular 
environmental or economic benefits within its borders. Other states may recognize an energy 
source as "renewable" that another state views as less environmentally beneficial. For instance, 
only Pennsylvania recognizes energy generated from waste coal as an eligible alternative energy 
source. State-specific RPS programs allow each state to customize its RPS to meet its local 
conditions and politics. 
As a result of limited commonality between the states in important program design elements, the 
REC market is not a cohesive, nationwide market but instead is highly fragmented regional or 
even state-based market. Even regional markets are restricted due to state RPS and attribute 
tracking system restrictions. Fragmentation of the REC market inhibits overall investment in 
renewable energy projects because fragmented markets are less efficient and less liquid and 
 
13 Since RPS is the more commonly used term, this paper will generally use RPS to refer to programs that 
set portfolio standards. However, specific references to Pennsylvania's program will use the terms AEC 
and AEPS. 
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therefore have not attracted the capital market investors that require greater liquidity. 
Fragmentation in the REC market has led to significant price differentials depending on the state, 
the type of eligible renewable energy sources in a particular state and the level of interstate 
trading of RECs.14 
One thesis is that harmonizing the REC market, even on a regional basis, would lead to increased 
interstate fungibility of RECs and greater liquidity, which in turn would lead to greater 
investment in renewable energy. Renewable energy projects are often capital intensive and the 
cash flows related to REC sales are an important consideration in investment decisions. Even 
limited harmonization could lead to greater clarity in the market, which enables enhanced 
investment decision-making. Harmonizing state programs may, to some degree, mitigate the 
price volatility by allowing RECs to flow to areas in need of RECs and with limited renewable 
energy in-state capacity. A uniform price for RECs is thought to create a more predictable 
investment environment. 
We are mindful, however, that there are potential benefits to individual states in maintaining 
their locally tailored RPS and the associated fragmented market. First harmonization of state 
RPS programs may be optimal from a market efficiency standpoint but, as discussed later, would 
require revisions to state statutes or regulations that created the RPS programs. Such revisions 
may implicate policy decisions underlying the RPS structure as well as disrupt the REC market 
in the short term as market participants adjust to the changes. In addition, the market 
fragmentation may provide development opportunities that would not otherwise exist. Certain 
investors maybe capitalizing on the existing fragmentation, bringing financial resources to 
renewable energy development that might not otherwise exist.   For the purposes of this analysis, 
we assume that the benefits of a regional REC market outweigh the benefits of the status quo. 
VIII. IMPEDIMENTS TO HARMONIZATION 
The establishment of a more liquid REC market is restricted by the specific provisions of the 
underlying state regulations and statutes establishing the RPS programs.  The state statutes and 
regulations delineate the REC market by setting forth the definition of renewable energy sources 
that may be used to create RECs and the geographic restrictions on the trading of RECs.  State 
laws also define what constitutes a REC (e.g., does it include environmental attributes such as 
avoided emissions). As illustrated below, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and 
Vermont have differing approaches to these concepts.  Establishing even limited harmonization 
between the states would require some consistency among the key programmatic elements. 
A. Eligible Renewable Energy Sources 
Establishing a consistent definition of the eligible renewable energy sources among states would 
enable renewable energy projects across the region to meet that element of each state's RPS 
program.  Currently, the Partner States' RPS statutes or regulations outline a positive list of 
renewable energy sources that are eligible to create RECs.  As shown in Appendix A, the Partner 
 
14 Ryan Wiser and Galen Barbose, Renewable Portfolio Standards in the United States, A Status Report 
with Data Through 2007, April 2008, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, P. 1.  
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States have some commonality between the eligible categories of renewable resources.  All 
Partner States recognize the following broad renewable energy categories: solar, wind, methane 
gas, hydroelectric and biomass.  Aside from wind, the states further define each broad category.  
For instance, in the statute establishing Massachusetts's program, eligible biomass must satisfy 
the following definition: "low-emission, advanced biomass power conversion technologies, such 
as gasification using such biomass fuels as wood, agricultural, or food wastes, energy crops, 
biogas, biodiesel, or organic refuse-derived fuel."15 In comparison, Pennsylvania requires, 
among other things, that the material used to create biomass energy be "segregated from other 
waste materials, such as waste pallets, crates and landscape or right-of-way tree trimmings or 
agricultural sources, including orchard tree crops, vineyards, grain, legumes, sugar and other 
crop by-products or residues." Therefore, some biomass projects may qualify under 
Massachusetts' program and not under Pennsylvania's and vice versa.   
Aside from further restrictions on the broad renewable energy category, there are other 
differences between the states' programs. For instance, Pennsylvania recognizes waste coal 
energy as an eligible alternative energy source while Vermont, Connecticut and Massachusetts 
do not.  Therefore, coal waste "AECs" cannot be used for compliance purposes in Connecticut or 
Massachusetts or in Vermont's voluntary program.  The recognition of such "AECs" may also be 
against state policies that seek to promote renewable energy sources and not simply alternative 
energy sources.  Harmonizing eligible renewable energy resources in the Partner States would 
ensure states were comfortable in allowing in out-of-state RECs because they would know the 
projects creating the RECs in the other state were from acceptable sources.  For Pennsylvania, 
this may mean that not all of its Tier II resources would be fungible. 
B. Geographic Restrictions 
A liquid REC market is bolstered by a free flow of RECs across geographic boundaries. Most 
states with an RPS allow the use of unbundled RECs for compliance purposes. As a result, there 
is greater flexibility in complying with RPS programs as RECs could theoretically come from 
across the nation.  However, a common feature of RPS programs, including the Partner States, is 
to restrict the geographic source of RECs,16 creating an obvious barrier to REC market liquidity. 
The Partner States analyzed in this report do not allow the unrestricted purchase of RECs for 
RPS compliance. See Appendix A. For instance, Connecticut recognizes RECs from generators 
within ISO-NE or from energy imported into ISO-NE pursuant to Rule 2.7(c) of the NEPOOL-
GIS operating rules as described below. Massachusetts allows for out-of-state RECs so long as 
the corresponding energy is delivered into ISO-NE. 
In addition, the northeast attribute tracking system - the New England Power Pool-Generation 
Information System ("NEPOOL-GIS") - has its own operating rules regarding importation of 
energy, which affect both Massachusetts and Connecticut. NEPOOL-GIS allows only RECs that 
accompany energy imported into ISO-NE from adjacent states to be eligible to create GIS 
certificates. The NEPOOL-GIS rules serve to exclude all non-NEPOOL RECs except those from 
 
15 M.G.L. 25A Sec. 11F(b)(viii).  
16 Clean Energy States Alliance, Northeast RPS Compliance Markets: An Examination of Opportunities 
to Advance REC Trading, October 12, 2005 [hereinafter "CESA Report"]. 
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New York, which is adjacent to ISO-NE.  Therefore, even if Connecticut and Massachusetts 
allowed for freely traded RECs, the NEPOOL-GIS rules would impede the flow of non-
NEPOOL, non-New York RECs. 
In comparison, Pennsylvania does not allow RECs from outside the regional transmission 
organizations that serve Pennsylvania (i.e., PJM or MISO) even if energy is also imported.  The 
relevant attribute tracking system in Pennsylvania - PJM-Generation Attributes Tracking 
Systems ("PJM-GATS") - recognizes out-of-state RECs so long as the RECs have been 
approved by the receiving state as eligible under the receiving state's RPS.  Therefore, unlike 
with NEPOOL-GIS, only Pennsylvania's state requirements and not PJM-GATS function to 
restrict the use of RECs in Pennsylvania. 
Even if all Partner States had the same definition of eligible renewable energy sources, the 
geographic restrictions would still restrict REC market liquidity.  Eliminating the geographic 
restrictions in the state RPS programs and NEPOOL-GIS would significantly contribute to the 
harmonization of the REC market in the Partner States.  
C. Definition of RECs 
The attributes included in a REC are not well-defined or universally agreed-upon.  Some believe 
that a REC includes only a certification that one megawatt-hour of energy has been generated 
from an eligible renewable energy source. Others maintain that RECs include environmental 
attributes such as the avoided emissions that result from renewable energy generation as 
compared to the displaced conventional energy generation.  
The difference in the REC definitions is important because it may affect the fungibility of the 
REC as well as the REC value.  In theory, if a compliance REC does not include avoided 
emissions, the avoided emissions portion could be sold to a third-party. A REC that includes 
avoided emissions should command a different price than RECs that do not include avoided 
emissions.  If the REC definitions in the Partner States are not consistent, it could result in 
decreased liquidity in the region's REC market.  
In recognition of this issue, some states have explicitly stated that RECs used for compliance 
with the RPS must include the environmental attributes like avoided emissions.17 Connecticut 
requires that any electric supplier that seeks to demonstrate RPS compliance by participating in 
the renewable energy trading program must have exclusive ownership of all renewable energy 
and environmental attributes that are associated with its renewable energy sources.  In other 
words, a utility submitting RECs for compliance in Connecticut cannot separately sell the 
avoided emissions from the same megawatt hour to another party.  Massachusetts' definition of 
"Generation Attribute" is less clear and does not explicitly reference environmental attributes or 
 
17 Edward Holt and Ryan Wiser, The Treatment of Renewable Energy Certificates, Emissions Allowances, 
and Green Power Programs in State Renewables Portfolio Standard, Berkeley National Laboratory, 
April 2007, P. 14. 
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avoided emissions.18 Pennsylvania's current AEC definition is silent with respect to 
environmental attributes and states only that the AEC "shall equal one megawatt hour of 
electricity from an alternative energy source.�19 In a proposed rulemaking dated July 25, 2006, 
Pennsylvania takes a different approach and allows parties to contract to include or exclude 
environmental attributes in the AECs.20 If this rulemaking becomes final, an entity in 
Pennsylvania could sell the environmental attributes separately to a third-party because 
environmental attributes need not be included in the AEC used for compliance purposes. 
The fact that the Partner States do not have consistent REC definitions may impede market 
liquidity because a Pennsylvania AEC may or may not have the environmental attributes 
necessary for RPS compliance in Connecticut and potentially required in Massachusetts.  Entities 
and investors would need to differentiate between RECs with or without environmental 
attributes, which may impact underlying eligibility and pricing for RECs among the Partner 
States. 
IX. MECHANICS OF HARMONIZATION 
Harmonizing the Partner States' RPS and increasing REC fungibility at the state level will likely 
require (i) changes in the definitions of renewable resource, (ii) changes to the definition of the 
REC itself; (iii) changes to the geographic restrictions contained in the state RPS programs; and 
(iv) changes to the attribute tracking rules. These changes will either be administrative or 
legislative in nature or potentially both. The various state RPS schemes are all authorized by 
state statute; however, the degree to which the state legislature has defined the RPS versus 
leaving the specific programmatic requirements up to the rulemaking process of the 
administrative agency in charge of implementing the RPS varies from state to state. 
States which have included most of their RPS provisions in their statutes will have to amend 
those statutes through their legislative processes, requiring consideration and approval by the 
state legislature. In states where regulations determine the RPS requirements, the responsible 
agency will have to amend their regulations through their rulemaking process. In some cases, the 
states have adopted regulations to further define the statutory requirements and a change in the 
statute will need to be followed by regulatory changes.  Each of the Partner States is discussed 
briefly below: 
Connecticut's RPS is defined by legislation adopted by the Connecticut General Assembly.21 The 
RPS statute defines the classes of renewables that may be used for RPS compliance, sets the 
compliance percentages, and provides for geographic restrictions on the source of RECs used to 
comply with the RPS. The Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control has adopted 
regulations which provide additional detail regarding reporting requirements, operating rules, 
 
18 The NEPOOL-GIS rules, which are relevant in Massachusetts and Connecticut, do not require avoided 
emissions to be included with the REC and thus do not provide further clarification for the REC definition 
in Massachusetts.  
19 73 P.S. § 1648.2. 
20 Pennsylvania Bulletin, Vol. 36, No. 41, October 14, 2006, p. 6299. This rulemaking has not yet been 
finalized. 
21 Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 16-1, 16-243q, and 16-245a. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
104    :        
modifications and alternative payments under the RPS.22 Any change to definitions, geographic 
restrictions or other key elements of Connecticut's RPS will require legislative changes made by 
the Connecticut General Assembly and corresponding changes to the Department of Public 
Utility Control's regulations. 
Massachusetts' RPS is primarily a creation of state regulation and not state statute. The General 
Law of Massachusetts directs the Division of Energy Resources to establish an RPS that meets 
certain basic requirements.23 The Division of Energy Resources has adopted regulations that 
define the requirements of the state RPS.24 As a consequence, Massachusetts may amend its RPS 
through the rulemaking process. The statute does define the list of eligible renewable resources 
but further allows the Division of Energy Resources to amend the list by adding technologies 
with the exception of coal, oil, natural gas25, and nuclear power. To the extent that harmonization 
requires removing resources from the Massachusetts renewable definition or adding waste coal, 
legislative change will be necessary. 
Pennsylvania's AEPS is largely detailed by legislation.26 Not only does the statutory language set 
the portfolio standards, but it also defines the alternative energy sources allowed for compliance 
and the program's geographic restrictions. The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission has 
proposed regulations that further define the State's AEPS. Because the AEPS is governed by 
statute, the Pennsylvania General Assembly will be required to vote on any amendments to the 
AEPS. Therefore, any attempts at full or partial harmonization will require legislative changes. 
Vermont's statute provides the structure of a mandatory RPS, leaving much of the detail to the 
rulemaking process of the Vermont Public Service Board.27 Since the RPS will not become 
effective until and unless the state electricity providers fail to meet the voluntary standard, 
Vermont has not adopted RPS regulations. Any attempts to harmonize the key elements of the 
RPS of the Partner States will not likely require legislative action in Vermont. In addition, when 
and if Vermont adopts mandatory RPS regulations, it will be able to draft it regulations so as to 
accommodate any harmonization efforts. 
X.	 OPTIONS TO OVERCOME BARRIERS AND INCREASE MARKET 
LIQUIDITY 
Despite the current fragmented nature of REC markets, there are several ways to overcome 
barriers and increase market liquidity and REC fungibility throughout the Partner States.  
Options range from entirely revamping state RPS statutes and regulations to create identical (or 
nearly identical) programs to implementing a federal RPS.  Each option would require different 
levels of engagement by the state and would have varying levels of harmonization and impact on 
regional market liquidity.
 
22 Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, § 16-245a-1 et seq. 
23 M.G.L. c. 25a, § 11F. 
24 225 CMR 14.00. 
25 The statute includes an exception for use in fuel cells.  M.G.L. c. 25a, § 11F(b). 
26 73 P.S. § 1648.1 et seq. 
27 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, § 8001 et. seq. 
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A. Adopt Identical Programs Across Partner States 
One option for creating a more liquid regional REC market is to adopt identical programs in the 
Partner States. If the Partner States adopted identical programs, there would be certainty 
regarding the type of renewable resource creating the RECs. This may result in greater 
acceptance of RECs from anywhere within the region because the energy sources of each REC 
will be recognized in each state's RPS.28  
This option may be most preferable from a market liquidity standpoint, but there are several 
significant obstacles. First, there is no universally preferable RPS design as each state has 
elements that may be important to it but not acceptable to others. Thus, there may be significant 
opposition to sweeping changes to the state's RPS program to the extent it implicates policy 
decisions underlying the design of the initial RPS program. 
Even assuming political exigencies are surmountable, there would need to be significant 
cooperation and coordination among the Partner States to craft consistent law. As described in 
Section V above, creating identical programs would require legislative change in multiple states, 
and ensuring that individual legislative processes result in compatibility with the other states' 
programs would be challenging.  Even in the states that could change significant elements of the 
RPS program by regulation, aspects of the program could be significantly altered in the 
rulemaking process. Due to the difficulty in passing compatible legislation in the states at issue, 
the likelihood of implementing identical RPS programs in all Partner States is low and would be 
a time-consuming undertaking.29 
B. Harmonize Treatment of a Common Set of Renewables 
While identical programs among the Partner States may result in the greatest level of liquidity, 
the Partner States' RPS schemes need not be identical to improve market liquidity and REC 
fungibility.  Market liquidity could be enhanced by altering the following key aspects of a state's 
RPS: the definition of eligible renewable resource, the REC definition, and geographic 
restrictions on RECs.  Harmonization of these key aspects would allow for RECs generated from 
a common set of renewable energy resources to be more freely traded among the Partner States. 
The harmonization of a portion of a state's RPS program allows states to maintain much of their 
existing RPS program, which lessens the need for potentially sweeping regulatory or legislative 
changes.  Each state also would be able to include or exclude resources that are critical to that 
state (e.g., waste coal, ocean thermal energy). While the harmonization of several types of 
 
28 However, as discussed in more detail below, attribute tracking system rules in NEPOOL-GIS may also 
function to restrict movement of RECs even if the Partner States have identical RPS programs. 
29 For example, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI") is an effort to establish a regional 
carbon cap-and-trade program for electricity generators in the Northeast.  It took over three years from the 
initiation of the effort to reach agreement on a Model Rule. After the Model Rule was determined, each 
participating state had to implement the Model Rule (or significant design elements from it) by legislative 
or regulatory means.  Now, two years after the Model Rule was decided upon, some states are still 
implementing the necessary framework for RGGI.  The cap-and-trade program is expected to commence 
January 1, 2009. 
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renewable energy sources does not achieve complete market liquidity, it would create a set of 
fully fungible RECs between the Partner States and result in greater liquidity in the RECs which 
are recognized in more than one state.  
1. Eligible Renewable Energy Sources 
One key aspect that would need to be harmonized among the Partner States is the definition of 
eligible renewable energy types.  As previously stated, the Partner States recognize different 
renewable energy sources as eligible under their RPS programs.  While identical renewable 
energy types across the Partner States would most improve market liquidity the choice of eligible 
renewable energy sources is informed by local conditions and preferences.  Therefore, agreeing 
upon all eligible renewable energy sources among the Partner States may be difficult.  
However, there are five types of renewable energy sources that are common to the Partner 
States' RPS programs: solar, wind, methane gas, hydroelectric and biomass.  Within these broad 
categories, there may be a greater likelihood of finding common ground between the Partner 
States and creating a set of consistent renewable energy types.30 
After the Partner States have agreed upon a set of eligible renewable energy sources that are 
acceptable to each state, RECs generated from such sources should be equivalent (e.g., hydro 
RECs from Pennsylvania should be based on the same criteria and thus equally as acceptable as 
hydro RECs from Connecticut).  Agreeing upon a set of consistent renewable energy sources (in 
conjunction with eliminating other impediments discussed below) would improve liquidity of the 
market with respect to the common renewable energy sources.  This option would also allow the 
states to continue to recognize for in-state RPS compliance those renewable or alternative energy 
sources that may be specific to the particular state. 
2. REC Definition 
Along with consistent eligible renewable energy sources, the definition of the REC itself must 
also be compatible between the states. Connecticut's REC definition is the most stringent 
because it requires that a REC include all environmental attributes.  Massachusetts may require a 
REC to include environmental attributes; however, the regulations are ambiguous.  
Pennsylvania's current AEC definition is silent with respect to environmental attributes but it is 
considering proposed regulations that would allow parties to transfer or sell environmental 
 
30 The Partner States include further restrictions relating to solar, methane gas, hydroelectric and biomass 
renewable energy sources.  The CESA Report provides an in-depth review of the details of each state's 
eligible renewable energy source definitions and the differences between some of the common renewable 
energy sources. CESA Report, pp. 18-29.  The different restrictions on eligible types of biomass projects 
are especially variable among the Partner States and the nuances likely reflect the particular state's 
preference for or local availability of feedstock material. The Partner States would need to agree to 
harmonize the additional restrictions in order to create a common set of eligible renewable energy 
sources. 
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attributes separately from the underlying AEC.  Consistent REC definitions across the four states 
would promote the greatest fungibility between RECs from the Partner States. However, if 
Pennsylvania or Massachusetts allowed RECs to exclude some environmental attributes, 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts RECs could still be used in Connecticut but the buyers would 
need to ensure that the particular RECs being bought included all environmental attributes.31 
3. Geographic Restrictions 
After agreeing upon compatible renewable energy and REC definitions, the Partner States would 
need to revise any restrictions relating to recognizing out-of-state RECs.  As described in Section 
IV.C, these restrictions are either state-specific restrictions or related to the attribute tracking 
systems.  Options to alter restrictions related to the attribute tracking systems are described in the 
following section. Removing both types of restrictions would improve the liquidity of RECs in 
the Partner States. 
As described in Section IV.B above and outlined in Appendix A, all of the Partner States restrict 
the eligibility of out-of-state RECs. These restrictions may be directives in regulation or statute 
or indirect restrictions by virtue of references to attribute tracking systems.  Some restrictions on 
out-of-state RECs may relate to an underlying policy concern about what type of renewable 
energy source creating the REC in the first place.  If a set of eligible renewable categories were 
harmonized as described above, this concern may be mitigated because all Partner States would 
have agreed on the common eligible renewable energy sources.  
Pennsylvania directly restricts RECs by recognizing some out-of-state RECs but only if the 
associated energy was generated within MISO or PJM.  This restriction prohibits all RECs from 
the Partner States.  In order to allow for trading of the common set of RECs between the Partner 
States, Pennsylvania would need to amend its restrictions that function to prohibit the recognition 
of RECs from NEPOOL. 
Connecticut and Massachusetts and NEPOOL-GIS restrict non-NEPOOL RECs. As stated, the 
NEPOOL-GIS rules allow imported RECs only from adjacent states.  Thus, the NEPOOL-GIS 
rules function to restrict the flow of RECs into NEPOOL except those from New York.  Even if 
Connecticut and Massachusetts changed their laws to freely recognize non-NEPOOL RECs but 
still relied on GIS certificates, NEPOOL-GIS rules would prohibit RECs from Pennsylvania (and 
from other non-adjacent states).  Therefore, any efforts to remove geographic restrictions on 
RECs in Connecticut and Massachusetts must also include revisions to NEPOOL-GIS rules as 
described below.  
4. Attribute Tracking Systems
 
31 We note that these differences required the drafters of the model ABA/ACORE/EMA REC Master 
Agreement for the trading of RECs to include a complicated schedule with multiple attribute scenarios 
from which to choose. 
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Lastly, along with revising state geographic restrictions on RECs, the geographic restrictions in 
the attribute tracking systems must also be amended. Ideally, such harmonization would occur in 
tandem with efforts to revise the state-based geographic restrictions. Harmonizing the attribute 
tracking systems and state RPS programs to remove geographic restrictions would improve 
market liquidity between the Partner States. 
a. NEPOOL-GIS 
As stated, the rules require that the energy associated with RECs issued under the NEPOOL-GIS 
be delivered into ISO-NE and the energy must be generated in a control area adjacent to ISO­
NE.32 Essentially, these requirements result in recognizing only non-NEPOOL RECs from New 
York.  Therefore, even if Connecticut and Massachusetts remove any out-of-state restrictions in 
their RPS programs, the operating rules of the NEPOOL-GIS attribute tracking system remain a 
barrier. 
Altering the operating rules of NEPOOL-GIS would require amending the existing NEPOOL­
GIS rules.  The NEPOOL-GIS operates according to the GIS Operating Rules, which may be 
amended according to the Restated NEPOOL Agreement.  Rule 1.3 of GIS Operating Rules 
states that an amendment of the GIS rules must be in accordance with Sections 6, 7 and 10 of the 
Restated NEPOOL Agreement.  Under these sections of the Restated NEPOOL Agreement, the 
NEPOOL Participants Committee or its delegatee may in its discretion adopt new GIS Operating 
Rules or amend existing GIS Operating Rules after such amendments or new GIS Operating 
Rules have been reviewed by the Markets Committee.  
b. PJM-GATS 
In comparison to NEPOOL-GIS, PJM-GATS is more flexible and will issue certificates for 
generating units located outside of PJM whether or not the energy is delivered into PJM. 
However, if the energy was not delivered into PJM, certificates will only be recognized if (i) the 
generator has been pre-qualified by one of the PJM states for its RPS programs; and (ii) the state 
has approved the creation of certificates.33 As a result, Pennsylvania's limitations on RECs are 
more stringent than its attribute tracking system, and any changes to PJM-GATS would not alter 
Pennsylvania's state restrictions. 
PJM-GATS operates according to the GATS Operating Rules. Changes to the PJM-GATS 
Operating Rules are typically made in coordination between state regulators and the PJM-
Environmental Information Services ("PJM-EIS"). There is no formal decision-making process, 
and the system was designed to be flexible to accommodate multiple state policies. With respect 
to geographic restrictions on RECs, it does not appear that any changes to the GATS Operating 
Rules would be necessary. 
 
32 New England Power Pool Generation Information System Operating Rules, § 2.7(c)(w). 
33 PJM-EIS, Generation Attribute Tracking System (GATS) Operating Rules, § 11 (2006). 
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The harmonization of NEPOOL-GIS to recognize non-NEPOOL RECs would allow 
Massachusetts and Connecticut to recognize RECs beyond those generated in New York.  PJM-
GATS already recognizes RECs from other states so long as they are approved by the non-PJM 
state. Therefore, any changes to PJM-GATS would not affect Pennsylvania's geographic 
restrictions on RECs. As a result, amending NEPOOL-GIS to recognize non-adjacent RECs 
would improve market liquidity but would need to occur in coordination with changes in 
Pennsylvania's state restrictions in order to achieve the greatest level of REC fungibility between 
the Partner States. 
C. Create a Weighted REC Scheme 
A third approach to improving the liquidity of the REC markets is to provide for a common REC 
exchange platform (REC-EX) by which states could freely transfer RECs among each other.34  
Under this idea, state RPS regulators would agree to recognize other state's RECs for RPS 
compliance but could discount the incoming RECs at a rate determined by the state.  
Adjustments would also be made based on the generator's ability to deliver electricity into the 
relevant control area as well as the state's preference regarding particular eligible renewable 
energy sources.  The creation of a weighted REC scheme would require either regulatory or 
legislative changes to the Partner State's RPS programs.  
Similar to the options described above, the definition of a REC and restrictions on out-of-state 
RECs would need to be modified.  Unlike both options described above, in the weighted REC 
scheme option, consistent eligible renewable energy project definitions among the Partner States 
would not be necessary.  Under a weighted REC scheme, a state could assert its preference for 
different renewable energy sources vis-a-vis a discount rate, which would be applied to out-of-
state RECs. For instance, if Massachusetts does not perceive Pennsylvania waste coal AECs to 
be consistent with Massachusetts' RPS, it could value the waste coal AEC at a percentage of its 
value in the Pennsylvania AEP system.  
Under a weighted REC scheme, market liquidity could theoretically be improved if states were 
relatively conservative in the level of discounting of out-of-state RECs. If states liberally asserted 
the discount, a weighted REC scheme could effectively become the same as restricting out-of-
state RECs.  
D. Federal RPS 
The adoption of a federal RPS would have the effect of harmonizing REC markets and 
increasing the fungibility of RECs across the U.S. despite the RPS requirements of the states. A 
federal RPS with a common set of definitions for renewable energy resources and no geographic 
restrictions could eliminate the fragmentation in the current REC market, created by the varied 
requirements of the state RPS programs. Entities required to comply with the federal RPS could 
 
34 Chris Berendt, Clean Energy Development Strategies, A State-Based Approach to Building a Liquid 
National Market for Renewable Energy Certificates: The REC-EX Model, Electricity Journal, Volume 19, 
Issue 5, June 2006, Pp. 54-68. 
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meet the renewable energy requirement through the purchase of RECs. However, since the 
federal RPS would establish a nationwide standard, the RECs could be purchased from anywhere 
within the United States. 
In addition to fully fungible RECs, there are several other advantages to a federal RPS. To the 
extent that state-specific RPS programs have a renewable percentage lower than the federal RPS, 
a nationwide standard sets a floor thereby increasing the available renewable energy resources.35 
There is also a potential for lower cost renewable resources, and by extension REC prices, as 
renewable development presumably will occur where it is most cost effective. In states where 
generators, suppliers, and distributors recover the costs associated with the RPS from consumers, 
the federal RPS could translate into lower costs for consumers than a state-specific program. 
A federal RPS has several drawbacks, particularly from a state policy perspective: 
•	 A federal RPS is not tailored to the particular resources of each state. Under a state RPS 
scheme, the state may favor resources that are readily available within that state. For 
example, the federal definition of biomass may not include the emissions limits 
established under Connecticut law. The federal RPS limits the ability of state-based 
special interests from including provisions that do not advance the growth of renewable 
resources; although federal legislation will suffer from its own special interest problems. 
•	 The nationwide fungibility of RECs may drive renewable development to certain states or 
regions which have greater renewable resources. Those states in which renewable 
development is difficult may experience less growth in their local renewable resources 
than they would under a state-specific RPS even if the availability of renewables 
increases on a national level. 
A federal RPS may interact with the existing state RPS in several ways including: pre-empting 
the state program, remaining silent, or recognizing the state RPS. Under the pre-emption 
approach, the state RPS would cease to exist and the renewable energy definitions, REC 
definitions, renewable percentages, and all other aspects of the RPS would be determined by 
federal statute. In many ways, this is the simplest approach, as the requirements are known and 
consistent across all states and for all entities that must comply. A federal RPS could also opt to 
remain silent on the status of state RPS. This is least preferable approach as it makes the status of 
the state RPS uncertain and thus is likely to create greater market confusion. 
Finally, the federal RPS could recognize the state level RPS programs, integrating them into the 
federal RPS or permitting the state RPS to continue as parallel programs. Integrating state RPS 
could occur in a variety of ways including allowing compliance with state level RPS to qualify 
for all or a portion of the federal RPS. This would allow states to favor renewable resources that 
are readily available within its boundaries or that guarantee the most local economic 
development. The Federal RPS might also grant credits to electricity providers required to 
 
35 According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, a federal RPS with a 20% standard would lead to a 
six-fold increase in renewable energy generation in the U.S. 
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/clean_energy_policies/res_campaign.html 
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comply with state RPS. Senate Amendment 1538 to the 2007 Energy Act took such an 
approach.36 
Alternatively, the federal RPS could recognize the state RPS and allow states to maintain their 
RPS programs. The Bingaman Amendment to the 2007 Energy Act took this approach in 
proposing a federal RPS.37 The Bingaman Amendment specifically stated that the federal RPS 
did not diminish the authority of the states to impose RPS of their own.38 This approach has the 
benefit of allowing states to favor local renewable resources in their state RPS. 
However, states would need to address several issues. First, states would need to address the 
issue of double counting of RECs, determining whether the state will allow compliance with the 
federal RPS to count toward state level compliance; doing so might decrease the investment in 
state specific renewable energy resources that are not eligible for the federal RPS. Second, if 
states do not allow double counting, depending on the level of compliance required at the federal 
level, states might have to reduce their portfolio standards to assure that the covered entities in 
their states can comply with both the federal and state RPS. 
Regardless of the approach used under a federal RPS, a clear integration or pre-emption of the 
state RPS will be critical to maintaining the REC market. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
The fragmentation in the REC market created by the varying state RPS requirements can be 
addressed by a combination of changes to Partner State laws and the operating rules of 
NEPOOL-GIS. At a minimum, the definitions of renewable energy resources, the geographic 
restrictions and the definition of a REC must be addressed as discussed above. Alternatively, a 
federal RPS could provide consistency across the states, which would improve REC fungibility 
and market liquidity. 
 
36 S. Amendment 1538, amending S. Amendment 1537, amending S. Amendment 1502, amending H.R. 6 
(2007). 
37 S. Amendment 1573, amending H.R. 6 (2007) 
38 Section (h)(1) of S. Amendment 1573, amending H.R. 6 (2007) 
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2017: 22.5% (15.5%- (including .39% 
Class I, 3%-Class II, Solar), 8.2% Tier II 
4%- Class III) 2020: 7.5% Tier I 
2018: 24% (17%- Class (including .4433% 
I, 3%-Class II, 4%- Solar), 8.2% Tier II 
Class III) 2021: 8% Tier I 
2019: 26.5% (19.5%-
Class I, 3%-Class II, 
(including .5% 
Solar), 10% Tier II 
1%- Class III) 
2020: 27% (20%- Class Suppliers that do not 
I, 3%-Class II, 4%- meet targets are 
Class III) assessed a penalty of 
$45 per MWh for 
Tier I or II, or 200% 
of average REC 
price for solar PV.
            Class I:  solar, wind, Solar photovoltaic, Energy produced Tier I:  solar 
          new sustainable solar thermal, wind, using technology photovoltaic and 
      biomass, landfill gas, ocean thermal, wave that relies on a solar thermal, wind, 
fuel cells, ocean thermal or tidal, fuel cell, resource that is low-impact 
power, wave or tidal landfill gas, biomass being consumed at hydropower, 
power and some a harvest rate at or geothermal, biomass, 
hydropower and below its natural biogas, fuel cell, coal 
biomass. regeneration rate. mine methane. 
Tier II: waste coal, 
Class II:  trash-energy Hydropower (up to demand side (energy 
and some biomass and 200MW), landfills, efficient technology, 
hydropower. methane, farm load management, 
methane, solar industrial byproduct 
Class III - Customer 
sited CHP, DSM energy 
savings, and waste heat 
recovery systems. 
energy, wind, bio-
diesel, biomass, and 
geo-thermal and 
fuel cells using 
renewables.  Waste 
use), distributed 
generation, some 
hydropower, 
municipal solid 
waste, generation 
other than from wood 
agricultural or processing 
silvicultural is byproducts, and 
excluded as is integrated combined 
nuclear fuel. coal gasification 
technology. Includes 
Includes only 
renewables from 
new and existing 
sources. 
facilities coming 
into service after 
Dec. 31, 2004. 
           Obligation can be met 
through purchase of 
RECs issued by 
Obligation can be 
met through 
purchase of RECs 
The mandatory 
RPS obligation can 
be met through the 
Alternative Energy 
Credits (AEC) 
(defined as tradable 
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NEPOOL. issued by NEPOOL. 
Also, an electricity 
supplier may 
discharge its RPS 
obligation by making 
an alternative 
compliance payment 
to the Massachusetts 
Technology Park 
Corporation, which 
administers the 
state's Renewable 
Energy Trust. 
purchase of RECs. instruments) may be 
used to comply with 
the AEPS. 
           Electric suppliers and For electrical energy Electricity AECs may be 
            distributors may meet 
the requirements with: 
1) RECs issued by 
NEPOOL GIS 
if the RECs are for a) 
energy produced by a 
unit generating Class I 
or II energy in ISO-NE 
or b) energy imported 
into control area of ISO-
NE pursuant to 
NEPOOL-GIS Rule 
2.7(c); 
2) RECs under contract 
to serve end-use 
customers in the state 
on or before October 1, 
2  
transactions not 
included in the ISO-
NE settlement 
market system but 
for which the 
supplier holds GIS 
Certificates from 
NEPOOL, the 
supplier must 
document the 
ownership of the GIS 
Certificates. 
For electrical energy 
transactions not 
included in ISO-NE 
settlement market 
system and for which 
the supplier has not 
secured GIS 
certificates, the 
transaction must be 
verified by an 
independent third-
party. Off-grid and 
behind-the-meter 
generators must be 
located in 
Massachusetts.  
generated inside or 
outside Vermont 
may be counted 
toward the goal. 
certified for the 
portion of renewable 
energy consumed or 
delivered to PA or 
the control area of 
the RTO that 
manages part of PA. 
AECs from outside 
PA are eligible for 
compliance purposes 
only in the parts of 
PA that are within 
the same RTO 
control area as the 
generator of the 
alternative energy. 
    Any electric supplier No explicit provision No explicit Owned by alternative 
  that seeks to 
demonstrate RPS 
compliance by 
participating in the 
regarding ownership 
of RECs. 
provision regarding 
ownership of 
RECs. 
energy generator (or 
customer generator) 
and may sell or 
transfer. 
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renewable energy 
trading program shall 
have exclusive 
ownership of all 
renewable energy and 
environmental attributes 
from such trading 
programs that are 
associated with its 
renewable energy 
sources. 
           2006 ISO-NE Data 2006 ISO-NE Data 2006 ISO-NE Data 2007 PJM Data 
   Natural Gas - 38.1% Natural Gas - 38.1% Natural Gas - Coal - 55.3% 
Nuclear - 14.4% 
Coal - 9.2% 
Oil - 24.4% 
Nuclear - 14.4% 
Coal - 9.2% 
Oil - 24.4% 
38.1% 
Nuclear - 14.4% 
Coal - 9.2% 
Nuclear - 33.9% 
Natural Gas - 7.7% 
Oil - 5% 
Hydro - 1.7% 
Hydro - 5.5% Hydro - 5.5% Oil - 24.4% Solid waste - .7% 
Pumped Storage - 5.4% Pumped Storage - Hydro - 5.5% Wind - .2%
Other Renewables - 3% 5.4% Pumped Storage -
Other Renewables - 5.4% 
3% Other Renewables 
- 3%  
  Electricity suppliers and Retail electricity Retail suppliers Electricity 
    electricity distribution suppliers selling distribution 
companies electricity to end-use companies and 
customers electricity generation 
suppliers with 
respect to energy 
sold to retail electric 
customers
          
  
      
NEPOOL GIS NEPOOL GIS NEPOOL GIS PJM GATS
          NEPOOL-GIS requires NEPOOL-GIS NEPOOL-GIS PJM GATS will 
  that the energy requires that the requires that the issue certificates for 
      associated with energy associated energy associated generating units 
        certificates issued under with certificates with certificates located outside of 
            the NEPOOL-GIS be issued under the issued under the PJM whether or not 
delivered into ISO-NE NEPOOL-GIS be NEPOOL-GIS be the energy is 
and that the energy be delivered into ISO- delivered into ISO- delivered into PJM. 
generated in a control NE and that the NE and that the If the energy was not 
area adjacent to ISO- energy be generated energy be generated delivered into PJM, 
NE. in a control area in a control area certificates will only 
adjacent to ISO-NE. adjacent to ISO- be created if 1) the 
NE. generator has been 
pre-qualified by one 
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of the P M states for 
its RPS program, and 
2) the state has 
approved the 
creation of 
certificates.
  
  
          
       
      
  
Connecticut Department 
of Public Utility Control
  
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 16-
245a, 16-1, and related 
provisions at Title 16, 
Chapter 283 
Regs., Conn. State 
Agencies, § 16-245a-1 
et seq. 
NEPOOL-GIS 
Operating Rules 
Massachusetts 
Division of Energy 
Resources
  
Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 
25A § 11F 
225 CMR 14.00 et 
seq. 
NEPOOL-GIS 
Operating Rules 
Vermont Public 
Service Board
  
30 V.S.A. § 8001 et 
seq. 
Board Rule 4.300 
amended in March 
2008 by S.B. 209 
NEPOOL-GIS 
Operating Rules 
Pennsylvania Public 
Utility Commission
  
73 Penn. Stat. §§ 
1648.1 et seq. 
SB 1030 
GATS Operating 
Rules 
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Report on China's Renewable Energy Law 
APP Project REDG-06-09 
Paul Curnow, Partner, Baker & McKenzie, 
Global Environmental Markets Practice 
May 2009 
This document has been prepared by Baker & McKenzie and the Chinese Renewable Energy Industry Association as part of a
 
project with funding support from the Australian Government and the US Government under the Asia-Pacific Partnership. This is not
 
a document of the Governments of China, Australia or the US, nor does it claim to represent the views of any these Governments.
 
This publication has been prepared for general information only. You should not rely on the contents. It is not legal advice and
 
should not be regarded as a substitute for legal advice. To the fullest extent allowed by law, Baker & McKenzie excludes all liability
 
(whether arising in contract, for negligence or otherwise) in respect of all and each part of this document, including without 

limitation, any errors or omissions. 

Please note that under current Chinese regulations, foreign lawyers are not admitted to practice law in the People's Republic of
 
China and thus are not permitted to render formal opinions on matters of Chinese law. 

© Baker & McKenzie, 2009.  All rights reserved. 
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1. Introduction and overview 
1.1 Background to this paper 
Asia-Pacific Partnership 
The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) is a voluntary
multi-national partnership between the Governments of seven nations in the Asia-
Pacific region – Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and the 
United States of America.  It was launched on 12 January 2006. 
The APP aims to strengthen existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements and create 
an international framework within which the participant nations will co-operate to 
pursue development, energy, environment and climate change objectives.  
The APP's charter states that the purposes of the APP are to: 
x	 create a voluntary, non-legally binding framework for international cooperation to 
facilitate the development, diffusion, deployment, and transfer of existing, emerging 
and longer term cost-effective, cleaner, more efficient technologies and practices 
among the Partners through concrete and substantial cooperation so as to achieve 
practical results; 
x promote and create enabling environments to assist in such efforts; 
x facilitate attainment of our respective national pollution reduction, energy security 
and climate change objectives; and
x provide a forum for exploring the Partners’ respective policy approaches relevant to 
addressing interlinked development, energy, environment, and climate change 
issues within the context of clean development goals, and for sharing experiences in 
developing and implementing respective national development and energy 
strategies. 
Renewable Energy & Distributed Generation Task Force
APP established eight public-private sectors task forces.  The Renewable Energy and
Distributed Generation Task Force (REDGTF) was formed to focus upon issues 
associated with renewable energy and distributed generation technologies. 
The REDGTF aims to: 
x	 facilitate the demonstration and deployment of renewable energy and distributed 
generation technologies in Partnership countries; 
x	 identify country development needs and the opportunities to deploy renewable 
energy and distributed generation technologies, systems and practices, and the
enabling environments needed to support wide-spread deployment, including in 
rural, remote and peri-urban applications; 
x	 enumerate financial and engineering benefits of distributed energy systems that 
contribute to the economic development and climate goals of the Partnership;
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x	 promote further collaboration between Partnership members on research, 
development and implementation of renewable energy technologies including 
supporting measures such as renewable resource identification, wind forecasting 
and energy storage technologies; 
x	 Support cooperative projects to deploy renewable and distributed generation 
technologies to support rural and peri-urban economic development and poverty
alleviation; and
x	 Identify potential projects that would enable Partners to assess the applicability of
renewable energy and distributed generation to their specific requirements. 
Our project
This paper forms a component of the REDGTF project: Identifying optimal legal 
frameworks for renewable energy in China and India (the Project). The Project is
undertaken by Baker & McKenzie and the Renewable Energy and International Law
project, with assistance from the Chinese Renewable Energy Industry Association 
(CREIA) and the World Institute for Sustainable Energy (India). It has funding support 
from the Australian Government and the US Government under the APP. 
The Project will consider and assess the legal, regulatory, institutional and policy
frameworks in China and India, and the barriers and opportunities facing the renewable 
energy sectors in those countries.  
The Project also involved hosting workshops in India and China to identify and 
promote best practice for laws and policies promoting renewable energy in developing 
countries. The final reports present results of the Project's investigations and make
recommendations. 
The ultimate aim of the Project is to encourage and enhance the capacity for emission 
reduction efforts in India and China, by promoting legal and regulatory measures 
which create an environment within which renewable energy and distributed 
generation technologies are viable.
The Project, while focused on India and China, is intended to provide policy options 
and recommendations that could be implemented in all APP partner countries. 
In relation to China, the Project builds on earlier work undertaken under RE Law 
Assist, a research and capacity-building project on renewable energy law in China, 
conducted in 2006-2007 by Baker & McKenzie, the Renewable Energy Generators of
Australia, CREIA and the Centre for Renewable Energy Development, with funding
from the Australian Government under the Australia-China Bilateral Partnership on 
Climate Change.
*****
For more information on any issues discussed in this paper, please contact 
Paul Curnow, Partner, Baker & McKenzie, at paul.curnow@bakernet.com. 
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1.2 China's Renewable Energy Law and this report
Introduction to China's Renewable Energy Law
The Renewable Energy Law of the Peoples' Republic of China (China) came into 
effect on 1 January 2006 – a significant milestone not only for China, but for 
renewable energy industries in countries around the world.  
The Chinese renewable energy market represents a significant opportunity for both
Chinese and Australian businesses, given the enormous energy demand increases 
expected within China in the coming decades, and the leading renewable energy 
technologies that have been developed in Australia over the past decade. The 
Renewable Energy Law is an essential platform for diversifying China’s energy mix. 
Australian industry, as a leader in a number of renewable energy technologies, is well 
placed to help China meet the additional demand for renewable energy as established 
by the Renewable Energy Law and the subsidiary regulations and regional initiatives 
that put this law into action.
The Renewable Energy Law itself is a brief umbrella document, which provides the 
provincial governments with a mandate to develop renewable energy feed in tariffs and 
quotas for the purchase of renewable energy within their locality. 
As part of RE Law Assist, a report was prepared in June 2007 which examined the 
Renewable Energy Law, and its impact on both China and Australian businesses 
(June 2007 Report).1 This report found that the Renewable Energy Law was an 
essential platform for diversifying China's energy mix, but that its nature as a 
framework meant that government regulations and implementing provincial legislation 
would play a crucial role in the development of China's renewable energy industry. 
China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) carried out the first 
official Government review of the Renewable Energy Law in early 2007.  The results
of the review, including recommendations from Chinese industry stakeholders, were 
published on 20 April 2007 and were reviewed in the June 2007 Report.  However, the 
June 2007 Report was published too early to consider the NDRC's Medium and Long-
Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China.  In addition, a host of new 
environmentally-focussed law and policy has been proposed and/or passed by the 
Chinese Government (see section 2.5 below). 
These developments will have a direct impact both within China and on the investment
analyses that Australian businesses will need to undertake when considering China as 
an investment opportunity.
1 Available at: 
http://www.bakernet.com/BakerNet/Resources/Publications/Recent+Publications/Renewable+Energy+ 
Law+in+China.htm 
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Aims of this review of the Renewable Energy Law
The purpose of the June 2007 Report was, among other things, to assist the Chinese 
Government, both at national and regional levels, to implement the detailed regulations 
under the Renewable Energy Law. In doing so, the June 2007 Report examined 
aspects of existing Chinese legislation or regulations that needed further elaboration or 
improvement, based on the needs and practice of Government and industry, and
drawing on the experience of Australian renewable energy project developers in 
developing renewable energy projects in a more mature market.
The purpose of this paper is to review the implementation of the Renewable Energy
Law since the publication of the June 2007 Report.  As such, it builds on the themes set 
out in the June 2007 Report, particularly with respect to regulatory achievements, 
policy challenges, the current state of implementation and future issues that will need 
to be addressed. It is not intended to be an encyclopaedic guide to investing in Chinese 
renewable energy projects (potential investors should always take project specific legal 
advice). However, it does outline key national law and policy, together with selected 
examples of provincial implementation of which investing businesses should be aware. 
Structure of this paper 
Following this summary, this paper is divided into three sections. Section 2 sets out a 
summary of the Renewable Energy Law.  It is intended to provide an introduction to 
those unfamiliar with the primary legal rules that the Chinese Government has 
introduced to date. It concludes with an overview of recent developments in law and
policy since the publication of the June 2007 Report.
Section 3 examines the law and policy identified in section 2 in more detail, looking at
specific aspects of the Renewable Energy Law and its impact on potential investors.  In 
doing so, it first considers regulation at the national level, before examining selected 
provincial examples that are indicative of how the national rules have been 
implemented.  Each sub-section in this part of the study concludes by highlighting the
key issues that are not yet resolved. Section 4 looks at issues arising with wind power, 
particularly pricing issues. Finally, section 5 sets out information on some broader 
issues associated with implementing a project in China, including project approvals, 
project financing and structuring, projects under the Kyoto Protocol, and protection of 
intellectual property. 
Appendix 1 contains a list of abbreviations used in this paper, Appendix 2 sets out 
summaries of relevant regulations, policies and standards, and Appendix 3 has details 
of wind power tariffs. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
M    
  
   
     
 
     
    
    
 
 
   
  
     
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
    
 
122    :        
1.3 Overview of RE markets in China 
This section sets out some information about the status of certain types of renewable 
energy in China, with comments on key issues of which investors should be aware 
before investing in the following types of renewable energy projects in China.
Wind 
Wind power is the fastest growing power generation technology in China. However, 
the methods for establishing the price paid to wind power generators for the electricity
generated are complex. There are two primary pricing methods: prices established by
tender under the Central Government's national concession program (for both private 
and State-owned developers), and prices negotiated on a case-by-case basis for
individual wind projects that are not part of the concession program. In addition, 
provincial governments have established various pricing mechanisms for wind 
projects. (Wind power pricing is discussed in more detail in Appendix 3 below.) 
One issue with the Government's national concession policy is that so far, only Chinese 
companies have won the tenders to build wind power plants, since the low bid prices 
appear to have deterred foreign companies from participating due to the low profit 
margins. The majority of wind power developers in China are Government-owned 
conventional power generation or energy corporations. These companies can invest in 
wind projects (which are politically attractive) without receiving commercial returns as
the wind projects are typically only a small proportion of their businesses.2 
The problems with individually negotiated projects are the fact that prices are often 
'guided' by the results of the concession bidding and that these projects have been 
limited to 50MW each (although they have proven to be the main avenue for new 
installations).3 
China is working hard to amass a domestic base of engineers skilled in wind projects 
and wind turbine technologies. This aim is furthered by the 'localization' provision of 
the national concession program, which requires that 70% of the value of turbines
installed under the program be manufactured in China. This manufacturing is often
undertaken by joint ventures between Chinese companies and subsidiaries of foreign 
companies. However, China's wind power technology still lags somewhat behind 
foreign technology. 
A further issue is that to date, attention has been focussed more on increasing wind 
power capacity, without a corresponding increase in the amount of wind power 
actually generated. Other issues include a need for more resource assessments and
upgrades to the electricity grids so the wind power is able to be used to the maximum
extent. 
2 "Rapid Development of Wind Power Market in China", presentation by Shi Pengfei of the Chinese 
Wind Energy Association at the Clean Energy Council Conference, Gold Coast 24 November 2008 
3 Martinot, E & Li Junfeng "Powering China's development: The role of renewable energy" Renewable
Energy World, January 2008
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
M 
  
    
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
    
  
  
 
 
   
    
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
    
 
    
 
   
 
    
 123 
Solar PV
The market for solar power in China is currently small. Given the price differential 
between solar power and fossil fuel power, large subsidies are required to support solar
photovoltaic (PV) projects, which the Government is not prepared to provide on a large 
scale. Many of the grid-connected PV systems currently operating in China are 
Government-commissioned demonstration projects.4 However, only approximately 5% 
of PV systems in China are grid-connected.5 The majority of solar power in China is in 
rural off-grid applications, again supported by Government programs.6 
Although the domestic market for the purchase of solar panels is cool, the solar panel 
manufacturing sector is in full swing, raising concerns that there will be excess 
capacity. Total investment by the top three Chinese solar panel manufacturing 
companies is predicted to exceed $1.3 billion by 2008-2010.7 Chinese company
Suntech, for example, is the world's fourth largest producer of solar cells. The 
manufacturers currently generate most of their revenues overseas, but the market for
solar panels in China is expected to grow.8 
Other issues facing solar panel manufacturers in China include the shortage of
polysilicon, and the relatively low levels of investment in continuing research and 
development (given the focus on expansion of production capacity).9 
Solar hot water
Despite the slow uptake of solar PV, China has made great strides with solar hot water 
and is now the world's largest market for solar hot water systems. Recent growth has 
been in urban areas, particularly the southern provinces, whereas historically solar hot
water was used in rural areas of China. Solar heating is now relatively affordable in 
China, due to a combination of low cost labour, cheap materials, and competition 
among a large number of domestic solar companies.10 
National and local government departments, architects, and real estate developers are 
paying attention to solar hot water and working to promote its use. The NDRC's 'Plan 
on Enforcement of Utilization of Solar Energy Heating Nationwide', issued in mid­
2007, mandates solar hot water heating in new construction. As a result of this 
4 Report on the Development of the Photovoltaic Industry in China (2006-2007), China Renewable 
Energy Development Project, June 2008 
5 Report on the Development of the Photovoltaic Industry in China (2006-2007), China Renewable 
Energy Development Project, June 2008 
6 Martinot, E & Li Junfeng "Powering China's development: The role of renewable energy" Renewable
Energy World, January 2008
7 Martinot, E & Li Junfeng "Powering China's development: The role of renewable energy" Renewable
Energy World, January 2008
8 Taylor, S "Sun rises slowly on China's solar energy sector", Reuters Carbon Market news, 18 January
2008 
9 Report on the Development of the Photovoltaic Industry in China (2006-2007), China Renewable 
Energy Development Project, June 2008 
10 Martinot, E & Li Junfeng "Powering China's development: The role of renewable energy" Renewable
Energy World, January 2008 
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initiative (and other similar provincial policies), solar hot water growth rates are 
expected to continue at 20%-25% per annum.11 
Hydro power
Hydro power makes up by far the greatest proportion of non-fossil-fuel energy in 
China. In 2005 it formed 16% of China's total power generation (and 23% of China's 
total installed power capacity).12 The Government has indicated that it intends to
continue developing China's hydro power resources, but that it will take into account
environmental and social issues in doing so (see for example the White Paper on
China's Energy Conditions and Policy, discussed in section 2.5 below). 
Hydro power is not eligible for special support under the Renewable Energy Law, and 
as such is not discussed in detail in this paper. The pricing and cost-sharing 
arrangements for hydro power projects are determined on a case-by-case basis, in 
accordance with existing hydro power policies.  
Biomass / Biofuel 
The Central Government has set targets for increased use of biomass for power 
generation, biomass pellets as a solid fuel, biogas for energy and bioethanol as a
transport fuel.13 
Some large-scale biomass power plants are now being developed, using agricultural 
wastes.14 
However, the Government is aware that increases in biomass/ biofuel use may conflict 
with producing food and protecting the environment. The Development Plan (see 
section 2.4) states that cultivated land should not be illegally occupied, food grains 
should not be excessively consumed and the environment should not be destroyed to 
produce biofuels or biomass for power.  
Geothermal 
To date there has been little development of geothermal power projects in China. The 
Development Plan states that most geothermal resources in China are more suitable for
industrial and agricultural heat applications and space heating rather than power 
generation. 
The Beijing Huaqing Geothermal Development Co. Ltd is to develop a geothermal 
heat pump system for the World Expo 2010 in Shanghai, China.
11 Martinot, E & Li Junfeng "Powering China's development: The role of renewable energy" Renewable
Energy World, January 2008 
12 Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China, section 1.2.1, English 
version September 2007 
13 Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China, section 4.2, English
version September 2007 
14 Martinot, E & Li Junfeng "Powering China's development: The role of renewable energy" Renewable
Energy World, January 2008008
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2. 	 Renewable Energy in China – 
background and developments 
2.1 	 Background – Energy in China 
China’s current and projected coal consumption and GHG emissions 
China’s energy sector is in many ways unique, not least because of its high dependence
on coal, which accounts for approximately 70% of China’s total energy – China has
little petroleum and natural gas resources. (By way of comparison, the United States 
relies on coal for approximately 25% of its total energy.)15 China’s coal production has 
more than doubled since 1990, from one billion tonnes to approximately 2.62 billion
tonnes in 2007, making it the world’s largest coal-producer and coal-consumer. 
China is now estimated to emit as much, or more, greenhouse gas than the United States, 
and therefore is (or soon will be) the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases.  
Despite China's low emissions per capita and declining rate of emissions intensity 
(emissions per unit of GDP), the trend in total emissions growth is likely to continue, 
as development continues and per capita energy use increases. By 2030 (or earlier) it is 
thought that China will account for 39% of the worldwide increase in carbon dioxide. 
Energy market reforms 
China’s State Council approved the plan for structural reform of the power industry in 

April 2002 (Reform Policy). The main tasks identified in the Reform Policy include: 

x separation of plant and grid; 

x restructuring of  power regulatory bodies and establishment of the State Electricity 

Reform Commission (SERC); 
x establishment of a competitive electricity market;
x implementation of power tariff reform; 
x formulation of environmental cost standards and surcharges for emissions; and 
x formulation of a pilot program where generators directly supply power to large
subscribers. 
Before the Reform Policy period, the State Power Corporation (SPC) controlled 46% 
of China’s electricity generation and 90% of China’s grid operations, and all provincial 
and autonomous region power companies were affiliates of the SPC, with exception of 
the Guangdong Power Group, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Group, and 
Hainan Province Power. 
15 Leggett, J, Logan, J & Mackey, A CRS Report for Congress: China's Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Mitigation Policies, 10 September 2008 
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Power generation companies 
After the reform, the SPC was broken into three parts, which consisted of power 
generation assets, grid assets and service companies.  The SPC’s power generation 
assets were restructured into the following power generating companies, each of which
is limited to no more than 20% of the generating capacity in each regional network:  
China Huaneng Group, China Datong Generation Group, China Huadian Group, China 
National Power Group, China Power Investment Group, and North China Power 
Group. Each of these generating companies has one or more China- or Hong Kong- 
listed companies. However, these companies remain ultimately controlled by the state. 
China’s electricity grid 
As a result of the separation of plant and grid under the Reform Policy, the SPC’s grid 
assets were restructured into the State Grid Company (a wholly state-owned company)
and the Southern Power Grid Company. 
The State Grid Company has several subsidiaries, which span most north and central
China – the North China Power Grid Company, the Northeast Power Grid Company,
the East China Power Grid Company, the Central China Power Grid Company and the
Northwest Power Grid Company.  In contrast, the Southern Power Grid Company’s 
scope covers south and southwestern China – Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, Guangdong 
and Hainan provinces. 
FIGURE 1:  GRID COMPANY SUBSIDIARIES 
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2.2 Introduction to renewable energy in China 
Renewable energy industry profile
China’s renewable energy industry is growing. From approximately 8% currently,
China’s target is to increase renewable energy to 15% of its energy mix by 2020. China 
invests extensively in renewable energy development. Such spending is largely
pragmatic, since the country is becoming increasingly poor in many energy resources 
in per capita terms. 
As well as satisfying pragmatic concerns relating to access to energy, China is also 
concerned about its international environmental image. Some of China’s emissions 
have been transported to nearby South Korea and Japan by strong winds, which may
affect its relations with key trading partners. Indeed, China’s “green” Olympics in 2008
were partly designed to showcase its willingness to adopt renewable energy. 
The Renewable Energy Law is aimed at ensuring China’s energy security while
protecting the environment.  
Key government players in renewable energy
It is widely recognised that China’s economic growth is linked to energy resources.
Premier Wen Jiabao, China’s Prime Minister, has indicated that energy supply will be
one of the greatest possible inhibitors to the growth of GDP.  Given that energy is such 
a priority, the State Council has appointed an energy coordination task force under the 
leadership of Premier Wen Jiabao. The State Energy Office, which operates at a 
ministerial level, will report directly to the task force. This taskforce replaced the
Ministry of Energy that was established in 1988.  
The key environmental monitor is the Chinese State Environment Protection Agency, 
which is gaining strength, as demonstrated when it halted construction of several dams
and power stations because their full environmental impacts had not been considered.  
Government policy on environment and GHG emissions 
While on one hand, several key figures in the Chinese Government have demonstrated
a commitment to the environment, such a commitment is tempered by the realities of a 
still-growing economy and GDP, which have increased energy usage exponentially.  
The Kyoto Protocol itself notes the potential for conflict between environmental 
objectives and the need to continue economic growth, since, as a developing nation, 
China is a signatory to the Protocol without being obliged to take on binding targets to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. China does, however, have institutional and
reporting obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Nevertheless, China has made some tangible steps towards reducing its emissions. In 
1995, the US Department of Energy and the Chinese Government signed a Protocol for 
Cooperation in the Fields of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Development 
and Utilisation. China signed Annex II to the Protocol the following year, which 
signalled its commitment to large-scale deployment of wind energy systems. 
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Furthermore, while China’s carbon dioxide emissions rose rapidly between 1978 and
1996, the rate of increase slowed between 1996 and 2000, although the Chinese 
economy grew by 36%.  To ensure continued economic growth with decreasing 
emissions intensity, technology development to implement newer, less-polluting 
facilities is considered a high priority. 
However, the experience of dams and power stations in operation in 2006 suggests that 
the environmental impact of constructing such facilities may need to be reviewed. In 
that year, China halted work on building 22 major dams and power stations because the 
Chinese State Environment Protection Agency stipulated that the projects, worth a total 
of US$14.65 billion, could not proceed until their environmental effects had been 
considered. 
History of renewable energy measures
The implementation of China’s Renewable Energy Law has not been an overnight 
proposition. Beginning with State Council policies on rural energy in 1983, measures 
to support renewable energy have included guidelines for wind farm development 
(1994), the Electric Power and Energy Conservation Laws (1995), renewable portfolio
standards models (2000), studies into feed-in tariffs, quotas and renewable portfolio 
standards (2002) and other measures implemented recently by the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress.  The Renewable Energy Law is the first attempt to 
implement a national framework for the development of all sectors of the industry and 
to create targets for the share of the total electricity market held by renewable energy. 
Pollution control 
In September 2006, the National Bureau of Statistics and the State Environmental 
Protection Administration jointly issued a report on adjustments to GDP caused by
environmental pollution. According to this report, the economic losses caused by
environmental pollution in China in 2004 amounted to 3.05% of China’s GDP in 2004. 
It is not surprising, then, that pollution control is one of the reasons for the Chinese 
government’s current plan to substantially increase the percentage of high and new 
energy and renewable energy in its overall energy consumption.  The Chinese 
Government’s concerns about pollution control and further implementation of the 
Renewable Energy Law are likely to lead to more support and access to the relevant
markets being provided to private companies in the renewable energy sector in China. 
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2.3 Formation of the Renewable Energy Law 
Legislative division of responsibilities 
Under Chinese law, all powers, unless delegated, are centrally exercised by the State 
Council, which is led by the Premier.  The Premier puts forth laws from the National 
People’s Congress and Standing Committee.  Accordingly, the National People’s 
Congress and its Standing Committee pass national laws, while the State Council 
enacts administrative rules and Local People’s Congresses make local regulations.
THE RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW – IN BRIEF 
The Renewable Energy Law entered into force on 1 January 2006 and covers energy
generated from all non-fossil sources (with the exception of nuclear generation).  It provides 
the framework for legislative initiatives, designed to secure the strategic position and future 
development of renewable energy. These include: 
 Renewable energy targets, including both economy-wide and technology-specific targets; 
 Compulsory grid connection for renewable energy facilities to the State electricity grid; 
 Power pricing arrangements, including feed-in tariffs and competitive tendering systems, 
to allow renewable energy to compete with traditional, fossil fuel-powered generation; and 
 Cost sharing arrangements to divide the costs of renewable energy generation and grid
connection equitably amongst utilities and electricity end users.
Rules comprising the Renewable Energy Law
The Renewable Energy Law is a framework that sets the overarching policies that 
drive the development of the Chinese renewable energy industry. Its importance stems 
from the fact that the development of the industry is, for the first, put on a statutory
footing.  The overarching policies enshrined in the Renewable Energy Law are put into 
practice through implementing regulations. 
In China the Central Government is responsible for formulating national regulations to 
guide individual provinces during the implementation process. Instructions regarding 
pricing, cost-sharing, taxation and the project approvals process are stipulated by the 
Central Government for the provincial government to follow.
However, since there are great disparities between various provinces in terms of 
resource availability, industrial capacity and demand, in some cases provincial 
governments have needed to formulate their own detailed provisions for their area 
within the Central Government’s general policy framework. Selected examples of 
provincial implementing measures are considered in section 3. 
Although some national and provincial regulations have been introduced, the 
implementation of the Renewable Energy Law is an ongoing process.  The key recent 
developments since the publication of the June 2007 Report are set out in sections 2.4 
and 2.5 below. 
In addition to national and provincial regulations, policy documents and technical 
standards have been (and continue to be) published, which provide guidance on 
specific topics.  These texts are mentioned in the relevant sections of this paper, and 
Appendix 2 provides an overview of the national implementing texts. 
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2.4 	 Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for
Renewable Energy 
The NDRC issued the Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable
Energy in China (Development Plan – envisaged in Article 8 of the Renewable Energy 
Law) in September 2007. It is the most important supporting document issued to date 
in relation to implementation of the Renewable Energy Law, as it is intended to put 
forward "guiding principles, objectives and targets, priority sectors, and policies and 
measures for the development of renewable energy in China up to 2020."
The Development Plan has sections on the renewable energy resource potential, and 
current level of development, for hydro, biomass, wind, solar and geothermal power.
It sets out targets for uptake of these types of renewable energy for 2010 and 2020 –
these targets are outlined in section 3.1 below. 
However, the other sections of the Development Plan, discussed below, are more 
general in nature and do not provide a significant level of detail on proposed new
measures.  
Guiding principles for RE development 
The Development Plan briefly lists the following as "guiding principles" for renewable 
energy development in China:
1.	 Conscientiously implement the Renewable Energy Law; 
2.	 Adopt renewable energy development as one of the key strategic measures to 
achieve China's goals of establishing a resource-saving, environmentally-friendly 
society and realizing sustainable development; 
3.	 Speed up the development and deployment of hydropower, wind power, solar 
energy, and biomass energy; 
4.	 Promote technical progress; 
5.	 Increase market competitiveness; and 
6.	 Continuously increase the share of renewable energy in China's overall energy
consumption mix. 
The Development Plan also discusses the issues of:
x	 Coordinating renewable energy development and deployment with economic, social 
and environmental objectives – ensuring that renewable energy is developed taking
into account the location of resources, social needs (such as lack of energy in rural 
areas), environmental issues (including waste/recycling and environmental 
protection) and economic issues, with specific mention of the problems faced by
biomass energy in relation to food sources and protection of the environment; 
x	 Ensuring mutual promotion of the market (demand) and industrial development 
(supply) – this should enable a sustainable and stable market for renewable energy; 
importance is also placed on China developing its own renewable energy
technologies; 
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x	 Combining short-term utilization with long-term technology development – focus 
should be placed both on renewable energy technologies which are currently
relatively mature, such as hydro, biomass and wind power, and on technologies 
which are less mature but have good prospects, such as solar photovoltaic energy;
and 
x	 Combining policy incentives with market mechanisms – the Central Government 
will provide policy incentives to address the issues of energy shortages and lack of 
access to energy in rural areas, as well as supporting development of a "recyclable 
economy" (see the Circular Economy Law, adopted on 29 August 2008). The 
Government will also provide for market mechanisms to promote renewable 
energy. This dual approach recognises that, while market mechanisms can be
efficient, they are not always well suited to solving issues relating to lack of access 
to energy in poor or remote areas. 
National policies and measures 
The Development Plan notes that the following policies and measures will be adopted 
to meet the objectives and targets set out in the Development Plan: 
1.	 Establish sustainable and stable market demand – by means of "favourable price
policies, mandated market share (MMS) policies, government investment, 
government  concession programs, and other measures." 
2.	 Improve the market environment – by a range of measures to be implemented by 
the state power grid companies (purchasing renewable energy and constructing 
power transmission lines for renewable energy plants), power dispatch companies
(arranging for priority dispatch of renewable energy), fuel wholesale companies 
(purchasing  biofuels), energy administrative authorities under the State Council 
(formulating regulations for grid connection), and various administrative bodies 
(developing national standards for solar systems in buildings).
3.	 Set renewable power tariff and cost-sharing policies – as set out in the Renewable
Energy Law. 
4.	 Increase fiscal input and tax incentives – including by establishing a renewable
energy fund, allocating funding at the local level to support renewable energy 
development, and putting in place preferential tax policies to support research and 
development relating to renewable energy, the development and deployment of
renewable energy and the manufacture of renewable energy equipment. 
5.	 Accelerate technology improvement and industry development – by establishing/ 
integrating renewable energy research institutes, developing human resources, 
increasing technical innovation capabilities, ensuring national scientific and 
technological development plans include reference to research on technology 
development and industrialisation of renewable energy, and including renewable 
energy projects in programs to support the manufacture of equipment. The goals
are to establish a basic system of renewable energy technologies by 2010, so that 
most renewable energy equipment can be manufactured in China, and for China 
to establish its own intellectual property rights in renewable energy innovations
by 2020, so as to be able to deploy renewable energy on a large scale. 
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2.5 	 Other developments relevant to renewable 
energy – laws and policies
New Energy Law
A new Energy Law for China has been drafted and is proposed to come into force in
2009. It is intended to be the foundation energy law to guide and co-ordinate other 
laws in China's energy sector, thus acting as an overlay for other energy sector laws 
such as the Renewable Energy Law, Energy Conservation Law, Electric Power Law
and their associated regulations and measures. The Energy Law will cover all forms of 
primary energy, including renewable energy, as well as secondary energy products 
such as electricity and petrol. 
The purposes of the Energy Law include: 
x creating a stable, economical, clean and sustainable energy supply and service 
system; 
x increasing energy efficiency; 
x ensuring energy security; and 

x promoting the co-ordinated development of energy, the economy and society. 

The "guiding principles" of the Energy Law include several which are intended to
 
reinforce the Renewable Energy law, such as: 

x sustainable development and resource conservation; 

x market-based allocation of resources;  

x ensuring basic energy supplies and services for all;

x incentivised and restrictive pricing policies for renewable energy and new energy; 

and 
x tax incentives to encourage the development and use of renewable and new energy.  
Under the Energy Law, a national energy strategy will be established to guide the 
sustainable development of China's energy resources and safeguard its energy security. 
The strategy is intended to extend for a period of 20-30 years, revised and amended 
every five years. Underneath the national strategy will sit five-year national energy
plans and local energy plans, all of which must be consistent with the national energy
strategy.  
Article 5 of the Energy Law encourages renewable energy and low-carbon energy, in 
accordance with the Renewable Energy Law and China's National Climate Change 
Program.  It does not appear that the Energy Law is intended to make any substantive 
changes to the way in which the Renewable Energy Law operates. However, a
company undertaking renewable energy projects will need to ensure that it complies
with the Energy Law as well as the Renewable Energy Law (and associated
regulations). 
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Energy Conservation Law
A new Energy Conservation Law came into effect on 1 April 2008. It refers to
renewable energy in several places.
Under Article 7, the State is to implement an industrial policy that is conducive to
energy conservation and environmental protection, restricting the development of 
industries that consume large amounts of energy and cause pollution, while developing 
energy-saving and environmentally-friendly industries. The State encourages and 
supports the development and utilization of new energies and renewable energies. 
Under Article 40, the State encourages the installation and use of solar energy in new 
buildings and in renovations.
Under Article 59, the State encourages and supports the popularization of renewable 
energy technologies (eg biomass, solar and wind energy). The State also supports the 
use of non-arable land for development of energy crops. 
No specific incentives for these activities are given under this law. However, Article 78
provides that if an electricity grid enterprise fails to implement relevant State laws on 
prices of electricity entering the grid (which would include the higher prices payable 
for renewable energy), the national electricity supervisory authority can order that 
company to redress the breach and compensate generators for any losses. 
National Climate Change Program 
In June 2007, China took a significant step forward in addressing the risks of climate 
change with the publication of a new National Climate Change Program (prepared by
the NDRC).   
The Program outlines steps that China will take to meet the previously-announced
goals of improving energy efficiency by 20% in 2010 over 2005 levels, raising the 
proportion of renewable energy in the primary energy supply to 10% by 2010, actively
promoting energy price reform and implementing institutional reforms in the energy
sector. It also provides for education and public awareness on environmental issues. 
Public environmental awareness is becoming increasingly widespread and having a
deepening impact on Government decision-making. 
The Program contains several statements relating to the Renewable Energy Law. It 
states that the measures set out in the Program will assist in "vigorously developing 
renewable energy" (section 3.3.1). Section 4.1.1(1) of the Program states that China 
will promulgate the Renewable Energy Law as early as possible, implement it in a 
comprehensive manner, and in addition: 
x further intensify preferential policies to develop and utilize clean and 
low carbon energy 
x [d]evelop supportive regulations and policies, prepare national and 
local programs for renewable energy development, identify 
development objectives and integrate renewable energy development 
into assessment indicator systems for the construction of resource-
conservative and environmentally-friendly society
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x	 [t]hrough legislation and other approaches, [guide and encourage]
domestic and international economic entities … to participate in 
renewable energy development and utilization. 
Furthermore, section 4.1.1(2) asserts that:  
A stable mechanism for [renewable energy] investment will be established 
through government investment, government concession and other
measures. A sustainable and stably expanding market for renewable energy
will be fostered, market environment for renewable energy will be improved 
and obligation of national electricity grids and petroleum sales enterprises 
under the Renewable Energy Law to purchase renewable energy products 
will be implemented.
Plan for Environmental Protection 
The National Eleventh Five year Plan for Environmental Protection, 2006-2010 

(approved by the State government in November 2007) contains a series of priorities
 
and actions regarding protection of the environment. Statements relevant to renewable
 
energy include: 

x China will raise the percentage of clean energy in the urban energy mix;
 
x China will vigorously develop renewable energy;  

x China will make more efforts in the development of biogas projects in rural areas;
 
x China will implement preferential policies for power from renewable energy, 

including priority grid access or higher electricity prices;
x stricter pollution controls will be imposed on coal-fired plants; and 
x the rule of law will be strengthened, with environmental laws to be improved and 
strictly enforced. 
These statements indicate that the State Government sees the development of renewable 
energy as forming part of its wider efforts to improve the environment in China. 
Catalogue for Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries 
The NDRC released the latest Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment 
Industries on 7 November 2007. This version replaces the 2004 version, and came into 
force on 1 December 2007. The catalogue lists the following industries (among others) 
as ones in which foreign investment is encouraged:  
x the construction and operation of hydro power stations, with power generation as a
major activity; 
x the construction and operation of new energy power stations (including using solar, 
wind, magnetic, geothermal, tidal wave and biological energy); 
x the manufacture of special equipment for solar battery manufacturing; and 
x scientific research and technical services relating to biomass energy technologies. 
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However, it remains unclear what actually constitutes "encouragement" of projects 
listed in the "encouraged" category.16 
Circular Economy Law
A law entitled Circular Economy Law of the People's Republic of China was adopted 
on 29 August 2008, to encourage recycling and efficiency of resource use. Several 
provisions are relevant to renewable energy.
x	 Article 23: Where possible, areas shall make sufficient use of solar, geothermal and 
wind energy, as well as other renewable energy sources.  
x	 Article 32: Grid companies must, according to the relevant State laws, conclude a 
grid connection agreement with an enterprise which generates power from
comprehensive use of resources (eg waste heat, slime, coal bed gas, refuse and 
other low-calorie fuels), provide grid access services and purchase all the electricity
sent to the grid from such enterprises.
x	 Article 34: Agricultural producers and relevant enterprises are encouraged by the 
State to take advantage of advanced technologies that use crop straws, livestock and 
poultry excrements, by-products of the agro-product processing industry and waste 
agricultural films, to develop and use biogas and other forms of energy from
biomass.  
x	 Article 46: The State department responsible for determining energy prices shall 
determine the prices paid for grid electricity produced by the types of projects 
mentioned in Article 32, so as to encourage the comprehensive use of resources.  
White Paper on China's Energy Conditions and Policies 
In December 2007, the Information Office of the State Council published China's first 
White Paper on energy issues. It includes discussion of the promotion of renewable 
energy in China as follows: 
x	 China will continue to boost hydroelectric power and other renewable energy 
resources, and to develop substitute energy resources in a scientific way (Section II). 
x	 On the conditions that the environment is protected and issues affecting local 
people are properly settled, energetic efforts will be made to develop hydropower
(Section IV).
x	 China gives top priority to developing renewable energy. The exploration and 
utilization of renewable energy resources plays a significant role in increasing
energy supply, improving the energy mix and helping environmental protection,
and is also a strategic choice of China to solve the contradiction between energy
supply and demand and achieve sustainable development. China has earmarked 
special funds for renewable energy development to support resource surveys, 
research and development of relevant technologies, building of pilot and 
16	 As noted in the European Business in China Position Paper 2008-2009, Energy Working Group p. 
176, published by the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China 
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demonstration projects, as well as exploration and utilization of renewable energy
in rural China (Section IV).  
x	 China will further the comprehensive development of areas with hydropower 
resources, speed up the construction of large hydropower stations, develop medium- 
and small-sized hydropower stations based on local conditions, and construct pumped-
storage power stations under appropriate circumstances. It will spread the latest 
technologies for the utilization of solar energy, methane and other renewable energy
sources, and increase their market shares. It will also actively popularize technologies 
utilizing wind, biomass and solar energy for power generation, and build several 
million kilowatt wind power bases to achieve industrialization by means of scale 
power generation. It will actively implement policies supporting renewable energy
development, foster a renewable energy market featuring sustained and stable 
development, and gradually establish and improve an industrial system and a market 
and service system of renewable energy, so as to promote renewable energy 
technological advancement and industrial development (Section IV).
x In order to improve energy development in rural areas, China will (among other
things): 
 make full use of small-sized hydropower stations, wind energy and solar energy
for power generation; 
 actively develop rural household methane and make better use of biomass and 
solar energy in rural areas;
 continue popularizing small energy facilities, such as small wind power and 
hydropower stations, in rural areas; and
 build green-energy counties for demonstration, and accelerate the exploration
and utilization of renewable energy resources in rural areas (Section IV).
x	 China will encourage foreign investment in exploration and development of 
unconventional energy resources, and will encourage foreign entities to invest in 
and operate renewable energy plants (Section VIII).
These are policy statements and do not contain any binding measures in addition to 
those proposed under the Renewable Energy Law and associated regulations. However, 
the White Paper indicates the importance the Government places on renewable energy
(particularly hydro power).
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2.6 Comparison to RE laws in other countries
Introduction 
In addition to China, various countries around the world have recognised the growing 
importance of renewable energy and have passed specific laws, directives, ordinances
or provisions for renewable energy in order to ensure the healthy and robust growth of 
the sector. These directives usually specify long-term renewable energy targets.
European countries are leading the way in this regard and their laws are an important 
factor in driving growth, evident in the tremendous growth of renewable energy in 
Europe. 
We summarise below some of the specific renewable energy laws from around the world. 
Australia: Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 
Since January 2001 Australia has had a mandatory national renewable energy target.
The target itself has been a modest one to date, intended to contribute an additional 
9,500 gigawatt hours of renewable energy per year to Australia's generation mix by
2010. (The Government has promised to expand this to 45,000 gigawatt hours by 
2020.) However, the framework implemented to impose this target, the Mandatory 
Renewable Energy Target Scheme (MRET), implemented by Australia's Federal
Government in the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cth), has demonstrated
that mandatory markets for renewable energy can operate successfully. 
MRET is a simple trading system based on the creation, trade and surrender of 
renewable energy certificates (RECs), each REC corresponding to one megawatt hour 
of electricity generated from renewable resources.  
Operation of MRET 
The scheme operates by requiring most wholesale purchasers of electricity and certain
deemed wholesale electricity purchasers to surrender a number of RECs that 
correspond to their required contribution to the renewable energy target. Each entity's 
required contribution is calculated based on a percentage of their share of acquisitions
of liable electricity in Australia.  
RECs are created by accredited entities, typically electricity generators that generate
electricity using eligible renewable energy resources set out in the table below. RECs
can also be generated from a series of solar hot water heaters and small-scale
generating units. The administrator of the Scheme, the Office of the Renewable Energy
Regulator, reported that by 31 December 2007 there were 253 accredited power 
stations. 
As RECs are tradeable, they can be sold to the liable entities to meet their targets. In 
theory, given the broad participation in the Scheme and the tradability of RECs, MRET
is intended to promote renewable energy projects that meet the target at the lowest cost 
by allowing the market to decide which projects should be undertaken.  
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RECs can be traded separately from the electricity that enabled them to be created. In 
fact, the MRET model operates entirely independently from any electricity regulation 
in Australia, over which the State Governments exercise legislative power. 
Eligible renewable energy
Eligible renewable energy sources have been defined under the Act to include: 
 hydro  wave 
 tide  ocean 
 wind  solar 
 geothermal aquifer  hot dry rock 
 energy crops  wood waste 
 agricultural waste  landfill gas 
 food waste  food processing waste 
 bagasse  black liquor 
 biomass based components of  waste from processing of agricultural 
municipal solid waste products 
 sewage gas and biomass based  any other energy source prescribed by
components of sewage the regulations 
Penalties 
If the liable entity is not able to surrender the required number of RECs by the year
end, then it is liable to pay penalties in the form of renewable energy shortfall charges 
– $40.00 for each REC by which the liable entity is in shortfall of its target. No penalty
is levied if the shortfall is within 10% of the required amount but the shortfall is carried 
forward to the next year for accounting purposes. The penalty amount has been set out 
in the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Charge Act 2000 (Cth). 
Another provision in the Act allows for the refund of the shortfall penalty under certain 
conditions. If the liable entity is able to surrender the required amount of renewable 
energy certificates (equal to the shortfall amount in the year in which the penalty was 
paid) within 3 years of paying the penalty, then the entity is liable for a refund of the
previously paid renewable energy shortfall charge penalty once administrative fees 
have been deducted. 
Impact on electricity costs 
The need to purchase and surrender RECs (and the resulting income stream for 
renewable energy project developers) has increased the cost of electricity in Australia. 
Virtually all businesses in Australia are paying suppliers or service providers for 
MRET related costs that are passed through the supply chain in the cost of goods or 
services – principally, to their electricity retailers in their electricity invoices. 
Electricity retailers in submissions to the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 
in New South Wales have calculated the additional MRET compliance cost per 
megawatt hour for electricity retailers in New South Wales to be from AUD$1.10 to 
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AUD$1.25.17 This is a relatively small percentage of the average cost per megawatt 
hour in New South Wales of AUD$41.66 in the financial year 2007-2008.18 
Potential distortions to the ideal REC market 
Electricity retailers pass on to their customers the cost of complying with the MRET, 
and sometimes the cost that electricity users pay might not reflect the actual costs to
the retailer of sourcing RECs.  
Unless a company is a large consumer of electricity that negotiates its electricity
purchase arrangements with its electricity retailers, there is only limited opportunity for 
individual companies to take control of the required renewable energy or lower-
emissions component of their electricity.
Under MRET, large users of electricity do not ordinarily take control of meeting the 
renewable energy target for the electricity they purchase. However, such an
arrangement could be negotiated contractually between the retailer and user, if the 
electricity user was able and willing to purchase RECs at a lower price than the cost 
that their retailer would otherwise pass on to them.  
Design improvements identified from the operation of MRET 
In the course of operation of the MRET, opportunities for improvement have arisen in 
relation to three design features of the Scheme.  
The legislation originally allowed accredited renewable energy generators to delay
creating RECs for an indefinite period of time after the corresponding electricity was 
actually generated. This led to an amount of "latent generation" – electricity generation 
from renewable resources that had not yet been used to create RECs and so which was
not known to the market. Without any market signals as to the potential number of 
RECs available, liable entities had to guess the potential supply of RECs to meet their 
targets and this made pricing less transparent. Before the end of the last compliance 
period there was a spike in the price of RECs, potentially because liable entities had 
assumed that more RECs would be available from this "latent generation" than were 
actually made available.  The legislation has now been amended so that RECs must be 
created within 12 months of the corresponding electricity generation.  
That round of legislative amendments also changed MRET so that RECs could be 
surrendered voluntarily, without being used to meet the mandatory target. Before this 
amendment, a number of companies who offered services for electricity consumers to 
voluntarily purchase renewable energy under the scheme could only promise that 
RECs would be purchased and transferred to an account in the registry where they 
would never be used again. Further, companies who created RECs and other 
environmental products under other voluntary or mandatory schemes could not 
voluntarily surrender RECs under MRET to demonstrate that they were not "double 
dipping" under the rules of those other schemes.  
17 Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of NSW, NSW Electricity Regulated Retail Tariffs 
2004/05 to 2006/07, June 2004 p.39. 
18 NEMMCO average annual price data from www.nemmco.com.au, accessed 6 May 2009.
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MRET allows renewable energy generators to create RECs for additional generation 
above their electricity generation on 1 January 1997 (the "renewable energy baseline"). 
This baseline is set using factors that include historical generation. As a result, some 
generators have been able to generate RECs from existing generation capacity. 
Renewable energy project developers have broadly criticised this approach, suggesting 
that setting the baseline according to historical generation dilutes the market and 
reduces the reward available for new electricity generation capacity.
MRET framework mirrored for additional targets in States of Australia 
Unsurprisingly, the limited additional generation capacity that is likely to be required 
to meet the small target under MRET has been very quickly achieved.19 The previous
Federal Government declined to increase the target and extend the scheme, which has 
been an impetus for Australian State Governments to impose their own schemes 
mirroring MRET.20 
Queensland and Victoria have each introduced schemes which operate using a similar
trading mechanism to impose their own additional targets. Victoria's Renewable 
Energy Target Scheme (known as VRET) imposes a target of an additional 3,274 
gigawatt hours of electricity to be purchased by retailers (and other wholesale 
purchasers) in that State from renewable energy sources by 2016, while Queensland's
Gas Scheme currently requires electricity retailers (and other liable entities) in that 
State to source 13% of their electricity from generators using certain lower-emissions 
fossil fuels (principally, natural gas or certain waste gases). 
The current Federal Government proposes to increase the renewable energy targets 
under MRET substantially, to ensure that by 2020 approximately 20% of energy comes 
from renewable sources. This may mean that State-based target schemes discussed 
above will terminate. 
Germany: Renewable Energy Sources Act 2000 (amended 2004) 
The German renewable energy law is a prime example of what properly designed, 
stable energy policy can do to bolster the growth of renewable energy. It has created a 
booming internal and external market, for wind and solar technology in particular, and 
has simultaneously helped Germany towards meeting its greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction targets.
19	 For example, Dr M Diesendorf of the University of New South Wales, quoted in ABC report by van 
Santen, J, 20 April 2006; Mascher, S Right on Target? Australia's Mandatory Renewable Energy 
Target, conference proceedings International Workshop on Legal Issues for Clean Energy and
Climate Change, 21-22 October 2006 Beijing, China p.125 at pp136-9. 
20	 Stafford, A Credit where credit's due: A primer of trading schemes for renewable energy and carbon 
in Australia (2006) 27(1) Solar Progress 9 at 10. 
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The stated objective of the Act, introduced in 2000 and revised in 2004, is to:  
facilitate a sustainable development of energy supply, particularly for
the sake of protecting our climate, nature and the environment, to 
reduce the costs of energy supply to the national economy, also by 
incorporating long-term external effects, to protect nature and the 
environment, to contribute to avoiding conflicts over fossil fuels and to 
promote the further development of technologies for the generation of 
electricity from renewable energy sources. 
Additionally the Act helps implement EU directives on renewable energy and 
contributes to the increase in the percentage of renewable energy sources in the 
country’s power supply to at least 12.5% by 2010 and to at least 20% by 2020. 
The Act regulates priority grid connection and transmission for renewable energy and 
also deals with the purchase and compensation paid for such electricity. Renewable 
energy sources are defined to include hydropower (including wave power, tidal power, 
salt gradient and flow energy), wind energy, solar radiation, geothermal energy, energy
from biomass including biogas, landfill gas and sewage treatment plant gas as well as
the biodegradable fraction of municipal and industrial waste. 
The core provision of the Act is to provide priority status for renewable energy,
particularly in the compensation paid for such electricity through the mechanism of 
feed-in laws or minimum price standards. A feed-in law is a legal obligation on utilities
to purchase electricity from a renewable source at a preferential purchase price.  
Producers of renewable energy are guaranteed the sales price and access to market
through an obligation from utility companies to purchase the green electricity on an 
annual fixed-rate basis.  The price paid is subject to periodic adjustments by regulators.  
The price and the duration of the contract are set at levels that maintain investor 
confidence, allowing healthy growth in the sector in a low-risk environment.  
Minimum prices for renewable energy 
MINIMUM PRICES FOR RE, 2004 AMENDMENTS (GERMANY)
RE SOURCE MINIMUM PRICE 
Hydropower At least 9.67 cents/kWh for plants with a capacity up to and including 500 
kilowatts and at least 6.65 cents/kWh for plants with a capacity up to and 
including 5 megawatts.
Landfill Gas, 
Sewage 
Treatment Plant 
Gas and Mine
Gas 
At least 7.67 cents/kWh up to and including a capacity of 500 kilowatts and at
least 6.65 cents/kWh up to and including a capacity of 5 megawatts. The fees
paid for electricity from mine gas plants with a capacity of over 5 megawatts 
are 6.65 cents/kWh. All above the minimum prices shall be reduced annually
by 1.5%
Biomass At least 11.5 cents/kWh up to and including a capacity of 150 kilowatts, at 
least 9.9 cents/kWh up to and including a capacity of 500 kilowatts, at least 
8.9 cents/kWh up to and including a capacity of 5 megawatts and at least 8.4 
cents/kWh for a capacity of over 5 megawatts and up to 20 megawatts. All 
above the minimum prices shall be reduced annually by 1.5% 
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RE SOURCE MINIMUM PRICE 
Geothermal At least 15 cents/kWh up to and including a capacity of 5 megawatts, at least
14 cents/kWh up to and including a capacity of 10 megawatts, At least 8.95 
cents/kWh up to and including a capacity of 20 megawatts and at least 7.16 
cents/kWh for a capacity of 20 megawatts and over. All above the minimum 
prices shall be reduced annually by 1.0%
Wind 8.7 cents/kWh for first five years till plants achieve 150% of reference yield. 
After five years the minimum price will be 5.5 cents/kWh. 9.1 cents/kWh for 
offshore installation for first 12 years for installation before 2010. After 12 
years the rate will be reduced to 6.19 cents/kWh. All above the minimum 
prices shall be reduced annually by 2.0% 
Solar 45.7 cents/kWh for ground mounted installations. If the plant is attached to or 
integrated on top of a building or noise protection wall, the fees shall be at
least 57.4 cents/kWh up to and including a capacity of 30 kilowatts, at least 
54.6 cents/kWh for a capacity 30 kilowatts and over, and at least 54.0 
cents/kWh for a capacity of 100 kilowatts and over. An addition of 5 
cents/kWh will be allowed for BIPV systems. All above the minimum prices 
shall be reduced annually by 5.0% 
Source: WISE, 2007 
All the above minimum prices are to be paid from the date of commissioning of the 
plant for a period of 20 calendar years, or 30 years for hydropower plants.  
A nation-wide equalization scheme has been implemented to reduce the cost 
differentials paid by grid operators in different parts of the country for the purchase of 
electricity from renewable sources. Under the law, energy from renewable sources 
commands premium prices. The additional costs are included in household electricity
bills. The total additional costs are currently estimated to be only about €1 per month
per household.
Grid connection 
Plant operators are to bear the cost of grid connection and metering while costs
associated with grid up-gradation are to be borne by the grid operators. Plant operators 
are defined as anyone who, notwithstanding the issue of ownership, uses the plant for 
the purpose of generating electricity from renewable energy sources or from mine gas. 
Grid system operators are defined as the operators of all types of voltage systems for
general electricity supply. 
Other issues 
Environmental verification organizations are required to issues certificates certifying 
guarantee of origin of electricity from renewable sources. The Act also requires the 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety to
prepare progress reports from time to time.
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Czech Republic: Act on the promotion of Use of Renewable 
Sources 2005
This Act came into effect in 2005 primarily for regulating the promotion of electricity
generation from renewable energy sources in the Czech Republic in accordance to the 
existing EU laws and directives. 
The various objectives that this law wishes to achieve are as follows:
x	 promote the use of renewable energy sources; 
x	 provide for a constant increase in the contribution of renewable sources to
consumption of primary energy sources; 
x	 contribute to sound use of natural resources and sustainable development of society; 
x	 create preconditions for fulfilment of the indicative target for the contribution of
electricity from renewable sources to the gross consumption of electricity in the
Czech Republic equal to 8% by 2010 and create preconditions for further increases 
in this share after 2010. 
Renewable energy sources have been defined in the Act to include wind, solar,
geothermal, hydro, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and biogas.
Pricing and grid connection
The renewable energy producer has two choices with regard to renewable energy 
pricing: 
x	 sell the electricity to the grid operator pursuant to the conditions and prices set 
under this Act; or 
x	 obtain a green bonus for this electricity and sell it on the market. 
A green bonus is defined in this Act as a: 
financial amount increasing the market price of electricity that is paid 

by the operator of a regional grid system or transmission system to a 

producer of electricity from renewable sources, taking account of
 
reduced damage to the environment resulting from use of a renewable 

sources compared to combustion of fossil fuels, of the type and size of 

the production plant and of the quality of supplied electricity.
 
Captive users are also allowed the benefit of the green bonus under the Act. The
Energy Regulatory Office is in charge of setting prices for renewable electricity
purchase subject to certain conditions laid down in the law. These prices came into 
effect for the first time in 2007. The above body is also responsible for publishing an 
annual progress report on the status and progress of renewable energy.  Heavy fines
have been laid down for non-compliance both for the grid operator and the electricity
producer. Preferential grid connection for renewable energy sources is guaranteed
under section 4 of the Act and the costs are to be borne entirely by the grid operator.  
Wind power plants located over an area of 1 km2 with a total installed capacity of
20 megawatts are excluded from the purview of this Act. 
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Austria: Green Electricity Act 2003 (amended 2006)
Austria’s Green Electricity Act was established to enact new provisions related to
 
renewable electricity generation and combined heat and power (CHP).
 
This Act regulates various renewable electricity-related matters, including:

x the guarantees of origin of electricity produced from renewable energy sources;  

x the obligations to purchase and pay for electricity;  

x the preconditions for, and the promotion of, electricity produced from renewable 

energy sources; and 
x the nation-wide equal sharing of costs associated with the promotion of electricity 
produced from renewable energy sources and from CHP plants.  
The objectives of the Act, aimed at protecting the climate and the environment, to: 
x achieve the target of 78.1% of electricity from renewable sources by 2010;
x make good use of the means of promoting renewable energy and to try and achieve 
market maturity for new technologies; 
x support CHP plants used for public district heating supply; 
x have at least 9% of electricity from hydropower plants with capacity less than 
10 megawatts by 2008; and
x promote renewable electricity and provide for a nation-wide burden-sharing scheme 
for electricity from renewable energy and CHP. 
"Renewable energy sources" are defined as renewable non-fossil energy sources (wind, 
solar, geo-thermal, wave, tidal, hydropower, biomass, waste containing a high 
percentage of biogenous materials, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and 
biogases). 
The following two areas are eligible for support under this Act: 
x	 Electricity produced from renewable energy sources through minimum price
mechanism and the obligation to purchase such electricity. Hydropower plants with 
a maximum capacity of more than 10 megawatts and electricity from animal meal, 
spent lye, sewage sludge or waste, save waste containing a high percentage of 
biogenous materials, are not entitled to the above support. 
x	 Existing and modernized CHP plants used for public district heating are entitled for 
support in the form of reimbursements for part of the operating costs. 
Grid connection and feed-in tariffs 
Grid operators are required to treat all connection applications equally and in a 
transparent manner. They also require to issue "guarantee of origin" certificates for 
electricity generated from registered renewable projects. There is an obligation to 
purchase electricity from solar PV nationwide capacity of up to 15 megawatts and a 
certain percentage of electricity from hybrid and co-firing plants based on renewable
energy. CHP plants are eligible for support only if used for public heating and if 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
M   
 
     
 
   
  
 
  
 
  
    
   
  
  
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 145 
primary energy use and CO2 emissions are reduced in comparison to separate 
electricity and heat generation. 
The Act requires new feed-in tariffs to be set for all new renewable electricity plants. 
Customers are also required to pay a nation-wide uniform support fee (per kilowatt hour 
of energy supplied to final customers) to create a fund to cover the additional costs. 
United Kingdom 
The UK has several major Acts covering the use of renewable energy. These are 
briefly described below. 
Sustainable Energy Act 2003 
This Act deals with the provisions for the development and promotion of a sustainable 

energy policy. The Act makes it mandatory for the Secretary of State to publish 

annually a "sustainable energy report" to indicate progress made towards:
 
x cutting the United Kingdom’s carbon emissions; 

x maintaining the reliability of the United Kingdom’s energy supplies;
 
x promoting competitive energy markets in the United Kingdom; and 

x reducing the number of people living in fuel poverty in the United Kingdom. 

The Act also requires the Secretary of State to specify targets for electricity production
 
from CHP plants.  

Energy Act 2004 
The Secretary of State is required to publish a strategy for promotion of micro-

generation after considering its potential for: 

x cutting emissions of greenhouse gases in Great Britain; 

x reducing the number of people living in fuel poverty in Great Britain; 

x reducing the demands on transmission systems and distribution systems situated in
 
Great Britain; 
x reducing the need for those systems to be modified; and 
x enhancing the availability of electricity and heat for consumers in Great Britain. 
The sources of energy and technologies that are permitted under the micro-generation 

initiative are: 

x biomass;
 
x biofuels;
 
x fuel cells; 

x photovoltaics;
 
x water (including waves and tides); 

x wind;
 
x solar power;
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x geothermal sources; 
x CHP systems; and
x other sources of energy and technologies for the generation of electricity or the
production of heat, the use of which would, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, 
cut emissions of greenhouse gases in Great Britain. 
To qualify as micro-generation, the maximum capacity of the above sources are:
x in relation to the generation of electricity, 50 kilowatts; or 
x in relation to the production of heat, 45 kilowatts thermal. 
The Act also lays down specific guidelines and regulations for the use of areas outside
the territorial sea for exploration and exploitation of energy, especially from water and
wind energy. There are regulations for the transmission, distribution and supply of 
electricity generated in such areas and for de-commissioning of such renewable energy
projects. The Government has also reserved the right to declare such an area as a
"Renewable Energy Zone" for the above purpose. 
RPS obligation relating to electricity, under s32(9) of Electricity Act 1989 
The Renewables Obligation order was first introduced in 2002 and subsequently
revised in 2006. Electricity distribution companies are required under this order to 
produce or source a minimum percentage of their electricity from renewable sources.
The minimum yearly percentages are specified below. 
MINIMUM PERCENTAGE OF ELECTRICITY TO BE SOURCED FROM RENEWABLE 
SOURCE  2006 – 2016 (UK)
YEAR RPS %
2006-2007 6.7 
2007-2008 7.9 
2008-2009 9.1 
2009-2010 9.7 
2010-2011 10.4 
2011-2012 11.4 
2012-2013 12.4 
2013-2014 13.4 
2014-2015 14.4 
2015-2016 15.4 
Source: http://www.opsi.gov.uk/SI/si2006/20061004.htm 
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The official Government policy as per the law is: 
to reduce dependence on imported fuels with due regard to the protection of 
public health, the environment, and natural ecosystems consistent with the
country’s sustainable economic growth that would expand opportunities for 
livelihood by mandating the use of biofuels as a measure to: 
x	 develop and utilize indigenous renewable and sustainably-sourced clean 
energy sources to reduce dependence on imported oil;
x	 mitigate toxic and greenhouse gas emissions; 
x	 increase rural employment and income; and 
x	 ensure the availability of alternative and renewable clean energy without any 
detriment to the natural ecosystem, biodiversity and food reserves of the
country. 
Compulsory use of biofuels
All liquid fuels for motors and engines sold in the Philippines require locally-sourced
biofuels components as follows.  
x	 Bioethanol: Within two years from the effective date of the Act, the annual total 
volume of gasoline fuel actually sold and distributed by each oil company in the 
country must include at least 5% bioethanol. All bioethanol blended gasoline must 
also contain a minimum of 5% bioethanol fuel by volume, provided that the ethanol 
blend conforms to the Philippines National Standards (PNS). 
x	 Within four years from the effective date of the Act, the National Biofuel Board
(NBB) created under the Act is empowered to determine the feasibility and 
thereafter recommend to the Department of Energy (DOE) to mandate a minimum
of 10% blend of bioethanol by volume into all gasoline fuel distributed and sold by 
each oil company in the country. 
x	 Biodiesel: Within three months from the effective date of the Act, a minimum of
1% biodiesel by volume must be blended into all diesel engine fuels sold in the 
country, provided that the biodiesel blend conforms to the PNS for biodiesel. 
x	 Within two years from the effective date of the Act, the NBB is empowered to
determine the feasibility and thereafter recommend to DOE to mandate a minimum
of 2% blend of biodiesel by volume. This may be increased taking into account
considerations including domestic supply and availability of locally-sourced
biodiesel components. 
The Act also includes incentives for biofuel production in the Philippines. 
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The official Government policy as per the law is: 
to reduce dependence on imported fuels with due regard to the protection of 
public health, the environment, and natural ecosystems consistent with the
country’s sustainable economic growth that would expand opportunities for 
livelihood by mandating the use of biofuels as a measure to: 
x develop and utilize indigenous renewable and sustainably-sourced clean 
energy sources to reduce dependence on imported oil;
x mitigate toxic and greenhouse gas emissions; 
x increase rural employment and income; and 
x ensure the availability of alternative and renewable clean energy without any 
detriment to the natural ecosystem, biodiversity and food reserves of the
country. 
Compulsory use of biofuels
All liquid fuels for motors and engines sold in the Philippines require locally-sourced
biofuels components as follows.  
x	 Bioethanol: Within two years from the effective date of the Act, the annual total 
volume of gasoline fuel actually sold and distributed by each oil company in the 
country must include at least 5% bioethanol. All bioethanol blended gasoline must 
also contain a minimum of 5% bioethanol fuel by volume, provided that the ethanol 
blend conforms to the Philippines National Standards (PNS). 
x	 Within four years from the effective date of the Act, the National Biofuel Board
(NBB) created under the Act is empowered to determine the feasibility and 
thereafter recommend to the Department of Energy (DOE) to mandate a minimum
of 10% blend of bioethanol by volume into all gasoline fuel distributed and sold by 
each oil company in the country. 
x	 Biodiesel: Within three months from the effective date of the Act, a minimum of
1% biodiesel by volume must be blended into all diesel engine fuels sold in the 
country, provided that the biodiesel blend conforms to the PNS for biodiesel. 
x	 Within two years from the effective date of the Act, the NBB is empowered to
determine the feasibility and thereafter recommend to DOE to mandate a minimum
of 2% blend of biodiesel by volume. This may be increased taking into account
considerations including domestic supply and availability of locally-sourced
biodiesel components. 
The Act also includes incentives for biofuel production in the Philippines. 
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3. 	 Implementation of the Renewable 
Energy Law 
3.1 Renewable energy targets 
Introduction 
As noted in the June 2007 Report, China's renewable energy industry is growing 
rapidly.  At the moment, renewable energy (other than hydro power) accounts for
roughly 8% of China's energy supplies.  However, even though this figure represents a 
notable increase in the use of renewable energy (even since the publication of the June 
2007 Report), it is dwarfed by China's use of coal, which supplies almost 70% of the 
country's energy needs.21 
Chinese renewable energy targets originate in Articles 4, 7 and 8 of the Renewable 
Energy Law: 
Relevant provisions of the Renewable Energy Law
Article 4 notes the development of renewable energy as a priority for the Chinese Government,
and states that this aim can be promoted by establishing overall generation targets for 
renewable energy and taking corresponding measures to achieve them.
Article 7 adds detail to Article 4, by requiring that the State Council sets national medium and
long-term targets that will foster the development of renewable energy in China.  As part of its
remit, the State Council is required to liaise with the relevant authorities in the provinces, regions 
and/or municipalities. 
Article 8 requires that the State Council prepares a national renewable energy development 
and utilisation plan, which can be reviewed subject to the approval of the State Council. It also 
provides for the implementation of that plan by provincial authorities. 
National regulations, policies and technical standards 
The central national text that gives substance to the targets enshrined in the Renewable 
Energy Law is the Development Plan. It sets out targets for 2010 and 2020 for various 
types of renewable energy, as well as targets for ownership of renewable energy
capacity by power companies and use of renewable energy in rural areas.  
In summary, the Development Plan sets the targets indicated in the following table.
TARGETS UNDER MEDIUM AND LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT PLAN
RENEWABLE ENERGY END 2005 
ACTUAL 
2010 TARGET 2020 TARGET
Proportion of renewable energy in
national energy mix 
8% 10% 15% 
Hydropower (gigawatts) 117 190 300 
Wind power (gigawatts) 1.31 10 30 
21	 "Powering China's development: The role of renewable energy" E. Martinot & Li Junfeng, Renewable 
Energy World, January 2008
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RENEWABLE ENERGY END 2005 
ACTUAL 
2010 TARGET 2020 TARGET
Biomass power (gigawatts) 2.0 5.5 30 
Biomass pellets for solid fuel (million 
tons) 
n/a 1 50 
Bioethanol (million tons) 1.02 2 10 
Biodiesel (million tons) 0.05 0.2 2 
Biogas (billion cubic metres) 7 19 44 
Solar power (gigawatts) 0.07 0.3 1.8 
Solar hot water (million square metres) 80 150 200 
Geothermal energy (annual utilisation, 
in Mtce)
n/a 4 12 
Mandated RE capacity (non-hydro) to 
be owned by power generators that
have more than 5 gigawatts of 
generation capacity (% of total
capacity)
n/a 3 8 
Rural households to use renewable
energy (% of rural households)
n/a 30 70 
Green energy counties (where more 
than 50% of energy is from renewable 
sources, and biomass waste is utilised) 
n/a 50 500 
Progress against targets 
Although these targets were initially seen as ambitious, some of the 2010 targets have 
been reached ahead of schedule and there are plans to increase the targets. An
economic stimulus package for renewable energy may be released in the next few
months (in addition to the previously-announced stimulus packages which included 
specific allocations for environmental protection). As part of this package, the overall 
renewable energy target for 2020 may be doubled.22 
The 2010 target for wind power was reached in 2008, and has now reached 12 
gigawatts. The 2020 wind power target is likely to be vastly increased, perhaps to over 
100 gigawatts. The solar power target may also be increased, as capacity is forecast to
reach 10 gigawatts by 2020. Use of solar hot water heaters has also been growing
rapidly, with 10% of all Chinese households estimated to have this technology.23 
22 Shen, R & Wong, J "China solar set to be 5 times 2020 target – researcher", Reuters News 5 May 2009 
23 Ling Li "China to push use of solar water heaters", Worldwatch Institute 8 May 2007
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Selected provincial measures
The following table gives examples of provincial measures that will assist in achieving
the renewable energy targets. 
TABLE OF PROVINCIAL MEASURES 
REGION NAME REGULATIONS OR OTHER DOCUMENT RESPONSIBLE OFFICE 
Shanghai White book for energy policy, which includes the 
renewable energy development plan
Local DRC 
Hainan/ Xintai Regulation to promote integration of solar hot
water into buildings 
Provincial construction 
bureau
Shenzhen Regulation to promote integration of solar hot
water into buildings
City construction 
bureau 
Baoding/ 
Kunshan/ Wuxi 
Establish industrial base of renewable energy
power generation 
Local government
Yunnan Certification requirements for installation of solar 
systems into buildings and set up a regional 
standards for solar building integration 
Provincial construction 
bureau 
Beijing Regulation for promoting solar systems in rural 
areas 
Local DRC 
Shandong Measures for promoting biogas and renewable 
energy in rural areas
Provincial government 
Hunan Regulation for renewable energy development in
rural areas 
Provincial government 
Guangdong Measures for promoting solar energy
development, set up a fixed price for wind power 
as 0.68 Yuan/kWh 
Provincial government 
Sichuan Measures for promoting biogas development in 
rural areas 
Provincial government 
Mongolia Measures of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region for the Development and Utilization
Management of Wind Energy Resources 
Provincial government 
Gansu First region to enact a provincial-level bidding 
policy, in parallel with the national policy, to 
support wind power.
Provincial government 
Jiangsu Working on first phase of a 10,000 roof program 
regarding developments for grid-tied or building
integrated solar PV, and discussing a feed-in tariff 
policy with local utilities.  
Provincial government 
Shenzen Built 1MW grid-tied solar PV plant on the World 
Garden Expo building 
Mandated solar hot water in all new residential 
buildings below 12 stories in height  
Local government 
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Outstanding issues
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM JUNE 2007 REPORT 
 Consider the implementation of utility-level renewable energy targets and a tradeable 
certificate scheme to effectively link overall targets with chosen policy mechanisms. 
 Alternatively, consider strict reporting arrangements to ensure that feed-in tariffs are
sufficient to meet established overall renewable energy targets. 
 A quota system that requires major power generators to develop a certain number of 
renewable energy projects could be developed and implemented.
 Consider a system to ensure that targets and tariffs are complied with, including penalties
for breach. 
 The National Renewable Energy Development Plan should be published as soon as
possible, to guide the development of the renewable energy industry and create certainty for 
investors. 
The third and fifth recommendations above have been fulfilled. Progress could still be 
made on reporting renewable energy use and ensuring compliance with targets. 
In relation to the third recommendation, which has been addressed via the Development 
Plan's mandated renewable energy quotas for power companies, the European Business in 
China Position Paper notes that the quota requirement has the (presumably unintentional) 
effect of making Chinese power companies unwilling to partner with foreign investors in 
renewable energy projects. The Chinese power companies are concerned that foreign 
investment will dilute the share of installed renewable energy capacity in their portfolio of 
installed energy capacity, making it harder for the Chinese power company to reach its 
renewable energy quota. Therefore the mandated renewable energy quota may act as a de
facto barrier to foreign companies taking equity in Chinese renewable energy projects.
It may help to address this issue if joint venture companies with majority Chinese 
shareholding are allowed to account the joint venture's entire renewable energy 
capacity towards the quota requirements of the Chinese company.24 
Key issues of which potential investors should be aware
The growth rate of the renewable energy market in China has declined following over-
investment in 2006 and 2007. Particular barriers to wind and solar energy growth include 
restricted access to grid connection, over supply of wind turbines and limited stimulation of 
solar markets. 
In wind power markets, limited grid capacity is the major factor limiting growth. In 2008 nearly 5 
GW of additional wind power capacity was installed. Installed wind power capacity is expected 
to rise to 25-30 GW by 2010 and 35-40 GW by 2012. Current grid capabilities are unable to 
cope with the expected increased capacity and it is likely grid bottlenecks will reduce the ability
of wind power to access the market. Investors should investigate the capacity of the local grid 
and government support for grid company expansion. 
Wind turbine manufacture also faces over-supply. At present there are more than 50 
manufacturers with a total manufacturing capacity of 10 GW. By 2012 this is expected to
increase to 15-20 GW and generate an oversupply of turbines. Investors should be cautious 
regarding investment in new manufacturing and investigate future turbine demand.
Solar power also faces barriers to growth. The domestic market has not embraced solar power, 
24	 As noted in the European Business in China Position Paper 2008-2009, p. 178, published by the 
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China 
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and investors should be aware of current slow growth. 

The Government should explore policies to increase the take-up of solar power, and the ability
 
of wind power to be used on the electricity grid, before further supporting solar and wind 

equipment manufacturing industries.
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3.2 Price setting 
Introduction 
Price is the key barrier to the commercialisation of renewable energy as a form of 
mainstream energy. Therefore it is crucial that the Renewable Energy Law effectively 
addresses the differential between the price for fossil-fuel power and for renewable 
energy. 
The price of renewable energy is set in one of two ways: governmental designated 
price (feed-in tariff) and governmental guided price.  The latter is the bidding price 
proposed by the successful bidder through the tendering process.
The way in which prices are intended to be set for each type of renewable energy is
briefly summarised below. 
HOW PRICES ARE SET FOR EACH TYPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY 
TYPE OF RENEWABLE
ENERGY 
PRICE SETTING MECHANISM 
Wind A governmental guided price, which is established through the 
tendering process organized by the price-charging department of 
the national council. However, in practice prices may be 
established in other ways, as discussed in more detail in chapter 4. 
Solar Determined on a project-by-project basis. The NDRC approved 4
Yuan/kWh for solar PV projects in Inner Mongolia and Shanghai. In 
March 2009 a generous subsidy for solar PV systems was
announced, providing 20 Yuan  per watt-peak for solar panels that 
are attached to buildings and have a capacity of over 50 kilowatt-
peak (in addition to some efficiency requirements).25 This subsidy
is estimated to cover more than half the cost of purchasing and 
installing solar panels.26 
Biomass and Biofuel While the Renewable Energy Law provides that the price of 
biomass may be determined by tender, the practice in China is to 
set a feed-in tariff. 
Geothermal Determined on a project-by-project basis.
Hydropower The renewable energy price system does not apply for 
hydropower. Prices are determined on a project-by-project basis. 
Projects of 50 MW and above are approved by the NDRC. Projects 
below that size are approved the provincial DRC.
25 Shen, R & Wong, J "China solar set to be 5 times 2020 target – researcher", Reuters News 5 May 2009 
26 Finamore, B "Solar subsidies in China", Switchboard NRDC 7 April 2009 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
M  
 
   
    
    
  
  
  
  
    
  
         
    
  
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
    
  
  
 
  
   
 
 
     
 
 
 155 
Relevant provisions of the Renewable Energy Law
Article 19—Grid power price of renewable energy power generation projects shall be 
determined by the price authorities of the State Council in the principle of being beneficial to 
the development and utilization of renewable energy and being economic and reasonable, 
where timely adjustment shall be made on the basis of the development of technology for the 
development and utilization of renewable energy. The price for grid-connected power shall be 
publicized. 
For the price of grid-connected power of renewable power generation projects determined
through tender as stipulated in the 3rd paragraph of Article 13 hereof, the bid-winning price 
shall be implemented; however, such a price shall not exceed the level of grid-connected 
power of similar renewable power generation projects. 
Article 22—For the selling price of power generated from independent renewable energy
power system invested or subsidized by the Government, classified selling price of the same
area shall be adopted, and the excess between its reasonable operation, management 
expenses and the selling price shall be shared on the basis of the method as specified in
Article 20 hereof. 
Article 23—The price of renewable heat and natural gas that enters the urban pipeline shall
be determined on the basis of price management authorities in the principle of being 
beneficial to the development and utilization of renewable energy and being economic and 
reasonable. 
National regulations and policies 
The Provisional Administrative Measures on Pricing and Cost Sharing for Renewable
Energy Power Generation (NDRC Price [2006] No. 7) (here called the NDRC Price
Measure) sets out details on price setting and cost sharing relating to the feed-in tariffs 
under the Renewable Energy Law.  
The NDRC Price Measure is set out in full below (note that English translations of 
some terms may differ).  
NDRC Price Measure
Chapter 1. General Principles 
Article 1. In compliance with the Renewable Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China and 
the Price Law of the People’s Republic of China, these Measures are formulated to promote the 
development of renewable energy power generation industry.
Article 2. The scope of application of the Measures includes wind, biomass (including power 
generation from forest and agricultural waste through direct combustion and gasification, solid
waste incineration, landfill gas, biogas), solar, geothermal and ocean power generation. 
Prevailing regulations on hydropower tariff are still in effect. 
Article 3. Renewable energy power generation projects within the boundaries of the People’s 
Republic of China and those to be approved for construction by the relevant governmental 
authorities in 2006 and beyond shall be governed by the Measures while projects approved for 
construction by the relevant governmental authorities before December 31, 2005 shall be 
governed by the relevant existing regulations.
Article 4. Code for pricing and cost sharing for renewable energy power generation projects
sticks to the principle of development promotion, efficiency enhancement, standardized 
administration and fair share.
Article 5. Tariffs for renewable energy power generation are categorized into Government 
Fixed Price and the Guidance Price of the Government. The Guidance Price of the Government 
refers to the awarded tariff of the bid winner through competitive tendering. 
The incremental cost of renewable energy power generation over the yardstick feed-in tariff for
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desulphurizing coal-fired generating units shall be shared among the sales volume of electricity
in power grids at the provincial or above level.
Chapter 2. Pricing of Electricity 
Article 6. The Guidance Price of the Government applies to the feed-in tariff for wind power 
projects and the pricing standards will be determined through bidding by the price authorities of
the State Council. 
Article 7. For biomass power generation projects where the government fixed price applies, the 
price authorities of the State Council shall set yardstick tariff by region and the price standard
shall be the addition of yardstick feed-in tariff for desulphurizing coal-fired generating units in 
2005 in respective provinces (autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central
Government) and subsidy price.
The subsidy price is 0.25 yuan per kilowatt-hour. 15 years of subsidy price shall be enjoyed for 
power projects starting from the date of power production; the subsidy price shall be annulled 
after 15 years of operation. 
Since 2010, the subsidy price for power generation projects newly approved for construction by
the relevant government authorities each and every year shall be decreased by 2% over that
approved for construction in the preceding year.
Mixed-fuel power generation projects with the conventional energy exceeding 20% in heat 
consumption for power production shall be regarded as conventional energy power generation 
projects and the yardstick tariff of local thermal power plants shall apply without enjoying the
subsidy price. 
Article 8. For biomass power generation projects with feed-in tariff set through investor bidding, 
the guidance price of the government shall apply, i.e. the price of the bid winner which shall not 
be higher than the local yardstick tariff.
Article 9. The Government Fixed Price applies to solar, ocean and geothermal power 
generation projects and the price standard shall be determined in the principle of reasonable 
costs plus reasonable profits by the price authorities of the State Council.
Article 10. Sales price to the end-user for public independent power systems from renewable 
energy is subject to categorized sales price of the local provincial power grid. 
Article 11. Power end-users are encouraged to purchase electricity from renewable energy of 
free will and the tariff is the addition of the power generation price of renewable energy and the
average transmission and distribution price of the grid. 
Chapter 3. Cost sharing mechanism 
Article 12. The incremental cost of: feed-in tariff for renewable energy power generation over
the yardstick feed-in tariff for desulphurizing coal-fired generating units, operation and 
maintenance (O&M) costs of state-invested or subsidized public independent power systems 
from renewable energy over the average electricity sales price of the local provincial grid as 
well as the grid connection cost of renewable energy power generation projects will be settled 
via tariff surcharge levied on the electricity end-users. 
Article 13. The renewable energy tariff surcharge shall be levied on the electricity end-users
within the service scope of the provincial and above grid enterprises (including wholesale 
customers of the provincial grid enterprises, auxiliary power plants, and large accounts directly
purchasing electricity from the power plants). End-users of county self-provided power grids,
end-users in Tibet area and those engaged in agricultural production shall be exempted from 
such tariff surcharge. 
Article 14. Renewable energy tariff surcharge shall be verified by the price authorities of the 
State Council and metered according to the actual power consumption of the end-users 
adopting the unified standards throughout China. 
Article 15. Calculation formulas for the renewable energy tariff surcharge: 
Renewable energy tariff surcharge = the total amount of renewable energy tariff surcharge / 
total sales volume of electricity at a price with the tariff surcharge throughout China. 
the total amount of renewable energy tariff surcharge = Ȉ [(renewable energy power generation 
price - the yardstick tariff for desulphurizing coal-fired generating units of the local provincial 
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power grid) * renewable energy power purchased by the power grid + (O&M costs of public
independent power systems from renewable energy - the average electricity sales price of the 
local provincial grid) * sales volume of public independent power systems from renewable
energy] + the grid connection cost of renewable energy power generation projects and other 
reasonable charges] 
Therein: 
(1) total sales volume of electricity at a price with the tariff surcharge throughout China = total
sales volume of electricity of the provincial or above grid enterprises during the planning
period - power consumption for agricultural production - sales volume of electricity of the 
Tibetan grid.
(2) renewable energy power purchased by the power grid = planned power generation from 
renewable energy – power consumption within the power plant
(3) O&M costs of public independent power systems from renewable energy = operating cost
for public independent power systems from renewable energy * (1+VAT rate). 
(4) the grid connection cost of renewable energy power generation projects and other 
reasonable charges refer to the engineering investment and O&M costs incurred 
specifically for the grid connection system of renewable energy power projects, based on 
the design documents from the relevant government departments. Before the transmission 
and distribution cost is defined by the State, the grid connection cost shall be temporarily 
included in the renewable energy tariff surcharge.
Article 16. The total amount of renewable energy tariff surcharge to be apportioned among the 
provincial grid enterprises is defined according to the proportion of sales volume of electricity at
a price with tariff surcharge of the provincial grid enterprises in the total sales volume of 
electricity at a price with the tariff surcharge throughout China. 
Calculation formula as follows: 
The total amount of tariff surcharge to be apportioned among the provincial grid enterprises = 
the national total of renewable energy tariff surcharge * sales volume of electricity at a price 
with the tariff surcharge within the service scope of provincial grid enterprise / national sales
volume of electricity at a price with tariff surcharge. 
Article 17. The renewable energy tariff surcharge shall be included in the sales price of grid 
enterprises, levied by the grid enterprises and kept in separate accounts to be used for specific 
purposes. Subject to the detailed regulations governed by the state council for preferential tax 
policies concerned. 
Article 18. The renewable energy tariff surcharge shall be adjusted on a timely basis by the 
price authorities of the State Council according to the actual situation in the development of 
renewable energy and the adjustment cycle shall not be less than one year. 
Article 19. The difference between the subsidy electricity fare actually paid by the provincial 
grid enterprises and the grid connection costs incurred for renewable energy power generation 
projects and the apportioned amount of tariff surcharge payable shall be subject to unified 
allocation in China. Concrete administrative measures will be formulated by the electricity 
regulatory departments according to the Measures and submitted to the price authorities of the
State Council for approval. 
Chapter 4. Miscellaneous
Article 20. Renewable energy power generation and grid enterprises shall record and maintain 
relevant data such as trade volume, price, and amount of power generated from renewable 
energy to the grid on a true and complete basis and shall accept the inspection and supervision
of price authorities, electricity regulatory institutions and auditing departments. 
Article 21. Any failure to implement the Measures resulting in loss of corporate and state
benefits shall be scrutinized by the price authorities of the State Council, the electricity
regulatory departments and auditing departments and the major responsible person shall be 
tracked down for his responsibilities.
Article 22. The Measure shall take effect on January 1, 2006.
Article 23. The Measures shall be construed by the NDRC. 
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Government department with price-setting powers
A new National Energy Administration was established in 2008, as part of the creation
of a new energy governance system in China. One of its functions is to manage the 
renewable energy industry. However, it will not have final control over prices for 
renewable energy, which will continue to be determined by the NDRC. The National 
Energy Administration may propose new energy prices, but these must be submitted to 
the NDRC for final approval. 
The NDRC will not approve the final feed-in tariff for a renewable energy project until
after the project has been constructed.  
Furthermore, while the National Energy Administration has the power to approve
major investments in overseas energy projects, the NDRC retains the right to make the 
final decision on major energy projects in China. 
Selected provincial measures
In Guangdong province, a unified feed-in tariff has been implemented for wind power 
projects since March 2008. The tariff was fixed at 0.68 Yuan per kWh, tax included, 
and is additional to national wind power concession prices. 
Outstanding issues
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM JUNE 2007 REPORT 
 A feed-in tariff regime for the wind energy industry should be reintroduced in consultation 
with industry.
 Competitive tendering schemes should be combined with robust technical standards and a 
floor price to prevent gaming, low contract implementation rates and poor quality projects. 
 When the solar power industry is considered sufficiently developed (or to assist in its 
development), separate government approvals should not be required for solar projects 
and a predictable and sufficient feed-in tariff should be introduced. Alternatively other forms 
of support such as tax incentives and/or seed funding could be provided.
 Clarify any existing feed-in tariffs and other support mechanisms at a provincial level and 
specify how these will be affected by the implementation of the Renewable Energy Law and 
regulations.
In relation to the first recommendation, there have been some changes to the methods 
for setting tariffs for wind power – see section 0 for a more detailed discussion. 
However, the pricing situation for wind power is complex and could be streamlined
and improved.  
Again, the situation with technical standards has improved, but more could be done –
see section 3.7. 
The third and fourth recommendations remain to be addressed. It may be preferable for 
feed-in tariffs to be set at a provincial level rather than a national level, to reflect 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
M  
    
    
 
   
  
     
  
      
  
 
  
 
   
 159 
regional variations affecting the viability of renewable energy projects. Feed-in tariffs
should be stable (although indexed to inflation) and should be made public.27 
The fact that the NDRC does not approve final feed-in tariffs for a project until after it 
has been built means that investors have to decide whether to invest in the project 
without the benefit of confirmed prices for the power, exposing them to greater risks.28 
This could be addressed by the NDRC providing confirmed feed-in tariffs at an earlier 
stage in project development. 
Key issues of which potential investors should be aware
The price of power is set by the NDRC, and the NDRC is unlikely to take into account industry
submissions. Therefore some renewable energy feed-in tariffs may still be low by international 
standards. However, some provinces, including Guangdong, have the right to price power
within the province and may allow greater business engagement regarding pricing.
In general, the feed-in tariff for wind power in China is lower than in other countries. 
International investors should be careful to take this into account when assessing wind project
investments. 
27	 As recommended in the European Business in China Position Paper 2008-2009, p.179, published by
the EU Chamber of Commerce in China 
28	 As noted in the European Business in China Position Paper 2008-2009, p.178, published by the EU
Chamber of Commerce in China 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
M 
     
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
    
  
         
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
  
  
  
160    :        
3.3 Cost sharing 
Introduction 
The aim of the cost-sharing provisions of the Renewable Energy Law is to share the
costs of supporting renewable energy between all energy consumers. This approach is 
taken by many other renewable energy support programs, such as in Germany and 
Australia. 
Relevant provisions of the Renewable Energy Law 
Article 20—The excess between the expenses that power grid enterprises purchase 
renewable power on the basis of the price determined in Article 19 hereof and the expenses 
incurred in the purchase of average power price generated with conventional energy shall be 
shared in the selling price. Price authorities of the State Council shall prepare specific 
methods.
 
Article 21—Grid connection expenses paid by grid enterprises for the purchase of renewable 

power and other reasonable expenses may be included into the grid enterprise power
 
transmission cost and retrieved from the selling price. 

Article 22—For the selling price of power generated from independent renewable energy
power system invested or subsidized by the Government, classified selling price of the same
area shall be adopted, and the excess between its reasonable operation, management 
expenses and the selling price shall be shared on the basis of the method as specified in
Article 20 hereof. 
National regulations and policies 
The primary regulations/ policies relevant to cost sharing include: 
x NDRC Price Measure, discussed above
x Renewable energy surcharge level regulation (NDRC Price [2006] No. 28-33) 
x Provisional regulation on renewable energy surcharge balancing (NDRC Price 
[2007] No. 44) 
x Provisional Administrative Measures on Renewable Energy Development Fund
(MoF Economic and Construction [2006] No. 237) 
x Temporary measures of additional income regulation of renewable energy power 
(NDRC, November 2007). 
Summaries of these measures are set out in Appendix 2.
Surcharges and subsidies 
In September 2007, the surcharge for renewable energy in 2006 was announced. In 
2006, a total surcharge amount of 260.24 million Yuan was collected, divided between: 
x	 38 wind power projects, biomass projects and solar PV projects, in respect of which 
251.46 million Yuan was paid as a subsidy from the national surcharge;  
x five public stand-alone wind power and solar power projects, in respect of which 
7.62 million Yuan was paid; and 
x	 five wind power grid connection projects, in respect of which 1.16 million Yuan 
was paid. 
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In 2006, the subsidy was not able to cover the extra cost of renewable energy in four
provinces, namely Xinjiang, Jilin, eastern Inner Mongolia and Tibet. The excess 
renewable energy from plants in those provinces was sold to the utilities of Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Shandong and Henan. The trade amounted to 91.71 million Yuan,
representing 35% of the total surcharge in 2006. 
In March 2008, the government announced the surcharge and subsidy arrangements for 
the period from January to September of 2007. During this period, a total surcharge
amount of 714.48 million Yuan was collected (much higher than in 2006). This was 
divided between: 
x 75 wind power projects, biomass projects and solar PV projects, which received a 
total subsidy of 699.37 million Yuan; and 
x 35 grid connection projects for wind power, which received 15.11 million Yuan.
However, this was not able to cover the cost of renewable energy in seven provinces, 
namely Heilongjiang, Jilin, Eastern Inner Mongolia, Northern Hebei, Shandong,
Xinjiang and Ningxia. The excess renewable energy from plants in those provinces
was sold to the utilities of Shanxi, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangsu, Beijing, Sichuan and 
Henan. This trade amounted to 178.42 million Yuan, representing 25% of the total 
surcharge during the first nine months of 2007. 
Outstanding issues
RECOMMENDATION FROM JUNE 2007 REPORT
 The details of how the cost-sharing revenue will be divided among the 31 provinces, and 
how the additional costs will be borne by energy utilities, need to be clarified.
The NDRC measure of November 2007 has assisted in clarifying cost-sharing issues, 
by setting out further details on cost sharing plans and quota trading issues. 
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3.4 Connecting renewable energy to the grid 
Introduction 
Providing for renewable energy plants to be connected to the electricity grid, and for 
the grid to be able to use the power supplied, is crucial. The Renewable Energy Law
sets out the basic provisions: grid companies must provide grid-connection services for 
renewable energy plants, and must buy the renewable energy that is produced and 
supplied to the grid. Costs can be passed down to the energy consumers.  
However, there is some more progress which can be made, particularly in relation to 
sharing the costs of grid connection and ensuring grids are technically and physically
able to accept and use the renewable energy supplied to them.
Relevant provisions of the Renewable Energy Law
Article 14—Grid enterprises shall enter into grid connection agreement with renewable power 
generation enterprises that have legally obtained administrative licence or for which filing has 
been made, and buy the grid-connected power produced with renewable energy within the
coverage of their power grid, and provide grid-connection service for the generation of power 
with renewable energy. 
Article 16—If the gas and heat produced with biological resources conform to urban fuel gas 
pipeline networks and heat pipeline networks, enterprises operating gas pipeline networks and 
heat pipeline networks shall accept them into the networks. ... Gas-selling enterprises shall, on
the basis of regulations of energy authorities of the State Council or people’s government at the
provincial level, include biological liquid fuel conforming to the national standard into its fuel-
selling system.
 
Article 21—Grid connection expenses paid by grid enterprises for the purchase of renewable 

power and other reasonable expenses may be included into the grid enterprise power
 
transmission cost and retrieved from the selling price. 

Article 29—If the power grid enterprises breach Article 14 hereof and fail to purchase 
renewable power in full, which results in economic loss to the renewable power generation 
enterprises, such power grid enterprises shall be liable for compensation, and the national 
power supervisory institutions shall order them to make correction within a stipulated period of
time; in case of refusal to make correction, a fine of less than the economic loss of the 
renewable power generation enterprises shall be imposed. 
Article 30—In case that enterprises of natural gas pipeline network and heat pipeline network 
breach paragraph 2 of Article 16 hereof and do not permit the connection of natural gas and 
heat that conform to the grid connection technical standard into the network, which results in 
economic loss to the gas and heat production enterprises, relevant enterprises shall be liable 
for compensation, and energy authorities of the people’s government at the provincial level 
shall order them to make correction within a stipulated period of time; in case of refusal to make 
correction, a fine of less than said economic loss shall be imposed against them. 
National regulations 
It is the intention of the Renewable Energy Law is that renewable energy will enjoy
priority access to the electricity grid, and some regulations are already in force to assist 
with this. Relevant regulations include: 
x Regulation on the administration of power generation from renewable energy
(NDRC Price [2006] No.7); and
x Measures on Supervision and Administration of Grid Enterprises in the Purchase of
Renewable Energy Power (SERC [2007] Order No.25).  
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The NDRC Regulation provides that utilities are obliged to allow renewable energy
facilities to connect to the grid.  
The SERC Order, which came into force on 1 September 2007, requires the national 
grid authority and national standards authority to draft grid connection and power 
purchase standards to ensure the safety of the grid when it receives electricity from
renewable energy sources. It also governs the supervision of power grid enterprises'
purchase of electricity generated by renewable sources. The SERC and local agencies 
are now responsible for supervising such purchases. Power distributors are required to
use all available renewable electricity in their power grid, including hydro, wind, solar, 
biomass and geothermal power. 
Furthermore, power grid enterprises and electricity distributors are held responsible for 
any misconduct that causes losses to producers of renewable energy. Some examples 
of misconduct include: 
x a failure to construct necessary facilities to connect the electricity to the power
grids, or failure to do so in time; 
x refusal to sign electricity purchase and distribution agreements with the producers 
or intentionally obstructing the conclusion of those agreements; 
x failure to provide services related to the connection of electricity or failure to do so
in time; and 
x failure to give priority to electricity from renewable energies in electricity
distribution. 
The penalties for such misconduct will be fines calculated by reference to the losses 
suffered by the renewable energy generators as a result of the misconduct.  
Technical standards 
There are various technical standards which apply to grid connection, including: 

x Technical code for wind farms to connect to the grid; 

x Technical code for geothermal power plants to connect to the grid; and
 
x Technical code for PV power plants to connect to the grid. 

Outstanding issues
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM JUNE 2007 REPORT 
 Favourable grid connection and pricing regulations for small hydropower projects, which are 
usually rejected by power grids, need to be developed.
In addition to specific grid connection issues for small hydro plants, there is still 
progress to be made in ensuring the grid can receive renewable energy. While the 
SERC Order (discussed above) is a welcome development, in practice the ability of the
grid to receive electricity from variable sources, such as most types of renewable 
energy, is still a concern.
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The Energy Working Group of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China notes that: 
Renewable energy developers face a series of grid interconnection 
difficulties. These difficulties create delays, reduce profits and increase 
risks and uncertainty to the detriment of the development of the renewable 
energy sector in China. ... Grid companies often use technical reasons for 
not complying with their [grid connection] obligations under the 
Renewable Energy Law.29 
Looking specifically at wind power, Shi Pengfei notes that power grid issues will be 
the major constraint to the further development of wind power in China.30 However, in 
2008 there was increased investment in the power grid to help to address these issues.31 
It may help if a new set of grid codes for renewable energy sources are developed to 
reflect the specific technical features of those sources, as traditional, inflexible codes
are not appropriate for renewable energy. In addition, publication of a model grid 
connection agreement and model power purchase agreement would assist.32 
Key issues of which potential investors should be aware
Although the Renewable Energy Law has provisions on grid connection and power purchase 
for renewable energy projects, in practice renewable energy companies may encounter
difficulties in achieving satisfactory connection to the grid and in selling all their power to the 
grid. 
29 European Business in China Position Paper 2008-2009, p. 178
30 “Rapid development of wind power market in China”, presentation by Shi Pengfei of the Chinese 
Wind Energy Association at the Clean Energy Council Conference, Gold Coast 24 November 2008 
31 "China blasts through wind energy target", 15 January 2009, Environmental Finance Online News 
32 European Business in China Position Paper 2008-2009, p. 178, published by the EU Chamber of
Commerce in China 
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3.5 Regulatory approvals 
Introduction 
The uncertainty, cost and time associated with obtaining the regulatory approvals 
required for a renewable energy project have a considerable impact on the 
attractiveness of such projects to investors. If an investor/ developer must obtain 
approvals from different levels and departments of government, if it is not certain until
a late stage whether all approvals will be obtained, if it takes some effort to complete 
the required forms and if it will take some time to receive responses, the investor/ 
developer will be less willing to proceed with a project. To a greater or lesser extent,
all of these issues apply in relation to approvals for renewable energy projects in China 
(in common with many other countries).  
In addition to approvals relating to land use, development and price setting, foreign 
investors will also need to go through the foreign investment approvals process. 
Local knowledge is important in navigating the approvals process. The Renewable 
Energy Law does not set out the full approvals process, but instead refers to the 
administrative permits and filings required by the State Council. 
Relevant provisions of the Renewable Energy Law 
Article 2— Application of this Law in hydropower shall be regulated by energy authorities of 
the State Council and approved by the State Council. 
Article 13— For the construction of renewable energy power generation projects, 
administrative permits shall be obtained or filing shall be made in accordance with the law and 
regulations of the State Council.
In the construction of renewable power generation projects, if there is more than one applicant
for project license, the licensee shall be determined through a tender. 
Outstanding issues
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM JUNE 2007 REPORT 
 Clarify the responsibilities of each level of government in the approvals process. 
 Clarify and streamline the overlap between the renewable energy approvals process and
the foreign investment approvals process. 
Some progress remains to be made in streamlining the approvals process for renewable 
energy projects, particularly for foreign investors who may not have a good 
understanding of the approvals process.  
Key issues of which potential investors should be aware
Foreign investors will need to obtain local advice and assistance in navigating the approvals 

process for establishing a renewable energy project. It may take some time to obtain all 

required approvals.
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3.6 Investment incentives 
Introduction 
Investment incentive are vital to the renewable energy industry, as the costs of 
renewable energy are still greater (in most cases) than fossil fuel power generation,
particularly in the project construction phase. The Renewable Energy Law sets out 
various incentives for renewable energy. The most important of these is commonly the
feed-in tariff, guaranteeing the renewable energy developer an above-market rate for 
the renewable energy it generates – see section 3.2.  However, certain other incentives
are also available, such as access to low-interest loans and tax benefits. 
Relevant provisions of the Renewable Energy Law
Article 19—Grid power price of renewable energy power generation projects shall be 
determined by the price authorities of the State Council in the principle of being beneficial to the 
development and utilization of renewable energy and being economic and reasonable, where 
timely adjustment shall be made on the basis of the development of technology for the
development and utilization of renewable energy. The price for grid-connected power shall be 
publicized.  

Article 25—Financial institutions may offer preferential loan with financial interest subsidy to 

renewable energy development and utilization projects that are listed in the national renewable 

energy industrial development guidance catalogue and conform to the conditions for granting 

loans.
 
Article 26—The Government grants tax benefits to projects listed in the renewable energy
 
industrial development guidance catalogue, and specific methods are to be prepared by the 

State Council.
 
National regulations and policies 
The requirement in the Development Plan that power generators have a certain percentage 
of their power generation capacity in the form of renewable energy generation capacity
(see section 3.1) provides an additional incentive for those companies to invest in 
renewable energy.
Outstanding issues
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM JUNE 2007 REPORT 
 Clarify the details of financial incentive programs for solar photovoltaic power generation 
and biofuels, as well as the tax and loan arrangements. 
 Consider international best practice for effective tax incentives, loans and funding for 
renewable energy projects, including tying assistance to technical standards and project
lifetime output goals.
 Ensure that the process for applying for and the criteria for receiving such incentives are 
clear and easily available, in several languages.
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Progress still remains to be made in addressing the above recommendations, 
particularly the third recommendation on making information on the available 
incentives easily available. The Energy Working Group of the EU Chamber of 
Commerce in China states that: 
China’s support mechanism for renewable energies has evolved from providing
direct subsidies to the supplier to a more complicated system that also includes
tax reductions and exemptions, preferential price and credit guarantees and 
other subsidies implemented by central and local governments.  
There is no transparent and systematic policy on these incentives nor is there
information to help investors understand how to benefit from these incentive 
policies.33 
The government may consider establishing a website and hotline with information on 
renewable energy incentives available in some key languages, with links to information 
resources of provincial governments where required.  
The incentives at central and provincial levels may benefit from a review for gaps, 
inconsistencies and overlaps, and to ensure that the desired outcome is being promoted. 
For example, the incentives should prioritise the actual generation of power from
renewable energy plants (operational incentives), rather than merely the establishment
of renewable energy capacity (investment incentives).
Key issues of which potential investors should be aware
In addition to the feed-in tariffs, some valuable renewable energy incentives may be available 
to renewable energy investors under State or provincial laws, but it may be difficult for foreign 
investors to locate full information on these incentives. Local advice will be useful. 
33 European Business in China Position Paper 2008-2009, p. 178-179
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3.7 Technical standards 
Introduction 
Technical standards are crucial to ensure components for renewable energy plants are 
safe and reliable, and reduce the long-term risks of renewable energy equipment. 
Standards need to be developed and then a system must be put in place to ensure that 
components meet those standards, with penalties for manufacturers, importers or 
retailers that provide products that do not meet the standards.  
The Renewable Energy Law provides for standards to be developed, particularly for 
solar power: 
Relevant provisions of the Renewable Energy Law 
Article 11—Standardization authorities of the State Council shall set and publicize technical 
standard for renewable energy electric power and the technical standards for relevant 
renewable technology and products for which technical requirements need to be standardized 
at the national level.
For those technical requirements not dealt with in the national standard in the previous
paragraph, relevant authorities of the State Council may establish relevant industrial standard, 
which shall be reported to the standardization authorities of the State Council for filing.
Article 17— Construction authorities of the State Council shall cooperate with relevant 
authorities of the State Council in establishing technical economic policies and technical
standards with regard to the combination of solar energy utilization system and construction. 
Real estate development enterprises shall, on the basis of the technical standards in the 

previous paragraph, provide necessary conditions for the utilization of solar energy in the 

design and construction of buildings.
 
For buildings already built, residents may, on the condition that its quality and safety is not 
affected, install solar energy utilization system that conform to technical standards and product
standards, unless agreement has been otherwise reached between relevant parties. 
National technical standards 
Many standards are still under development. As noted in the June 2007 Report, two 
wind power generation standards have been published, as well as technical codes for 
wind farms, geothermal power plants and solar PV plants to connect to the electricity
grid. 
Several solar PV standards and codes have been or are in the process of being 
developed by the Solar Energy Photovoltaic Products Certification Technical 
Committee. Some of the more recent PV standards are:
x Photovoltaic systems - Characteristics of the utility interface (serial number
GB/T20046-2006)
x Photovoltaic module safety qualification - Part 1: Requirements for construction 
(serial number GB/T20047.1-2006). 
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Solar PV standards in the process of being developed include the "Technical
Specifications for PV-use Valve Control Sealed Lead-Acid Storage Batteries" and the 
"Implication Rules for Certification of Stand-alone Photovoltaic Systems".34 
The Ministry of Construction has completed the "Technical Regulations on the
Application of Solar Water Heating Systems in Civil Construction" and the "Technical 
Regulations on the Application of Geothermal Pumping Engineering".35 
The Development Plan notes (in section 5(2)) that the administrative authorities under 
the State Council responsible for the construction industry and the Standards
Administration of China will develop national standards for solar systems in buildings,
and will update the relevant construction standards, engineering specifications and 
management regulations of urban construction to create good conditions for the
development of solar systems in buildings.  
Provincial technical standards 
Only Yunnan and Hainan have developed standards for integrating solar power with
building development. 
Outstanding issues
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM JUNE 2007 REPORT 
 Implement further technical standards to build China's renewable energy in light of its
limited experience (e.g. standards for the bio-fuel productions to allow for larger scale 
application). Australian technical bodies and consultants may be able to assist with
developing appropriate standards. 
 Require manufacturing and consultant companies to provide warranties to government 
authorities that products meet technical standards, and require independent verification of 
estimates and designs, to put commercial pressure on companies to deliver high-quality 
products.
 Environmental protection regulations for large hydropower projects need to be clarified. 
While some progress has been made in this area, further development and enforcement 
of technical standards would be useful in ensuring the efficiency and reliability of the
renewable energy industry.
Although there is an authorised certification authority for the certification of renewable 
energy products, the China General Certification Centre, China's renewable energy
testing levels are generally not recognised internationally.36 This is an area for further 
development.  
34 Report on the Development of the Photovoltaic Industry in China (2006-2007), China Renewable 
Energy Development Project, June 2008 
35 China Renewable Energy Development Overview, March 2008, Energy Bureau and Energy Research 
Institute of the NDRC 
36 Report on the Development of the Photovoltaic Industry in China (2006-2007), China Renewable 
Energy Development Project, June 2008 
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The lack of technical standards for wind turbines is a serious issue. Standards should 

be set at the national level, based on international practices.

In relation to the third recommendation above, the White Paper on China's Energy
 
Conditions and Policies notes, in general terms, that hydro power projects will be
 
developed on the conditions that: 

x the environment is protected; and 

x problems affecting local people are properly settled (Section IV).  

Further detail on these protections would assist.
 
Key issues of which potential investors should be aware
Technical standards for renewable energy products in China may not be the same as standards in
other countries. In some cases standards have yet to be developed or are not regularly enforced. 
Foreign investors in renewable energy manufacturing industries may wish to consider adopting
and promoting the standards used in their country of origin. 
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3.8 Resource data 
Introduction 
Electricity generation from renewable sources can be very sensitive to small changes in 
the renewable resource. It is important to make investment decisions based on the best 
available data on the availability of the selected renewable energy, whether that be
wind, sunlight, water flow or available biomass fuel. 
The Renewable Energy Law provides that national resource surveys should be 
conducted, and the results made public.  
Relevant provisions of the Renewable Energy Law
 
Article 6 — Energy authorities of the State Council are responsible for organizing and
 
coordinating national surveys and management of renewable energy resources, and work with
 
related departments to establish technical regulations for resource surveys.
 
Relevant departments of the State Council, within their respective authorities, are responsible 

for related renewable energy resource surveys. The survey results will be summarized by the 

energy authorities in the State Council. 

The result of the survey of renewable energy shall be released to the public, with the exception
 
of confidential contents as stipulated by the Government. 

Article 24 —The Government budget establishes renewable energy development fund to
 
support the following:
 
(1) 	 Scientific and technological research, standard establishment and pilot project for the 
development and utilization of renewable energy; 
(2) 	 Construction of renewable energy projects for domestic use in rural and pasturing areas; 
(3) 	 Construction of independent renewable power systems in remote areas and islands; 
(4) 	 Surveys, assessments of renewable energy resources, and the construction of relevant 
information systems; 
(5) 	 Localized production of the equipment for the development and utilization of renewable
energy. 
Current status of resource assessments 
The Development Plan goes some way towards the resource assessment goals set out 
in the Renewable Energy Law by noting the potential resources of hydropower, 
biomass energy, wind energy, solar energy and geothermal energy. However, this
information is not detailed. 
The White Paper on China's Energy Conditions and Policies notes that the Government 
has earmarked special funds for a renewable energy resource survey (Section IV).  The 
NDRC has completed an assessment of China's hydro power resources, including
estimates of the remaining hydro power resources. In 2008 the NDRC conducted a 
national wind energy resource investigation, wind site assessment and biomass energy
resource assessment.37 As of January 2009, the results of this assessment were not 
publicly available in English. 
37	 China Renewable Energy Development Overview, March 2008, Energy Bureau and Energy Research 
Institute of the NDRC 
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Outstanding issues
RECOMMENDATION FROM JUNE 2007 REPORT
 Implement a national approach to resource assessment such as wind mapping.  Conduct 
training in resource assessment and make methods and results available to developers.
While the Government has undertaken some resource surveys, it would assist if 
detailed results were made more widely available and if resource assessment methods 
were disclosed. To be most helpful, assessments should take into account not just the 
physical resource, but also factors such as terrain, traffic, proximity to grid, proximity
to sources of demand for energy, infrastructure and social conditions.38 
Key issues of which potential investors should be aware
Not all publicly-available renewable energy resource assessments are complete and up-to-date. 
Investors may need to conduct some level of resource assessment themselves before 
committing to renewable energy projects, in order to obtain recent, detailed data on the 
resources at their proposed sites. 
38	 “Rapid development of wind power market in China”, presentation by Shi Pengfei of the Chinese 
Wind Energy Association at the Clean Energy Council Conference, Gold Coast 24 November 2008 
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4. Wind power – key issues
4.1 Wind power capacity
While there has already been significant development of wind power in China, there 
remains substantial potential for further wind power projects in several provinces. 
However, not all of this resource potential is ideally located with respect to load 
centres and grid infrastructure. The table below sets out some estimates of installed 
capacity and potential wind power capacity in various provinces. (Note that installed
capacity is expressed in megawatts and potential capacity is expressed in gigawatts.)
POTENTIAL AND INSTALLED WIND POWER CAPACITY IN PROVINCES
PROVINCE POTENTIAL (IN GW) INSTALLED (IN MW) 
Beijing Municipality N/a 49.5 
Tianjin Municipality N/a 1.5 
Hebei Province 77.9 491.45
Shanxi Province 49.3 5 
Inner Mongolia Aut. Region 786.9 1563.19 
Liaoning Province 77.2 507.81
Jilin Province 81.2 612.26
Heilongjiang Province 219.5 405.25 
Shanghai Municipality N/a 28.9 
Jiangsu Province 30.3 293.75
Zhejiang Province 20.8 47.35 
Fujian Province 17.5 237.75
Shandong Province 50.1 350.2 
Henan Province 46.8 3 
Hubei Province 24.6 13.6 
Hunan Province 31.4 1.65 
Guangdong Province 24.8 287.39 
Hainan Province 8.2 8.7 
Gansu Province 145.6 338.3 
Ningxia Aut. Region 18.9 343.2 
Xinjiang Aut. Region 437.3 299.31
Hong Kong N/a 0.8 
Source: CREIA Total 3236 
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4.2 Recent developments and major projects 
Wind power capacity in China increased by 127% from 2007 to 2008. By the end of 
2008, installed wind power capacity reached approximately 12.8 GW, according to a 
report by the China Electricity Council. 
The wind power industry in China is dominated by five big State-owned electric power 
companies, which are required to have a certain percentage of renewable energy in 
their portfolios (see section 3.1). 
Case studies 
 One of the most important wind farm development areas is Inner Mongolia, which 
generates approximately 40% of the national total wind power. Installed wind power 
reached approximately 1563 W at the end of 2007 and is estimated to reach 30 to 40 GW 
by 2020. Several gigawatt-size wind farms have been identified in the region. 
 The area with the second largest wind power potential is the three North-east provinces.
The total wind turbine installation amounts to 1524 MW with expected installation to reach 
10 to 15 GW by 2020. Three gigawatt-size wind farms have been identified in the region.  
 The third largest potential wind power area is in Gansu. Current power generation is
 
approximately 145 GW. Total wind power installation is 338 MW. The provincial 

government is attempting to develop a 20 GW wind farm by 2020. A 5 GW project has 

been approved and a 3.6 GW project has passed the bidding tender process.

 The region with the fourth-highest wind potential is Jiang. The Government has indicated 
that it wishes to build a 20 GW wind farm there by 2020. To date, approximately 294 MW
of wind power has been installed. 
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4.3 Tariffs for wind power 
Wind power prices are intended to be set by the government in the form of a feed-in 
tariff, as noted in section 3.2. In principle, this regulation should apply to all the
projects. However, there is a vast difference in wind resources and individual projects 
across China. In practice, the regulation is only applied to national concession (tender)
projects.  After the release of the NDRC Price Measure, several price establishing 
methods, pertaining to non-concession projects, were approved. 
1.	 Non-concession projects following the concession prices: Individual projects that 
have not been developed as national concession projects but which present similar 
resource conditions and terrain may apply for the development right and 
authorisation by the NDRC under the concession program by promising to accept 
the price already determined under a national concession project. Examples of 
projects where this has occurred include projects in Jiangsu, Inner Mongolia, Jilin 
and Gansu provinces.  In Jiangsu Province, a series of projects have been 
approved by this method. Developers accepted the online reference price level 
established by concession projects and projects were subsequently approved by
local government authorities.
2.	 Local tender: The local tender price level is generally higher than the national 
tender price, estimated to be 5-10 cents more per kWh.  Local tendering is
generally organized by the Provincial Development and Reform Committee or 
county government organizations, and is for projects up to 50 megawatts only. 
Examples of provinces which have established a wind power tariff through 
tendering include Fujian, Inner Mongolia and Shandong and Hebei provinces. 
3.	 Price approved by the local government: Pricing at a local level can often be 
influenced by lobbying the appropriate government departments in charge of 
project and pricing approval.  For example in Jilin and Inner Mongolia some
project tariffs were approved by the local government despite there being a
national concession tender price that could act as a reference. Other projects were
approved by the central government. In Liaoning, Shandong, Heilongjiang and 
Fujian Provinces local governments also adopted tendering as a pricing method 
for projects, without using a standardised reference tender price.  
4.	 Set tariff in Guangdong: In Guangdong province, a unified "Feed-in tariff" is 
available for wind power projects.  All projects, including those that are not 
national wind power concession projects, are able to access the feed in tariff. In 
March 2008 the tariff was raised to 0.68 Yuan per kWh. No other province has a 
specifically identified tariff. 
National concession projects are large projects awarded by tender, for which the 
Central Government often gives favourable terms. The national concession price is, 
theoretically, only applicable to these tendered projects, but due to tariff alignments the 
national concession price may also affect other wind power projects close to the
national concession projects. Other types of renewable projects however are unlikely to
be affected by national concession projects policies.  
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Usually, project owners submit project documents, which include suggested tariffs, to
the provincial department in charge of energy (generally the transportation and energy
division of the provincial development and reform committee).  The government 
departments in charge of approving pricing are the Pricing Department of the NDRC 
and the provincial Bureau of Commodity Prices. The difference between the 
preliminary opinion of the Bureau of Commodity Prices and the final approved tariff is
normally determined by discussion. When approving a power project, the NDRC and 
the local Bureau of Commodity Prices normally recommend a tariff. When the project
construction is completed the tariff takes into account the actual construction cost. 
The wind power pricing system is very complicated. However, in summary there are
two channels to establish the wind power price: 
x Bidding price – there are currently 4 phases of bidding with a total of 2400 MW 
generated by approximately 15 projects. These projects are national wind 
concession projects and are priced from 0.38 Yuan/kWh to about 0.519 Yuan/kWh. 
The average price of bidding projects calculated at the end of 2007 is 0.471 
Yuan/kWh with 8.5% of valued added tax (VAT) by end of 2007.
x Prices adopted by local price bureaus at the provincial level. The price is mainly
based on the wind resource with some reference to the bidding project price. The 
price ranges from 0.42 Yuan/kWh to 0.78 Yuan/kWh with an average price of 
approximately 0.59 Yuan/kWh. 
The wind price includes 8.5% of VAT. Local approval prices are generally higher than 
the prices under the National Bidding program, with an average difference of 0.12 
Yuan/kWh. 
The highest price paid is for a project located in Shandong, which pays approximately
0.681Yuan/kWh. The lowest price paid is a project located in Jiangsu where all the 
prices come through the bidding channel.  The current wind power prices in various
provinces of China are shown in the tables in Appendix 3.
In 2007 and 2008, the Pricing Division of the NDRC approved prices for more than 60 
wind power projects, in more than 10 provinces/ cities, taking into account the 
renewable energy resources of the area and the construction costs. Prices differ 
between regions, but are generally consistent for projects within the same region. 
Tariffs fixed by the NDRC in this way tend to be higher than prices established under 
tender for concession projects, but are still lower than wind power prices in other 
countries. 
The table below compares prices set by tender for concession projects to the prices set 
by the NDRC for wind power in different areas. 
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PRICES FOR WIND POWER PROJECTS – CONCESSION AND FIXED
REGION CONCESSION TARIFF TARIFF FIXED BY NDRC 
Inner Mongolia 0.382-0.5216 West 0.51 East 0.54 
Hebei 0.5006-0.5510 North 0.54 South 0.61
Jilin, Shandong, Liaoning, 
Heilongjiang, Henan, 
Shanxi and Hubei 
0.509-0.52 0.61 
Gansu 0.4616-0.5206 0.54 
Ningxia NA 0.56 
Xinjiang NA 0.51 
Fujian NA 0.585 
Jiangsu 0.4365-0.4877 NA 
Guangdong 0.5013 0.68 (set by local government) 
Source: based on the website of NDRC. Tariffs include VAT.
At a provincial level, pricing has also become increasingly standardised for projects
within the province, by way of a unified tariff. Uniform prices set by individual 
provinces have been used as a standard and are expected to indicate price trends in 
approved wind projects.  
In addition, trends in awarding tenders indicate the highest and lowest bids will be 
deleted and the bid closest to the median will determine the final concession price. 
When a tariff is applied to either a national concession project or a non-concession 
project, it is applied for 30,000 hours. This is only applicable for wind projects. 
To date, most foreign investors have adopted a joint venture model with domestic 
partners for wind power development. However, the approved tariff is not affected by
whether the development is owned by domestic or foreign investors.
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4.4 Other issues 
Key issues of which potential investors should be aware
Some general information is available on wind resources in China. Jiangsu, Inner Mongolia, 
Jilin and Gansu provinces are the most important wind farm development areas. However,
other provinces including Xijiang, which is the second largest wind resource region in China,
Fujian and Guangdong are also attractive wind development areas. However, there is an 
urgent need to develop detailed wind resource assessments, incorporating consideration of 
factors such as terrain, traffic, proximity to grid, proximity to sources of demand for energy, 
infrastructure and social conditions.39 
Availability of land near major sources of demand is increasingly an issue. In Inner Mongolia, 
Gansu and Xinjiang, there are good wind resources and available land, but not much demand. 
The efficient transmission of wind power to centres of demand is crucial, and improvements 
may be required to the grid infrastructure to achieve this. Power grid issues will be the major 
constraint.40 
The goals in the Development Plan are to increase wind turbine installation to 10 GW by 2010 
(already achieved) and 30 GW by 2020. However, it is likely that the total installation will be
greater than these amounts, and it may reach 25 GW by 2010 and 100 to 150 GW by 2020. 
Revised targets may be announced soon.  
Recent rapid growth in the wind power sector has been associated with turbine unreliability and
underperforming wind power projects. The industry is starting to address this by doing further 
testing. 
39 “Rapid development of wind power market in China”, presentation by Shi Pengfei of the Chinese 
Wind Energy Association at the Clean Energy Council Conference, Gold Coast 24 November 2008 
40 “Rapid development of wind power market in China”, presentation by Shi Pengfei of the Chinese 
Wind Energy Association at the Clean Energy Council Conference, Gold Coast 24 November 2008 
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5. 	 Undertaking a project in China –
broader issues 
5.1 Corporate structuring 
Possible investment structures 
Foreign investors keen to enter the renewable energy market in China may, under 
current Chinese laws and regulations, only do so under a joint venture (JV) 
arrangement in China and not as a wholly foreign owned enterprise (except in certain 
encouraged industries), or under an arrangement which combines both structures. 
Determining which JV investment structure will be adopted and being alert to the
advantages and disadvantages of each will be essential to effectively manage business
and legal risk. 
China has a number of national laws relevant to JV foreign investment and the 
renewable energy industry.  The types of corporate structure available to foreign 
investors in China are:
x Representative office; 
x Equity joint venture (EJV); 
x Contractual joint venture (CJV); and 
x Wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE). 
JV structure – distributing profit 
The different features and requirements that apply to EJVs and CJVs are significant for 
investors seeking to undertake renewable energy projects in China.  CJVs may provide
a flexible structure via which investors might make their contributions to registered 
capital, manage the JV, and distribute its profits.  By contrast, EJVs are typically
viewed as less flexible than CJVs. For instance, management control and profit 
distribution are typically proportionate to each party’s respective contribution to the 
EJV’s total registered capital. 
For both CJVs and EJVs, however, central government regulations may influence 
and/or determine significant factors, such as the amounts of the parties’ capital 
contributions to the JV, the types of foreign investors that are permitted to invest in 
certain types of projects, and the type of JV structure which might be used for foreign 
investment in certain sectors. For instance, in CDM projects, the percentage of foreign 
shareholding is restricted and, currently, only EJV structures can be used.  
JV structure – managing joint ventures 
Foreign parties should be aware of certain management issues associated with a JV 
structure.  For example, under relevant laws and regulations in China, changes to the 
JV’s amount of registered capital, as well as changes to the articles of association and 
JV Contract, may be made only with unanimous consent of the JV’s board of directors. 
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These requirements might pose a problem in a situation where, for example, one 
investor wishes to add capital to the JV and the other partner does not.
An advantage of a CJV is that, subject to approval by the relevant government 
authorities, it may be possible for the foreign investor to achieve early recoupment of 
the capital that it has invested.  In an EJV, on the other hand, investors usually cannot 
recover their capital, except in certain circumstances, which might include liquidation 
of the JV, transfer of their equity interest in the registered capital of the JV, which 
would require government approval and is subject to the other JV partners’ pre­
emptive rights, or reduction of the JV’s registered capital, which is subject to approval 
by the relevant government authorities (such approval is often difficult to obtain).
WFOE structure 
Foreign investment in the construction and operation of power stations using new 
sources of energy (including solar energy, wind energy, magnetic energy, geothermal 
energy, tidal energy, biomass energy and so on) is encouraged by China’s foreign 
investment policies, and the establishment of WFOEs in such industries is permitted.  
A WFOE can be a limited liability company or, upon approval by the relevant Chinese 
government authorities, may take another form.  Currently, most WFOEs in China are 
established by a single foreign investor, although the relevant regulations allow two or 
more foreign investors to apply jointly to establish a WFOE.
Foreign investors often prefer WFOEs, since, unlike for an EJV or a CJV, there is no
requirement for the investor to partner with a Chinese party. Thus, the WFOE 
provides foreign investors with the opportunity to completely control and manage the
daily operations of the entity. 
Acquire shares or assets? 
A JV could result from a foreign investor buying into an existing domestic Chinese
enterprise by acquiring an equity interest in the registered capital of that enterprise.
Alternatively, the foreign investor and the investors in the Chinese enterprise could 
agree to jointly establish a new EJV or CJV. 
If the parties opt for a buy-in by the foreign investor, the equity acquisition should be 
structured to address hidden liabilities.  Such hidden liabilities might include the tax
liabilities arising from the enterprise’s operation prior to the buy-in, and the feasibility
of the effective assignment of all business contracts, government permits and 
concessions. 
Regardless of whether a foreign investor opts to establish a new enterprise in China or
to acquire interests in or assets of an existing enterprise in China, it will be subject to 
approval by the relevant Chinese government authorities and to applicable 
requirements under relevant laws and regulations in China concerning limits on foreign 
investor shareholding, permissible shareholding structures, required registered capital 
amounts, and anti-trust filing requirements.  In addition, it will be important for the 
foreign investor to know if the transaction involves any state-owned assets, since the 
sale of state-owned assets is subject to a special regulatory regime in China. 
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Taxation 
For JVs and WFOEs (collectively, foreign investment enterprises or FIEs) that were 
approved and established before 16 March 2007, the following tax principles apply: 
An FIE is subject to 30% national income tax rate, plus a 3% local income tax 
rate.  Manufacturing FIEs with a term of 10 years or more are eligible for a 100% 
tax exemption for the initial two profit-making years and a 50% reduction during 
the subsequent three years. Longer tax holidays are available to export-oriented 
enterprises and technologically advanced enterprises. Even more preferential tax
incentives are available in certain development zones and for special industries. 
No withholding tax is levied on dividends remitted to the foreign investor outside of 
China.  A 10% withholding tax applies to royalties, rental and interest income. FIEs are
also subject to other taxes, including value added tax, business tax, real estate tax, land 
value added tax, customs duties, stamp tax and vehicle and vessel license tax. Whether 
a particular FIE will be subject to all or some of these taxes depends on the nature of its 
activities. 
Foreign exchange controls 
There are limits on the amount of foreign exchange that an FIE may borrow. These
limits will vary and will depend primarily on the particular financial, total investment, 
and registered capital circumstances of the FIE. 
FIEs are subject to “debt-equity” ratio requirements which regulate the percentage of 
registered capital which must be paid in by the investors in WFOEs and JVs.  For 
example, where the total investment for an FIE is more than US$3 million but less than
or equal to US$10 million, at least 50% of the total investment must be in the form of 
registered capital (which must be paid in to the FIE by its investors).  
Investors’ capital contributions to FIEs can take the form of cash, machinery,
equipment, industrial property, proprietary technology or, upon approval, Renminbi 
profits derived from their other investments in China.  It will be important to ensure 
that the non-cash contributions are appropriately valued. 
One of the reasons many investors consider utilizing a CJV instead of an EJV is that 
the investors are able to make their contributions to the JV in forms other than those 
typically allowed for an EJV.  For example, the Chinese party to a CJV might, as part 
of its contribution to the registered capital of the CJV, locate and pay for the local 
labour required by the CJV. 
Debt financing restrictions for foreign companies 
Currently, foreign companies are limited to a maximum of 66% debt financing of the 
capital cost of a project (compared to domestic projects which are permitted 80% debt 
financing), a restriction which automatically results in a lower return on investment for 
foreign companies over the life of the project.  It has been reported that lower than 
anticipated leveraged rates of return for development, construction and operation of 
projects is adversely affecting foreign investment in new renewable energy facilities.
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5.2 Project approvals 
In China, different categories of projects (encouraged, permitted, restricted or 
prohibited) are subject to different government approval requirements.  The table 
below summarises these requirements. 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT CATEGORIES AND APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
CATEGORIES
TOTAL INVESTMENT (INCL. ANY
CAPITAL INCREASE)
VERIFICATION AND
APPROVAL AUTHORITY
1 Encouraged or permitted US$500 million or above State Council 
Restricted US$100 million or above 
2 Encouraged or permitted US$100 million – US$500 
million 
NDRC and Ministry of 
Commerce at the central 
level 
Restricted US$50 million – US$100 million 
3 Other foreign investment projects Local counterparts of 
NDRC and Ministry of 
Commerce 
The effect of these categorisations is to streamline the approval requirements for, and
thereby encourage, those projects that are seen as high priority projects for Chinese 
development (in encouraged, and to a lesser extent, permitted categories). Renewable 
energy projects can benefit from these distinctions, since for the most part such 
projects are encouraged and therefore subject to less stringent requirements. 
The category of ‘encouraged’ projects includes the following project types: 
x Construction and operation of power stations using technology for clean burning of 
coal; 
x Construction and operation of thermo-electric cogeneration power stations; 
x Construction and operation of hydroelectric power stations; and 
x	 Construction and operation of power stations using new sources of energy
(including solar energy, wind energy, magnetic energy, geothermal energy, tidal 
energy, biomass energy etc). 
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5.3 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
Introduction 
The CDM is intended to be, among other things, a vehicle for investment and 
technology transfer between developed countries and developing countries including 
China. However, the international rules concerning the CDM as well as China’s
domestic CDM legislation have resulted in some barriers which must be overcome if 
the CDM is to be a meaningful driver for significant market growth in the renewable 
energy sector. Renewable energy investors in China seeking to develop renewables
projects under the CDM should also be aware of some practical issues and difficulties
that should be considered early in the project cycle, as well as some specific corporate
structuring requirements for CDM projects in China.
International CDM rules 
Additionality is a key eligibility criterion, and must be proved using the “additionality
tool” provided by CDM Executive Board. Chinese policies encouraging renewable 
energy (e.g. the Renewable Energy Law) are not to be taken into account when
assessing baseline (type E- under CDM rules). This benefits developers in China 
because it is easier to meet the requirement of additionality. Developers should
consider additionality early and document the decision-making process to enable them
to substantiate additionality arguments later. 
However, Chinese policies and regulations encouraging renewable energy are not to be 
taken into account when calculating the baseline scenario (this is known as ‘Type E- 
additionality’).  The baseline is calculated as the hypothetical scenario without the 
regulations being implemented. This benefits developers in China because it is easier 
to meet the requirement of this additionality.
Developers should consider additionality early and document the decision-making 
process to enable them to substantiate additionality arguments later. 
Host Countries (i.e. the Chinese Designated National Authority) must issue approvals
of potential CDM projects confirming their contribution to the country’s “sustainable 
development”. Entities wishing to receive certified emissions reductions (CERs) 
directly must also obtain authorisation from a developed country that is party to the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
Chinese CDM rules 
CDM regulations in China impose a number of specific requirements on renewable 
energy projects conducted as CDM projects.  
Corporate structuring
In relation to corporate structuring, the Chinese CDM rules impose restrictions on the
involvement of foreign companies in Chinese projects.  Specifically, the rules state that 
only enterprises in China which are wholly Chinese-owned or those in which the 
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Chinese party or parties hold a controlling interest (i.e. at least a 51% stake) may
undertake CDM projects with foreign parties.  This is understood to mean that the 
Project Entity must be a Chinese individual or entity or controlled by a Chinese 
individual or entity.
It has been reported that this restriction is resulting in a number of projects not being 
developed, as many investors are unwilling to cede control of a project to an unknown 
or inexperienced domestic partner.  This is particularly the case for large projects 
which need strong operational skills and experience to ensure profitability.41 
The CDM rules also impose restrictions on the form of joint ventures that can be used 
for CDM projects in China.  Currently, only equity joint ventures will be approved by
Chinese Government authorities; cooperative joint ventures cannot be used at this time. 
Terms of emissions reduction purchase agreement (ERPA) 
In addition, the Chinese CDM rules provide that Chinese government authorities, 
principally the NDRC, must review and approve the terms on which CERs are sold and 
the contents of the CER sale agreement. This review includes approval of the specific 
buyer and the specific price at which CERs are sold under the ERPA or other CER 
sales agreement.
In its implementation of the CDM Measures, the Chinese government has effectively 
set a “minimum floor price” for the sale of CERs in China, which is currently €8.00.  
The Chinese Government has stated that in conducting its mandatory review of the 
terms of CER sale agreements, it will not approve CDM projects with a CER price
lower than these floor price amounts.  Moreover, since the NDRC generally takes the 
unit price agreed under an ERPA as the minimum unit price to be paid by a buyer of
CERs generating by the project covered by that ERPA, the Government may not be 
willing to approve ERPAs which contain provisions where under an agreed unit price 
could be reduced. 
While these provisions appear to limit the ability of CDM project participants to 
determine prices, in practice the Chinese Government has allowed some flexibility 
where justified by the particular contractual arrangements.  For example, where the 
buyer’s contribution to the CDM project is comprised both of payments for CERs and 
technology or consulting services, the Government may approve a purchase price that 
is lower than the established floor price. 
Preferential tax treatment 
Finally, the Chinese  CDM rules also provide for preferential tax treatment for
renewable energy projects. The tax on renewable energy projects is just 2% of total 
CER benefits, while revenues from HFC-23 (industrial gas) projects, which have a 
lower sustainable development benefit, are taxed at 65%.  The funds collected from
these taxes are contributed to a fund used to finance sustainable development in China. 
41	 O’Flynn, B “A Study on the Pricing Policy of Wind Power in China: Airtricity Comments and
Perspectives”
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Renewable energy and the CDM – what are the issues? 
Despite the favourable tax treatment of renewable energy-derived CER revenues in 
China and the ever-expanding opportunities for carbon financing, renewable energy
projects still face some unique hurdles that should be considered by project proponents. 
Lower emissions reduction potential of renewable energy projects
Firstly, due to the differentiated global warming potentials of greenhouse gases (carbon 
dioxide, which is displaced by renewable energy, being the least “potent” in terms of 
its global warming effect), the volume of emission reductions from renewable energy
projects is much smaller per unit of output than the volumes created by projects which 
abate other greenhouse gases such as nitrous oxide, HFC or methane.  Conversely, the 
equipment cost of most renewable energy projects is significantly higher per emission 
reduction than the cost of other types of potential CDM projects, such as agricultural 
methane flaring projects. The overall contribution of the revenue stream from CERs is
therefore comparatively smaller for renewable energy projects than for other types of 
potential CDM projects. 
As the CDM is essentially a market, CDM project equity investors will tend to go to 
where “manufacturing costs” are cheapest, and purchasers will tend to seek out a 
plentiful supply of CERs for minimum transaction costs. Renewable energy projects 
are therefore at a comparative disadvantage in the CDM compared to projects which 
reduce other types of greenhouse gases.
Long lifespan of renewable energy plant / short commitment period
In addition, renewable energy projects such as wind farms have a long operation life, 
which (for projects being constructed today) will extend far beyond the Kyoto 
Protocol’s first commitment period. There is uncertainty as to whether the Kyoto 
Protocol will be continued beyond the end of its first commitment period (i.e. 2012). 
CER purchasers have therefore been reluctant to make binding commitments to
purchase CERs post-2012, such that the financial incentive created by CERs has in
many cases been insufficient to support renewable energy projects for their entire
operational life.
Effect of these issues on renewable energy projects 
As a result of the issues discussed above, many renewable energy projects which may
be eligible under the CDM have had difficulty attracting project finance to support the 
projects. CER purchasers have tended to restrict their involvement in CDM projects to 
a commitment to pay for CERs upon delivery, rather than provide financial support for 
the underlying project. Registration as a CDM project does not necessarily mean that a 
renewable energy project will achieve project finance and become operational. Issues
such as perceived regulatory and political risk in developing countries and the higher 
level of technology risk involved in renewable energy projects (as opposed, for 
example, to traditional fossil fuel projects) have meant that those renewable energy
projects which have achieved external finance have tended to be smaller scale projects, 
rather than projects to create the optimum number of CERs.  
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Therefore, the transaction costs of developing projects as CDM projects (including the 
costs of external auditors, registration fees, consultants’ fees and legal fees for the 
negotiation of CER purchase agreements and power purchase agreements) may be 
prohibitively high compared to the volume of CERs expected to be generated by the 
projects. 
Some local host country regulations (such as grid connection, distribution or electricity
tariff arrangements) may not provide renewable energy projects with the priority or 
support needed to make them feasible in the existing electricity market.  In China, 
however, additional policy support for renewables provides unique double financing 
opportunities and other avenues of financial support. 
How these issues are being addressed 
A number of important steps have already been taken which should mitigate some of 
these barriers.
Taxation measures 
One of the most innovative steps is China’s differential tax treatment of renewable
energy projects as compared to other projects that are less beneficial for sustainable 
development – a system that is the first of its kind in domestic CDM regulation 
worldwide. 
Bundling CDM projects 
The international CDM rules now explicitly allow the “bundling” of large-scale projects 
(not just small-scale projects) to further reduce transaction costs. This additional 
flexibility in the CDM rules should reduce transaction costs for renewable energy
projects. 
Programmatic CDM 
Programmatic CDM projects have the potential to assist in overcoming some of the 
barriers to renewable energy projects carried out under the CDM.  Although local,
national or regional policies and standards cannot be registered as CDM projects, small 
greenhouse gas reduction activities carried out under a formal program of activities can 
be collectively registered as a single CDM project activity. This facility is known as
“programmatic CDM”. 
Programmatic CDM involves the aggregation of a number of small greenhouse gas 
reduction activities into a larger program, which is then submitted to the CDM
Executive Board as a single activity (using one baseline and monitoring methodology). 
The facility is designed to overcome the cost barriers identified above, which are
particularly prohibitive for small renewable energy projects, and which might 
otherwise prevent small projects from being implemented. 
Small renewable energy projects which are implemented as part of a "program of 
activities" (e.g. the installation of solar lighting in a community or the financing of a 
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number or biomass plants in rural areas) can now be eligible under the CDM as a 
single project. 
As another example, the costs of a CDM project involving the conversion of a small 
number of vehicles to biofuels would only generate a small number of CERs, and so 
would not be economically viable even with the generation of additional carbon 
revenue. If, however, the project could be expanded to involve the conversion of
multiple fleets of public transport vehicles, the number of CERs generated may be 
sufficient to offset the costs of the project and enable it to be implemented. 
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5.4 Protecting intellectual property 
Introduction 
A major concern for many companies entering China is ensuring adequate protection 
of intellectual property (IP).  In fact, it is a common misconception that there is no IP 
law in China.  However, China introduced its first IP laws in the mid-1980s and has 
since updated them in conformity with its international obligations under the World 
Trade Organisation (to which it acceded in 1994) and the Madrid Protocol (to which it 
became a party in 1995).  China has comprehensive legislation in place dealing with
trademarks, copyright and patents, with the latter covering design patents (often called
industrial designs), invention patents and utility patents.  Despite the promising content 
of the black-letter law, enforcement difficulties remain the principal issue for IP 
owners. 
Obtaining protection: trademarks
Trademarks are primarily governed by the Trademark Law of the PRC, as amended in 
2001.  The responsible government agency is the China Trademark Office.  
Registration of trademarks is vital since China adopts a “first-to-file” system.  This 
means that the person who gets their trademark application in first is entitled to register 
it.  In comparison, the person who uses a trademark first is entitled to register in 
Australia. 
A mark is prima facie registrable in China if it is a visually perceptible sign capable of
distinguishing the goods of one natural person, legal person or other organisation from
those of another.  In order to file a trademark application, a Chinese government-
approved trademark agency must act on your behalf and can only do so with a signed 
power of attorney.  Furthermore, the applicant must provide its name and address in 
Chinese.  It typically takes up to two years to obtain a trademark registration in China, 
with protection generally effective on the date of registration, rather than retroactive to 
the filing date (as is the case in Australia and many other countries). Once registered, 
protection is afforded for ten years and can be renewed for successive ten year periods.  
Registration confers upon the owner the exclusive right to use and exploit a trademark 
in relation to the goods or services in respect of which use of the mark is approved. 
The law permits trademark owners to licence others to use the mark or to transfer
ownership of the mark.  Where a licensing arrangement is entered into, it is important 
to remember that the owner of a trademark is responsible for the quality of the goods 
on which the mark appears. 
Obtaining protection: patents 
The main legislation dealing with patents is the Patent Law of the PRC. Local patent
administrative offices are responsible for processing patent applications and enforcing
patents, while the State Intellectual Property Office issues all final approvals. Patents
are granted on a “first-to-file” basis rather than a “first-to-invent” basis. 
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There are three types of patents in China: 
x design patents are used to register a new design of a shape or pattern;  
x invention patents are used to register new technical solutions for a product or 
process; and 
x utility patents are used to register new technical solutions related to shape or 
structure. 
Invention patents are likely to be most relevant in a renewable energy context. For
eligibility, these patents require novelty, inventiveness and practical applicability. 
As is the case with trademark applications, patents can only be obtained via a state-
approved patent agent.  Although only a preliminary examination by the patent
administrative office is required for design and utility patents, a supplementary
substantive examination is conducted for invention patents.  Patent registration can be
obtained for design and utility patents within as little as twelve to eighteen months and 
is valid for ten years. It can take up to three years for registration of invention patents,
which remain valid for twenty years.  Notably, protection is afforded from the 
application filing date, provided that annual maintenance fees are paid.
A patent owner has the exclusive right to make, use, offer for sale, sell or import the
patented product or process.  Patents and the right to apply for a patent are assignable.  
A licence is required for third party use of a Chinese registered patent in China and
must be registered with the State Intellectual Property Office.
If registration is not obtained, control over overseas patents in China must be exercised 
through contractual provisions.  Registration is highly recommended, however, since
contractual provisions do not provide the same degree of protection or possible 
remedies. 
Obtaining protection: copyright 
The Copyright Law of the PRC governs copyright protection in China and the 
responsible government agency is the National Copyright Association.  Works
attracting copyright protection include written works, oral works, graphic works such 
as drawing of engineering designs and product designs, schematic drawings, model 
works, and computer software. 
Registration is not required for copyright protection, although it may be desirable for 
enforcement purposes. Copyright automatically vests in works of Chinese citizens,
legal persons and other organisations.  Since China is party to the Berne Convention, 
works originating in Australia (which is also a party) are given at least the same level 
of protection in China as that given to works created by Chinese citizens. 
Copyright is generally owned by the author of a work.  However, where the creation of
a work is sponsored by, represents the will of, and is the responsibility of a legal 
person or other organisation, that legal person or other organisation is deemed to be the 
author. A citizen’s rights in respect of his or her work – which include publication, 
reproduction, distribution and sale – are protected for the life of the author plus fifty 
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years.  Works of legal persons or other organisations are protected for fifty years from
first publication. 
Copyright is capable of being assigned or licensed.  It is not a legal requirement that 
licences be registered, although it is often considered prudent to do so. 
Enforcement issues
IP enforcement remains an issue in China despite improvements in the legal regime.  In 
particular, there may be concerns about the adequacy of remedies, the ability and 
willingness of the relevant authorities to control ongoing infringements and local 
protectionism.  The Chinese Government at higher levels widely and openly recognises
the problems associated with local protectionism.  Its occurrence is nonetheless often 
reported and is facilitated in part by the fact that most administrative enforcement 
authorities are funded by local governments rather than national authorities.  
In China, IP rights can be enforced through administrative agencies, through the civil 
courts or via criminal action. Administrative enforcement procedures tend to be most 
effective for prompt and inexpensive action against small infringers.  However, there is
normally not financial compensation for losses and fines are generally very low, 
meaning that deterrence is not always achieved.
Civil litigation, on the other hand, is a useful method to take action against large, well­
organised infringers.  Possible remedies include compensation and an injunction.
The court system’s handling of IP disputes has improved dramatically, although there 
continue to be problems with inconsistency and the lack of judicial training in technical 
issues. Foreign plaintiffs also encounter difficulties and high costs in fulfilling 
procedural requirements imposed by the courts (e.g. translation of all foreign-sourced 
evidence). There have also been complaints about the lack of discovery and other 
valuable means for gathering evidence.
Criminal action may be taken by requesting the police to investigate.  Counterfeiting a 
patent and infringing business secrets are crimes punishable by up to seven years' 
imprisonment.  Again, however, there may be issues with bias and lack of training in 
the judiciary.
Techniques to maximise protection  
IP rights are generally territorial, meaning that registration of a trademark or patent in, 
say, Australia, does not automatically result in protection in China.  It is important to 
note that China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are separate jurisdictions for the 
purpose of IP protection and therefore have separate systems of registration.  Here we 
focus on China’s system. 
For maximum protection, trademark and patent applications should be filed as early as 
possible, and preferably well before entering the Chinese market.  Although it is not 
legally necessary, trademark owners should register and actively use a Chinese-
language counterpart for English language trademarks since Chinese consumers tend to 
refer to the Chinese versions of foreign brands.  
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Regular due diligence is required to ensure that registrations are in place for all 
relevant pieces of IP and have not lapsed.  Rather than solely relying on the authorities
to deal with potential infringements, IP owners should actively monitor their rights. IP
owners are normally advised to send a strong message from the start by taking “zero­
tolerance” approach to IP infringements.
The theft of trade secrets – including both patented and non-patented technology and 
other valuable business information – is of particular concern where a foreign company
has established a joint venture or licensing relationship with a Chinese partner. 
Business partners and employees should be selected carefully and practical steps may
be taken to maintain confidentiality.  Such steps could include teaching employees 
about IP rights and utilising physical security measures.  It is particularly important to 
ensure that contracts with business partners and employees are stringently drafted in 
order to deter theft of IP and to ensure maximum protection under local law. 
China is making concerted efforts to address IP enforcement issues through raising 
public awareness, establishing the necessary institutions, educating personnel and 
imposing harsher penalties.  The attitude at the top levels of the Chinese Government is 
encouraging, with a definite realisation that stringent protection of IP rights is vital to 
encourage foreign investor confidence.  Nonetheless, the full implementation of 
China’s relatively comprehensive IP laws will require a great deal of effort and 
expenditure. 
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5.5 Project planning and implementation 
Introduction 
Practical issues associated with the implementation of a project can be the difference
between a viable project and an unprofitable one.  The availability of the necessary
renewable resources, a site for the project with appropriate land tenure, obtaining
necessary project approvals and having arrangements in place to ensure the project 
outputs can be sold at the right price, are all essential factors in any renewable energy
project. Having partners with local knowledge in China and in investing in existing 
project proposals implemented at a local level can help.  Ultimately, as is the case for
projects undertaken in jurisdictions outside of China, sheer commercial will, good local 
advice, and early planning, can help to ensure that projects in China overcome the 
practical and regulatory issues arising when implementing a project. 
Land use rights 
In China, there are two types of land ownership – state ownership and collective 
ownership.  Historically, there has been no “private” land ownership in China. State
land ownership means the relevant land is owned by the Chinese Government, while 
collective land ownership means the relevant land is under the control of a local “rural 
collective of peasants”.  Basically, land in urban areas is under state ownership, 
whereas land in rural and sub-urban areas is under collective ownership.  The Chinese 
Government may acquire and convert collective land in rural and sub-urban areas into 
state land pursuant to a statutory “land requisition procedure”.  
Commercially speaking, “land use rights” rather than “land ownership” is the relevant 
legal concept.  China’s land laws and regulations permit the Chinese government
(acting through its local land bureaus) and other land owners to transact “use rights” in 
their land.  Generally, there are four different types of land use rights in China, namely:  
x granted land use rights;
x leased land use rights; 
x allocated land use rights; and 
x collective land use rights. 
Granted land use rights are freely transferable – they have a limited duration and 
require payment of a fee which is normally paid in one lump sum prior to any transfer 
of the land use rights. Allocated land use rights are not transferable, and may be taken 
back by the Chinese government without compensation.  
Once the type of land use right is known, investors can determine how best to structure 
the legal arrangements for the planned project.
For construction, the land administration department reviews a feasibility study and
issues a pre-certification report. If acceptable, rights to use the land are issued and a
land use rights contract is entered into, usually by and between the enterprise 
controlling the project and the relevant land administration bureau.
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A new Property Rights Law was approved in 2007, which strengthens legal protections
for privately owned land.  This law creates a registration system for real property 
ownership and transfer, provides a mechanism for creating securities over property and 
sets out clearer provisions for enforcement of private property rights.  It represents 
China's first comprehensive national framework for the protection of property.
Environmental approvals process
Key environmental laws in China are enacted at the national level, with most 
enforcement and implementation occurring at the local level. As a result, 
environmental protection laws can be enforced differently in different provinces or 
municipalities. Local regulations are also allowed to be more stringent than national 
regulations. 
Projects could be impacted by a range of different laws and regulations, including 
those which govern conservation, pollution, contamination, and employee health and 
safety. Enforcement of these laws and regulations is undertaken by the relevant 
government authority and remedies may include warnings, fines, administrative 
sanctions, civil compensation for losses, restraints on construction or operation, or 
criminal prosecution. 
Generally, environmental laws in China adopt a “polluter pays” approach. However, 
pursuant to other laws and regulations, liability for pollution on the land can extend to 
others, especially in cases when the polluter cannot be located or cannot be clearly 
determined. For instance, companies which acquire or merge with another company
that holds land use rights can be held responsible for environmental harm connected 
with that land – that is, “buyer beware” principles can apply.
Depending on the type and size of the project, environmental assessments are approved 
by either the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) or Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (EPBs) at the provincial or municipal levels.
Since environmental laws are enforced by EPBs at the provincial/municipal level, it 
can be important to engage local authority support for the project (sometimes this is 
made easier where the project involves local companies and/or where the project 
generates local benefits). However, SEPA may suspend approvals for new projects if 
local governments do not comply with the applicable requirements under
environmental laws and regulations, so risks remain even if a project has broad local 
support. 
The following diagram shows the environmental approvals process for projects in
China – note that final approval is not granted until after work is commenced, which 
could be expensive for developers who commence work but do not receive final 
approval. 
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FIGURE 2: ENVIRONMENTAL APPROVALS PROCESS IN CHINA
Power purchasing agreement / concession contract
It is important to secure a buyer for the energy output and any CERs on terms that take 
account of regulatory, market or resource risks, as well as meeting any prerequisites for 
favourable tax treatment, tariffs or other concessions. 
Buyers will generally be seeking a renewable energy supply that will comply with 
regulatory obligations or consumer demand. Therefore, they will want terms that limit 
or compensate for compliance risks and ensure the buyer will not have financial 
commitments for energy supply that fall short of expectations. Project proponents (and 
their financiers) will ordinarily seek to see a secure and constant revenue stream (with 
tolerable variation for resource, market or regulatory risks).
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Appendix 1 – Abbreviations 

ABBREVIATION DEFINITION 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol 
CER Certified Emission Reduction from a CDM project 
CJV Contractual Joint Venture 
CREIA Chinese Renewable Energy Industry Association 
Development 
Plan 
Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy in China, issued by the NDRC in
September 2007 
DRC Development and Reform Commission, eg of a province 
EJV Equity Joint Venture 
EPB Environmental Protection Bureau
ERPA Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreement 
FIE Foreign Investment Enterprise
June 2007
Report
Report on China's renewable energy law, prepared as part of the RE Law Assist project (discussed
in section 1.2). It was circulated in June 2007 and is available at: 
http://www.bakernet.com/BakerNet/Resources/Publications/Recent+Publications/Renewable+Energy 
+Law+in+China.htm 
JV Joint Venture 
MRET Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (Australia) 
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission of China 
NDRC Price 
Measure 
Provisional Administrative Measures on Pricing and Cost Sharing for Renewable Energy Power 
Generation (NDRC Price [2006] No.7)
REC Renewable Energy Certificate 
SEPA State Environmental Protection Administration 
SERC State Electricity Regulatory Commission of China 
SPC State Power Corporation
State Council National council led by the Chinese Premier, responsible for exercising all powers (unless delegated 
to provincial governments). The State Council enacts administrative rules.
WFOE Wholly foreign-owned enterprise
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Price Setting 
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o. 7) 
Cost Sharing 
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N
o.237 
Regulation governing the
use of the renew
able energy
developm
ent fund to
prom
ote renew
able energy
integration in buildings 
A
pproved 
2006 
M
oF
 and M
oC
 [2006] 
N
o. 460 
A
ll 
T
ogether w
ith the ‘N
otice on the approach to appraisem
ent of pilot projects for 
rene
w
able energy integration in buildings’ , sets out ho
w
 the R
ene
w
able E
nergy 
D
evelopm
ent F
und w
ill be used to prom
ote the integration of rene
w
able energy in 
buildings, the application and approval procedures and the criteria for project selection. 
Regulation on the
m
anagem
ent of bio-ethanol
projects 
A
pproved 
2006 
M
O
F
 C
onstruction 
[2006] N
o. 460 
B
iofuel 
S
ets out the policy for bio-ethanol developm
ent, im
poses stricter m
arket-entrance 
standards, project m
anagem
ent and supervision requirem
ents, and stream
lines the 
adm
inistration system
 
Regulation of the
construction and 
m
anagem
ent of w
ind farm
s 
A
pproved 
2006 
N
D
R
C
 E
nergy [2006] 
N
o. 1204 
W
ind 
O
bliges local governm
ent authorities to develop local w
ind energy developm
ent plans 
(for facilities sm
aller than 50M
W
) according to w
ind resource availability. T
he w
ind 
tariff is still determ
ined by the S
tate C
ouncil through a tender process. 
M
edium
 and long-term
developm
ent plan for
renew
able energy in china 
A
pproved 
S
eptem
ber 
2007 
N
D
R
C
 
A
ll 
S
ets rene
w
able energy targets by technology type, sets out guiding principles for the 
developm
ent of rene
w
able energy, and notes the national policies and m
easures to 
achieve these objectives. 
M
easures on supervision
and adm
inistration of grid
enterprises in the purchase
of renew
able energy pow
er 
A
pproved 
2007 
S
E
R
C
 [2007] N
o. 25 
A
ll 
T
his regulation requires the national grid authority and national standards authority to 
draft grid connection and po
w
er purchase standards to ensure the safety of the grid 
w
hen it receives electricity from
 rene
w
able energy sources. 
Rural biom
ass industry
developm
ent plan for 2007­
2015 
A
pproved 
M
ay 2007 
A
griculture P
lan N
o. 
18 [2007] 
A
ll 
T
he M
inistry of A
griculture w
ill draft a rural bioenergy plan, as required by the 
R
ene
w
able E
nergy La
w
, for the developm
ent of rural bioenergy for the period 2007­
2015. It w
ill cover biogas utilization, biom
ass po
w
er generation and other areas. 
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Appendix 3 – Wind power tariffs
 
Source: CREIA
APPROVED PROJECTS AND TARIFFS (BEFORE 2006)
PROJECTS APPROVED PRICE (AVERAGE TARIFF IN THE 
OPERATION PERIOD) 
YUAN/KWH, INCL TAX 
Zhurihe, Inner Mongolia 
Huitengxile, Inner Mongolia 
Shangdu, Inner Mongolia 
Xilinhaote, Inner Mongolia 
Dale, Inner Mongolia 
Zhangbei, Hebei 
Factory No.1 Dabancheng, Xinjiang
Factory No. 2, Dabancheng, Xinjiang 
Donggang, Liaoning 
Dalian Hengshan, Liaoning 
Cangnan, Zhejiang 
Hainan Dongfang 
Guangdong Nan’ao 
Guangdong Nan’ao Zhenneng
Guangdong Nan’ao Dannan 
Fujian Dongshang Aoziaishan 
Gansu Yumen 
Jilin Tongyu
Shanghai Chongming 
CONCESSION TARIFF (2006, YUAN/KWH)
0.5918 
0.5918 
0.5918
0.6291
0.6574
0.984 
0.4 
0.66 
0.9154 
0.9 
1.2 
0.56 
0.74 
0.62 
0.46 
0.46 
0.73 
0.9 
0.773 
LOCATION WITHOUT VAT WITH VAT 
(8.5%)
Jiangsu Rudong, Huarui Co., Ltd 0.402 0.437 
Guangdong Shbeishan, Yuedian, Group Co., Ltd 0.462 0.501 
Inner Mongolia, Huitengxile, Beijing International Power
New Energy Co.
0.352 0.382 
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LOCATION WITHOUT VAT WITH VAT 
(8.5%)
Jinlin Tongyu, Longyuan Power Group Co. 0.470 0.510 
Jilin baicheng, Huaneng 0.470 0.510 
Jiangsu Rudong, Longyuan 0.478 0.519 
Jiansu Dongtai, Huadian International 0.449 0.487 
Gansu Anxi, Huanghe Power 0.425 0.462 
Inner Mongolia, Huitengliang, Guangdong Nuclear 0.374 0.406 
Inner Mongolia, Baotou Bayin, Longyuan 0.429 0.466 
Heibei Danjinghe, China Energy conservation 0.461 0.501 
Average 0.434 0.471 
WIND POWER PRICE BY REGION (2006, YUAN/KWH) 
REGION PROJECT WITHOUT VAT WITH VAT 
(8.5%)
Shandong Qixia 49.5MW 0.719 0.780 
Rongcheng 49.5MW 0.700 0.760 
Laizhou 49.5 MW 0.599 0.650 
Zhanhua 49.5 0.618 0.670 
Hekou 49.5 MW 0.645 0.700 
Dawang 49.5 MW 0.487 0.529 
Average 0.628 0.681 
Inner Mongolia Chifeng Saihanba West 30.6 MW  0.507 0.550 
Huitengxile Windfarm Project 0.461 0.500 
Huitengliang 49.5MW  0.525 0.570 
Chifeng Dongshan 49.3MW 0.502 0.545 
Saihanba East 45.05 MW 0.507 0.550 
Saihanba North 45.05 MW 0.507 0.550 
Average 0.502 0.544 
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REGION PROJECT WITHOUT VAT WITH VAT
(8.5%)
Jiangsu (bid prices) Rudong Huangang 200 MW 0.478 0.519 
Dongtai 200 MW 0.449 0.487 
Jiangsu dongtai 200 MW 0.449 0.487 
Jiangsu rudong 100 MW 0.402 0.437 
other 4 projects with 200 MW each 0.449 0.487 
Average 0.445 0.483 
Fujian Dongshan Wujiaobay 30MW Wind
Power Project 
0.599 0.650 
Zhangpu Liuao 30.6 MW Wind
Power Project 
0.496 0.538 
Average 0.548 0.594 
Ningxia Helanshan Wind-farm Project 49.5 
MW 
0.524 0.568 
Ningxia Tianjing 50.25MW 0.470 0.510 
Tianjing Shenzhou 30.6MW 0.516 0.560 
Average 0.503 0.546 
Hebei Chengde Songshan 49.5 MW 0.553 0.600 
Zhangbei Manjing 49.5MW 0.602 0.653 
Kangbao Wolongtushan 30 MW 0.553 0.600 
Zhangbei Mijiagou 49.5 MW 0.553 0.600 
Hebei Shangyi Manjing East 49.4 
MW 
0.553 0.600 
Average 0.563 0.611 
Xinjiang Sanchang First Phase 34.5 MW 0.433 0.470 
Tuoli Wind-Farm  30 MW 0.399 0.433 
Average 0.416 0.452 
Heilongjiang Huafu Muling 49.5 MW 0.607 0.659 
Yichun Erduoyan 28.05 MW 0.612 0.664 
Yichun Daqingshan 0.612 0.664 
Liaoning Kangping 24.65MW  0.645 0.700 
Average 0.619 0.672 
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REGION PROJECT WITHOUT VAT WITH VAT 
(8.5%)
Liaoning Changtu Windfarm Project 0.604 0.655 
Zhangwu 24.65MW 0.645 0.700 
Average 0.624 0.678 
Jilin Taobei Huaneng 49.3MW 0.559 0.607 
Datang Shuangliao 49.5 MW 0.544 0.590 
Taobei Fuyu 49.5MW 0.512 0.556 
Changling Wind 24 MW 0.599 0.650 
Taonan 49.5 MW 0.546 0.592 
Average 0.552 0.599 
Guangdong with fixed price 0.487 0.528 
Overall average 0.544 0.590 
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Linking Energy Policy and Land
Conservation in the U.S. 
Bradford Gentry 
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
U.S. energy infrastructure is unquestionably expanding. This may be in response to 
recent years’ steep rises in energy prices and concerns about energy security or the 
2009 focus on using infrastructure projects to help stimulate the economy and 
address climate change. 
At a minimum there is tension, if not direct conflict, between the expansion of 
energy infrastructure (even “green” energy such as wind) and efforts to conserve open 
space. New turbines and transmission lines consume land – often land of high 
amenity and ecosystem value. Similar issues arise around the production of biofuels 
– do they offer sustainable uses for rural areas or are they just another form of 
intensive, destructive agricultural production? Do the efforts to increase domestic gas 
and oil production offer only threats or are there ways to couple these activities with 
new mitigation/conservation efforts? Is there such a thing as “clean coal” and what 
might be its footprint – through mining, transportation, combustion, carbon dioxide 
capture, transportation, and underground injection? 
For many U.S. land trusts, issues regarding energy infrastructure provide one of 
their first, most direct links to the impacts of global warming and possible responses. 
Should we support the expansion of wind energy? If so, where? Should we amend 
existing easements to allow the construction of new turbines? Should we support the 
expanded use of woody biomass or will doing so degrade the health of our soils and 
forests? Are mitigation credits – from wetlands, streamsides, forests and other 
ecosystems – a valuable source of conservation finance to be pursued or an illusion 
that distracts our attention from the real impacts of expanded energy production and 
transmission? 
Only by stepping back from the day­to­day effort to protect land and engaging 
with others from outside the land conservation community can U.S. conservation 
leaders hope to develop strategic responses to these questions. The Obama 
administration’s efforts to link energy and environmental policies also offer an 
opportunity to address these issues in new and more effective ways. 
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The purpose of the 2009 Berkley workshop was to explore these opportunities and 
threats, as well as to develop creative ways forward. The workshop convened a diverse 
range of leaders in land conservation and energy policy (see Box 1). The facilitated 
discussions and free time for thought/conversation on the grounds of the Pocantico 
Conference Center were designed to stimulate innovative thinking on new 
approaches to these issues. As part of a multi­year effort involving Yale, the Land 
Trust Alliance, and other conservation leaders, several mechanisms for follow­up 
from the ideas and actions identified during the workshop are already in place. 
Box 1 Workshop participants 
Judy Anderson, President, Community Consultants 
Forrest Berkley, Board Member, Maine Coast Heritage Trust 
Aimee Christensen, Board Member, American Council on Renewable Energy 
Ernest Cook, Director of Conservation, Trust for Public Land 
Kaarsten Turner Dalby, Senior Director Ecological Services, The Forestland Group LLC 
Jim Dooley, Senior Staff Scientist, Joint Global Change Research Institute 
Kim Elliman, CEO, Open Space Institute 
Jay Espy, Executive Director, Sewall Foundation 
Brad Gentry, Senior Lecturer and Director, Yale Program on Strategies for the Future of 
Conservation, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
Nathanael Greene, Director, Renewable Energy Policy, NRDC 
Frank Hebbert, Associate Planner GIS, Regional Plan Association 
Janet Keating, Executive Director, Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition 
Gil Livingston, President, Vermont Land Trust 
Andy Loza, Executive Director, Pennsylvania Land Trust Association 
Nancy McLaughlin, Professor of Law, University of Utah 
Chris Miller, President, Piedmont Environmental Council 
Casey Pickett, Masters Student, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies 
David Higby, Director Federal Government Relations, The Nature Conservancy of NY 
Christopher Recchia, Executive Director, Biomass Energy Resource Center 
Dan Reicher, Director, Climate and Energy Initiatives, Google.org 
Paul Risser, Chair, National Research Council Committee on the Environmental Impacts 
of Wind Energy Projects, CEO, University of Oklahoma Research Cabinet 
Marc Smiley, Partner, Decisions Decisions 
Peter Stein, General Partner, The Lyme Timber Company 
Randy Swisher, Former Executive Director, American Wind Energy Association 
Buzz Thompson, Professor of Law and Co­Director Woods Institute for the Environment, 
Stanford University 
Laurie Wayburn, President, Pacific Forest Trust 
Rand Wentworth, President, Land Trust Alliance 
This is the fourth in a series of workshops providing convening and research 
support for efforts to expand and apply most effectively the resources (financial, 
political, personnel) available for land conservation in the US. It is made possible by 
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gifts from Forrest Berkley and Marcie Tyre to the Yale School of Forestry & 
Environmental Studies, as well as additional support from the Overhills and Pequot 
Capital Foundations. The structure and background papers for the workshop also 
build from the clean energy and land use dialogue during the REIL Network meeting 
in 2008 sponsored by the Blue Moon Fund and the UN Foundation. Marc Smiley, our 
facilitator, once again did a wonderful job making sure that the conversation was lively 
and productive, while offering everyone an opportunity to share their thoughts. Many 
thanks as well to Amy Badner for all of her help organizing the administrative aspects 
of the gathering. Our deepest appreciation also goes to Judy Clark, Regina Creegan 
and their colleagues at the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation for allowing us to use the 
magnificent facilities at the Pocantico Conference Center. Finally, it is important to 
note that the views expressed in this publication are solely those of the editors and 
individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Yale University, The 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund or any of the other participants. Lastly, our gratitude is 
extended to the F&ES Publication Series for making this publication possible. 
summary of major themes 
Over the course of the three days, a massive amount of learning occurred and a 
remarkable set of connections were made. The purpose of this section is to 
summarize some of the major themes of the discussion, along with the next steps 
participants identified as ones that they will or others should pursue. 
Themes from the discussion 
The conservation and clean energy communities need each other. 
Probably the most important theme to emerge was how much the land conservation 
and clean energy communities in the U.S. need each other. Land trusts need help 
ensuring that the effort to build new energy infrastructure does not target already 
conserved land. This requires that they have a seat at the clean energy/climate change 
table, as that is where the policy momentum currently resides. Helping to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gasses will also allow land trusts to benefit from mitigation 
funding opportunities as they arise and, hopefully, reduce the scale of the adaptation 
efforts that will be required in the future. 
At the same time, the clean energy community needs help siting “good” projects 
quickly. This requires not only connections at the federal level, but also effective 
grassroots/tops, bi­partisan, community­based networks – one of the key strengths 
of the land trust movement. Local conservation networks need to see the value of 
specific projects to help speed their siting and deployment. In addition, the 
conservation community can help implement cost­effective mitigation techniques, 
from storing carbon in forests/grasslands/geologic formations to substituting current 
carbon (in the form of woody biomass) for fossil carbon. 
These mutual needs also underscore how much the clean energy and conservation 
communities have to learn from each other – especially as they increasingly come 
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together as part of the broader climate change community. This could be seen in the 
different tone of the discussions this year as compared to previous years. This year 
there were fewer arguments that any particular position should be adopted and many 
more questions about new areas as the participants tried to get their arms around the 
technologies, policies, business realities and ethics of the topics being considered. 
This was particularly true of climate change – and all of the attendees owe Jim 
Dooley a debt of gratitude for his agreement to offer a superb update on climate 
science and potential responses on extremely short notice. 
Land trusts need to pursue a more dynamic model of “permanent conservation.” 
The focus on climate change also poignantly poses the question of what “permanent” 
land conservation means in practice. A view that the land trust community should be 
trying to stop all change clearly cannot hold. The only constant is change, whether 
through natural processes, shifts in human values, human­induced changes to the 
climate or technological changes that pose new threats to open spaces; such 
technological changes themselves span from low­speed wind turbines in areas with 
less wind to new techniques for extracting natural gas from oil shale deposits. Some 
of the implications of this line of inquiry include the need for the land trust 
community to: 
● Continue to think about how legal instruments can be drafted/used to 
anticipate and adapt to such changes, such as through the inclusion of 
specific provisions (floating conservation zones, amendment procedures) 
and the articulation of criteria (balancing scientific and community values) 
on which such changes may be made; 
●	 Find ways to incorporate the most recent data on projected changes in 
temperature, moisture and other climate factors into conservation planning 
efforts; 
●	 Consider how aesthetics fit into such questions in a changing world, 
particularly since a powerful part of the land trust business model has been 
helping donors prevent changes to the lands they love; and 
●	 Challenge itself to lead on the change it would like to see, rather than waiting 
for condemnation proceedings to sort out the debate site­by­site. 
While some participants were of the view that the urgent need to respond to 
climate change should trump virtually all other public goals, others did not share that 
perspective. At a minimum, this means that the efforts to find win/win opportunities 
must intensify. Ways must be found to add “saving land” to the list of popular co­
benefits from actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions – such as saving money 
(through energy efficiency), creating jobs (through the manufacture and deployment 
of new, cleaner technologies) and increasing energy security (through reductions in 
energy demand, as well as the use of more domestic energy sources). The 
opportunities to reduce emissions from land development and store more carbon in 
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natural areas make this an opportunity well worth exploring further. For example, 
saving land can save money (as carbon storage in forests/grasslands costs less than 
many other options), create jobs (in community forestry using woody biomass as a 
fuel), and increase energy security (through the use of locally grown plants as fuel) 
while also helping to reduce the flooding expected from extreme storms. It can also 
allow for the storage of water in areas hit by drought and create opportunities to purify 
water at a lower cost than more carbon­intensive concrete and steel treatment plants. 
The comparative advantage of land trusts is their ability to say yes across divides. 
Land trusts clearly have the potential to help move the aforementioned efforts 
forward. Their focus on permanent land conservation in the communities within 
which they work, along with their local, bipartisan appeal, makes them uniquely 
credible messengers between relevant stakeholders. This is true both in local 
communities as well as with representatives in state capitals and Washington, DC. 
Land trusts can also help the broader environmental community combine fear 
with hope – linking the ability to say no (to certain proposals) with the ability to say 
yes. Many environmental organizations are more comfortable just saying no – you 
cannot build/dump that here. One of the core strengths of the land trust movement, 
however, is saying yes – doing deals to acquire rights to land, often in unusual and 
difficult circumstances. 
Marrying the ability to try to stop “bad” clean energy projects with the ability to 
help move “good” projects along more quickly will be a key component of any effort 
to bring together the U.S. clean energy and land conservation communities. 
Obviously, this means that land trusts will need to know what they want to see in 
“good” projects and be able to say no to “bad” ones – both internally and externally. 
Nathanael Greene offered three principles on which to build these efforts: (1) 
minimize the trade­offs that have to be made; (2) make any trade­offs carefully; and 
(3) make sure to receive what was bargained for when the tradeoff was made. 
New skill sets will be required for land trusts. 
Doing so will require new skill sets for the land trust community at the local, 
regional, and national levels. While some land trusts have strong public education 
programs, others do not – such programs will need to be scaled up dramatically. 
Political action by land trusts often involves targeted contact with decision makers 
who are supporters of land conservation efforts – will there be a need to go beyond 
those known supporters to help cultivate new ones? Finding the time and resources 
to collect, analyze, and disseminate data on the benefits of combining more efficient 
or cleaner energy efforts with the protection of critical lands will also be a challenge. 
Since so many energy infrastructure issues arise at a regional level, it may make sense 
to expand the role of land trust service bureaus to providing support for work on 
these topics as well. 
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And traditional connections will have to be applied in new ways. 
A large number of conservationists have joined the Obama administration, offering 
an unusual opportunity to push for a balance between protecting critical landscapes 
and deploying cleaner energy technologies. The Land Trust Alliance should consider 
keeping an inventory directory of conservationists in the administration, as well as 
assessing how connections with land trusts can help bring value to their work. One 
specific initiative is to push for or provide data on inter­agency efforts to create 
guidelines for assessing and siting new energy facilities that take account of 
conservation values and community input. 
Prior work on tax incentives for conservation has demonstrated the value of the 
land trust community’s grasstops networks in Congress. That network should be 
brought to bear on clean energy and climate change as well. Efforts should be made 
to identify senators whose votes are key on climate change or clean energy legislation, 
then to see which ones are also close to the conservation community and ultimately 
strive to meet with them. Among the topics that could be covered are: (a) ensuring 
that public and private protected areas are considered in any federal preemption of 
the process for siting transmission lines; and (b) providing other incentives for land 
conservation as part of a climate or clean energy bill. 
Responding to climate change requires the urgent use of many different
technologies. 
Moving from these broad themes to more detailed reflections on the discussions 
regarding specific technologies, one major conclusion was clear – the scale of the 
change needed to respond to climate change means that no one technology or 
approach will be enough. Rather, a suite of efforts across a range of technologies and 
locations will be required. This appears to include an expanded and more connected 
electricity network as we move from primary reliance on constant/baseload power 
(coal, nuclear) to more intermittent sources (wind, solar) and decentralized energy 
production/storage. A related observation is that as we move from more dense fuels 
(fossil fuel, nuclear) to less dense fuels (wind, solar, biomass), more land may well be 
required. This means that the competition for land for food, fiber, fuel, shelter and 
services will only intensify. 
Another specific reflection detailed how wide the range of issues discussed 
spanned different covered technologies. For wind farms and transmission lines, the 
focus was on criteria and processes for finding and permitting the “best” sites. For oil 
and gas exploration it was on the implications of technological change in terms of 
threats to open space, as well as the reputational issues around engagement with 
energy projects. Issues of severed estates – either subsurface rights or fee ownership 
– arose in the discussions about fossil fuels and carbon dioxide capture and storage. 
The human impacts of energy development were starkly illustrated by the discussion 
of mountaintop removal coal mining in Appalachia. Additionally, the need for new 
models of locally sourced and delivered heat energy was a central part of the woody 
biomass discussion. 
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The next few paragraphs dig a little more deeply into some of these issues. At the 
same time, the variety of topics covered underscores the need for the land 
conservation and clean energy communities to continue to learn from each other. 
Only by doing so can they hope to navigate the tension between conserving critical 
lands and rapidly deploying cleaner energy technologies.1 
Energy efficiency is priority number one. 
All land trusts should push energy efficiency first and as fervently as they can. If 
demand for energy is reduced, so, too, is the need for new generation and 
transmission facilities. Land trusts should collaborate with energy efficiency 
advocates and local programs to promote specific actions in their own operations, by 
their members, and in their broader communities. Tighter links should also be forged 
with the smart growth community, given their focus on energy efficiency in buildings 
and transportation systems. 
New information technologies need to be used to inform siting processes in novel ways. 
Much of our discussion focused on capturing the opportunities that exist to influence 
the new energy facility siting process. New information technologies offer a means for 
mapping areas of special interest and engaging a wide range of stakeholders to help 
define both areas for development and those for protection. Specific efforts in this 
area might include the following: 
● Articulating guidelines for assessing potential energy development sites and 
building from those that have been developed to date; 
●	 Pushing for a broader, more integrated approach to energy resource 
planning, particularly in the identification and assessment of options for 
ways forward; 
●	 Including data on conserved lands, energy resource potential, patterns of 
existing development and a range of other community values in the 
assessment of potential sites for energy projects; 
●	 Expanding efforts to hear from more parties earlier in the siting process as part 
of energy planning efforts at the national, state, regional, and local levels; 
● Seeking to engage land trusts more directly in the assessment/planning 
processes already underway, such as the administration’s look at siting on 
federal lands or that in which NRDC is involved in the U.S. West; 
● Advocating for combined “infrastructure corridors,” including power lines, 
major roads, rail systems, pipelines, etc. as a way to minimize the footprint 
of the different networks; 
● Engaging around the topic of cost allocation – not just direct, but externalized 
costs as well – as a vehicle for justifying mitigation/compensation areas and 
payments as part of new energy development projects; and 
1 For an overview of technolo­
gies to address climate 
change, see the GTSP’s 2007 
report on Global Energy 
Technology Strategy at 
http://www.pnl.gov/gtsp/docs 
/gtsp_2007_final.pdf/. 
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❥ Using whatever leverage the conservation community has to insert the 
results of these proactive, regional assessment efforts into the more formal 
energy siting processes led by governments, regional transmission 
organizations, and electric utilities. 
Sub­surface rights are a growing area of concern for the conservation community. 
A couple of specific areas of work were identified around sub­surface energy 
activities, as these appear to be posing new questions for an increasing number of 
land trusts. Included were the needs to: 
● Offer guidance on options for responding to oil and gas leasing on or near 
conserved lands; 
● Consider how that guidance might apply to sub­surface technologies that 
seem likely to receive more attention in the future, particularly carbon 
dioxide capture and storage (from the burning of fossil or other biofuels) 
and deep geothermal projects; and 
● Respond to the Secretary of the Interior’s request that the land trust 
community take a position on off­shore drilling, particularly given the 
historical use of royalties to help fund land conservation. 
Engaging communities and related ethical issues will continue as critical areas for
work. 
Underlying many of our discussions were deeper questions about the roles of local 
communities and the ethical dimensions of land use decisions. On the community 
side, a variety of concerns were raised about their capacity and right to be heard on, 
influence, and benefit from the siting of energy projects. Much of the discussion 
focused on links with local communities, including the historic concentration of land 
ownership in corporate hands in much of Appalachian coal country, methods for 
obtaining community input on aesthetics/viewshed issues, and the possibility of 
recognizing public ownership rights in wind and solar resources. As land trusts 
become more engaged on these issues, their traditional strengths in enabling 
decentralized, community­scale action are likely to become an even more valuable 
part of their efforts. 
On the ethics side, a wide range of issues were raised. One of the clean energy 
representatives raised the question of who should decide how to use what land, 
expressing some surprise that land trusts, as unelected private actors, felt comfortable 
making such decisions on their own. More generally: Who should decide what 
tradeoffs are appropriate using what process with input from whom? Should land 
trusts profit from fossil fuels? What leadership roles should land trusts and their 
individual members be taking on climate change/energy options? While a range of 
views were offered by individual participants on these and related questions, no effort 
was made to forge a consensus. Rather, these issues remain to be discussed in specific 
projects, as well as in broader strategy sessions in the future. 
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next steps 
In addition to these broad themes, participants also identified a number of next steps 
for their organizations, the new administration, and researchers. A sample of these 
suggestions is provided below. 
Actions by their organizations 
Land conservation/management organizations 
●	 Be more vocal and engaged on the need to respond to climate change, even 
ahead of more traditional reasons to conserve land. 
● Partner with energy, energy efficiency, climate, and other environmental 
groups to help capture current policy opportunities. 
● Articulate the value of open space/natural areas as part of the solution to 
climate change (mitigation/adaptation). 
●	 Add energy production to their definition of “working landscapes,” 
including “community/conservation energy” from woody biomass. 
● Help promote the development of community scale renewable energy 
projects (wood, methane, wind, solar, etc.). 
● Inventory and disseminate information on new mapping/decision­making 
tools being developed to enable spatially explicit and participatory planning 
efforts. 
●	 Better understand and help promote incentives for deploying more 
renewable energy technologies. 
●	 Engage more closely with the smart growth/transportation­oriented 
development communities to understand how best to collaborate on specific 
projects. 
●	 Think more deeply about the impact of traditional approaches to land 
conservation on standards of living, climate change, and related issues, as 
well as the implications for future work. 
●	 Help develop site­appropriate rules/guidance for managing conserved 
forests and range lands to reflect climate considerations. 
● Expand the attention paid to energy issues as part of the due diligence for 
land acquisitions. 
● Review model easement language in light of both climate change and energy 
project developments. 
●	 Think about better ways to communicate the connection between land 
protection and responses to climate change. 
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●	 More actively undertake and promote actions to save energy, including 
energy audits of offices/homes, along with expanded communications with 
members and the land trust community as a whole. 
●	 Seek to modify state eminent domain laws to ensure that they reflect 
conservation organizations’ ownership rights and ecosystem values. 
● Support wind projects on their lands. 
●	 Build a national database of sites under conservation easements to add to 
those covering fee­owned conservation land. 
Clean energy organizations 
● Link energy and land use efforts more widely. 
● Bring local land trusts into efforts to say yes to “good” clean energy projects. 
●	 Bring people from the land conservation community into the climate/clean 
energy policy discussions/advocacy at the state and national levels. 
● Connect land conservation organizations with the providers of clean energy 
technologies to explore ways forward 
Research/academic organizations 
●	 Continue to educate the environmental community on how climate change 
(as a stock problem) poses fundamentally different issues than traditional 
pollution (flow problem) and that it needs to be addressed using all available 
tools as quickly as possible, while still working to raise the general standard 
of living on the planet (particularly in developing countries). 
● Encourage land trusts to engage publicly at the micro (local news, with 
members) and macro (in DC) levels on the need for action on climate, 
including siting issues. 
● Work with the land trust community to build databases on why certain areas 
are important so that the scientific community can harvest micro level 
details on land use from them. 
● Develop maps of historical and projected land use change over centuries for 
use with policymakers, landowners and others. 
● Analyze big data sets on energy infrastructure, other infrastructure, and 
natural systems/infrastructure to see where they overlap or do not and 
disseminate the results. 
● Develop new tools to enable faster modeling of land use choices and broader 
participation as part of visioning/planning processes. 
●	 Bring land trusts into the work of more academic ecologists on predicting 
ecological change. 
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●	 Understand the land use impacts of the carbon offsets being purchased by 
the organizations for which they work. 
Ideas for action by the Obama Administration 
● Recognize the climate value from “saving land.” 
● Ensure that mitigation for new energy projects is adequate to compensate for 
the full range of their externalized costs. 
● Ensure full accounting for carbon from different forms of biomass energy. 
● Include consideration of both publicly and privately protected lands in any 
federal preemption policy for energy facilities. 
● Pursue an inter­agency task force on guidelines and processes for assessing 
possible sites for energy projects. 
●	 Recognize that different energy technologies raise different issues and face 
different problems and thereby require different policy responses. 
● Review the wording of the federal tax code, as well as the model easement 
under the Forest Legacy and other federal funding programs, to ensure that 
they adequately reflect climate and clean energy related goals on conserved 
lands. 
●	 Truly dedicate the funds from energy projects on federal lands to 
conservation programs. 
● Coordinate the spending of federal stimulus dollars with the results of recent 
climate modeling. 
Topics for further research and development 
● How might the ambiguities in old conservation easements be addressed 
through presumptions expressed in state law? 
●	 How do cases on rights of way reflect/address protected lands? 
● Whether renewable energy resources are or should be covered by the public 
trust doctrine – i.e., is the government under an obligation to ensure that 
they are used to promote the public interest in a responsible fashion? 
● How do decentralized energy technologies/systems fit into current, more 
centralized systems, models and decision­making processes for responding 
to climate change? 
● What are the best ways to bring diverse communities to a common level of 
understanding on clean energy projects? How might new information 
technologies help support such efforts? 
● What does a full, lifecycle accounting show as the carbon budget for different 
types of biofuels and carbon storage technologies? 
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●	 Continue work to understand and articulate the environmental effects of 
wind farms. 
● What are the implications of various carbon storage techniques for land 
management choices? 
● What would it take to develop a mapping tool that helps landowners see the 
carbon impacts of different land management choices? Does one already 
exist? 
● Explore ways to bring the values held by affected individuals into the data 
analysis for siting decisions. 
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U.S. POLICY ACTION NECESSARY TO ENSURE 

ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE AIR 

EMISSION REDUCTION BENEFITS OF
 
INCREASED USE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY
AND RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
Debra Jacobson & Colin High* 
INTRODUCTION
Policies encouraging energy efficiency and 
renewable energy (“EERE”) technologies need to 
ensure that the air emission reduction benefits of these 
technologies are calculated accurately.  Otherwise, the 
market will not fully capture their important economic
and social benefits.
Federal, state, and local governments and private
entities have developed protocols for reporting 
greenhouse gases (“GHG”) and other air emissions.1 
Many of these protocols have been designed to allow 
emissions from individual sources to be aggregated into 
total emissions for an entire entity, such as a 
corporation or a governmental body, while
* This Article was prepared by Debra Jacobson and Colin High,
and most of its underlying research was funded by the Clean 
Energy/Air Quality Integration Initiative of the U.S. Department of 
Energy’s (“DOE”) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable 
Energy. Although we appreciate DOE’s strong support for our
work, the views expressed in this Article are those of the authors 
alone.
Ms. Jacobson is the owner of DJ Consulting, LLC and
conducted the primary work for the Article in that capacity.  She is
also Co-Director of the Solar Institute at The George Washington 
University (“GW”), a Research Professor at GW, and a 
Professorial Lecturer in Law at GW Law School. The Solar
Institute provided some additional support in the final stages of this
Article.   Ms. Jacobson can be contacted at
djacobson@law.gwu.edu.
Dr. High is Chairman of Resource Systems Group, Inc.
(“RSG”) in White River Junction, Vermont.  RSG compiled the 
initial database and designed the software used to support the Time
Matched Marginal (“TMM”) methodology discussed in this Article 
and used in the final stages of this project.  Dr. High can be
contacted at chigh@rsginc.com
1 See, e.g., WORLD RES. INST. & WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL: A 
CORPORATE ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARD 3 (2004)
[hereinafter GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL], available at
http://pdf.wri.org/ghg_protocol_2004.pdf.
appropriately emphasizing consistency, transparency, 
and the use of publicly available data.  When measuring 
indirect emissions from electric power generation, these
protocols have widely relied on total output emissions 
rates (the “eGRID system average methodology”2), 
which are based on information in the Emissions & 
Generation Resource Integrated Database (“eGRID”).
The eGRID system average methodology is acceptable 
for reporting by corporations, governmental bodies, or 
other entities when they are aggregating emissions from 
all sources into an inventory.3 
However, inadequate attention has been focused on 
methodologies for measuring the air emission reduction 
benefits of increased use of EERE and other low-
emission technologies.  This Article, presenting results
of original research completed in 2008 and 2009, 
demonstrates that many individuals have misapplied the 
most commonly used methodology—the eGRID system 
average methodology.  The eGRID system average
methodology undervalues the GHG emission reduction 
benefits of increased use of EERE technologies in most 
regions of the country.4 
This Article demonstrates that the eGRID system
average methodology, when compared to the Resource
System Group’s Time Matched Marginal emissions
methodology,5 understates the carbon dioxide (“CO2”) 
and nitrogen oxide (“NOx”) emission reduction benefits
of five EERE technologies6 by approximately 65% to 
2 As used in this Article, the term “eGRID system average 
methodology” is not a methodology “of” eGRID, but refers to a
methodology that uses eGRID total output emission rates when 
verified, utility-specific emissions data is not available. See 
generally U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, eGRID
Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-resources/egrid/faq.html
(last visited Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter eGRID Frequently Asked 
Questions] (explaining that eGRID as used by EPA is an inventory 
of air emission data based on information from US electricity-
generating plants).
3 See infra Part I.A (discussing two types of GHG protocols).
4 See infra Part II. 
5 See infra Part I.B.3. 
6 The five technologies studied in this 2008 and 2009 research 
work are wind energy, solar photovoltaic energy (“PV”), high-
efficiency commercial air conditioning, high-efficiency 
commercial lighting, and LED traffic signal retrofits.  See infra
Part II (introductory text).
[Vol. 1:1 2010] The George Washington Journal of Energy and Environmental Law 1 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
     
     
  
 
     
   
 
   
 
    
   
     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
     
  
 
      
   
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
   
 
     
  
    
            220    :              
� Policies Encouraging Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Technologies� ���������������
165% in the two power markets studied.7 This Article 
also concludes that the emission reduction benefits of 
increased use of EERE technologies calculated with the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) eGRID
non-baseload methodology also are significantly higher 
than those calculated with the eGRID system average 
methodology.8 Recent studies across all regions 
confirm that these findings are not isolated results but
are indicative of widespread misapplication of the 
eGRID system average methodology by many users.9 
Although the eGRID system average methodology 
is generally appropriate for estimating indirect 
emissions from electricity purchases (“scope 2 
emissions”) for general emission inventory purposes,10 
it does not accurately estimate the year-to-year impacts 
on GHG levels resulting from increased use of EERE 
technologies.  The Climate Registry,11 hundreds of
local governments, and others have relied on the
eGRID system average methodology since 2008 in their 
protocols for estimating emissions from electricity 
purchases in their GHG emission inventories.12 This 
Article recommends that The Climate Registry consider 
developing an additional protocol and registry during 
the 2010 planned revision of its General Reporting 
Protocol to more accurately reflect the emission 
reduction benefits from increased use of EERE 
technologies by states and other entities.   
Similarly, EPA should consider developing an 
additional protocol in its mandatory GHG reporting rule 
to fully value emission reduction benefits from 
increased use of EERE technologies.  Specifically, 
regulatory agencies should use a methodology that 
calculates emission reductions at marginal units.13 
Ideally, these emission reductions should be calculated 
on an hourly basis.    
7 The study focused on the PJM Interconnection and the Upstate
New York power markets. See infra Part II. 
8 See infra Part I.B.2 and Table 1.
9 See infra Part II. 
10 THE CLIMATE REGISTRY, THE GENERAL REPORTING PROTOCOL 
FOR THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING PROGRAM, VERSION 1, at 97
(2008), available at
http://www.theclimateregistry.org/downloads/GRP.pdf.
11 Id. at 8, 99.
12 See infra Part III.A.
13  Marginal units are fossil fuel-fired units whose power output
varies with the overall level of power demand over time. See 
WORLD RES. INST. & WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEV., GUIDELINES FOR QUANTIFYING GHG REDUCTIONS FROM
GRID-CONNECTED ELECTRICITY PROJECTS 13-14, 54-57 (2007)
[hereinafter QUANTIFYING GHG REDUCTIONS], available at
http://pdf.wri.org/GHGProtocol-Electricity.pdf. 
Finally, this Article recommends addressing these 
problems in a cost-effective manner. An investment of 
limited funds by the Department of Energy (“DOE”), 
EPA, or state agencies to create an enhanced database 
of marginal electric generating units would enable 
government agencies and businesses to more accurately 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of EERE programs in 
reducing emissions. 
I. BACKGROUND
A. Role of EERE in Reducing Air Emissions from  
Electric Power Generation 
The electric power sector is responsible for 
approximately forty percent of the CO2 emissions in the 
United States14 as well as significant direct and indirect 
emissions of methane and other greenhouse gases.15 
According to leading energy experts, the electric power 
sector requires a dramatic transformation to meet 
national targets for GHG emission reductions over the 
next several decades.16 Adopting energy efficiency and 
zero or low-carbon emission technologies, such as
renewable energy, is a key part of this transformation.17 
For example, the International Energy Agency has
stated that a “global revolution is needed in ways that
energy is supplied and used,” and it has cited energy 
efficiency and renewable energy as central to this 
energy revolution.18 Building and product efficiency 
measures, such as high-efficiency lighting and 
appliances, and dramatic increases in the use of wind 
and solar energy, are among the high priority 
technologies cited by the Agency.19 In addition, many 
promising strategies for reducing GHG emissions from
14 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010,
EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW 11 (2009), available at
http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/overview.pdf.
15 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, eGRID 2007, YEAR 2005
SUMMARY TABLES 1 (2008) [hereinafter  EGRID SUMMARY 
TABLES], available at
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/egridzips/eGRID2007 
V1_1_year05_SummaryTables.pdf.
16 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, LAUNCHING AN ENERGY 
REVOLUTION IN A TIME OF ECONOMIC CRISIS: THE CASE FOR A 
LOW-CARBON ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PLATFORM 3 (2009),
available at
http://www.iea.org/G8/docs/Energy_Revolution_g8july09.pdf.
 
17 Id.
 
18 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 

2008: SCENARIOS AND STRATEGIES TO 2050 IN SUPPORT OF THE G8
 
PLAN OF ACTION 1-7 (2008).
 
19 Id.
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the transportation sector involve advanced energy 
technologies, such as plug-in electric hybrid vehicles
and electric cars, which reduce petroleum use through 
electrification.20 
Implementing these strategies will increase the 
importance of ensuring the accurate assessment of the 
effects of EERE technologies on the electric grid, 
particularly hourly and seasonal differences in GHG 
emissions. In order to comprehensively report GHG
emissions and to measure cost-effectiveness, it is
necessary to improve the accuracy and lower the costs 
of methodologies applied by state and local 
governments and the private sector to estimate the 
emission reduction benefits of increased use of EERE 
technologies.21 
Other air quality goals, including reducing ozone
levels, also can be advanced by increasing use of EERE 
technologies and practices.22 Many of these air quality 
problems are most serious during certain seasons, such 
as the summer ozone season, and certain hours of the
day, such as summer afternoons.23 Federal, state, and 
local agencies benefit from accurate and low-cost 
methodologies to estimate the impact of EERE 
strategies in the air quality planning process.24 
In all energy sectors, it is important not only to use 
improved methods but also to obtain agreement on 
consistent protocols for quantification and reporting 
GHG emissions.25 The need for more accurate 
methodologies intensified when the EPA adopted the 
first mandatory GHG reporting rules last year.26 
20 INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, TRANSPORT, ENERGY, AND CO2:
MOVING TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 32-33 
(2009), available at
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/transport2009SUM.pdf.
21 See infra Part I.B.
22 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON STATE 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (SIP) CREDITS FOR EMISSION REDUCTIONS
FROM ELECTRIC-SECTOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE 
ENERGY MEASURES 1 (2004) [hereinafter GUIDANCE ON STATE 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN]. 
23 DEBRA JACOBSON & COLIN HIGH, ROLE OF ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS IN BUILDINGS IN ADDRESSING AIR
QUALITY AND GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION GOALS 1-3 (2008)
[hereinafter ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS], available
at
http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/wip/pdfs/tap_webcast_20080717_fact
 
_sheet.pdf.

24 See infra Part III.
 
25 See generally id. (discussing technological improvements that
 
would enhance federal and local air quality programs).
 
26  Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg.
 
56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pt. 98); see also
 
infra Part III.B. 

Moreover, the EPA is now considering options to 
expand its GHG registry to include indirect emissions
from electricity purchases.27 
There are currently two types of protocols relating 
to GHG emissions from the use of electric power. 
Confusion about the appropriate use of these two types
of protocols lies at the heart of the issues discussed in 
this Article. 
The first type of protocol is an emissions inventory 
to provide accounting of GHG emissions for a 
corporation or other entity.28 The protocol is designed 
to facilitate reporting by the owners or operators of 
individual units, such as business plants and 
government buildings, so that these emissions can be 
aggregated for an entire corporation or governmental 
unit.29 This protocol typically requires reporting of 
both indirect emissions and direct emissions.30 Indirect 
emissions, also known as Scope 2 emissions, are air 
emissions that result from activities, such as electricity 
purchases, of one entity that occur at sources owned or 
controlled by another entity, such as an electric
generating plant.31 In contrast, direct emissions, also 
known as Scope 1 emissions, are air emissions from 
sources owned or operated by the reporting entity, such 
as GHG emissions from the smokestacks owned by a 
power generating company.32 
The Greenhouse Gas Protocol of the World 
Resources Institute and the General Reporting Protocol
of The Climate Registry are examples of emissions 
inventories that track both scope 1 and scope 2 
emissions.33 Electricity emission factors from the 
eGRID system average database are often used under 
these protocols to represent the amount of GHGs 
27  Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. at
56,288.
28  GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, supra note 1, at 3.
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 26-27.  Under reporting standards developed by the
World Resources Institute and the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development, operational boundaries have been 
established with respect to direct emissions and indirect emissions
to assist entities in better managing the full spectrum of GHG risks
and opportunities for reducing such risks.  For many companies,
indirect emissions from purchased electricity represent one of the
largest sources of GHG emissions and the most significant
opportunity to reduce these emissions. Id.
31 Id. at 25-27.
32 Id. at 27.
33 Id. at 25; THE CLIMATE REGISTRY, supra note 10, at 1. The
eGRID system average methodology is typically used in cases
where no verified, utility-specific data is available. See infra Part
I.B.1 for a fuller discussion of the eGRID system average database 
and calculations.
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emitted per unit of electricity consumed.34 These 
emission factors are “usually reported in units of 
pounds of GHGs per kilowatt-hour or megawatt­
hour.”35 
A second type of protocol has been developed to 
quantify reductions in GHG emissions that result from 
projects that either generate low-carbon electricity or 
reduce the consumption of electricity transmitted over 
electric power grids.36 The most well-known protocol 
in this area is the Guidelines for Quantifying GHG
Reductions from Grid-Connected Electricity Projects, 
developed by the World Resources Institute (“WRI 
Guidelines”).37 The WRI Guidelines are intended for 
use by two primary groups:  (1) “project developers 
seeking to quantify GHG reductions outside the context 
of a particular GHG offset program or regulatory 
program”; and (2) “designers of initiatives, systems, 
and programs that incorporate grid-connected GHG 
projects.”38 
The basic approach set forth by the WRI Guidelines 
involves the calculation of both an “operating margin” 
and a “build margin.”39 According to the WRI 
Guidelines, the operating margin is defined as 
“electricity generation from existing power plants 
whose output is reduced in response to a project 
activity.”40 The WRI Guidelines use EERE 
technologies as the primary examples of such project 
activities.41 The WRI Guidelines state that:
[Operating margin] emissions are
estimated using methods that attempt to 
approximate the emissions from the 
specific power plants whose operation is 
displaced.  In theory, this estimation 
requires identifying which power plants
are providing electricity at the margin . . 
. during the times that the project activity 
is operating. . . . Generation provided or 
avoided by the project activity may 
therefore affect a different marginal
resource in each hour. . . . [E]stimating 
[operating margin] emissions can be a 
complex and data intensive task, 
34  GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, supra note 1, at 99.

35 Id.

36 See QUANTIFYING GHG REDUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 4.
 
37 Id.
 
38 Id. at 6.
 
39 Id. at 11-16.
 
40 Id. at 13.
 
41 Id. at 11. 

matching a project activity’s output to 
the marginal generating sources in each 
hour. In practice, a diversity of
estimation methods can be used that vary 
in their complexity and accuracy.42 
A spectrum of methodologies thus exist that have 
been used (and misused)43 to estimate the operating 
margin.  At one end of the spectrum are imprecise tools 
that estimate the impact of EERE measures on the 
average mix of emissions in the grid.44 On the other 
end of the spectrum are methodologies, such as 
computer-based “hourly dispatch” models, that “capture
a high level of detail on the specific electric generating 
units displaced by [EERE] projects or programs.”45 
These dispatch models can be expensive and “difficult 
for non-experts to evaluate,”46 and are therefore too 
advanced for most state and local governments.  In 
addition, these dispatch models are generally 
proprietary,47 which means that the assumptions used in 
calculating emission reduction benefits are not 
transparent to third parties. 
B. Methodologies for Calculating Emission 

Reductions from EERE Technologies  

Grid-connected EERE technologies, such as wind 
power, have zero direct air emissions48 and displace 
emissions from fossil fuel-fired electric power 
generation.49 These emission reductions occur because 
42 Id.
43 See infra Part I.B. 
44  STEVEN R. SCHILLER, NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY MODEL ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM IMPACT 
EVALUATION GUIDE 6-5 (2007), available at
http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/evaluation_guide.pdf.
45 Id. at 6-7.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48  DEBRA JACOBSON & COLIN HIGH, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY 
OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, 
COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE AVOIDED EMISSIONS 
METHODOLOGIES APPLIED TO SELECTED NORTHEAST POWER 
MARKETS 4, available at
http://www.mwcog.org/uploads/committee­
documents/bf5dwFtb20081216140014.pdf.
49 QUANTIFYING GHG REDUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 11-12. In 
our Article, EERE is generally used to refer to energy efficiency 
and zero-emission renewable electric power generation, including 
solar energy, wind energy, geothermal energy, and tidal energy.
Other renewable energy technologies, such as biomass, waste-to­
energy, and landfill gas, do have some direct GHG emissions from
combustion and other processes.
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of the way the electric power system works. EERE
technologies have zero fuel costs and very low 
incremental operating costs.  In other words, when 
renewable generation produces power, electricity 
supplies from other sources generally will be reduced or 
not brought on-line.50 For example, “a wind-generated 
kilowatthour displaces a kilowatthour that would have 
been generated by another source—usually one that 
burns a fossil fuel. . . The wind-generated kilowatthour 
therefore avoids the fuel consumption and emissions
associated with that fossil-fuel kilowatthour.”51 When 
available, EERE technologies generally will displace 
generation at facilities with higher operating costs and 
varying output over time.52 
The specific mix of coal, oil and gas-fired power 
units that will be displaced by EERE technologies 
varies significantly among states and regions of the 
country.53 Some states, such as West Virginia and 
Pennsylvania, rely on coal plants for a majority of their 
generation, and in those States, coal units are displaced 
by EERE technologies during some seasons and times 
of day.54 In comparison, natural gas units are more 
typically displaced in other states and regions, such as 
California and New England.55 
EERE technologies “almost never displace nuclear 
power on the electric grid. Nuclear power plants are 
normally operated as baseload generators that run at full
capacity (unless there is a planned or unplanned outage) 
because of low operating costs.”56 
In addition, EERE technologies generally do “not 
reduce hydroelectric power on the grid because of its
low operating costs and flow constraints.”57 Although 
the operators of hydroelectric plants may shift the
timing of their generation as a result of renewable 
energy use or energy savings, the “[t]otal generation at 
50 Id. at 11.  

51  Michael Milligan et al., Wind Power Myths Debunked, IEEE
 
POWER & ENERGY MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 89, 94. 

52 DEBRA JACOBSON & COLIN HIGH, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY 

LAB. SUBCONTRACTOR REPORT #SR-500-42616, WIND ENERGY 

AND AIR EMISSION BENEFITS: A PRIMER 9-10 (2008), available at
 
http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/pdfs/policy/wind_air_emiss
 
ions.pdf.  For more information on the complexities of analyzing 

avoided emissions under cap-and-trade programs, see id. at 12-17. 

53 Id. at 10.    

54 Id.
 
55  Id.  

56 Id.
 
57 Id.
 
such hydroelectric plants is generally not reduced on 
average.”58 
Finally, the total amount of emission reductions 
resulting from EERE technologies also varies by time 
of day and season.59 For example, emission reductions
are highest in the middle of the day because energy 
efficiency savings, particularly from high-efficiency 
commercial air conditioners, “are greatest at the hours
of the day with the highest temperatures and the highest 
electricity demand in offices and other commercial 
buildings.”60 Similarly, the energy savings and air 
emission reduction benefits of highgefficiency air 
conditioners are “concentrated in the summer months”
whereas “highgefficiency refrigerators and dishwashers 
provide yearground energy savings.”61 
In this Article, we review three common 
methodologies used for quantifying emission reductions 
from increased use of EERE technologies, along with 
specific examples to illustrate the range of results.  The 
three methodologies produce data with the following 
parameters: eGRID system average emission rates, 
eGRID non-baseload emission rates, and Time Matched 
Marginal (“TMM”) emission rates. 
Proprietary electric grid system dispatch models 
also have been used as a basis for calculating marginal 
emission rates from EERE technologies.62 These
models are not reviewed because they are proprietary, 
and as a result, the costs are often prohibitive. They also 
are not sufficiently transparent or replicable to be 
suitable for use in public accounting of air emissions.   
1. EPA eGRID System Average Methodology
The eGRID database is maintained by the EPA and 
is “a comprehensive inventory of environmental 
attributes of electric power systems” in the United 
States.63 According to EPA, eGRID is “[t]he 
58 Id. The operating schedule of hydroelectric plants also may be
limited by environmental constraints. Id.
59 ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS, supra note 23, at 1­
4. See also Press Release, PJM Interconnection, PJM Reports New
Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data (Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter PJM
Press Release], available at http://www.pjm.com/~/media/about­
pjm/newsroom/2010-releases/20100325-pjm-reports-new-carbon­
dioxide-emissions-data.ashx (attached graphic and tables
comparing CO2 emission rates of marginal generating units 
compared to CO2 emission rates of system average generating 
units for 2005 to 2009).
60 Id. at 3. 
61 Id. at 1.
62 See supra text accompanying note 45-47.
63 eGRID Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 2.
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preeminent source of air emissions data for the electric 
power sector. . . .”64 The eGRID database is derived 
from: 
[A]vailable plant-specific data for all 
U.S. electricity generating plants that 
provide power to the electric grid and 
report data to the U.S. government. 
eGRID integrates many different federal 
data sources on power plants and power 
companies, from three different federal
agencies:  EPA, the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC).65 
This database contains air emissions data for several
GHGs, including CO2, methane (“CH4”) and nitrous 
oxide (“N2O”).66 It also provides data for the following 
criteria and hazardous air pollutants: NOx, sulfur 
dioxide (“SO2”), and mercury (“Hg”).67 
The eGRID database is provided in a web-based 
application, eGRIDweb, as well as in Microsoft Excel 
format.68 The database is publicly accessible on the 
EPA’s web site.69 The EPA funds a contractor70 to 
compile various types of data, including aggregated 
emissions data by state, electric generating company, 
parent company, power control area, eGRID subregion, 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(“NERC”) region, and total U.S. levels.71 “Total 
emissions and emission rates, and total generation and 
resource mix are displayed for each of these levels.”72 
The two most important eGRID output emission rates
are the system average emission rates (also called “total 
output emission rates”) and the non-baseload emission 
rates.73 
64 Id.
 
65 Id.
 
66 Id.

67 Id.
 
68  SUSY ROTHSCHILD & ART DIEM ET AL., THE VALUE OF EGRID
 
AND EGRIDWEB TO GHG INVENTORIES 1 (2009).

69 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, eGRID,
 
http://www.epa.gov/egrid (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter
 
eGRID].
 
70 See E.H. PECHAN & ASSOC., INC.,  EGRID EMISSIONS AND 

GENERATION RESOURCE INTEGRATED DATABASE VERSION 1.0
 
USER’S MANUAL (2009).

71  eGRID, supra note 69.
 
72 Id.

73 See ROTHSCHILD & DIEM ET AL., supra note 68, at 5-7.

The system average emissions rate is calculated by 
dividing the total annual emissions of a particular 
pollutant74 from all units in a region or power system 
(i.e., within the relevant grid boundary) by the total 
energy output of those units over the year.75 This 
system, or grid average, includes all units that report 
data to the government, including nuclear power plants, 
hydroelectric plants, and other zero-emission sources as 
well as fossil fuel-fired generation units.76 The system 
average emission rates rely on information from electric 
generation companies required to provide emissions 
data to both the EPA, including data from Continuous
Emissions Monitors (“CEMs”), and to the Energy 
Information Administration.77 
The EPA reports the system average emission rates
for the NERC regions and eGRID subregions shown in 
Figure 1.78 The twenty-six eGRID subregions are 
subsets of the NERC regions.79 
Figure 1:  Map of U.S. EPA eGRID Subregions.  
The most recent eGRID database available includes 
emissions data for calendar year 2005.80 The eGRID 
system average emission rates for each eGRID
subregion vary considerably depending on the amount 
74  Measurements are typically in pounds. See SCHILLER, supra
 
note 44, at 6-5.
 
75 See id. Total energy output of units over a year is typically
 
measured in Megawatt-hours or MWh.
 
76 See E.H. PECHAN & ASSOC., INC., THE EMISSIONS &
 
GENERATION RESOURCE INTEGRATED DATABASE FOR 2007
 
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT (2008), available at
 
http://www.epa.gov/RDEE/documents/egridzips/eGRID2007Tech
 
nicalSupportDocument.pdf.
 
77 See id. at 4.
 
78 EGRID SUMMARY TABLES, supra note 15, at 6, 10.
 
79  eGRID Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 2; see 

ROTHSCHILD & DIEM ET AL., supra note 68, at 1.
 
80 See eGRID, supra note 69.
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of zero on sources, nuclear andemissi  such as   
hydroelectric power, in the subregion.  81 Analyses 
conducted by Resource Systems Group, Inc. (“RSG”) 
reveal that the system average emission rates are the 
lowest of the three methods discussed he re in most  
eGRID subregions.82 
The methodology for calculating indirect emissions 
electricity purchases, as adopted by The Climatefrom  
Registry, relie on system average emission rates (when  s    
verified, utility-specific data is not available). 83 As a  
result, this methodology implicitly values emission 
reduction benefits of EERE technologies at the same 
emi sions rates as system average rate. Under the the  
system average methodology, ye ar-to-year changes in  
electric power purchases resulting from increased use 
EERE technologies are accounted for by calculatingof   
the difference between the indirec  t missions frome
electricity purchases in successive years based on t  he 
eGRID sys em average emission rates.t   84 
However, accordi to the WRI Guidelines,ng 
”because calculating a simple average is signi icantly   f  
less precise than other methods,” the system average 
approach “should only be ed where other methods are us
practicable or calculating the operating margin fornot  [f    
EERE projects].”8 As discussed below, the eGRID5  
system average methodology has  en found tobe
significantl rse tate the emi sion reduction benefits y und  s
of increased use of EERE es in technologi  most  
regions.86 
2. eGRID Non-Baseload Average thodologyMe  
The eGRID non-baseload methodology is based on 
an understanding of the way in which increased ERE  E  
81 he E  eG D summary tables provide information on theT PA RI  
generation x (pe oil,resource mi rcent of generation from coal, 
natural gas, other fossil fuels, biomass, hydro, nuclear, wind, solar,
on. Thesegeothermal, and other) in each of the eGRID subregi
sum y t bl provide information on the eGRID emissionsmar a es also  
rates in each of these regions. A ri n o hese tabl compa so f t es
demonst atesr  that the eGRID sys emt  average emi on ates arssi  r e 
lo hen a sub on or region has a hig ntage of nuclearwer w regi h perce  
and hydro resource n the generat on m x.i i S EGR SUMMARYs i ee ID  
TABLES, supra note 15,  6, 10. at 
82 See infra Part II. 
LIMATE REG , supr 10, .83 THE C ISTRY a note at 99
84 See id. at 99-100.
UANTIFYING GHG EDUCTIONS, supra  13,85  Q R  note  at 55.
S discussion infra Pa  II. See PJ  Press Release, upra86 ee  rt also M s
note 59 (attached graphi c and tables comparing CO em sion ates 2 is r
ne ng units compared to CO em ssii on rates ofof marginal ge rati  2  
system av ag  ge erating units for 2005 to 2009).er e n  
technology use displace fossil fuel-fired electric s   
generation.  87 This type of methodology focuses on  
electric generating units whose output varies accordi ng  
to the overall level of power demand (the “load” level) 
in the gional pow arket.88 The e load-followingsre  mer  
generating units are generally foss l fuel-fired, and i  
include generating  units usuall classified as y   
intermediate (shoulder) load and peak load plants.89 
These units are al o called “s marginal units” because   
they provide electricity “at the margin,” and their  
output varies depending on the load. 90 Baseload units  
are generally excluded but may f tion arginalmunc as  
units during certain hours and seasons of the year.91 
For exa oal plants operate as ntermediatemple, some c i  
plant s in the PJM92 erconnection power market   Int  
during certain imes of the year.93 Figure 2 highlightst  
the di tinction between baseload and non-baseload s
(shoulder/intermediate and peak load) generating        
units.94 
Fi Baseload and Non Baseload-  en rat g Ugure 2:  G e in nits 
Source: National Conference on State Legi latures, s
2005.95 
87 See supr Pa t I.B.1a r . 
EDUCTIONS sup note 13, at Annex A.1.88 QUANTIFYING GHG R , ra 
89 th Brown et al., NAT’L C NCEMat ew ONFERE  OF STATE 
LEGISLATU , E RGY AN AIR QUALITY: THE POWER NDUSTRYRES NE D I
AND AIR QUALITY 6-7 (2005).­
90 QUANTIFYING GHG REDUCTIONS, supra 13, note  at 55.
91 JACOBSON & HIGH, supra note 52, at 1 0.
92 PJM is a gion ns on organi on uppl ngre al tra missi zati s yi  
ana, Ken NewDelaware, Illino s,i  Indi tucky, Maryland, Michigan, 
Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsy vania,l  enne giT ssee, Vir nia,
We t Vir inia nd the istr t of olumbia. See PJM: Who Wes g a D ic C  
 
Ar , http://w w.pjm.com/about-pj /who we are.as- - px (last visited
e w   m  
Ma  25 2010)
r. , .
 
93 JACOBSON & HIGH, supra note 52, at 1
 0.
 
Br wno  et al., supra
94 note 89, at 6.
95 Id.
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The major difference between the eGRID system 
average methodology and the eGRID non-baseload 
methodology is the group of generating units that is 
considered in calculating the avoided emissions rate. 
Whereas the eGRID system average methodology 
considers the emissions of all generating units 
operating on the regional or subregional power grid, the
non-baseload calculation excludes all generation from 
resources that are not fossil fuel-fired.96 Thus, “[p]lants 
with 100% hydro, nuclear, wind, solar, and/or 
geothermal generation are removed from the non­
baseload calculation.”97 In addition, “[no] 
generation at plants with high capacity factors (0.8 and 
greater) is considered in the calculation of the non­
baseload emissions rate.”98 Thus, the non-baseload 
average emission rates do not include consideration of
emissions from baseload units99 such as nuclear power 
plants, hydroelectric power plants, and many coal-fired 
plants.100 
As highlighted by a sample of subregional power
markets in the 2005 eGRID Subregion Emission Rates 
table, the eGRID non-baseload emission rate is
significantly higher than the system average rate in 
most regions101 because it excludes zero-emission 
nuclear and hydropower units and renewable energy 
generation.102 
96 See E.H. PECHAN & ASSOC., INC., supra note 76, at 15.
 
97 Id.

98 Id. According to the technical document, the non-baseload 

average is calculated from a percentage of each plants emissions
 
and generation (depending upon capacity factor) that combusts fuel
 
and has a capacity factor of less than 0.8. Id. at 15.
 
99 Id.

100 Id. Nuclear, hydroelectric, and coal plants are considered
 
baseload plants because their capacity factor is greater than 0.8.

Id.
 
101 See EGRID SUMMARY TABLES, supra note 15, at 6.
 
102 E.H. PECHAN & ASSOC., INC., supra note 76, at 15.
 
Table 1: Comparison of eGRID Non-Baseload 
Methodology and eGRID System Average 
Methodology for Selected eGRID Subregions103 
Subregional 
Power 
Market 
Non-Baseload 
Methodology 
(lb. CO2 
/MWh) 
System 
Average 
Methodology 
(lb. 
CO2/MWh) 
Midwest 
(MROW) 2,158.79 1,821.84 
Midwest 
(SRMW) 2,101.16 1,830.51 
Mid-Atlantic 
(RFCE) 1,790.50 1,139.07 
California 
(CAMX) 1,083.02 724.12 
Southwest 
(AZNM) 1,201.44 1,311.05 
Comparison of the eGRID database reveals that the 
eGRID non-baseload emissions rate is higher than the 
eGRID system average rate in twenty out of the twenty-
six eGRID subregions.104 Experts involved in the 2005 
eGRID database confirmed this conclusion in a recently 
published paper, stating that “in general, with few 
exceptions, the non-baseload values are larger than the
total output emission rates.”105 
The eGRID non-baseload average emission rates for 
eGRID subregions are also provided by the EPA on its
website and in its summary reports.106 The EPA’s
Green Power Partnership appropriately relies on the 
eGRID non-baseload average methodology in 
calculating emission reductions resulting from the use 
of renewable energy generation.107 This EPA program 
has developed a calculator tool that incorporates the 
eGRID non-baseload methodology.108 
103 EGRID SUMMARY TABLES, supra note 15, at 6.
104 EGRID SUMMARY TABLES, supra note 15, at 6.
105 ROTHSCHILD & DIEM ET AL., supra note 68, at 7.
106 Id.
107 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Green Power
Partnership, http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Green Power Partnership]. The
Green Power Partnership is a voluntary EPA program that supports
the organizational procurement of green power by offering expert
advice, technical support, tools and resources.  For purposes of this
program, green power is defined as electricity produced from a
subset of renewable resources, such as solar, wind, geothermal,
biomass, and low-impact hydro. See id.
108 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Green Power
Equivalency Calculator,
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3. Time-Matched Marginal Emissions  
Methodology (“TMM”) 
Over the course of several years, Resource Systems 
Group (“RSG”) has developed a methodology for 
estimating air emissions avoided by the increased use of 
EERE technologies. This TMM emissions
methodology differs from the eGRID system average 
approach in several fundamental ways.  
First, the TMM methodology is based on emissions 
monitoring data for each of the 8,760 hours of the year 
for generating units that submit hourly data to EPA. In
comparison, the eGRID database focuses on annual
averages of emissions for grid-connected electric
generators.109 The significance of this difference is 
underscored by the National Action Plan for Energy 
Efficiency, a coalition of the DOE, EPA, and more than 
fifty other agencies and organizations.110 The National 
Action Plan’s Model Energy Efficiency Program 
Evaluation Guide, released in November 2007, 
emphasizes that the eGRID system average approach to 
estimating avoided emissions has several major 
limitations.111 The first major limitation is summarized 
as follows: 
[One] shortcoming of this approach 
is that energy efficiency savings tend to 
vary over time, such as savings from an 
office lighting retrofit that only occurs 
during the workday.  Using an annual 
average emission factor that lumps 
daytime, nighttime, weekday, and 
weekend values together can skew the 
actual emissions benefits calculation.112 
The second difference between the TMM
methodology and the eGRID system average
methodology is that the TMM methodology focuses on 
the actual generating units expected to be displaced 
when renewable energy generation or energy savings 
take place.  Nuclear units and hydropower units are thus 
generally not considered by the TMM methodology 
when calculating avoided emissions.  
http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/pubs/calculator.htm (last visited
 
Mar. 5, 2010).  This tool is only available to Partnership members.
 
109 See supra Part I.B.1. 

110 SCHILLER, supra note 44.
 
111 Id. at 6-5. 

112 Id.
 
In comparison, the eGRID system average 
methodology considers nuclear and hydroelectric units
in calculating avoided emissions, even though such 
units are rarely displaced by increased use of EERE 
technologies.113 The National Action Plan’s Program 
Evaluation Guide views the inclusion of nuclear and 
hydroelectric units as a shortcoming of the
methodology: 
A shortcoming of this [system
average] approach is that it does not
account for the complexity of regional
power systems. . . . In many regions, the 
marginal units displaced by energy 
efficiency programs can have very 
different emissions characteristics from 
the base load units [such as nuclear and 
hydropower] that dominate the average 
emissions rate.114 
The eGRID non-baseload methodology also shares
the first limitation of the eGRID system average
methodology because it is based on the annual average 
avoided emissions,115 instead of a more accurate hourly 
measure.  However, it differs from the system average 
methodology and shares a benefit of the TMM
methodology because it focuses on the non-baseload 
units that are actually displaced when EERE technology 
comes online.116 
Thus, RSG’s TMM methodology provides a 
marginal rather than a system average emission rate.  In 
addition, it uses a time-matching approach that is
specific to the EERE technology under consideration. 
The TMM methodology is based on the following 
steps: 
1. Estimating the hourly electric power generation 
for each fossil fuel-fired unit in a specific power market 
area; 
2. Identifying the marginal fossil fuel-fired units at 
each hour by using the hourly generation to identify 
units that follow the total load at each hour.  Based on 
this information, RSG’s TMM method estimates
average emission rates of the marginal units based on 
their incremental contribution to the load; 
3. Using data to compile a profile of the energy 
savings or energy generation on an hourly basis over 
113 See Part I.B.
 
114 SCHILLER, supra note 44, at 6-5.
 
115 E.H. PECHAN & ASSOC., INC., supra note 76, at 15.
 
116 Id.
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the 8760 hours of the year.  This profile is prepared for 
a particular technology, such as wind power or high-
efficiency commercial air conditioning, and for a 
particular region;117 
4. The “time-matching” occurs when the load 
profile is matched for a specific technology on an 
hourly basis against the marginal emissions profile for 
the same hours; 
5. The avoided emission rates can be used to 
produce, in Microsoft Excel format, a calculator that 
provides total avoided emissions from annual 
generation or savings, using either project-specific 
profiles or default regional profiles. This calculator also 
can be used to estimate avoided emissions on a monthly 
or seasonal basis. 
Although RSG pioneered the TMM methodology, 
at least one other prominent energy consulting firm has 
used a conceptually similar approach.  In July 2008, 
Synapse Energy Economics published a report for the 
EPA using an hourly approach to estimate avoided 
emissions based on hourly EPA CEM data from 
intermediate and peak load generating units.118 This 
report, entitled Analysis of Indirect Emissions Benefits 
of Wind, Landfill Gas, and Municipal Solid Waste
Generation, calculates avoided emissions for the three 
selected renewable energy technologies in each of the 
EPA’s twenty-two eGRID subregions in the continental 
U.S.119 The regional, hourly power profiles for each of
the three renewable resources are combined with the 
hourly indirect emissions factors to yield annual
indirect emissions benefits for each type of resource for 
each eGRID subregion.120 
Researchers at the Laboratory for Energy and the 
Environment at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (“MIT”) also have studied the emission 
reductions from another renewable energy technology, 
solar photovoltaics (“PV”), using a methodology 
similar to the TMM method.121 The MIT study relies 
117  The recommendations in Part IV, infra, highlight the need for
additional work to refine these load profiles and to make them
publicly available.
118 See BRUCE BIEWALD ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., ANALYSIS OF INDIRECT
EMISSIONS BENEFITS OF WIND, LANDFILL GAS, AND MUNICIPAL
SOLID WASTE GENERATION i (2008), available at
http://www.synapse-energy.com/Downloads/SynapseReport.2008­
07.EPA.EPA-Indirect-Emissions-Benefits.06-087.pdf. 
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See THE ANALYSIS GROUP FOR REG’L ENERGY 
ALTERNATIVES, EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS FROM SOLAR 
PHOTOVOLTAIC (PV) SYSTEMS 1-4 (2004), available at
on “matching up PV generation with associated 
changes in unit generation on an hourly basis.”122 It 
focuses on the fossil fuel units offset by PV generation 
in each region and each hour of the day.123 
Moreover, the MIT study expresses serious 
concerns about the system average approach.124 The 
researchers stressed that “[t]his report also challenges 
the simple averages approach on the ground that there 
is no evidence that average . . . emission rates occurring 
when PV is generating are representative of the fossil 
units that respond to changes in load, to be met by 
dispatchable generation.”125 
Finally, the DOE’s Loan Guarantee Program Office 
(“LGPO”) has adopted the RSG TMM methodology as 
a component in its review of loan guarantee 
applications for EERE projects.126 The LGPO is 
applying the methodology in its evaluation of
comparative GHG and air emission reduction benefits
of projects competing for loan guarantees.127 
II. FINDINGS FROM COMPARISON OF THREE AVOIDED
EMISSIONS METHODOLOGIES
In 2008, RSG conducted an analysis of results from 
the three different methodologies that measure the
emissions impact of increased use of EERE 
technologies.  The analysis focused on five EERE 
technologies:  high-efficiency commercial lighting, 
high-efficiency commercial air conditioning, LED 
traffic lights, solar PV, and wind energy.  In each case, 
RSG compared the avoided emissions from a specific 
technology using its TMM methodology, the eGRID 
system average methodology, and the eGRID non­
baseload methodology.  RSG analyzed both the PJM
http://web.mit.edu/agrea/docs/MIT-LFEE_2004-003a_ES.pdf.
 
122 Id. at 1-2.
 
123 Id. at ES-1.
 
124 Id. at 1-4. 

125 Id.
 
126  The LGPO subcontracted with RSG to conduct the analysis of
 
GHG and air emission reduction benefits on the electric grid 

resulting from alternative technologies competing for loan 

guarantees, and RSG is applying its TMM methodology in this
 
process. See generally RSG, Inc., Avoided CO2 Emissions,
 
http://www.rsginc.com/avoided-co2-emissions-2/ (last visited Mar. 

25, 2010).  The DOE required applicants to set forth the hourly 

load profiles for electric generation or savings under their
 
technologies as part of the loan guarantee application process. See
 
LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAM OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
 
ELECTRICAL PROFILES—GENERATION, PURCHASES, SAVINGS AND 

TRANSFERS WORKSHEET (2008), available at
 
http://www.lgprogram.energy.gov/lew.xls.
 
127 Id.
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Interconnection power market and the Upstate New  
York power market. 
The findings of this analysis are as follows:  
1. Avoided air emission benefits for the five EERE 
technologies for CO and N x are 65% to2 O from  165% 
or more higher us he TMM dology when ing t metho  
compared to the e RID system average method;  G  
2. Avoided air emissions benefits for the five
EERE technologies for CO2 are from approxi mat ely   
fifteen percent higher using the TMM methodology 
when ompared to the eGRID n -bac   on loadse  
methodology; 
3. Within the two pow arket areaer m  s studied, the 
emi sion reduction benefitss  associated with the five 
differe ERE technologies varied by only up to threent E   
percent. The variability is mainly associated wit h the 
degree of seasonal variation in electricity savings or  
additional rene able energy generation.  w   
4. In all cases, the results for NO are morex  
complicated and ore variable han the results for CO  m t  2. 
This lated to the highly variabl ecomplexity is re   
emi sion ratess  for NO resulti arge erencesx from l diff ng 
in the efficiency of lution control tech pol  nologies for 
this pollutant . are nIn comparison, there o pollution 
control  for COs on the units s udied.t2  
Figure 3 highlights these res ts, and the actual data ul
relating to these summary findings is set forth in the
Appendix. 
Figur  3: pa n o SG ded Emissionse Com riso f R TMM Avoi  
Rates for NOx and CO2 wi GRID ssion Rates for th e Emi   
the pstate York and PJM Interconnection PowerU New    
Markets
 
New York pst NYUP)U eGRID su regate ( b ion  
PJ  In rco ect on eG ID regi RFCE)M te nn i ( R sub on 
The wide variation in the results pos  significant es 
challenges to state and local government  in preparing s   
GHG inventories and conducting other  GHG 
accounting.128 The following hypothetical example    
highlights the erences among the threediff    
ethodologies. (It should, however, be noted that the m  
eGRID system average methodology is not 
recommended for this type of imation even though it est  
is often inappropriately us   or calculating emiss ion ed f   
reductions resulting from increased use of EERE 
technologies).129
This hypothetical involves a municipality in  
western New York hatt  tracking it  GHG emissionsis s  
and reporting under The Climate Registry protocol s— 
using system average emission rates for its purchase of   
electricity. Assume that the municipality decided to   
reduce its GHG emissions to meet a target in its 
Climate Action P an and decided to install a municipal l
wind farm to power its own facilities and generate 
10,000 MWh per year. The reported avoided emi sionss 
from e thre alternative emissions essmentth e  ass 
methodologies are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Avoided CO Emissions from 10,000 MWh2  
of Wind Energy Generation in Upstate New York. 
Based on 2005 Data.
Avoided Emissions 
Methodology  
Avoided 
Emissions 
(Tons p 
Year) 
CO2 
er 
Organization Using 
Methodology 
eGRID System 
Average  3,600 Climate Registry
130 
eGRID Non 
Baseload A rage 
-
ve 7 571,  
EPA Green Power 
Partnership 
Matche 
Marginal (TMM 
Time-
  
d 
) 9,160 
DOE Loan Guarant 
Program, Metro 
Washington CO 
ee   
 
G 
128 In this ex ple ( or ci e onl e consi edam and f simpli ty), w y hav der  
avoi ed ed missions from operational chan generat on ges n the in i  i
near-term. ve no nside ed the dded com le itWe ha t co r  thata p x y
addi onal generat on mi ay have on reduc ng t  i he need to bui d newlti   
electric generating capacity in the future. 
See gene Part III (discussing t es ead se o129 rally he wid pr u f the 
eGRID system average methodology).  
130 See infra Part III.A. 
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Under this example, the municipality’s own 
wind power project would result in a decrease in 
reported CO2 emissions to The Climate Registry of
approximately 3,600 tons per year.131 On the other 
hand, the municipality might be a member of EPA’s 
Green Power Partnership and calculate the air emission 
benefits from its new wind farm using the eGRID non­
baseload methodology.  Under this methodology, the 
emission reduction benefits claimed would be 7,571 
tons of CO2.132 The amount of avoided CO2 emissions 
reported under this non-baseload methodology would 
thus differ substantially from the amount of avoided 
CO2 emissions calculated under the eGRID system 
average methodology.  Moreover, using an hourly 
marginal emissions analysis, such as the TMM method, 
a more accurate estimate of the avoided emissions 
benefits of a municipal purchase of 10,000 MWh of 
wind power would be about 9,160 tons of CO2. 
If the municipality wanted to quantify its progress 
toward a GHG reduction target, the TMM methodology 
would be most accurate in the near-term. This 
hypothetical illustrates the need for greater consistency 
and accuracy in calculating and reporting CO2 reduction 
benefits. 
The analysis described above is based on only two 
of the twenty-six NERC subregions.  However, 
subsequent to the completion of the research included 
in this Article, RSG analyzed the emission reduction 
benefits of a wide range of EERE projects across all of 
the NERC regions and virtually all of the NERC 
subregions.  RSG’s analysis confirms that the use of the 
TMM methodology results in significantly higher 
emission reduction benefits than using the eGRID 
system average methodology in most regions of the 
country. The comparison with the non-baseload 
131   The Climate Registry’s General Protocol does suggest the
reporting of supplemental information about green power
purchases in its entity-wide report on indirect emissions from
electricity purchases. THE CLIMATE REGISTRY, supra note 10, at
101. However, the indirect emissions that are reported as scope 2
emissions from electricity purchases would only be reduced by
3,600 tons.
132 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, eGRID2007 Version
1.1 Year 2005 GHG Annual Output Emission Rates,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/egridweb/ghg (last visited Mar. 23, 2010)
(listing the “[a]nnual non-baseload output emissions rates” for
Upstate New York (NYUP) as 1511.14 lb CO2/KWH); U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Green Power Partnership,
Green Power Equivalency Calculator,
http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/pubs/calculator.htm (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2010).
average is more complex, making it difficult to draw 
clear conclusions. 
Thus, this recent work further confirms that the 
eGRID system average methodology is an inappropriate 
approach for assessing the avoided emissions benefits
of specific EERE programs and projects, which is 
implicit in how state and national registries and 
accounting programs currently estimate indirect 
emissions from electricity purchases.133 This 
conclusion was supported by EPA eGRID experts at the 
recent Energy and Environmental Conference 2010 
(commonly called the EUEC 2010) in Phoenix.134 
According to a paper presented by the eGRID experts, 
the eGRID non-baseload emission rates, rather than the 
eGRID total output emission rates (system average
rates), are recommended for use in estimating “the 
emissions benefits of reductions in grid supplied 
electricity use, especially those that are somewhat 
coincident with peak demand.”135 The experts 
specifically recommended the eGRID non-baseload 
methodology to calculate emission reductions from 
using high-efficiency air conditioning.136 
III.	 IMPROVED METHODOLOGIES WOULD BENEFIT 
FEDERAL AND STATE CLIMATE AND AIR
QUALITY PROGRAMS
A. The Climate Registry’s Reliance on the eGRID  
System Average Methodology 
It is very important to promptly address the
inappropriate use of the eGRID system average 
methodology for calculating changes in CO2 emissions 
resulting from increased use of EERE technologies. 
Unfortunately, a large majority of states and hundreds 
of local governments and private entities using GHG 
emission protocols are misapplying the system average 
avoided emissions methodology in these
circumstances.137 Reliance on the eGRID system
average methodology has significant ramifications 
because of the possibility that other government entities 
and the authors of national climate legislation will 
follow this precedent.   
Most importantly, the General Reporting Protocol 
of The Climate Registry—a non-profit organization 
133 See infra Part III.C. 

134 See ROTHSCHILD & DIEM ET AL., supra note 68, at 6.

135 Id.
 
136 See id.
 
137 See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
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comprised of forty states and the District of
Columbia—recommends the use of system average 
emissions rates to calculate indirect GHG emissions 
from electricity purchases if utility-specific emissions 
information is not available.138 The Climate Registry’s
General Reporting Protocol incorporates a table that 
contains specific emission factors to apply in such 
cases—the eGRID system average.139 
The General Reporting Protocol does suggest the 
reporting of supplemental information regarding green 
power purchases in its entity-wide report on indirect 
emissions from electricity purchases.140 However, this 
Protocol does not require any reductions in the level of
indirect emissions from electricity purchases (scope 2 
emissions) reported as a result of the increased use of 
renewable energy technologies and does not require an 
additional inventory to reflect emission reductions that 
result from increased use of renewable energy 
technologies.141 The General Reporting Protocol, 
moreover, does not discuss any adjustments to account 
for reductions in energy use from major energy 
efficiency projects undertaken by an entity.142 
In comparison to the TMM methodology, the 
General Reporting Protocol methodology does not
involve marginal emissions rates, nor does it require 
time-varying profiles of specific EERE technologies.143 
A companion Protocol developed by the Local
Governments for Sustainability (“ICLEI”) in 
partnership with The Climate Registry, the California 
Climate Action Registry, and the California Air
Resources Board, uses a similar approach.144 In 
addition, as discussed below, Climate Registry 
138 See THE CLIMATE REGISTRY, supra note 10, at 99. The
Climate Registry is a non-profit organization that supports public
reporting of greenhouse gas emissions throughout North America 
in a single unified registry. The Protocol indicates that generator-
specific emission factors are preferred instead of eGRID data but
allows the use of eGRID data when such generator-specific 
emission factors are not available.  Even with respect to the
generator-specific data, the Protocol does not require the use of
marginal emissions data. See id. at 99.
139 See id. at 99, 104.  
140 See id. at 101.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 97-108.
143 Compare id., with supra Part I.B.3 (discussing TMM
methodology).
144 LOCAL GOV’TS FOR SUSTAINABILITY ET AL., LOCAL
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS PROTOCOL, VERSION 1.0, at 169, 175­
76 (2008), available at http://www.icleiusa.org/action­
center/tools/lgo-protocol-1 (using system average data in Tables
providing default electricity emissions factors).
protocols have been referenced in several major pieces 
of national climate legislation.145 
It should be noted that The Climate Registry’s 
General Reporting Protocol “recognizes the need to 
develop a specific accounting framework for green 
power purchases in order to encourage and incentivize 
emission reduction efforts.”146 The General Reporting 
Protocol, however, asserts that “[t]here is not yet 
consensus on how to accurately and credibly track 
green power purchases in an accounting framework, 
beyond allowing Reporters to provide supplementary 
information about their green power purchases in 
annual emission reports.”147 
In its General Reporting Protocol, The Climate 
Registry committed to “incorporating a framework for 
accounting for contractual purchases of electricity, such 
as green power,” as it “develop[ed] an industry specific 
protocol for the power and utility sector. . . .”148 
Unfortunately, The Climate Registry did not resolve 
this issue when it issued its voluntary reporting protocol 
for the electric power sector in June 2009.149 
The Climate Registry’s Protocols raise particular 
concerns about the disconnect between year-to-year 
changes in CO2 emissions reported to The Climate
Registry, as compared to energy efficiency savings, and 
related GHG emission reductions reported by state 
energy agencies and electric utilities.  For example, if
the State of Maryland—a member of The Climate 
Registry—reports its CO2 inventory under the General 
Reporting Protocol, it is likely to underestimate the 
benefits of energy savings from high-efficiency heating 
equipment in the State for a variety of reasons, 
including the fact that the eGRID system average
methodology does not reflect seasonal changes in 
avoided emissions.150 
This issue of seasonal variation is significant 
because the avoided CO2 emissions from energy 
efficiency technologies in Maryland are greater in the
145 See infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
 
146 THE CLIMATE REGISTRY, supra note 10, at 101.
 
147 Id.
 
148 Id.
 
149 THE CLIMATE REGISTRY, ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR
 
PROTOCOL FOR THE VOLUNTARY REPORTING PROGRAM, ANNEX 1
 
TO THE GENERAL REPORTING PROTOCOL, VERSION 1.0, at 54, 64­
67, 76-77 (2009), available at
 
http://www.theclimateregistry.org/downloads/2009/05/Electric­
Power-Sector-Protocol_v1.0.pdf.
 
150 See NAT’L ACTION PLAN FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY, MODEL
 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM IMPACT GUIDE 6-5 (2007), 

available at http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy­
programs/napee/resources/guides.html#guide5.
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winter months.151 The fossil fuel-fired units displaced 
in the regional power market are more often coal-fired 
units with high CO2 emissions.152 As Maryland 
implements its new EmPOWER Maryland efficiency 
initiative,153 The Climate Registry methodology is thus 
unlikely to reflect the full benefits of the new initiative.   
The eGRID system average methodology also will 
not provide an accurate comparison of the cost-
effectiveness of alternative GHG reduction strategies 
that rely on EERE technologies, particularly 
comparisons of actions in different regions and power 
markets.  For example, the MIT study emphasized that
the degree of reliance on higher emitting fossil fuel-
fired electricity in a particular power grid will be a 
greater determinant of the level of avoided emissions 
from solar photovoltaic energy than the amount of
sunshine in a particular region.154 This fact may 
heighten the CO2 reduction value of solar energy in 
certain regions, such as the Northern Plains and the 
Tennessee Valley, which generally are not viewed as 
promising solar generation areas.155 Furthermore, the 
adoption of time-of-use pricing in electricity markets156 
will require increased emphasis on time-of-use avoided 
emissions analysis if the cost-effectiveness of energy 
efficiency programs is to be properly evaluated. 
The misapplication of the eGRID system average is 
likely to have sweeping impacts because the broad 
151 Information is based on RSG Inc. TMM emissions 
methodology discussed supra Part I.B.3. 
152 Id. 
153 See Maryland Energy Administration, Energy Facts and
Programs,
http://www.energy.maryland.gov/facts/empower/index.asp (last
visited Mar. 25, 2010).  Under Maryland’s “EmPOWER
Maryland” initiative, the state is working with its utilities to 
require actions to reduce energy consumption by fifteen percent by 
the year 2015. Id. 
154 STEPHEN CONNORS ET AL., LAB. FOR ENERGY & THE ENV’T, 
EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS FROM SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEMS 
ES-2, at 8-1 (2005), available at
http://solar.gwu.edu/index_files/Resources_files/MIT_Solar%20P 
V%20Report2004.pdf.
155 Id. at 6-7.
156 Time-of-use rates provide electric consumers with rates that
vary over time to reflect the “value and cost of electricity in 
different time periods.”  The purpose of this approach is to 
encourage consumers “to use less electricity at times when
electricity prices are high.” U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BENEFITS OF 
DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM: A REPORT TO THE 
U.S. CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 1252 OF THE ENERGY 
POLICY ACT OF 2005, at v, xi (2006), available at
http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/congress_1252d.p 
df.
geographic membership of The Climate Registry has
spurred partnerships with other important organizations. 
For example, in December 2008, ICLEI announced a 
partnership with The Climate Registry to encourage 
local governments to report their emissions as members 
of The Climate Registry.157 Previously, ICLEI had 
worked with The Climate Registry to develop the Local 
Government Operations Protocol to facilitate reporting 
of GHGs by local governments.158 More than 600 local 
governments in the United States are members of the 
ICLEI organization.159 
Several pieces of national climate legislation also 
have referenced The Climate Registry’s protocol.  For 
example, H.R. 2454, the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009, approved by the House of 
Representatives in June 2009, references The Climate 
Registry in its provisions establishing a greenhouse gas 
registry.160 Section 713(b)(1) requires the EPA
Administrator to issue regulations establishing a federal 
greenhouse gas registry, and subsection (b)(1)(E) 
requires the Administrator to: “[T]ake into account the 
best practices from the most recent federal, state, tribal 
and international protocols for the measurement, 
accounting, reporting, and verification of  greenhouse 
gas emissions, including protocols from The Climate 
Registry and other mandatory state or multistate 
authorized programs.”161 
Moreover, H.R. 2454 requires the EPA 
Administrator to explain any major differences in the 
approach between the registry established under the 
new regulations and The Climate Registry and other 
mandatory state and multistate programs.162 The 
Climate Registry is defined in the legislation as “the
greenhouse gas emissions registry jointly established 
and managed by more than 40 States and Indian tribes
157  Press Release, The Climate Registry and Local Gov’ts for
 
Sustainability, ICLEI and the Climate Registry Partner to Track
 
Rigorous GHG Emissions Accounting for Local Governments
 
(Dec. 2, 2008).
 
158 See Open Letter from Rachel Tornek, Senior Policy Manager,
 
Cal. Climate Action Registry & Garrett Fitzgerald, Dir. Of
 
Programs, ICLEI — Local Govt’s for Sustainability, Local 

Government Protocol Invitation (Mar. 2, 2008), available at
 
http://www.icleiusa.org/programs/climate/protocol-invitation­
letter/?searchterm=LocalGovernmentOperationsProtocol.
 
159  ICLEI — Local Governments for Sustainability, About
 
ICLEI, http://www.icleiusa.org/about-iclei (last visited Mar. 5,
 
2010).
 
160 See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R.
 
2454, 111th Cong. § 713 (2009).
 
161  H.R. 2454 §§ 713(b)(1), (b)(1)(E) (emphasis added).
 
162 H.R. 2454 § 713.
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in 2007 to collect high-quality greenhouse gas emission 
data from facilities, corporations, and other 
organizations to support various greenhouse gas 
emission reporting and reduction policies for the 
member States and Indian tribes.”163 
Similarly, the provisions of the Senate version of 
climate legislation establishing a GHG registry also 
reference The Climate Registry protocols.164 Section 
713(b)(1)(E) of the Clean Energy Jobs and American 
Power Act states that the regulations issued by the EPA 
Administrator to establish a GHG registry shall “take 
into account the best practices from the most recent 
Federal, State, tribal and international protocols for the 
measurement, accounting, reporting, and verification of 
greenhouse gas emissions, including protocols from 
The Climate Registry and other mandatory State or 
multistate authorized programs.”165 
In summary, The Climate Registry is in a key 
position to develop additional protocols that more 
accurately reflect the emission reduction benefits of
increased use of EERE technologies.  The leadership of 
the Climate Registry has emphasized that corrections 
and clarifications to its General Reporting Protocol will 
be necessary as the program evolves.166 The 
organization has announced plans to release a new 
version of its General Protocol in 2010,167 and the 
Authors have sought to facilitate necessary 
clarifications by sharing the results of the methodology 
issues raised in this Article with the Climate Registry 
staff.   
B. Mandatory GHG Reporting Rules
On October 30, 2009, the EPA published a final 
rule requiring the first-ever national mandatory 
reporting system for GHGs in the United States.168 
Although the October 2009 rule only focused on direct 
emissions and did not require reporting of indirect 
emissions from electricity purchases,169 the preamble to 
163  H.R. 2454 § 713(a)(1).

164  Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th
 
Cong. § 713(b)(1)(E) (2009).

165  S. 1733 § 713(b)(1)(E) (emphasis added). 

166 THE CLIMATE REGISTRY, GENERAL REPORTING PROTOCOL 1.1
 
CLARIFICATIONS AND CORRECTIONS 1 (2008), available at
 
http://www.theclimateregistry.org/downloads/08.11.24_GRP_Clar
 
ifications_and_Corrections.pdf.
 
167 Id.

168  Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg.
 
56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 98).
 
169 Id. at 56,289.
 
the final rule indicated that reporting of indirect 
emissions was likely to be considered in the future.170 
Any methodology ultimately adopted by the EPA in a 
future rulemaking for mandatory reporting of GHG
emissions will be extremely important in establishing a 
precedent for the treatment of indirect emissions from 
electricity purchases.   
According to the preamble, the EPA stated:  
While EPA is not collecting data on 
electricity purchases in this rule, we 
understand that acquiring such data may 
be important in the future.  Therefore, 
we are exploring options for possible 
future data collection on electricity 
purchases and indirect emissions, and 
the uses of such data.  Such a future data 
collection on indirect emissions would 
complement EPA’s interest in spurring 
investment in energy efficiency and 
renewable energy.171 
To date, the EPA has not addressed the option of
developing two separate inventories for indirect 
emissions—one to help aggregate reports of GHG 
emissions from individual entities and a second to 
account for changes in GHG emissions resulting from 
increased use of EERE technologies.172 However, since 
the EPA views the encouragement of EERE
technologies as an important goal, it is essential for the 
EPA to use the appropriate methodology to accomplish 
its objective.     
Consistent with the WRI Guidelines, the EPA
should use a marginal emissions methodology in any 
emissions inventory intended to measure reductions in 
GHGs resulting from increased use of EERE.173 
Businesses and policymakers seeking a level playing 
field for EERE technologies should closely follow 
EPA’s future rulemaking activities in this area.  
Moreover, EERE technologies are not the only 
technologies affected by this methodological problem. 
The evaluation of air emissions reductions from other 
electric technologies, such as fuel cells, grid-connected 
batteries, compressed air and pumped storage and plug­
170 Id.
 
171 Id.

172 See id.
 
173 See infra Part IV (providing a more extensive elaboration of
 
this recommendation); see supra Part I.B.2.-3 (providing a
 
description of the non-baseload and TMM methodologies).
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developed with support from the DOE Clean 
Energy/Air Quality Integration Initiative, could fulfill 
this essential need.  It has already been employed by the 
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments 
(MWCOG), the Commonwealth of Virginia, the State 
of Maryland, and the District of Columbia.188 
The MWCOG calculator, which is based on the
RSG TMM methodology, allows the user to use 
standard load profiles for a specific renewable energy 
or energy savings technology, or project-specific load 
profiles, and to enter these profiles into an Excel-based 
spreadsheet.189 In developing its air quality plan to 
meet the eight-hour ozone standard, the MWCOG staff
used the calculator to compute the annual or monthly 
avoided emission estimates for NOX using the hourly 
TMM emission rates that were embedded in the
calculator.190
An hourly marginal emissions methodology is also 
ideally suited to assess the benefits of EERE measures 
on high electric demand days. Energy savings measures 
188  The following document issued by the Metropolitan 
Washington Council of Governments (“MWCOG”) relies on the
analysis from the TMM calculator in its chapter on voluntary 
control measures (Chapter 6) and in Appendix H. METRO. WASH. 
COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, PLAN TO IMPROVE AIR QUALITY IN THE 
METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON, DC-MD-VA REGION: STATE 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR 8-HOUR OZONE STANDARD 6-61 to 6­
82, Appendix H (2007), available at
http://www.mwcog.org/environment/air/downloads/SIP_APP/defa 
ult.asp.
The calculator tools are set forth in Appendix H of the MWCOG
document for LED traffic lights, wind energy and the DC RPS.
The methodology underlying the calculator tools is set forth in the
following document contained in Appendix H of the MWCOG
document. See COLIN HIGH & KEVIN HATHAWAY, RES. SYSTEMS 
GROUP, AVOIDED AIR EMISSIONS FROM ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND
RENEWABLE ENERGY POWER GENERATION IN THE PJM
INTERCONNECTION POWER MARKET AREA (2007), available at
http://www.mwcog.org/environment/air/downloads/SIP_APP/App 
_H_-_RSG_Avoided_Emissions_Rept_5-23-07_Draft_Final.pdf.
189 METRO. WASH. COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, supra note 188, at 6-61.
190 Id. The calculator tool that was initially developed in 2007 
has been refined in 2008 and 2009 under a grant issued by the
DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
(EERE).  The grant was issued to the Virginia Department of
Mines, Minerals and Energy under the EERE’s  state Energy 
Program to support a project titled “Promoting Air Quality with
Clean Energy in the Metropolitan Washington Region.”  The
methodology has been further refined under work performed for
the DOE’s Loan Guarantee Project Office to encompass GHGs and
other pollutants. In view of the NOx emissions trading regime in 
effect in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia, the air
agencies in these jurisdictions committed to retire NOx allowances
in an amount commensurate with the amount of calculated 
emissions.  See id. at Appendix H.
that reduce summer electric use “during the days and 
hours with the highest electrical demand, such as high-
efficiency air conditioning and commercial lighting, are 
particularly valuable in reducing emissions of NOX—a 
precursor to ground-level ozone that causes adverse 
respiratory effects in adults and children.”191 “Ozone is 
formed on hot summer days, and the hottest summer 
days also are typically the days of highest electrical 
demand—the so-called ‘high electric demand days.”192 
Research has demonstrated that daily NOX 
emissions on high electric demand days from fossil 
fuel-fired electric generating units in certain regions of 
the country, such as the Northeast and the Mid-Atlantic 
regions, substantially exceed emissions on more typical
summer days.193 “This result occurs because the peak 
load generating units used on these limited number of
days each year (generally fewer than a dozen days) are 
typically older units with limited pollution controls.”194 
There is a major opportunity to provide access to 
the TMM method and calculator to state and local
governments.  States have time to develop and 
distribute the database and calculator prior to the 
submission of the SIPs in 2013 and to train state 
employees to use this tool. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the findings presented above, this Article 
offers five recommendations. Adopting these 
recommendations would substantially advance efforts 
to measure the full air emission reduction benefits of 
EERE technologies.
First, DOE, EPA, and state air, climate, and energy 
agencies, including the Board of The Climate Registry, 
should fund an enhancement of the eGRID database to 
provide a profile of hourly marginal emissions for each 
of the 8,760 hours of the year in each of the eGRID 
subregions. This enhanced eGRID database should 
cover all power markets as well as all regions and 
subregions of the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation.
The enhanced eGRID database would include
additional information based on the TMM methodology 
or a similar methodology (initially using data from 
191  ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS, supra note 23, at
2.
 
192 Id.
 
193 See NE. STATES FOR COORDINATED AIR USE MGMT., FINAL 

WHITE PAPER: HIGH ELECTRIC DEMAND DAY AND AIR QUALITY IN 

THE NORTHEAST (2006).  

194 ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS, supra note 23, at 2.
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developed with support from the DOE Clean 
Energy/Air Quality Integration Initiative, could fulfill 
this essential need. It has already been employed by the 
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments 
(MWCOG), the Commonwealth of Virginia, the State 
of Maryland, and the District of Columbia.188 
The MWCOG calculator, which is based on the
RSG TMM methodology, allows the user to use 
standard load profiles for a specific renewable energy 
or energy savings technology, or project-specific load 
profiles, and to enter these profiles into an Excel-based 
spreadsheet.189 In developing its air quality plan to 
meet the eight-hour ozone standard, the MWCOG staff
used the calculator to compute the annual or monthly 
avoided emission estimates for NOX using the hourly 
TMM emission rates that were embedded in the
calculator.190
An hourly marginal emissions methodology is also 
ideally suited to assess the benefits of EERE measures 
on high electric demand days. Energy savings measures 
188  The following document issued by the Metropolitan 
Washington Council of Governments (“MWCOG”) relies on the
analysis from the TMM calculator in its chapter on voluntary 
control measures (Chapter 6) and in Appendix H. METRO. WASH. 
COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, PLAN TO IMPROVE AIR QUALITY IN THE 
METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON, DC-MD-VA REGION: STATE 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR 8-HOUR OZONE STANDARD 6-61 to 6­
82, Appendix H (2007), available at
http://www.mwcog.org/environment/air/downloads/SIP_APP/defa 
ult.asp.
The calculator tools are set forth in Appendix H of the MWCOG
document for LED traffic lights, wind energy and the DC RPS.
The methodology underlying the calculator tools is set forth in the
following document contained in Appendix H of the MWCOG
document. See COLIN HIGH & KEVIN HATHAWAY, RES. SYSTEMS 
GROUP, AVOIDED AIR EMISSIONS FROM ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND
RENEWABLE ENERGY POWER GENERATION IN THE PJM
INTERCONNECTION POWER MARKET AREA (2007), available at
http://www.mwcog.org/environment/air/downloads/SIP_APP/App 
_H_-_RSG_Avoided_Emissions_Rept_5-23-07_Draft_Final.pdf.
189 METRO. WASH. COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, supra note 188, at 6-61.
190 Id. The calculator tool that was initially developed in 2007 
has been refined in 2008 and 2009 under a grant issued by the
DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
(EERE).  The grant was issued to the Virginia Department of
Mines, Minerals and Energy under the EERE’s  state Energy 
Program to support a project titled “Promoting Air Quality with
Clean Energy in the Metropolitan Washington Region.”  The
methodology has been further refined under work performed for
the DOE’s Loan Guarantee Project Office to encompass GHGs and
other pollutants. In view of the NOx emissions trading regime in 
effect in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Virginia, the air
agencies in these jurisdictions committed to retire NOx allowances
in an amount commensurate with the amount of calculated 
emissions.  See id. at Appendix H.
that reduce summer electric use “during the days and 
hours with the highest electrical demand, such as high-
efficiency air conditioning and commercial lighting, are 
particularly valuable in reducing emissions of NOX—a 
precursor to ground-level ozone that causes adverse 
respiratory effects in adults and children.”191 “Ozone is 
formed on hot summer days, and the hottest summer 
days also are typically the days of highest electrical 
demand—the so-called ‘high electric demand days.”192 
Research has demonstrated that daily NOX 
emissions on high electric demand days from fossil 
fuel-fired electric generating units in certain regions of 
the country, such as the Northeast and the Mid-Atlantic 
regions, substantially exceed emissions on more typical
summer days.193 “This result occurs because the peak 
load generating units used on these limited number of
days each year (generally fewer than a dozen days) are 
typically older units with limited pollution controls.”194 
There is a major opportunity to provide access to 
the TMM method and calculator to state and local
governments.  States have time to develop and 
distribute the database and calculator prior to the 
submission of the SIPs in 2013 and to train state 
employees to use this tool. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the findings presented above, this Article 
offers five recommendations. Adopting these 
recommendations would substantially advance efforts 
to measure the full air emission reduction benefits of 
EERE technologies.
First, DOE, EPA, and state air, climate, and energy 
agencies, including the Board of The Climate Registry, 
should fund an enhancement of the eGRID database to 
provide a profile of hourly marginal emissions for each 
of the 8,760 hours of the year in each of the eGRID 
subregions. This enhanced eGRID database should 
cover all power markets as well as all regions and 
subregions of the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation. 
The enhanced eGRID database would include
additional information based on the TMM methodology 
or a similar methodology (initially using data from 
191  ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS, supra note 23, at
2.
 
192 Id.
 
193 See NE. STATES FOR COORDINATED AIR USE MGMT., FINAL 

WHITE PAPER: HIGH ELECTRIC DEMAND DAY AND AIR QUALITY IN 

THE NORTHEAST (2006).  

194 ROLE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS, supra note 23, at 2.
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Continuous Emission Monitors and other data reported 
to the EPA).  As a result, it should be possible to 
compile this database for a relatively modest amount of
funding relative to the potential benefits.  Since the 
enhanced eGRID database would be extremely useful 
in obtaining air quality, climate, and energy goals by 
federal, state, and local agencies, some type of cost-
sharing arrangement among these agencies appears 
reasonable. 
Alternatively, it seems appropriate to fund such a 
database on a longer-term basis with funds from 
allowance auction revenues generated under regional or 
national climate change legislation.  This funding can 
be justified on the grounds that the data will directly 
facilitate the development of more accurate GHG 
reduction estimates.
Second, as an interim measure pending the 
completion of the eGRID enhancement set forth in our 
first recommendation, the federal government and 
states should utilize the eGRID non-baseload emissions 
methodology for calculating the emission reduction 
benefits of increased use of EERE technologies.  This 
non-baseload methodology is far more representative 
than the eGRID system average methodology and has 
already been developed by the EPA.  Moreover, the 
eGRID non-baseload methodology is recommended for 
estimating emissions reductions from EERE,195 and this
methodology has been adopted by the EPA Green 
Power Partnership to calculate the GHG emission 
reduction benefits of renewable power.196 
The eGRID non-baseload methodology could 
therefore serve as a valuable interim approach. During 
the interim period before the development of an 
enhanced eGRID database, appropriate agencies should 
consider allowing state and local governments, such as 
the MWCOG, and private entities to submit marginal 
emissions calculations from other verified sources, such 
as the RSG TMM, instead of using the EPA non­
baseload emissions estimates.197 
195 ROTHSCHILD & DIEM ET AL., supra note 68, at 6.
196 See Green Power Partnership, supra note 107.
197       For example, shortly before the publication of this Article,
the PJM Interconnection announced the availability of CO2 
emissions data for marginal generating units from January 2005 to 
December 2009. The related press release stated that this data “can 
be used to estimate carbon dioxide reductions from demand 
response, energy efficiency measures and increases in emissions-
free generation.” PJM Press Release, supra note 59 (attached
graphic and tables comparing CO2 emission rates of marginal
generating units compared to CO2 emission rates of system
average generating units for 2005 to 2009).
As noted above, recent research by RSG has
determined that the difference between the eGRID non­
baseload methodology and the TMM methodology can 
be quite significant for certain regions and technologies. 
Therefore, reliance on this eGRID non-baseload 
approach should be only an interim step.   
Third, DOE, the EPA, and other interested agencies 
and parties should consider continuing their support of
the Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnerships (“NEEP”) 
Evaluation, Measurement, and Verification (“EMV”) 
Forum,198 and other similar efforts to develop hourly 
load profiles for specific EE technologies.  The EMV 
Forum was initiated in 2008 with funding from a 
number of entities, including DOE and the EPA.  There 
remains strong synergy between the proposed work of
the EMV Forum to compile hourly load profiles of 
various energy efficiency measures with the proposed 
compilation of hourly marginal emission rates under the 
TMM and the eGRID non-baseload methodologies.
As stated in Part I.B.3, supra, the “time-matching” 
aspect of the TMM methodology involves matching the 
load profile for a specific technology against the 
emissions profile of the marginal units.199 The 
recommendation for the eGRID enhancement would 
provide information to generate the hourly emissions 
data on the marginal units, but the NEEP process and 
other similar efforts will provide the second piece of the 
puzzle for energy efficiency resources—the load profile 
for specific energy efficiency technologies, such as 
high-efficiency commercial air conditioning and high-
efficiency residential lighting.200 
198 See SUSAN COAKLEY ET AL., NE. ENERGY EFFICIENCY P’SHIP, 
NORTHEAST EVALUATION MEASUREMENT AND VERIFICATION
FORUM: THREE-YEAR PLAN 3 (2008), available at
http://neep.org/uploads/EMV%20Forum/EMV_forum_plan_4.08.p 
df.
199 See supra Part I.B.3.
200 With respect to renewable energy resources, many of the load
shape profiles are already readily available.  For example, the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory has developed the
PVWattsTM calculator to allow researchers to easily determine the 
energy production of grid-connected “PV” energy systems in 
different regions of the U.S. and the world.   National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory, Renewable Resource Data Center, PVWatts,
http://www.nrel.gov/rredc/pvwatts (last visited Mar. 5, 2010).  The
PVWatts calculator works by creating hour-by-hour performance
simulations that provide estimated monthly and annual energy 
production in kilowatts and energy value. Users can select a
location and choose to use default values or their own system
parameters for size, electric cost, array type, tilt angle, and azimuth
angle. In addition, the PVWatts calculator can provide hourly 
performance data for the selected location. See id.
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
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Fourth, DOE, the EPA, and other agencies and 
entities should initiate additional research to refine the 
time-matched marginal emissions methodology. 
Although both marginal emissions methodologies are 
far more accurate than the system average methodology 
in estimating avoided emissions from EERE 
technologies, these marginal methodologies require 
additional research to overcome certain limitations 
discussed below.201 Federal and state agencies should 
consider funding this research to increase the value of
the marginal methodologies measurement approach.  
The most valuable improvement in both the eGRID 
non-baseload and TMM methodologies would be an 
expansion of the methodologies to include the impact of
significant grid changes in the mid-term and long-term. 
This refinement would capture changes in emissions 
caused by the construction of new power generation 
units and by the retirement of old units.   
The two eGRID methodologies and the initial TMM
methodology (used for the analysis of the two power 
markets discussed in this Article) only capture the 
displacement of existing fossil fuel-fired units on the
grid by EERE technologies because they are based on 
the analysis of historic data.  These analyses thus reflect 
the so-called operating margin202 that dominates near-
term changes in emissions.  
However, leading experts on GHG emission 
analysis emphasize that the analysis of avoided 
emissions from grid-connected electric generation over 
several decades also must consider the impact of new 
units that may be built on the grid—the so-called build 
margin.203 Further work is needed to develop cost-
effective and transparent methods to capture this “build
margin.”204 
In addition, electric generation modeling experts
suggest that it would be useful to compare the results of
at least one leading proprietary dispatch model with the 
results of the TMM methodology.205 This comparison 
201 See infra Part I.B.3. 

202 See QUANTIFYING GHG REDUCTIONS, supra note 13, at 13.
 
203 See Id.

204  RSG has undertaken initial work related to three NERC
 
subregions to expand its TMM methodology to include projections
 
of the construction of new electric generating capacity based on 

construction in progress, planned additions, and projections of
 
future plant additions (reflecting alternative public policy
 
scenarios).
 
205 Telephone Interview with Chris James, Senior Assoc.,
 
Synapse Energy Econ., & Jeremy Fisher, Scientist, Synapse
 
Energy Econ. (Winter, 2009).

would be useful to further validate the methodology and 
to identify any areas of necessary improvement.
Finally, we recommend that federal and state 
regulatory agencies, as well as electric utilities and their 
trade associations, consider the GHG emission profiles 
of electric generation in evaluating charging strategies 
for electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles as well as 
energy storage technologies.  The GHG emissions 
profile of electric generation varies by region, season, 
and hour of the day.  Unless governmental agencies 
consider the specific emissions profile of each region, 
they may fail to develop the optimal strategy for 
reducing GHG emissions from new technologies for 
energy storage and advanced electric vehicles.
CONCLUSION
Federal and state agencies involved in climate, air 
pollution, and energy matters should act promptly to 
ensure that accurate methodologies are used in 
calculating reductions in emissions of GHGs and other 
air pollutants resulting from increased use of EERE 
technologies on the electric power grid.  In particular, 
the forty states involved in The Climate Registry should 
consider developing an additional protocol and registry 
during their planned revisions of the General Reporting 
Protocol in 2010. The proposed supplementary 
protocol should incorporate a more accurate 
methodology based on marginal emissions to account
for the increased use of EERE technologies on the 
electric power grid. Such an approach also should be 
incorporated into EPA’s Mandatory Greenhouse Gas 
Reporting Rule and in requirements of climate 
legislation relating to GHG inventories.   
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APPENDIX 
Comparison of RSG TMM Avoided Emissions Rates for NOx and CO2 with eGRID Emission Rates for Two 
NERC Subregions 
New York Upstate (NERC subregion NYUP)
CO2 CO2 NOx NOx 
Avoided Difference Avoided Difference 
Emission from eGRID Emission from eGRID 
Rate System Rate System 
(lb/MWh) (Average %) (lb/MWh) (Average %) 
Avoided 
Emissions 
Methodology 
eGRID 
Output 
System 
Average 
eGRID 
Non-
Baseload 
721 0% 0.83 0% 
Average 
RSG 
Average 
1,706 137% 1.82 119% 
TMM Rate 
TMM­
1,813 151% 2.14 158% 
Wind 1,832 154% 2.01 142% 
TMM-PV 1,805 150% 2.12 155% 
TMM-AC 
TMM­
1,798 149% 2.20 165% 
Lighting 
TMM­
LED Traffic 
1,808 151% 2.18 163% 
Signals 1,822 153% 2.17 161% 
���������������� 
For the New York Upstate data,  8760 hour generation or savings 
profile was simulated based on comparable profiles for the TMM-Wind, 
TMM-PV, TMM-AC, TMM-Lighting, and TMM-LED Traffic Signals. 
Note: The results are based on 2005 eGRID data and 2005 
Continuous Emission Monitors (CEM) and other 2005 emissions data 
reported to the EPA. The year 2005 is the most recent for which 
comprehensive verified emissions data is available from the EPA. 
����������� �������������������������������������������������� ��� 
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PJM Interconnection — (NERC subregion RFCE) 
CO2 CO2 NOx NOx 
Avoided Difference Avoided Difference 
Emission from eGRID Emission from eGRID 
Rate System Rate System 
(lb/MWh) (Average %) (lb/MWh) (Average %) 
Avoided Emissions
Methodology 
eGRID Output 
System Average
eGRID Non­
1,139 0% 1.63 0% 
Baseload Average 
RSG Average TMM 
1,790 57% 2.77 70% 
Rate 1,888 66% 2.14 31% 
TMM-Wind 1,905 67% 2.01 23% 
TMM-PV 1,892 66% 2.12 30% 
TMM-AC 1,870 73% 2.2 35% 
TMM-Lighting 
TMM-LED Traffic 
1,894 66% 2.18 34% 
Signals 1,881 65% 2.17 33% 
For the PJM Interconnection data, 8760 hour generation or savings profile was 
simulated based on comparable profiles for the TMM-Wind data. 8760 hour generation 
or savings profile was based on actual profiles for the region for the TMM-PV, TMM­
AC, TMM-Lighting, and TMM-LED Traffic Signals. 
Note: The results are based on 2005 eGRID data and 2005 EPA Continuous
Emission Monitors (CEM) and other 2005 emissions data reported to the EPA. The 
year 2005 is the most recent for which comprehensive verified emissions data is 
available from the EPA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Copenhagen Climate Conference— 
Success or Failure? 
RICHARD L. OTTINGER * 
The Copenhagen Climate Conference and its Copenhagen 
Accord have generally been regarded by the press as a failure.1 I 
think this is a very unfortunate mischaracterization. The 
conference was a failure only in not achieving binding 
* Richard L. Ottinger came to the Pace University School of Law when he
retired from Congress in 1984. As a professor, he taught in the environmental
law program and as co-director of the Center for Environmental Legal Studies,
he started the Pace Energy Project (renamed the Pace Energy and Climate 
Center), which raises $900,000 per year, advocating utility investment in 
conservation and renewable energy resources. In his sixteen years as a member
of the United States House of Representatives, Dean Ottinger authored a 
substantial body of energy and environmental laws. He was one of the earliest 
environmentalists in Congress in 1965. As chairman of the Energy Conservation
and Power Subcommittee, Energy & Commerce Committee, he was instru­
mental in adopting key energy and environmental legislation. Dean Ottinger
was also a founding staff member of the Peace Corps, serving it during 1961­
1964. He was appointed Dean of Pace Law School in December 1994, retired as 
Dean in July 1999, and currently serves as Dean Emeritus. Dean Ottinger 
attended COP15 from December 7-19, 2009 as one of the International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) delegates to the environmental summit. For a 
list of Dean Ottinger’s blog posts, see Pace Law School, IUCN Delegate Richard 
Ottinger’s Copenhagen Blog, http://www.pace.edu/page.cfm? doc_id=35304 (last
visited Jan. 20, 2010). This article is an expansion of a previous blog post. See
Copenhagen Climate Conference: Success or Failure?, http://www.facebook.com/ 
note.php?note_id =228485486503 (Dec. 31, 2009, 10:28 EST). 
1. See Darren Samuelsohn, Obama Negotiates 'Copenhagen Accord' With 
Senate Climate Fight in Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2009; Juliet Eilperin & 
Anthony Faiola, Climate Deal Falls Short of Key Goals, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 
2009, at A01; Joss Garman, Copenhagen—Historic Failure That Will Live in 
Infamy, THE INDEP., Dec. 20, 2009. 
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commitments2 to reduce global greenhouse gas emission levels 
sufficient to meet the requirements identified by the some 3,000 
leading global scientists of the United Nations Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to avoid disastrous 
consequences such as sea level rise leading to massive population 
displacement, food disruption, water shortages, tropical disease
migration, and destruction of biodiversity.3 The conference
organizers could not have foreseen that their summit would occur 
in the midst of a global recession that would cause countries to 
focus their energies on preventing economic collapse instead of on 
mitigating climate change and curtailing greenhouse gas 
emissions. Even against such a tumultuous backdrop, a great
deal was accomplished at the conference, and leading emitters 
have established a good foundation for a future agreement.4 The
years of hard work by many international, national, municipal, 
industrial, and academic experts resulted in some very significant
results. 
First, the fact that 193 nations sent delegations to 
Copenhagen to address the global climate challenge was truly 
unprecedented.5 The participation by the key emerging countries 
of China, India, Brazil and South Africa who, along with the
United States (U.S.), negotiated the final Accord and the 
agreement by Mexico to host the next climate conference were 
very important.  This is because of particular importance as these
countries had earlier declined to make greenhouse gas emission 
reduction commitments for the Kyoto Protocol.6 The near
universal recognition of the seriousness of the climate change 
2. Frank E. Loy & Michael A. Levi, The Road From Copenhagen, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009. 
3. See generally IAN ALLISON ET AL., THE UNIV. OF NEW S. WALES CLIMATE 
CHANGE RESEARCH CTR., THE COPENHAGEN DIAGNOSIS (2009), http://www.ccrc. 
unsw.edu.au/Copenhagen/Copenhagen_Diagnosis_LOW.pdf. 
4. See Andrew C. Revkin & John M. Broder, A Grudging Accord in Climate 
Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009, at A1. 
5. See Loy & Levi, supra note 2. See also John M. Broder, Many Goals
Remain Unmet in Five Nations’ Climate Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19. 2009, at A1; 
David A. Fahrenthold, Copenhagen Climate Talks, by the Numbers, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 19, 2009, at A06.
 6. Patrick Kampert, U.S. Takes Heat; Why is Bush’s Stand on Global-
warming Treaty Upsetting Nations Around the World, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 
17, 2001, at C3. 
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challenge for the future of the world7 and support for a binding 
international agreement to address it8 were vitally important.
Indeed, there would have been a clearly binding agreement to 
lock in the commitments made at the conference if the Danish 
Prime Minister had not taken over the chairmanship from the
very able Danish Climate & Energy Minister, Connie Hedegaard.9 
The Prime Minister misinterpreted the need for adoption of the 
Accord by “consensus” as a requirement for unanimity.10 
Therefore, the objections of just five countries—Bolivia, Cuba, 
Nicaragua, Sudan and Venezuela—were allowed to derail the 
desires expressed in speech after speech by virtually all other 
countries in support of such an agreement, including the U.S. and
China.11 There is even an active debate among legal scholars12 
about whether the Accord can be considered “soft law”13 for which
countries making emission reduction and financial commitments 
can be held accountable. 
The fact that 119 heads of state both attended the conference 
and overwhelmingly voiced strong support for an international 
climate commitment14 was also unprecedented and clearly 
demonstrates the importance the world attaches to addressing 
this issue.  In addition, the civil society generated an incredible 
outpouring of support for a strong agreement.  Concerned citizens
7. See generally Revkin & Broder, supra note 4. 
8. Id.
9. John M. Broder, Poor and Emerging States Stall Climate Negotiations, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2009, at A16.
10. See generally Robert Stavins, Another Copenhagen Outcome: Serious 
Questions about the Best Institutional Path Forward, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & 
INT’L AFFAIRS, Jan. 5, 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/analysis/stavins
/?p=496# (last visited Jan. 23, 2010). 
11. Alden Myer, Director of Strategy & Policy, Union of Concerned Scientists, 
Statement: The Copenhagen Accord: Not Everything We Wanted, But 
Something to Build On (Dec. 23, 2009), available at  http://www.ucsusa.org/ 
global_warming/solutions/big_picture_solutions/the-copenhagen-accord.html.
See Loy & Levi, supra note 2; see also Louise Gray, Copenhagen Accord: 
Questions and Answers, TELEGRAPH, Dec. 19, 2009, available at http://www. 
telegraph.co.uk/earth/copenhagen-climate-change-confe/6846033/Copenhagen­
Accord-Questions-and-Answers.html. 
12. See Posting of James Harrison, to International Law Observer, 
http://internationallawobserver.eu/2009/12/22/after-copenhagen/ (Dec. 22. 2009). 
13. See Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and 
Soft Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 901 (1999). 
14. See Fahrenthold, supra note 5. 
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and many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from around 
the world comprised the 45,000 conference attendees, and 
maintained enthusiastic support even though the Center could 
accommodate only 15,000 of them.15 The NGOs, governments,
international and scientific organizations, industrial groups, and 
others held approximately 1,000 “side events” and conducted
panels on every aspect of climate change and its solutions.16 The
United Nations Foundation, Climate Action Network,
Environmental Grantmakers’ Association and others held public 
briefings with many of the top experts and negotiators on climate 
issues and the status of the conference.17 All of this reflected an 
incomparable energy and enthusiasm. 
Another of the conference’s very important accomplishments
was the uniting of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 
and the Group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
organization.18 Pace Law School and the Yale School of Forestry 
and Environmental Studies, under the leadership of Professors
Roy Lee and Robert Van Lierop, had collaborated with these 
organizations in devising a strategy to use their leverage to 
strengthen the agreement and to assure that their members’ dire 
need for climate change adaptation help were met, which was 
largely ignored at the prior climate conferences.  While drastic,
their acts of shutting down the plenary for more than a week and
at one point in walking out of the conference with the African 
countries was very effective in making negotiators address these 
needs.19 As one member nation after another pointed out, the 
island states and many of those most vulnerable stand to lose 
their countries, homes and livelihoods if greenhouse gas 
emissions are not effectively and sufficiently limited.20 AOSIS
15. Elisabeth Rosenthal & Tom Zeller Jr., Left Out in the Cold at the Climate 
Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, at A17.
16. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Side Events List,
http://regserver.unfccc.int/seors/reports/events_list.html?session_id=COP15 (last
visited Jan. 23, 2010).
17. Id.
18. See AOSIS: Alliance of Small Island States, http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/ 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2010). 
19. See Broder, supra note 9. 
20. The statement is based on the author’s own observations during the
Copenhagen Climate Conference. For additional support, see generally
Elisabeth Rosenthal, In a Busy Conference Center, an Alphabet Soup of Causes 
and Clauses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, at A10; see also Broder, supra note 9. 
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and the LDCs, therefore, had little choice but to take these 
drastic actions, and they succeeded in obtaining an agreement to 
immediately establish a $10 billion short-term adaptation fund.21 
This fund will grow to $30 billion in 2010-2012, for which full 
funding was committed.22 Additionally, $100 billion a year by 
2020 was committed;23 though the donors to the $100 billion fund 
were not identified, Secretary Clinton did commit the U.S. to 
paying its fair share.24 They also obtained a commitment in the 
Accord requiring consideration of establishing emission 
reductions to limit temperature increases to 1.5˚C (350 ppm) in
the first reviewing period in 2015.25 
The conference adopted the goal set by the IPCC scientists 
for holding temperature increases to 2˚C (450 ppm),26 which
would require a 10-40% global emission reduction below 1990 
levels by 2020.27 The press paid little attention to the quite 
substantial greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions 
commitments designed to reach this goal.  The European Union 
(E.U.) and Japan made the largest commitments—20%28 and 
25%29 respectively below 1990 levels.  Negotiators for the twenty-
seven, member bloc were very aggravated over the fact that other 
large emitters made much smaller reduction commitments and 
21. Broder, supra note 9. 
22. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of Parties, 
Fifteenth Session, Dec. 7-18, 2009, Copenhagen Accord, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord]. 
23. See John M. Broder & Elisabeth Rosenthal, Obama Has Goal to Wrest a
Deal in Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at A1; Juliet Eilperin & 
Anthony Faiola, U.S. Pledges Aid, Urges Developing Nations to Cut Emissions, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2009, at A01.
24. Broder & Rosenthal, supra note 23; Eilperin & Faiola, supra note 23. 
25. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 22, ¶ 12. 
26. Id. ¶ 2. 
 27. IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (AR4): CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 748 (B. Metz et al. eds., 2007). 
28. European Union, Climate Action, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/
climate_action.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2010). 
29. Embassy of Japan in Germany, Note Verbale, U.N. Doc. JB 15/2010 (Jan. 
26, 2010), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/japancph
accord_app1.pdf. 
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that no binding agreement was reached.30 The E.U. industry is
also very concerned that the cost requirements of meeting their
much higher emission reduction goals will cause job losses and 
put them at a competitive disadvantage.31 The U.S. committed to 
a 17% emissions reduction, but only below 2005 levels,32 which 
equates to just 3% below 1990 levels.  President Barack Obama 
was under great constraint because he did not want to undermine 
the passage of a climate bill if he agreed to more stringent 
reductions than those contained in the pending Senate 
legislation; this dilemma was generally recognized by the 
international community, and the U.S. did make a very 
substantial $3.6 billion commitment towards the short term 
developing country adaptation fund.33 Furthermore, China and 
India made emission reduction commitments for the first time of 
40-45% and 20-25% below 2005 levels, respectively.34 However,
these reductions are only of emissions intensity, not emission
levels.35 Brazil committed to reductions of 36.1 to 38.9% by 
2020,36 Mexico to 50% below 2002 levels,37 South Africa to 34% 
30. See Paul Taylor, Snubbed in Copenhagen, EU Weighs Climate Options, 
REUTERS, Jan. 13, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE
60C3HB20100113.
31. The statement is based on the author’s own observations during the
Copenhagen Climate Conference.  For additional support, see Jonathan Stearns, 
EU Nations Spar Over Climate Policy After UN Summit Deadlock, BLOOMBERG, 
Jan. 17, 2010, available at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-17/eu­
nations-spar-over-climate-policy-after-un-summit-deadlock.html.
32. John M. Broder, Obama to Go to Copenhagen With Emissions Target, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2009, at A1. 
33. Selina Williams & Alessandro Torello, Proposed Climate Deal: US 
Pledges $3.6 Billion Climate Finance 2010-12, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Dec. 18, 
2009, available at http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/stock-market-news-story.aspx? 
storyid=200912181816dowjonesdjonline000666&title=proposed-climate-dealus­
pledges-36-billion-climate-finance-2010-12. 
34. Jonathan Watts, China Sets First Targets to Curb World's Largest 
Carbon Footprint, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 26, 2009, available at http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/26/china-targets-cut-carbon-footprint; see
also Nitin Sethi, India Vows 20-25% Carbon Intensity Cuts, TIMES OF INDIA, Dec. 
4, 2009, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-vows-20-25-carbon-inten 
sity-cuts/articleshow/5298030.cms. 
35. Watts, supra note 34; Sethi, supra note 34. 
36. See Brazil’s Lula Signs Law Cutting CO2 Emissions, AGENCE FRANCE­
PRESSE, Dec. 29, 2009, available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/art
icle/ALeqM5iez9sn2BkTTmjkMO-JxaGawmSrdw. 
37. See David Adam, Mexico Leads the Way with Carbon Reduction Pledge, 
THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 11, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ environ 
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reduction by 2020 and 42% by 2025,38 South Korea to 4% below
2005 levels, and a 30% reduction by 2020.39 Agreement for these 
commitments was incorporated into an Appendix to the Accord
along with a provision for the inclusion of greater and additional 
commitments by January 31, 2010.40 Very significantly, the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
found that these commitments would reduce 2020 emissions by 
11 to 22% and that the costs of achieving these goals would be 
only 0.15% of gross domestic product.41 
One of the most important accomplishments of the conference 
was an agreement on the architecture and funding for the 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, or 
REDD program (short for), which included measures for
monitoring, reporting and verification.42 In addition, developed 
countries agreed to pay a total of $30 billion to initiate quickly
the forest preservation process.43 
The Accord contained verification formulae agreed upon by 
both the U.S. and China,44 commitments for technology
development and transfer to developing countries,45 a black 
carbon reduction program to be undertaken by the U.S.,46 the 
ment/2008/dec/11/poznan-climate-change-mexico-carbon-pledge; see Mexico to
Pledge Halving Emissions by 2050, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 1, 2009,
available at http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/Mexico_to_pledge_halving _em 
issions_by_2050_999.html. 
38. Simon Mundy, SA Surprises with Pledge of 42% Emissions Slowdown, 
BUSINESS DAY, Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/ Content 
.aspx?id=88994; Posting of Christian Teriete to WWF Climate Blog, Good Move: 
South Africa Surprises Copenhagen with Peak Pledge, http://blogs.panda. 
org/climate/2009/12/07/good-move-south-africa-surprises-copenhagen-with-peak­
pledge/ (Dec. 7, 2009). 
39. Christian Oliver et al., South Korea Pledges Emissions Cut, FIN. TIMES, 
Nov. 17, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/49e3bc1a-d3a7-11de-8caf­
00144feabdc0.html?ftcamp=rss. 
40. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 22, ¶¶ 4-5. 
 41. Jeff Tollefson, World Looks Ahead Post-Copenhagen: A Weak
International Climate Agreement Leaves Room for Science to Shape the Next 
Round of Negotiations, 462 NATURE 966, 967 (2009). 
42. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 22, ¶¶ 6, 8, 10. 
43. Id. ¶ 8. 
44. Id. ¶ 5. 
45. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8, 10-11. 
46. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Oceans & Int’l Envtl. & 
Scientific Affairs, Strategy to Reduce Black Carbon Emissions Affecting the
Arctic (Dec. 17, 2009), available at http://cop15.state.gov/pressroom/133771.htm. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 
 418  
 
 
  
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    
   
 
   
 
  
   
 
 
 
  
  
248    :        
INTRODUCTION
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 
continuation of the negotiations by the IPCC Long Term 
Cooperative Action Working Group and Kyoto Protocol Working
Group,47 and guidance on reforming the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) programs.48 
There was no agreement to include carbon capture and storage as 
a CDM measure, and the Accord instead called for more research
on leakage and permanence of sequestration.49 The International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) also made 
important contributions to the Accord, which included the 
consideration of gender, the needs of indigenous peoples, the role 
of marine issues, and the need for environmentally based 
adaptation measures.50 
Finally, President Obama and Premier Wen Jiabao of China 
emerged as the key leaders in saving the Accord.51 Although 
there were some very unfortunate conflicts between the U.S. and 
China along the way, both countries eventually agreed on the 
urgency of a strong climate agreement.52 President Obama
perfectly underscored both the successes of the Copenhagen 
Conference and the need for more action when he stated: 
47. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 22, at pmbl. 
48. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the 
Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 7-18, 
2009, Further Guidance Relating to the Clean Development Mechanism, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/L.10 (Dec. 18, 2009); see also U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties Serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 7-18, 2009, Guidance on the 
Implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol (Dec. 18, 2009). 
49. See generally Copenhagen Accord, supra note 22. 
50. See Lorena Aguilar, At Last a Turning Point for Women and Climate
Change?, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, Nov. 30, 2009, 
http://cms.iucn.org/unfccc/events/copenhagen/?uNewsID=4256; Annelie Fincke &
Gonzalo Oviedo, Indigenous Women: Most Vulnerable to Climate Change but 
Key Agents of Change, IUCN NEWS, June 22, 2009, http://cms.iucn.org/
about/work/programmes/social_policy/news/?uNewsID=3403; Press Release, Int’l 
Union for Conservation of Nature, Copenhagen Climate Summit: Copenhagen 
Accord a Step in Right Direction, but Insufficient (Dec. 19, 2009), 
http://cms.iucn.org/media/materials/releases/?4417/Copenhagen-Climate-Summ
it-Copenhagen-Accord-a-step-in-right-direction-but-insufficient. 
51. See Revkin & Broder, supra note 4. 
52. Id.
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For the first time in history all major economies have come 
together to accept their responsibility to take action to 
confront the threat of climate change . . . we’re going to 
have to build on the momentum that we’ve established here 
in Copenhagen to ensure that international action to 
significantly reduce emissions is sustained and sufficient 
over time.  We’ve come a long way, but we have much 
further to go.53 
As President Obama described, sustained international 
action on emissions reduction will be a key part of any agreement 
in Mexico City. Furthermore, as the threats and damage
associated with sea level rise and changing weather patterns 
grow stronger, there will have to be a greater focus in each 
country on climate change adaptation and mitigation.
Thus, while the conference did not achieve a clearly binding 
agreement or emission reductions satisfying the IPCC
requirements to avoid catastrophic global temperature increases, 
it will serve as the foundation for such an agreement during the 
November 2010 Conference of the Parties meeting in Mexico 
City.54 There is little point to being depressed about the outcome 
of Copenhagen because, as Chair Connie Hedegaard stated, 
“what we need to do is to secure the step that we took and turn it 
into a result.”55 
53. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by
the President During Press Availability in Copenhagen (Dec. 18, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-during-press­
availability-copenhagen. 
54. Lisa Friedman, Path from Climate Summit Unclear for Many, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/01/04/ 
04climatewire-path-from-climate-summit-unclear-for-many-3832.html 
55. Justyna Pawlak, EU Calls for More U.S. Involvement in Climate Works, 
REUTERS, Dec. 22, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B 
L21F20091 222. 
yale school of forestry & environmental studies 

